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 Abstract  
 
The 1992 decision of the High Court of Australia to uphold the claim of the 
Meriam people was welcomed as beginning a new era where the unique status 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples would gain recognition. Intense 
debate and activity ensued with federal parliament adopting a legislative 
framework to recognise native title and the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation considering its broader constitutional implications. Fourteen 
years on though much of the promise of Mabo lies unfulfilled. 
 
This thesis draws upon the work of Canadian philosopher James Tully. 
He writes of contemporary constitutionalism in Western society and its inability 
to give more than superficial recognition to cultural difference. He locates the 
problem as lying with the dominant language of modern constitutionalism. This 
language provides for two main forms of recognition: the equality of self-
governing nation states and the equality of individual citizens. Tully locates a 
way forward through the presence of another constitutional language. Common 
constitutionalism has enabled an accommodation of cultural differences guided 
by its three conventions of mutual recognition, continuity, and consent. 
Moreover, it is beneficial to analysing other studies about the ability of common 
law to recognise the claims of Indigenous people. 
 
Tully’s contribution is applied to an examination of the Mabo events in a 
way that takes account of Australia’s constitutional traditions. The aim is to 
clarify the languages employed by the representatives of Australia’s institutions 
of governance and whether this places obstacles in the way of recognising 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The inquiry considers the events 
prior to the High Court’s decision, the Keating government’s response, and the 
Howard Government’s native title changes. Other chapters examine the 
constitutional language used by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
and the significance of the Council of Aboriginal Reconciliation.   
 
The central argument of this study is that once it is accepted that the 
claims of Indigenous people in Australia are constitutional, it becomes possible 
to appreciate that these were largely voiced through the language of human 
rights and common constitutionalism. In contrast, when the claims were 
considered by the High Court and federal parliament significant aspects were 
articulated through the modern constitutional language. Another thread running 
through the events was a desire to confront and overcome the influence of the 
language of White Australia. The thesis concludes by considering the 
significance of the findings for a settlement between Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples and other Australians.  
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 Chapter 1: 




The genesis for this thesis occurred in the latter part of 1999 when the 10 
year endeavour of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (the Council) was 
coming to an end. The following May the Council launched the Australian 
Declaration Towards Reconciliation and over the following months in one city 
after another hundreds of thousands of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians joined together to give the Declaration life and meaning.
1
 
The document built on two important steps along the road to 
reconciliation: the 1967 changes to the Australian Constitution and the High 
Court’s 1992 Mabo decision.
2 The changes to Australia’s Constitution in 1967 
were widely interpreted as a referendum affirming the equality of Indigenous 
people.
3 Carried overwhelmingly, the referendum changed the Constitution by 
deleting the words ‘other than the aboriginal race in any State’, thus allowing a 
                                                 
1 Mike Steketee and Megan Saunders, ‘PM stays home on historic day’, The Australian 29 May 
2000, 1; Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation, 
(Canberra: 2000); Stephanie Balogh, ‘Another rally bridges the gap’, The Australian 5 June 
2000, 2; Carol Altmann, ‘50,000 vote for hope with feet’, The Australian 13 June 2000, 8; 
Bruce Montgomery, ‘25,000 cross the bridge to forgiveness’, The Australian 24 July 2000, 3; 
Anne Buggins, ‘40,000 march for reconciliation’, The West Australian 4 December 2000, 1. 
2 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Corroboree 2000: Towards Reconciliation, (Canberra: 
2000), 2. 
3 Bain Attwood, Andrew Marcus et al, The 1967 referendum, or, When Aborigines didn’t get the 
vote, (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1997), ix-xi, 64-9. 
  15federal government to enact special laws on their behalf; and deleting s 127 so 
that Australia’s Indigenous peoples could in future be counted in a census.
4  
 
The second step was the High Court’s 1992 Mabo decision.
5 Widely, but 
not unanimously welcomed,
6 the decision was considered to break with the past 
and gave a positive sign of things to come.
7 The post-Mabo era had arrived. 
Aboriginal leaders considered the decision provided an opportunity to establish 
a ‘Long Term Settlement Process for the benefit of all Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples’.
8 Reinforcing the significance of the decision Prime 
Minister Paul Keating’s speech at Redfern Oval in December 1992 gave voice 
to and fanned the hopes of many. ‘Mabo establishes a fundamental truth and 




Mabo is an historic decision – we can make it an historic turning point, the 
basis of a new relationship between Indigenous and non-Aboriginal 
Australians. The message should be that there is nothing to fear or to lose 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 40-1, 55; Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Constitution, (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), s 51(xxvi).  
5 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1.  
6 Jane Hammond and Jamie Walker, ‘Blainey attacks Mabo as misreading history’, The 
Australian 13 May 1993, 1-2.  
7 John Gardiner-Garden,  ‘The Mabo debate - A chronology’ in Department of the 
Parliamentary Library, Mabo Papers, Parliamentary Research Service Subject Collection No. 1, 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994), 148; Editorial, ‘The triumph of 
Eddie Mabo’s suit’, The Australian 26 January 1993, 10; Michael Bachelard, The great land 
grab: what every Australian should know about Wik, Mabo and the ten-point plan, (South Melb: 
Hyland House Publishing Pty Ltd, 1998), 8. 
8 The Aboriginal Peace Plan, reprinted in Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (Eds), Make a better 
offer: the politics of Mabo, (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press Australia Ltd, 1994), 218-9; See also 
Eva Valley Statement, reprinted in ibid. 233-4 and Commonwealth Government, Mabo: The 
High Court Decision on Native Title, Discussion Paper, June 1993, (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1993), 95-7.  
9 Paul Keating cited by Frank Brennan, One land, one nation: Mabo: Towards 2001, (St Lucia, 
Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1995), 42. 
  16in the recognition of historical truth, or the extension of social justice, or 
the deepening of Australian social democracy to include indigenous 
Australians.  
 
  Keating invited Indigenous people to participate in forging a new 




Participate they did. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders identified 
claims necessary for any settlement. Some concerned native title, and the 




Other claims with far-reaching ramifications were also made. One claim 
was for a treaty or agreement. At the time of the Declaration, the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) signalled its desire to place a 
treaty back on the Australian political agenda. Chair Geoff Clark told those 
gathered on the steps of Sydney’s Opera House that a treaty was essential to 
reconciliation.
11 Expanding on this theme later he explained that a treaty ‘means 
recognising we possess distinct rights arising from our status as first people, our 
relationships with our territories and waters, and our own systems of law and 
governance.’ Clark described post-Mabo as marking ‘a new era of informed 
                                                 
10 Attorney-General’s Department, Native title: legislation with commentary by the Attorney-
General’s Legal Practice, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994), 
‘Commentary on the Native Title Act 1993’, C1. 
11 Steketee and Saunders, above n 1, 1. 
  17constitutional consent’ that would have to address the circumstances that gave 
rise to ‘no treaties, no formal settlements [and] no compacts.’ Continuing this 
theme, he said ‘We are not mentioned in the Constitution. We are well behind 
developments in other countries.’
12
  
Other constitutional proposals were more specific. Leading up to the 
November 1999 referendum on a republic, Indigenous spokespeople sought to 
include references to their custodianship of the country in the Constitution’s 
preamble. Instead, the Howard government proposed a preamble ‘[h]onouring 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation’s first people, for their deep 
kinship with their lands …’ Prominent Indigenous figures slammed the 
statement as the result of minimal consultation with Indigenous people. At the 
November referendum the proposal for a republic failed and along with it the 
Howard government’s draft preamble.
13
 
The Council also sought to remove s 25 from the federal Constitution 
and ‘introduce a new section making it unlawful to adversely discriminate 
against any people on the grounds of race’.
14 The clause spells out the 
consequences of  disqualifying ‘all persons of any race’ from voting. If 
activated, and it has not been so since 1967, ‘then, in reckoning the number of 
                                                 
12 Geoff Clark, ‘A treaty was always our aim’, The Australian 30 May 2000, 13.  
13 Commonwealth Government, Response to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Final 
Report - Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, (Canberra: Office of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
September 2002), 20, (“Response to Reconciliation”); Karen Middleton, ‘Mate, it’s another 
row’, The West Australian 12 August 1999, 6; Karen Middleton, ‘Senate vote on preamble riles 
elders’, The West Australian 13 August 1999, 4; Stuart Rintoul, ‘Aboriginal leaders go both 
ways on republic’, The Australian 30-31 October 1999, 11. 
14 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, (Canberra: 
2000), Chapter 10 - Recommendations (“Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge”). [Available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/2000/16, accessed 19/01/2004]. 
  18people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of that race resident in that 
State shall not be counted’.
15 The clause countenances the possibility of 
disenfranchising citizens on a racial basis, reflecting the influence of what has 
become known as the White Australia policy.
16 While it remains in the 
Constitution the ‘provision allows States to deprive citizens of the right to vote 
and take part in the government of their State on the basis of their race’ and so 
ATSIC argued for its removal.
17   
 
Yet another claim was for the allocation of special seats in Parliament to 
Indigenous people. In June 2000 Australian Democrats senator and prominent 
Aboriginal Aden Ridgeway called for ‘two seats in each house of parliament to 
be set aside for Aboriginal politicians’. The proposal had been raised by ATSIC 
chair Geoff Clark and ‘backed by’ Charles Perkins and Lowitja O’Donoghue.
18 
This proposal was also raised the following month by ATSIC in a submission to 
the United Nation’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
19 The idea 
draws inspiration from the New Zealand experience where special seats in 
parliament have been provided to Mâori since the 1850s, Inuit ‘home rule’ in 
Greenland and Sami parliaments in Finland, Norway and Sweden.
20
 
                                                 
15 The Australian Constitution, above n 5, s 25. 
16 Commonwealth Government, Response to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Final 
Report - Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, (Canberra: Office of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
September 2002), 20.  
17 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Treaty: let’s get it right!, (Canberra: 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 2001), 11. 
18 Megan Saunders, ‘Blacks in push for seats quota’, The Australian 1 June 2000, 1. See also 
Megan Saunders, ‘Limited support for black seat quota’, The Australian 2 June 2000, 2; 
Editorial, ‘Black seats won’t solve representation’, The Australian 2 June 2000, 10. 
19 Megan Saunders, ‘Push for quota of black MPs’, The Australian 28 July 2000, 3. 
  19Another claim focussed on those children who had been forcibly 
separated from their natural families through intervention by government 
authorities, missions and other institutions. In the early 1990s, action around this 
coalesced as the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
demonstrated a strong correlation between deaths and forced separation. Forty-
three of the 99 deaths investigated had experienced childhood separation. 
Following discussions with ATSIC and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner, in May 1995 the Keating government announced 
a national inquiry into the forcible separation would be undertaken by the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (the Human Rights 
Commission).
21 ATSIC made a submission to the inquiry that included a call for 
governments and ‘relevant non-government agencies [to] acknowledge that 
separation policies were unjust and apologise to all Indigenous Australians for 
the harms to Indigenous communities, families and individuals.’ It also called 
for an examination of ‘current laws, practices and policies with respect to the 
placement and care of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and advise 
on any changes required taking into account the principle of self-determination 
...’
22 Headed by the Human Rights Commission president, and former High 
Court judge the late Sir Ronald Wilson, the Bringing Them Home Report was 
released in May 1997. Among its many recommendations, the report called on 
                                                                                                                                    
20 Mason Durie, Te Mana Te Kâwanatanga: The politics of Mâori Self-Determination, 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1998), 96; Saunders, ‘Blacks in push for seats quota’, 
above n 18, 1. 
21 Robert Tickner, Taking a stand, (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 55.  
22 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Submission to the National Inquiry into 
the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, undated. 
[Available 
@http:www.atsic.gov.au/issues/law_and_justice/bringing_them_home_report/task_for ... , 3. 
Accessed 15/04/2004]. 






Now 14 years after the High Court’s Mabo decision, the time of the 
Declaration with hundreds of thousands marching for reconciliation in cities 
across the country is receding from public memory. How has this situation come 
about? What happened to the settlement process? Why is it that the proposals 
for a treaty have not been acted upon? Why have the high hopes of Mabo been 
met with frustration and disappointment for many claimants? 
 
It will be demonstrated here that the constitutional language in which the 
debate over the claims was conducted had a significant influence on this 
outcome. The claims were adjudicated through concepts (e.g. the people, 
nationhood, sovereignty, self-determination, recognition and constitutional) 
inherited from the European tradition. As a consequence of this adjudication, 
the first peoples of Australia were not necessarily heard in their own voices. 




                                                 
23 Tickner, above n 21, 55-6; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing 
Them Home: National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Children from their Families, (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
1997). 
24 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 34, 39. 
  21Just what the prevailing assumptions of the participants in the legal and 
political debates were and the ways in which these influenced its outcome is the 
focus of this inquiry. The aim is to bring to the fore the issues that arise when 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples voice their claims in a language 
that centres upon the recognition of their distinct cultures and yet the language 
of the dominant response overlays another view of recognition. So different are 
these ways of thinking about relations with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders that they are best understood as distinct constitutional languages, each 
with their own rules and ‘self-contained practice’.
25  
 
Here the Canadian scholar James Tully’s work on cultural recognition 
and constitutional languages is invaluable. Tully surveys the past 400 years of 
European and non-European constitutionalism. He identifies modern 
constitutionalism as the principal constitutional language influencing Western 
thought. In its shadow he rediscovers another language – common 
constitutionalism with three conventions: mutual recognition, continuity and 
consent. From his examination, Tully suggests the latter language can guide 
contemporary practice. It lends itself to the conciliation of the claims for 
recognition through constitutional dialogues in which agreement is reached so 
that cultural differences are accommodated in a just way.
26 While his work is 
principally a contribution to moral and political philosophy it intersects with the 
                                                 
25 Simon Blackburn, (Ed), The Oxford dictionary of philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 126, 211. 
26 Tully, above n 24, cover.  
  22concerns of others in disciplines that have been variously described as legal 
pluralism,




Tully is concerned with constitutional norms, how they come into being, 
their main features and how these interact with the norms of other cultures. Two 
specific themes resonate throughout his work. One is the clash between the 
norms of Western colonising powers and those of Indigenous peoples. He 
argues that American Aboriginal peoples speak through a common 
constitutional language whereas the institutions of governance in the West are 
inherited from the age of European imperialism.
30 Another theme concerns the 
lessons learnt from the replacement of the ancient constitutional relations with 
modern constitutionalism. His studies lead him to conclude that these lessons 
have shaped the popular understanding of constitutionalism itself.
31  
 
Claims and methods 
 
This inquiry concentrates on two themes: the native title developments 
and the debate around reconciliation. The latter debate involves discussion of 
the claims of a treaty, altering the preamble to the Constitution and the removal 
                                                 
27 Tully describes legal pluralism as a ‘new interdisciplinary field of anthropology, history, law 
and political philosophy’ that was established ‘in the 1980s’. See ibid. 101. For a text in this 
field see Sally Falk Moore, Law as process, (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1978). 
28 See John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Rules versus relationships: the ethnography of 
legal discourse, (Chicago, US: The University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
29 Jurisprudence means the philosophy of law and this ‘concerns itself with questions about the 
nature of law and the concepts that structure the practice of law’. See Blackburn, above n 25, 
213.  
30 Tully, above n 24, 95-96. 
31 Ibid. 209-212.  
  23of s 25 from the Constitution. The selection of these two themes provides a 
basis to examine the treatment of at least four of the claims identified earlier.  
 
There are two important reasons to focus on the developments around 
native title. One is that the High Court’s Mabo decision is almost universally 
judged as a watershed, indeed the subsequent claims were premised upon this 
view. A thorough examination of the Mabo decision would help in better 
understanding the impact of the language used in this decision upon the other 
claims. Another reason is that the debate over the native title legislation has 
already revealed the existence of different perspectives, particularly concerning 
the Howard government amendments in 1998.
32 The examination here will look 
at how these differences are connected to the languages used by the participants.  
 
The High Court and federal parliament play crucial and distinct roles in 
Australia’s governance. Federal parliament has the power to enact legislation 
for the whole of the country and the High Court is charged with interpreting the 
Constitution and other laws and applying these to individual cases.
33 
Nevertheless, state jurisdictions are also being affected by and responding to 
native title developments. Since federal parliament enacted native title 
legislation and Australia’s Constitution directs that federal legislation should 
‘prevail’ over any inconsistent state laws
34 a focus on the federal decisions was 
more of a priority for this examination than those made by the states.  
 
                                                 
32 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth); Native Title Act 1993 [Consolidated 1998] (Cth). 
33 ‘An Outline’ in The Australian Constitution, above n 4, v-vi. 
34 The Australian Constitution, ibid. s 109. 
  24The timeframes for the material examined around native title starts with 
the 1992 Mabo decision and finishes with the adoption of the Native Title 
Amendment Bill in July 1998 (NTAB). By this time, the defining features of 
how native title will be recognised are apparent: the decision to legislate was 
taken, the bill drafted, passed by federal Parliament and implemented, and 
subsequently amended by the new Howard government.
35  
 
This thesis uses a documentary analysis of High Court and federal 
parliamentary decision-making as its primary research method. This provides a 
way to accurately record the participants’ views rather than the interpretation of 
others. It is also publicly available. This method also provides insights into the 
thinking of some of Australia’s most influential decision-makers and offers a 
means to directly engage with their ideas. 
 
Two different time periods are crucial to the reconciliation debate, the 
first dates from when the claims were first brought forth in the aftermath of the 
Mabo decision and the other is from late 1999 when the Council provided its 
recommendations and the Howard government responded.  
 
The argument unfolds 
 
The discussion of these ideas unfolds through highlighting the 
distinctive influence of the constitutional languages on the Mabo events and 
how these influences affected the outcome. Chapter 2 focuses on ‘the politics of 
                                                 
 
35 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 6151 (15 July 1998); Native Title 
  25cultural recognition’ and why Western constitutionalism has difficulty 
accommodating their claims. Included under the umbrella of the politics of 
cultural recognition are a wide and diverse group of claims: nationalists; supra-
national associations; linguistic and ethnic minorities; immigrants, exiles and 
refugees; feminist demands to modify institutions of governance; the demands 
of Indigenous people; and those of same-sex couples. The contemporary 
Western world has difficulty accommodating these claims because the legal and 
political vocabulary in everyday use rests upon assumptions incompatible with 
recognition. The dominant vocabulary, labelled by Tully as modern 
constitutionalism, originated around two main forms of recognition: the nation 
state and the individual citizen. Its seven features presume that culture is 
homogenous and this goes to the heart of problem. The claims noted earlier 
directly challenge the premise of homogeneity.   
 
Chapter 3 examines the alternative approach to constitutionalism 
presented by Tully in Strange multiplicity. This alternative is based on a view 
that considers culture as ‘overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated’.
36 
This view directly challenges the presumption that constitutionalism is uniform. 
Indeed, once this presumption is abandoned the influence of cultural diversity 
upon constitutions comes to light. One of the sites where a ‘hidden constitution’ 
has been found is with the common law in Commonwealth countries. Out of the 
examination of common law, a contrast between the attitudes toward custom in 
the ancient and modern constitution provides the first strand for the alternative 
approach. Another strand is provided by contrasting the seventeenth century 
                                                                                                                                    
Act 1993 [Consolidated 1998] (Cth). 
  26moral reasoning of Sir Matthew Hale with that of Thomas Hobbes. A third 
strand lies with the long tradition of moral reasoning in European history with 
its preference for dialogue over monologue and practical experience of 
particular cases over abstract theorising. The fourth strand is the practical 
reasoning outlined by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations.
37 
From the latter, Tully develops an analogy between language and 
constitutionalism. Applying this, Tully argues that contemporary 
constitutionalism is better understood as ‘akin to an assemblage of languages’.
38 
On these alternative premises, he considers it is possible to reconceive 
constitutionalism as a form of activity.  
 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the language of common constitutionalism 
and its application to the claims of Indigenous people. At the heart of this 
language are the three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and 
continuity. Specific examples are discussed where each of the three conventions 
were applied to common law decisions. This alternative approach is also 
compared to the works of two scholars who write about common law’s ability to 
recognise the claims of Indigenous people. One of these is Common law 
aboriginal title by Canadian scholar Kent McNeil;
39 the other by American 
Indian scholar Robert Williams (Jr) concentrates on the American Indian in 
Western legal thought.
40 This chapter also compares the suitability of the three 
                                                                                                                                    
36 Tully, above n 24, 10. 
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, Second Edition, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). 
38 Tully, above n 24, 36. 
39 Kent McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
40 Robert A. Williams, Jr, The American Indian in western legal thought: the discourses of 
conquest, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 




To successfully translate the ideas that Tully lays out in Strange 
multiplicity from a Canadian context to an examination of the Mabo events, it is 
necessary to consider Australia’s constitutional traditions. It is not simply a 
matter of whether a constitution can recognise and accommodate cultural 
diversity. It also concerns whether there are sufficient experiences with the 
conventions of common constitutionalism to embrace the language as the 
answer to relations between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and 
other Australians.  
 
Chapter 5 outlines why the examination emphasises gaining an 
understanding of the influence of the languages on the Mabo debates. This 
contrasts with Tully’s stress on advocating common constitutionalism as the 
solution to the most difficult conflicts. Unlike the Canadian circumstances, 
Australia lacks experience with treaty constitutionalism and the mutual 
recognition of peoples. Moreover, these are compelling reasons to concentrate 
on identifying the distinct constitutional languages influencing the Mabo events. 
It is beneficial to understanding what has happened and to assist in determining 
how to move forward.  
                                                 
41 The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was developed by 
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations ‘in full consultation with Indigenous peoples 
from around the world’. It has ‘not yet been adopted by the General Assembly’ but ‘can be 
described as the most coherent and comprehensive articulation of the aspirations of the world’s 
Indigenous peoples’. See Garth Nettheim, Gary D. Meyers & Donna Craig, Indigenous peoples 
and governance structures: a comparative analysis of land and resource management rights, 
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Studies, 2002), 21. 
  28 
A separate chapter discusses the impact of colonisation and identifies the 
influences of various constitutional languages in the years preceding the 1992 
decision. In addition to the initial attitudes toward the existing inhabitants, 
Chapter 6 also discusses the impact of several early legal cases, the provisions 
of the federal Constitution and the shift to anti-discrimination from the 1960s 
and how this affected the claims for recognition. The chapter concludes by 
tracing the beginnings of the Mabo claim and the hurdles it confronted before 
the claim for recognition was considered by the High Court. As well as 
confirming the existence of the constitutional languages discussed by Tully, 
modern and common, the presence of another language - White Australia - is 
also found. More generally it validates the view that Australia’s constitutional 
tradition is more complex than is usually acknowledged.  
 
Three chapters consider the Mabo decision and the subsequent responses 
from Australia’s institutions of governance. Chapter 7 focuses exclusively on 
the High Court’s Mabo decision, considering in detail the differing judgements 
and their impact on the recognition of native title. It brings the influence of 
modern constitutionalism on shaping the Mabo events to the fore. It 
demonstrates that while the High Court majority sought to end common law’s 
association with the language of White Australia, it recoiled from its practical 
implications. This compromise comprises elements from the modern and 
common constitutional languages. Furthermore, in introducing Australia-wide 
rules for extinguishment, the Court presumed it could speak for Indigenous 
people.   
 
  29Two chapters focus on the legal and political responses to Mabo. 
Chapter 8 explores the post-Mabo decisions until the adoption of Native Title 
Act (NTA) in December 1993.
42 Included in this is a detailed examination of the 
Keating government’s response to Mabo, its Native Title Bill
43 and the 
subsequent parliamentary debate. Rejecting the idea of establishing a settlement 
process, a body of mutual recognition, to address native title was one of the 
Keating government’s most crucial decisions. It embraced the High Court’s 
approach with a few, relatively minor, modifications. A key feature of its 
legislation was establishing rules to extinguish native title; so its compromise, 
mixing recognition with extinguishment, involved elements of modern and 
common constitutionalism. 
 
Chapter 9 begins with two High Court decisions: the Western Australian 
government challenge to the federal legislation
44 and the Wik decision in 
December 1996.
45 The former confirmed most aspects of the native title regime, 
and the Wik decision concerned the impact of native title claims on pastoral 
leases. The High Court majority emphasised that the particulars of a claim 
should be considered; the minority sought to establish Australia-wide rules for 
the extinguishment of native title in relation to pastoral leases. This chapter also 
considers the Howard government’s 10-Point Plan, its draft legislation and the 
subsequent parliamentary debate. It shows that modern constitutionalism 
increasingly eclipsed the initial concerns with a settlement and the recognition 
of Indigenous peoples.  
                                                 
42 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 
43 Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth). 
44 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
  30 
If mutual recognition between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples and other Australians is to occur, then it must surely start with hearing 
the claims of Indigenous peoples. Chapter 10 discusses the views of ATSIC, 
two crucial meetings in 1993 and the views of four prominent Indigenous 
people: Noel Pearson, Pat Dodson, Michael Dodson and Larissa Behrendt. It 
demonstrates that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples spoke about the 
Mabo events in the language of common constitutionalism and human rights. It 
also shows that they considered that the convention of consent should have been 
applied in relation to any proposals to extinguish native title. 
 
Chapter 11 centres on the work of the Council and examines the impact 
of the High Court decision, the discussion in federal Parliament about 
reconciliation, the Council’s final report and the response of the Howard 
government. As part of its work the Council considered the claims for a treaty 
or agreement. Concerning the Constitution, it considered a re-rewriting of the 
preamble and the removal of s 25. The Council employs the convention of 
mutual recognition with its final report and reflects the language of common 
constitutionalism. By contrast, the Howard government’s response spoke in the 
language of modern constitutionalism.   
 
The inquiry into Mabo and constitutional languages is sketched over six 
chapters. Summing up the findings, Chapter 12 considers their significance for 
achieving a settlement between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples 
                                                                                                                                    
45 Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 129. 
  31and other Australians. The most important finding is the discord concerning the 
language employed to adjudicate the Mabo claims. Australia’s First Peoples 
voice their claims in the language of human rights and common 
constitutionalism, but Australia’s institutions of governance arise out of a 
modern constitutional tradition. The challenge is to take the practical steps to 
resolve this paradox.  
 
  32Chapter 2: 
The politics of cultural recognition and 
modern constitutionalism   
 
 
…. the dominant constitutional norm that every nation should be 
recognised as an independent state [misidentifies] … the phenomenon of 




Recognition of a people’s customs and practices by the international 
community is one of the oldest and most cherished desires of humanity. Why 
then do many peoples who cherish this as a goal still find it elusive or tenuous? 
This chapter will discuss the different sorts of claims that are advanced for 
recognition, examine their common features and consider why modern 
constitutionalism really only provides an unqualified recognition in the case of 
independent states. The key obstacle to the progress of the other claims is 
located in how modern constitutionalism conceives cultural diversity. Before we 
can consider how to move forward it is necessary to understand how this current 
situation came about and what characterises the general features of the modern 
constitutionalism. 
 
                                                 
1 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 9.
  33Material for this chapter is drawn principally from Tully’s Strange 
multiplicity.
2 A few words though about the other authors engaged with in this 
discussion. Charles McIlwain’s authoritative study on Constitutionalism: 
ancient and modern is drawn on for the discussion of Anglo-Saxon 
constitutionalism.
3 Michael Foley looks at The silence of constitutions: gaps, 
‘abeyances’ and political temperament in the maintenance of government with a 
particular reference to the experience of the United States.
4 This examination 
also draws upon many of the individual contributions in The Cambridge history 
of political thought, 1450-1700.
5
 
The politics of cultural recognition  
 
Tully speaks of ‘the politics of cultural recognition’ to denote the 
umbrella of struggles where peoples seek recognition for their distinct cultures.
6 
He identifies six different types of claims:
7  
 
•  the claims of nationalist movements; 
•  the ‘pressures to recognise and accommodate larger, supra-national 
associations with powerful cultural dimensions’ (eg the European Union and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement); 
                                                 
2 Ibid.  
3 Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: ancient and modern, revised edition (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1947). 
4 Michael Foley, The silence of constitutions: gaps, ‘abeyances’ and political temperament in 
the maintenance of government, (London: Routledge, 1989). 
5 J.H. Burns edited with the assistance of Mark Goldie, The Cambridge history of political 
thought, 1450-1700, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
6 Tully, above n 1, 1-2. 
7 Ibid. 4-5. 
  34•  the claims of those caught between the nationalist movements and the pressures 
for federations and confederations, such as ‘linguistic and ethnic minorities’ 
(eg the Romany in Europe); 
•  the “multicultural or ‘intercultural voices’ of hundreds of millions of citizens, 
immigrants, exiles and refugees” competing ‘for forms of recognition and 
protection of their cultures’; 
•  the demands of the feminist movement to modify institutions of governance to 
‘accommodate women’s culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting’; and, 
•  the demands of the ‘250 million Aboriginal or Indigenous peoples of the world 
for the recognition and accommodation of their twelve thousand diverse 
cultures, governments and environmental practices’. 
 
A further type of claim can be added with the recent rise of a movement 
calling for the recognition of same-sex relationships. With South Africa’s recent 
Constitutional Court decision directing its parliament to amend the current 
marriage laws to ‘permit same-sex marriage’ the country will join The 
Netherlands, Spain, Belgium and Canada in recognising same-sex marriage. The 
United Kingdom has followed a different path by providing legal recognition of 
‘civil partnerships for same-sex couples’ from 21 December 2005.
8  
  
These different types of claims raise three distinct obstacles for existing 
constitutional arrangements. One is that a people’s desire for cultural 
recognition is intimately bound up with self-determination since ‘demands for 
                                                 
8 ‘A correspondent in Johannesburg’, ‘S African go-ahead for gays to wed’, The Weekend 
Australian 3-4 December 2005, 14. 
  35cultural recognition’ are ‘aspirations for appropriate forms of self-government’.
9 
Some peoples strive to achieve this through establishing their own political 
institutions. Others seek it through participating within existing institutions of a 
dominant society in ways that ‘recognise and affirm ... their culturally diverse 
ways of thinking, speaking and acting’. Nevertheless, what they all share ‘is a 
longing for self rule: to rule themselves in accord with their customs and ways’, 
the ‘oldest political good in the world’.
10 Yet, when the different claims are 
compared, only the independent nation state is readily associated with self-
determination. 
 
Another obstacle faced by these claims is that ‘the basic laws and 
institutions of modern societies, and their authoritative traditions of 
interpretation, are unjust in so far as they thwart the forms of self-government 
appropriate to the recognition of cultural diversity’. Thus, if the ‘sovereignty of 
a people is in some way denied and suppressed’ rather than affirmed and 




A third challenge that arises from these claims is that ‘culture is an 
irreducible and constitutive aspect of politics’. That is, the diverse ways in 
which people think about, speak, act and relate to others in a constitutional 
association are always to some extent the expression of their different cultures. 
Existing constitutions ‘can seek to impose one cultural practice, one way of rule 
following’ or ‘it can recognise a diversity of cultural ways’ of participating. 
                                                 
9 Tully, above n 1, 4.  
10 Ibid. 4-5.  
  36However, regardless of the decision, a constitution ‘cannot eliminate, overcome, 
or transcend, this cultural dimension of politics’.
12
  
Therefore, despite the myriad of forms of struggle, each different type of 
claim is a struggle for liberty: the quest for freedom from domination and for 
self-rule. Tully locates these contemporary struggles within a familiar tradition. 
“From the struggles of the Italian city states for liberties against imperial rule 
during the Renaissance, to the European and American revolutions for liberty in 
the early modern period, and to the national liberation movements of the 
twentieth century, ‘liberty’ has meant freedom from domination and of self-
rule.” There is an important difference with the past though: ‘What is distinctive 
of our age is a multiplicity of demands for recognition at the same time; the 




Comparing these seven types of claims for cultural recognition is 
unusual. Modern constitutionalism usually serves as the normative backdrop to 
the actual examination of a claim and so each of these struggles are usually 
treated as ‘different in kind and [to be] studied by different specialists’.
14 For 
instance, usually a different academic field studies nationalist struggles from 
those who consider the claims of linguistic and ethnic minorities. Similarly, 
those who examine feminist struggles do not typically compare these to the 
claims advanced by Aboriginal peoples. For these reasons, the common 
                                                                                                                                    
11 Ibid. 5. 
12 Ibid. 5-6. 
13 Ibid. 6. 
14 Ibid. 1. 




Difficulties in accommodating the claims 
 
The difficulty that the contemporary Western world has in 
accommodating these claims arises because the legal and political vocabulary in 
everyday use rests upon assumptions forged around the ‘norm of independent 
nation states’ and these are incompatible with their recognition. One key 
assumption underpinning the normative outlook is the idea that ‘cultures worthy 
of recognition should be nations’. Another assumption is the idea that ‘nations 
should be recognised as states’. So influential are these two assumptions that 
basic concepts such as ‘popular sovereignty, citizenship, unity, equality, 
recognition and democracy all tend to presuppose the uniformity of a nation 
state with a centralised and unitary system of legal and political institutions’.
16
 
Tully shows that the ‘inherited normative vocabulary’ originated with 
seventeenth century European thought. The modern constitutional vocabulary 
(Tully abbreviates this to ‘modern constitutionalism’) has developed over four 
centuries around two main forms of recognition: ‘the equality of independent 
self-governing nation states, and the equality of individual citizens’.
17
 
Modern constitutionalism is a short-hand reference to a tradition often 
taken for granted. Examining this tradition and considering some of its different 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 6 
16 Ibid. 9.  
  38aspects, one of the most important ideas is that the dominant collective form of 
recognition revolves around nation-states. The pre-eminence of the nation-state 
has long been accepted in political thought. For instance, in introducing his own 
work on the recognition of states, Thomas Grant firmly locates it within these 
boundaries when he writes that recognition ‘is a procedure whereby the 
governments of existing states respond to certain changes in the world 
community’.
18 Confirmation can also be found in Steven Curry’s Indigenous 
sovereignty and the democratic project. In a separate chapter on the ‘State and 
Nation’ he described the long journey of the ‘modern European nation’ as it 
evolved from ‘strictly tribal legal authority’ into a nation-state premised on 
‘territorial authority’.
19 He noted that ‘the explorers and settlers who established 
colonies’ around the world ‘employed the language of the nation’ to ‘avoid the 
implications of recognizing only territorial kinds of authority’.
20   
 
Prominent thinkers in European thought embraced the idea that the 
nation-state was sovereign, though disagreeing over other aspects of its 
employment. For instance, Pufendorf
21 and Bodin
22 saw sovereignty as ‘the soul 
of the state’.
23 This attitude set the scene for what Walker described as ‘a 
collective universe in which claims to autonomy can be intelligible’, pointing to 
the principles of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 1714, the 
                                                                                                                                    
17 Ibid. 15. 
18 Thomas D. Grant, The recognition: law and practice in debate and evolution, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praegar Publishers, 1999), xix. 
19 Steven Curry, Indigenous sovereignty and the democratic project, (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2004), 71. 
20 Ibid. 77. 
21 Samuel Pufendorf was born in Saxony (now in Germany) in 1632 and studied theology and 
philosophy. He became professor of law of nature and nations at Heidelberg. See Burns, above n 
5, 690. 
22 Jean Bodin was born in 1529 at Angers (in France). He studied civil law and argued for 
religious toleration. See Burns, above n 5, 663. 
  39Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 and the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 as 
all building ‘upon an account of the essential coherence of a system of states’.
24  
 
Likewise, the recognition of individual citizens originates squarely 
within modern European thought. Observing that the ‘handbooks or official 
proclamations … of this ethical heritage … are intractably universalist’, John 
Dunn cited Samuel Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis, the American 
Declaration of Independence of 1776, the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen in 1789 and the United Nations Charter. All consider 
‘individual human beings … as their fundamental ethical units …’
25 Similarly, 
Charles Taylor observed that the ‘politics of equal dignity is based on the idea 
that all humans are equally worthy of respect’,
26 locating its emergence in 
‘western civilization’ with Kant and Rousseau.
27 In his writings the French 
writer and politician Benjamin Constant observed a contrast between the ‘liberty 
of the ancients’ and the ‘liberty of the moderns’. He said: ‘If this is what the 
ancients call liberty, they admitted as compatible with this collective freedom 
the complete subjugation of the individual to the authority of the collectivity.’
28
 
                                                                                                                                    
23 Alfred Dufour, ‘Pufendorf’ in Burns, above n 5, 574; Curry, above n 19, 47-50. 
24 R.B.J. Walker ‘World Order and the Reconstitution of Political Life’ in Richard A. Falk, 
Robert C. Johansen & Samuel S. Kim (Eds), The Constitutional foundations of world peace, 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 205. 
25 John Dunn, Western political theory in the face of the future, Canto Edition, (Cambridge, 
UK: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1993), 59. 
26 Charles Taylor, Philosophical arguments, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1995), 235. 
27 Ibid. 237; The German philosopher Immanuel Kant lived from 1724 to 1804 and wrote of 
knowledge, reason and ethics. The French philosopher and writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau lived 
from 1712 to 1778, his work The Social Contract having a significant influence on the French 
Revolution. See The Wordsworth Dictionary of Biography, (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd, 1994). 234, 373 
28 Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, translated and edited by Biancamaria Fontana, 
(Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1988), 311. 
  40Indeed, the recognition of the modern state and the individual are often 
considered intertwined. Such a view was expressed by the Dutch political and 
theological thinker Hugo Grotius. In the eyes of later political thinkers such as 
Pufendorf, Grotius was the one who ‘broke the ice’ and provided ‘a new theory 
of natural law’.
29 Examining the fundamental rules in Grotius’ De Iure Praedae 
the third rule states that ‘What each individual has indicated to be his will, that 
is law with respect to him’ and the next is ‘What the Commonwealth had 
indicated to be its will, that is law for the whole body of citizens’.
30 The link 
binding these two rules is the idea of government by consent of the people. 
Heywood affirms its contemporary currency, explaining that governments exist 
‘to fulfil the needs and protect the rights of its citizens, who therefore consent or 
agree to be governed’.
31
 
Tully also writes of modern constitutionalism exhibiting an anti-
imperialist feature. He has in mind its opposition to the Holy Roman Empire. 
Robert Kingdom describes this opposition as arising from a new type of 
Protestantism – Calvinism that was to take hold from the mid-sixteenth century 
onwards in several ‘free cities in what is now southern Germany and 
Switzerland’.
32 The following century was to see the resistance to imperial 
authority exploded into the Thirty Years War from 1618-48 across Western 
Europe and the revolt of the Calvinist Puritans against royal power in England 
from 1640-60.
33 Eventually, as it gained adherents among the nobles and gentry 
                                                 
29 Richard Tuck, ‘Grotius and Selden’ in Burns, above n 5, 499. 
30 Ibid. 505-6. 
31 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: The 
Macmillan Press, 1992), 281. 
32 Robert M. Kingdom, ‘Calvinism and resistance theory, 1550-1580’ in Burns, above n 5, 193.  
33 Ibid. 218. 




Features excluding cultural diversity 
 
Tully’s argument that the modern forms of recognition are centred on 
the state and the individual is not new. Nor is the view that modern 
constitutionalism had an anti-imperial edge. However, Tully does introduce the 
idea that modern constitutionalism has seven distinct characteristics that ‘serve 
to exclude or assimilate cultural diversity’.
35   
 
The first feature concerns the ways in which popular sovereignty is 
conceived and is directly related to the individual and the state as the dominant 
forms of recognition. Tully identified three different variations of popular 
sovereignty: ‘as a society of undifferentiated individuals, a community held 
together by the common good or [as] a culturally defined nation’ associated 
with liberalism, communitarianism and nationalism.
36 Each of these variations 
presumes the ‘sovereign people’ to be ‘culturally homogenous’. Adherence to 
this presumption then leads to the idea that cultural diversity is a non-
constitutional matter.
37 Benjamin Constant took this thought significantly 
further in 1819 when he suggested that Europeans were ‘essentially 
homogeneous in their nature’.
38   
                                                 
34 J.H. Elliot, Europe divided, (London: Fontana 1968), 98. 
35 Tully, above n 1, 62.  
36 Ibid. 36, 41. For further discussion by Tully of the three variations of popular sovereignty see 
ibid. 63-4. See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origins and 
spread of nationalism, Revised Edition, (London: Verso, 1991).  
37 Tully, above n 1, 41, 63. 
38 Constant, Political Writings, above n 28, 313. 
  42 
The writings of others on government confirm that the presumption that 
the people are culturally homogenous is more broadly acknowledged, or is 
effectively applied when constitutional matters are under consideration. For 
instance, in his introductory work on political ideologies, Andrew Heywood 
wrote that ‘democratic theorists often imply’ that ‘the people’ is a ‘single, 
homogenous entity, which acts collectively and is bound together by a common 
interest’. While arguing this is not so, Heywood explains that any differences, 
presumably also including cultural differences, are resolved through the 
majority asserting itself and claiming the ‘right to speak for all’.
39 Ernest 
Gellner arrives at a similar juncture, though by a different course, when he 
writes of the rise of nationalism and ‘the organization of human groups into 
large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units’.
40  
 
A second feature of modern constitutionalism is the way in which it 
typically deals with custom. The modern constitution is favourably contrasted 
with ancient or earlier constitutions. In the latter category are the pre-modern 
European constitutions and the customs of non-European societies.
41 It is not so 
much that adherents of modern constitutionalism see a constitution as 
completely independent of custom. Rather, they consider as their starting point 
‘that it is appropriate to, and results from a self-conscious reflection on, the 
customs, manners, and civilisation of modern societies …’ This approach rests 
upon a ‘stages’ view of human history that was used by the ‘classic theorists’ in 
order to ‘map, rank and thereby comprehend the great cultural diversity 
                                                 
39 Heywood, above n 31, 275. 
40 Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), 34-5. 
  43encountered by Europeans in the imperial age’.
42 Supporting this conclusion are 
the comments of the English seventeenth century philosopher John Locke when 
he wrote that modern constitutions only come into being because of this 
development among ‘those who are counted the Civiliz’d part of Mankind’.
43   
 
Concerns about what sort of relationship custom should have to the laws 
of modern political society were the subject of vigorous debate in the 
seventeenth century. In his review on constitutionalism Lloyd describes this 
debate.
44 Some, like the Parisian legist Etienne Pasquier, considered custom 
should always give way to law because ‘law being made by the prince and 
custom by the people, a custom which runs directly counter to law is never 
admissible’.
45 However, this view was challenged by others, including Pierre 
Rebuffi who argued that ‘laws that ran counter to custom endangered the 
community’s well being – the end of political society, and of law itself’.
46 Lloyd 
explains that one way of ‘avoiding confrontation between law and custom lay in 
assigning each to a distinct sphere’.
47 As Louis Charondas Le Caron explained, 
in the public sphere are the matters ‘which concern the condition of the 
commonwealth (l’estate de la république) and not of each one in particular’.
48 
And so in the division between public and private, constitutional matters were 
privileged to the extent that if there were a conflict between custom and 
constitution, the former was to give way.  
                                                                                                                                    
41 Tully, above n 1, 64. 
42 Id.  
43 John Locke, Two treaties of government, ed. Peter Laslett, reprinted with amendments, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), Second Treatise, s. 30. 
44 Howell A. Lloyd, ‘Constitutionalism’ in Burns, above n 5, 268-9. 
45 Etienne Pasquier, cited by Lloyd, ibid. 268. 
46 Pierre Rebuffi, cited by Lloyd, ibid. 269. 
47 Lloyd, ibid. 269.  
  44 
Tully says that the ‘stages’ view of human history presumed that as the 
processes of colonisation and modernisation spread around the world from 
Europe, what they viewed as the ‘lower peoples’ in the colonies will ‘become 
objects of the causal process of improvement, gradually shedding their primitive 
customs and ways appropriate to their lower level of development’. It was 
expected that these peoples either would be ‘assimilated into modern nations 
within a European imperial structure or into independent modern constitutional 
nation states’, or they would be cast aside by the ‘march of progress’.
49 The 
widespread prevalence of this outlook among European scholars was also 
confirmed by David Maybury-Lewis. He explained that ‘evolutionary theorists 
invariably placed tribal societies at the bottom of the ladder of development’.
50 
With such an outlook it was presumed that whatever choices were to be made, 
these were best made by drawing upon Western knowledge. As Williams noted, 
the ‘Western colonizing nations of Europe’ were ‘sustained by a central idea: 
the West’s religion, civilization, and knowledge are superior to the religions, 
civilizations, and knowledge of non-Western peoples’.
51    
 
Tully goes on to make the point that those who favourably contrasted 
modern constitutionalism over the ancient typically understood culture as 
‘separate, closed, internally uniform, and relative to a stage of economic 
development’.
52 He explained that it was considered that humans reason ‘within 
                                                                                                                                    
48 Louis Charondas Le Caron, cited by Lloyd, ibid. 269. 
49 Tully, above n 1, 65. 
50 David Maybury-Lewis, Millennium: tribal wisdom and the modern world, (New York: 
Viking, 1992), 20. 
51 Robert A. Williams (Jr), The American Indian in western legal thought: the discourses of 
conquest, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 6. 
52 Tully, above n 1, 65. 
  45the bounds of the cultures of which they are members …’ In such a spirit, Locke 
was to write:  
 
Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our Thoughts, and 
Notions, had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hotentots that inhabit 
there: and had the Virginia King Apochancana, been educated in England, 
he had, perhaps, been as knowing a Divine, and as good a Mathematician, 
as any in it. The difference between him, and a more improved English-
Man, lying barely in this, That the exercise of his faculties was bounded 
within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own Country, and never 
directed to any other, or farther Enquiries (sic).
53  
 
Another feature of modern constitutionalism is that its uniformity is 
considered a virtue and is often favourably contrasted to the irregularity of the 
ancient constitution. Tully explains that because the latter ‘is the incorporation 
of varied local customs, an ancient constitution is a motley mix of overlapping 
legal and political jurisdictions, a kind of jus gentium
54 common to many 
customary jurisdictions as in the Roman republic or common law of England’. 
In a similar way, he says, ‘the assemblages of laws, customs and institutions of 
Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia were seen as the paradigm of the 
ancient constitutions’. The modern constitution was considered to have 
overcome the irregularity and been able to ‘establish a constitution that is 
                                                 
53 John Locke, An essay concerning human understanding, (Ed), Peter Nidditch (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), 1.4.12, 92. 
54 Jus gentium - Latin words referring to the “‘law of nations’, the concept in Roman law of 
those provisions which are shared by the legal codes of all countries…”. See John Ayto, 
Dictionary of Foreign Words in English, (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1995, 
168-9). In contemporary times, the words are also taken to refer to international law, the 
“system of law regulating the interrelationship of sovereign states and their rights and duties 
with regard to one another”. See Elizabeth A. Martin (Ed), A Dictionary of Law, Fourth Edition, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 240. 
  46legally and politically uniform: a constitution of equal citizens who are treated 
identically rather than equitably, of one national system of institutionalised legal 
and political authority rather than many, and a constitutional nation equal in 
status to all the others’.
55 Tully’s collaborator on a study of seventeenth century 
European political thought, Richard Tuck, brought out the psychological 
impetus within Hobbes’ political theory. This involved finding ‘peace and 




Other writers on constitutionalism have also noted how the ancient 
constitution is portrayed as being irregular and unfavourable when compared 
with the uniformity of the modern form. For instance, Michael Foley writes that 
‘By reputation’ the Stuart constitution in England ‘was a moribund arrangement 
of government containing an unsustainable mixture of royal absolutism, 
Parliamentary power and common law rights’. Developing a contrast with the 
United States constitution, he says the latter ‘appears to be everything the Stuart 
constitution was not’. Foley makes the point though that the Stuart constitution 
was ‘a highly developed and sophisticated constitutional order …’ Furthermore, 
‘from the evidence gathered’, he says ‘it can be argued that the stability of the 
American constitution has been due not so much to its settled character or to its 
internal consistency, but to its anomalies and disjunctions being effectively held 
in abeyance by a constitutional order extraordinarily well equipped, and well 
disposed, to do so’.
57
                                                 
55 Tully, above n 1, 66. 
56 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and government, 1572-1651, (Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of 
the University of Cambridge, 1993), 346. 
57 Michael Foley, above n 4, xii. 
  47 
Tully identifies the perceived virtue of uniformity as arising from the 
lessons classical theorists drew from the events leading up to 1648. The Thirty 
Years’ War was considered a war about sovereignty, arising because of the 
‘conflicting jurisdictions and authorities of the ancient constitutions’.
58 
McIlwain identifies a more general weakness of ‘medieval constitutionalism’:  
its inability to provide ‘any effective sanction for … legal limits to arbitrary 
will’ and ‘its failure to enforce any penalty … against a prince who actually 
trampled under foot those rights of his subjects which undoubtedly lay beyond 
the scope of his legitimate authority’.
59 To these problems, classical theorists 
responded by advocating that ‘authority had to be organised and centralised by 
the constitution in some sovereign body’. Tully states that a consequence of this 
outlook was that ‘the plurality of existing ancient authorities was eliminated by 
construing the people as the single locus of authority and their aim as the 
constitution of a uniform system of government’.
60 Other writers confirm the 
historical shift to the single locus. Richard Tuck traces the rise of the ‘distinctive 
notion of the sovereign and autonomous agent’ and the view that the ‘survival 
of the state was of such overriding importance’.
61  
 
Tully distinguishes a fourth feature of modern constitutionalism as the 
‘recognition of custom within a theory of progress’. He explains that the reason 
why a uniform constitutional system of government was established was not 
that they disregarded the ‘plurality of ancient customs in the process of 
                                                 
58 Tully, above n 1, 67. 
59 McIlwain, above n 3, 91, 93. 
60 Tully, above n 1, 67.  
  48consolidation and centralisation of modern constitutional states’. He points to 
the writings of Smith, Sieyès, and Constant as supporting the view that the 
‘unintended historical progress of economic and social conditions gradually 
undermines the ancient constitution of customs and ranks’. This led to the 
creation of a society of one ‘estate’ or ‘state’ of ‘equal and legally 
undifferentiated individuals’ with similar ‘manners’. That is, it is based on the 
presumption that the modern constitution is merely responding to and 
recognising the transformed character of modern society.
62  
 
The writings of Constant confirm the belief that commerce ‘brought 
nations closer’ and ‘has given them customs and habits which are almost 
identical’.
63 Gellner also writes of the centralising tendencies of modern 
societies, not so much from commerce per se, but from the nature of industrial 




Tully identifies a fifth feature with a ‘specific set of European 
institutions’ whereby the ‘people alienate or delegate political power to 
government in these institutional forms’. Here he has in mind the assumptions 
about how governance should be ordered: representative government, separation 
of powers, rule of law, individual liberty, standing armies and a public sphere. 
These definitive constitutional institutions in turn comprise the modern 
                                                                                                                                    
61 Richard Tuck, The rights of war and peace: political thought and the international order 
from Grotius to Kant, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 226-227. 
62 Tully, above n 1, 67.  
63 Constant, above n 28, 325. 
64 Gellner, above n 40, 110. 




The idea that these institutions are associated with contemporary 
constitutionalism is hardly controversial. Foley identified the ‘status of the 
separation of powers and of the associated checks and balances as the 
government’s chief structural and operational characteristic’.
66 In his political 
primer, Heywood also explained that representation is a cornerstone of 
democracy ‘in the modern world’.
67 The separation of powers, the belief that the 
‘legislative, executive and judicial powers of government should be exercised 
by three independent institutions’, he too associates with ‘liberal 
constitutionalism’.
68 He also cited Hobbes and Locke to demonstrate that in the 
modern state the rule of law is intertwined with freedom. Locke, for instance, 
said ‘where there is no law there is no freedom’.
69   
 
Tully says that another feature of modern constitutionalism is the 
attribution of a specific individual identity of a ‘nation’ to the constitutional 
state. He explains that while ‘the nation is interpreted differently in each society, 
as Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson have shown, it engenders a sense of 
belonging and allegiance by means of the nation’s individual name, national 
historical narrative and public symbols’. By naming the constitutional 
association and giving it a historical narrative, ‘the nation and its citizens 
possess a corporate identity or personality’. Tully observes that from Pufendorf 
                                                 
65 Tully, above n 1, 67-8.  
66 Foley, above n 4, 36. 
67 Heywood, above n 31, 277 
68 Ibid. 30. 
  50onwards, this corporate identity has been seen as necessary to the unity of a 
modern constitutional association.
70 Pufendorf viewed the state as a ‘compound 
moral person whose will, intertwined and united by the pacts of a number of 
men, is considered the will of all’.
71   
 
While Anderson makes the point that nationalism engenders a sense of 
belonging, it also brings with it ‘amnesias’. He points to the rise of the ‘new 
nationalisms’ in Europe where ‘almost immediately’ they ‘began to imagine 
themselves’ as ‘awaking from sleep’.
72 He observed that part of the need for ‘a 
narrative of identity’ is to help forget ‘the [preceding] ruptures’.
73  
 
The view that the modern constitution can be associated with the identity 
of the nation was also noted by Michael Foley when writing of the US 
Constitution. He explained that it is ‘venerated because of its role in the nation’s 
historical and political development’. Taking it a step further than Tully, he 
noted that the US Constitution ‘assumes the identity of the nation itself’. He said 
that it ‘has come to represent’, for example, ‘the lifeblood of the American 
nation, its supreme symbol and manifestation … so intimately welded with the 
national existence itself that the two have become inseparable’.
74
 
Tully notes a seventh feature of modern constitutionalism as the idea 
that a ‘constitution comes into being at some founding moment and stands 
                                                                                                                                    
69 Locke, cited by Heywood, ibid. 27. 
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  51behind - and provides the rules for - democratic politics’. As Tully said, this 
feature is reinforced by the popular images of the American and French 
revolutions as great founding acts performed by founding fathers at the 
threshold of modernity.
75 Like Tully, McIlwain noted that key figures associated 
with modern constitutionalism view a constitution in this way. Indeed, 
McIlwain related that the English-born Thomas Paine went further and 
following his participation in the American Revolution stated that ‘a true 
constitution is always antecedent to the actual government in a state’.
76 This is 
further entrenched by the presumption that the modern constitution is universal, 
something that the people agreed on at some time, but for all time. ‘This image 
is enhanced by the myths of the single lawgiver in the republican tradition, the 
original consensus of the community or nation in the nationalist tradition and 
the original or hypothetical contract, to which all citizens today would consent if 
they were rationale, in the liberal tradition’. Thus, the modern constitution 
appears as a ‘precondition for democracy, rather than a part of democracy’.
77  
 
Foley also wrote about this matter in his comparison of the American 
and British constitutions, though with a slightly different emphasis. He pointed 
to how the founding moment is considered as justification to leave the 
constitution unchanged: ‘The constitution is often portrayed as having been 
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  52Connecting theory to practice 
 
These features now influence contemporary thinking about governance 
around the world. The norm of one nation, one state serves to impose a set of 
pre-conditions on the responses provided when a claim for cultural recognition 
is advanced. Its starting point is the presumption that the governing institutions 
transcend culture. This is why a claim for cultural recognition faces such 
difficulties in being heard, let alone being accommodated.  
 
To show how the ‘inherited normative vocabulary’ misrepresents 
cultural diversity, Tully points to some examples current when he wrote his 
book. Many of these claims were unleashed by the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union: ‘the Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Caucasus, central Asian, Russia and 
the former Yugoslavia’. He observes that the separation into one nation-state 
after another seemed as endless as ‘overlapping minority cultures within, as well 
as nationals left without the new boundaries in turn immediately demanded 
recognition as nations’. At that time the tragedies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Rwanda were at the forefront of attention. Tully explains that these were only 
the most recent examples ‘of the policies and wars of repression, assimilation, 
exile, extermination and genocide that compose the long and abhorrent history 
of attempting to bring the overlapping cultural diversity of contemporary 
societies in line with the norm of one nation, one state’.
79  
 
There is another example: a current flashpoint on Australia’s doorstep 
was ignited by the claims of the people of West Papua for refugee status in 
  53response to violations of human rights. Some contributing to Australia’s public 
discourse portray such claims as threatening the unity of Indonesia and the 
stability of Australia’s relations with that country.
80 Underpinning this reaction 
is a presumption that self-determination can only occur through a separate 
nation-state. The Australian government has yet to acknowledge the possibility 
that the people of West Papua are oppressed and do not have the freedom to 
exercise their distinct culture.
81 The claim of the people of West Papua for 
cultural recognition is redescribed through the features of the modern 
constitution. It is taken as a given that the people of Indonesia are homogenous 
or should become so in the interests of modernity, that the recognition of 
difference is a threat to the unity of the state and that unity can only be achieved 
around a nation-state. No consideration is given to modifying the allocation of 
powers within the state to accommodate the claims of Papuan self-
determination. 
 
Generalising then, the problem in accommodating claims for cultural 
recognition originated with the way the modern constitution is conceived. The 
difficulty arises from the shift in emphasis away from the idea that authority is 
guided by custom and is replaced by the notion that a constitution precedes the 
establishment of the government of a state and should remain unchanged 
regardless of the claims advanced. Such diverse claims as those advanced by 
nationalists, linguistic and ethnic minorities, immigrants, exiles and refugees all 
come up against the idea that the constitution should be unmovable. Only out of 
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  54crises arising from wars or sustained mass protest does it become possible for 
modifications to occur to the governance of a state.  
 
The claims of Indigenous people throughout the world for recognition 
have similarly proved difficult to reconcile with modern constitutionalism. It is 
these historical experiences that provide a backdrop to the Mabo events and the 
claims of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.  
  55 
  56Chapter 3:  
Constitutional languages and cultural 
diversity 
 
A contemporary constitution can recognise cultural diversity if it is 
reconceived as …. a ‘form of accommodation’ of cultural diversity. A 
constitution should be seen as a form of activity, an intercultural dialogue 
… 
James Tully, Strange multiplicity
1
 
Tully outlines an alternative approach in Strange multiplicity. The 
starting point in the development of this alternative lies with the philosophical 
question: What constitutional framework is required to recognise and 
accommodate cultural diversity?  
 
Tully begins his explanation by examining the meaning of cultural 
diversity. Consistent with modern constitutionalism, accounts provided by 
anthropologists earlier in the twentieth century considered culture as something 
akin to a ‘billiard-ball’ as though it fitted neatly into clearly delineated 
boundaries. Now, some anthropologists have replaced this earlier view with one 
that sees culture as ‘overlapping, interactive and internally-negotiated’.
2  
 
                                                 
1 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge, UK: 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 30.
2 Ibid. 10. 
  57Tully employs this newer explanation of culture in his study of 
constitutionalism. He refers to sites where ‘hidden constitutions’ have been 
rediscovered, challenging the idea that constitutionalism has a universal 
template. One of these sites, ‘common constitutionalism’, is located in the 
common law, the judge-made law originating in ancient England.  Because of 
its significance, its origins are discussed in some detail. The alternative 
approach to recognition is also associated with a different type of reasoning that 
can be contrasted with scientific reasoning. This debate over reasoning can also 
be set into a longer historical context when the moral reasoning based upon case 
studies is examined. Another dimension to the alternative approach arises from 
the application of Wittgenstein’s ideas about language games to 
constitutionalism. 
 
Since the focus of this chapter is to outline Tully’s alternative approach, 
his  Strange multiplicity is the primary reference point throughout. This is 
particularly so when discussing the sites of ‘hidden constitutions’ and the 
reasons he advances for viewing constitutionalism as a language game.
3 The 
discussion of anthropology and culture will focus on the sources Tully 
principally relies upon to build his argument. These texts are Why humans have 
cultures: explaining anthropology and social diversity by the British social and 
cultural anthropologist Michael Carrithers
4 and Europe and the people without 
history by Eric R. Wolf.
5 The brief sketch on the ‘common law mind’ is based 
on an updated edition of John Pocock’s 1957 study on the Ancient constitution 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 99-182.
4 Michael Carrithers, Why humans have cultures: explaining anthropology and social diversity, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
5 Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the people without history, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982).
  58and the feudal law.
6 McIlwain’s study on ancient and modern constitutions 
locates the changes to constitutionalism in a historical context.
7 Since the debate 
over constitutionalism between Thomas Hobbes and Matthew Hale captures the 
contrasting languages, the writings of both scholars are also directly referred to.
8 
Additional to Tully’s work this discussion draws upon Quentin Skinner’s 
Reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes.
9 The section on dialogical 
reasoning draws on Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin’s work on the Abuse of 
casuistry.
10 The discussion of Wittgenstein’s ideas principally relies upon his 
work in Philosophical Investigations.
11  
 
A different approach 
 
In asking whether a constitution can recognise cultural diversity, Tully 
also considers if the language in which the enquiry proceeds is itself just, 
whether it is capable of giving all the participants their due. Certainly, one of the 
frequent charges made about how contemporary claims are addressed is that the 
people making the claim are ‘not recognised in their own cultural language or 
voice’. Frequently, the language in which claimants are obliged to present their 
                                                 
6 John G.A. Pocock, Ancient constitution and the feudal law, reissue, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of Cambridge, 1987). 
7 Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: ancient and modern, revised edition (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1947). 
8 Thomas Hobbes was born in England in 1588 and is best known for his political writings; Sir 
Matthew Hale was born in 1609 in England, chaired a law reform commission and wrote a 
history of the common law. See J. H. Burns, edited with the assistance of Mark Goldie, The 
Cambridge history of political thought, 1450-1700, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 677-8. 
9 Quentin Skinner, Reason and rhetoric in the philosophy of Hobbes, (Cambridge, UK: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1996). 
10 Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The abuse of casuistry: a history of moral reasoning, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).  
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, Second Edition, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974). 
  59claims is the ‘language of the master: masculine, European or imperial’.
12 The 
significance of this observation is far-reaching because it suggests the injustice 
occurs from the beginning, in the authoritative language employed to discuss the 
particular claims.  
 
  Often the language ‘functions as a promissory note or ceremonial 
display before constitutional negotiations begin in both theory and practice’. Its 
use in determining claims to recognition ‘continues to stifle cultural differences 
and impose a dominant culture, while masquerading as culturally neutral, 
comprehensive or unavoidably ethnocentric’.
13
 
So in striking out on a different path from the prevailing norm, one 
should be guided by the ‘ethical watchword’ to always ‘listen to the voices of 
others’ and to abide by the principle of ‘self-identification’. While this ethic has 
a contemporary resonance it also has a long tradition. The Latin phrase audi 
alteram partem, always listen to the other side, is associated with the humanism 
of the Renaissance. Here the emphasis is on the ‘civic dignity’ of speaking in 
one’s own cultural voice. Conversely, an indignity will arise if one speaks on 




Guided by this ethic, in Strange multiplicity Tully carefully avoids 
developing further theory to be imposed on the claimants. Instead, he 
undertakes a survey of the language used in the debate over recognition to bring 
                                                 
12 Tully, above n 1, 34. 
13 Ibid. 35. 
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  60to light the shared conventions that render it problematic and give rise to 
conflicting solutions. In other words, he considers ‘both sides’ of the debate. In 
addition to considering how the modern constitution deals with recognition, he 
examines cases where claims are approached differently, relating historical 
examples from Aboriginal and common law systems.
15      
 
Tully also has some direct experience with practitioners of this method 
as it was applied by scholars he worked with at Cambridge University. He 
explains that it is adapted from the ‘form of historical critique developed in 
Cambridge over the last three decades by Quentin Skinner, John Dunn and their 
many students’. He describes this as ‘the application of Wittgenstein’s method 
of dissolving philosophical problems … not by presenting yet another solution’, 
but through a survey that ‘brings to critical light’ the unexamined conventions 




Respecting cultural diversity 
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, Tully bases his approach upon revisions 
anthropologists have made to the explanation of cultural diversity. He says that 
the claims for the recognition of particular cultures ‘constitute one of the most 
dangerous and pressing problems of the present age’ since ‘racial, linguistic, 
national, ethnic and gender tensions’ are exhibited in almost all social relations 
in contemporary societies. Culture is so central to these social relations that the 
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  61idea of treating it in isolation is dismissed as fanciful. It affects the way humans 
relate to others through the myriad of interactions in which they are engaged. It 
is also affects whether we follow or challenge a particular social rule. Culture 
provides a dimension to all social relations from the slur in the workplace to the 
breakdown in relations between two nations.  As the English political 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes perceptively notes, the cause of political conflict 
can be ‘a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, 
either direct in their persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their 
Nation, their Profession, or their Name’ (sic).  Those with an eye on 
contemporary events would probably add that even a newspaper cartoon can 





In examining cultural diversity, Tully introduces ideas presented by two 
anthropologists who convey a new way of explaining the relationship of culture 
to society. Michael Carrithers wrote his book Why humans have cultures with 
two purposes in mind: to introduce a new audience to the discipline of 
anthropology and to ask




According to Carrithers, anthropologists are moving away from telling a 
story about human diversity in one particular way and recasting it otherwise. He 
says the earlier version was ‘well established before the Second World War’. It 
was ‘largely ahistorical in … perspective’, was the result of ‘long periods of 
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  62fieldwork in remote regions’ and articulated a viewpoint that emphasised the 
present tense.
21 Citing examples where anthropologists invoked analogies of 
sea-shells and cups to represent a particular culture, Carrithers suggests that the 
theoretical frame of the earlier version was to present ‘the human world’ as 
‘composed of separate, distinguishable entities: one society and culture might be 
dominant, but it is still only one separate variant among equals’.
22
 
Eric Wolf’s Europe and the people without history, is also important in 
stimulating this new version about the story of culture. Published a decade 
earlier than Carrithers’ work, Wolf demolishes one of the myths promoted by 
the earlier explanation of cultural diversity. He shows ‘region by region 
throughout the world, the ways in which apparently isolated, apparently local 
and unaffected, groups of people were in fact already deeply entwined in a 
growing world system of commerce, colonization, and the exercise of imperial 
power’.
23 He concludes that by ‘endowing nations, societies, or cultures with the 
qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded 
objects, we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the 
entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls. Thus it 
becomes easy to sort the world into differently colored balls.’
24
 
Instead of emphasising their separateness, Wolf ‘stresses the relationship 
between peoples or populations’.
25 He states:
26
                                                 
21 Ibid. 11. 
22 Ibid. 16. 
23 Carrithers, above n 4, 25. 
24 Wolf, above n 5, 6. 
25 Carrithers, above n 4, 26. 
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  63 
The central assertion of this book is that the world of humankind 
constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries 
that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify 
reality. Concepts like ‘nation’, ‘society’, and ‘culture’ name bits and 
threaten to turn names into things. Only by understanding these names as 
bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from 
which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences 
and increase our share of understanding.  
 
Reflecting upon the change in focus from the earlier to the later version 
of this story, Carrithers sees it as moving ‘from the centre of cultures and 
societies to their peripheries and the relations between them; and from a more or 
less static description of their characteristics to a dynamic one of processes in 
which they are involved’.
27 Wolf defines societies as ‘changing alignments of 
social groups, segments and classes, without either fixed boundaries or stable 
internal constitutions’.
28 Like Carrithers, Wolf develops a view of culture that is 
very different from the earlier view that conceives society as akin to a static 




Wolf views culture in a similar way to society, describing it as ‘a series 
of processes that construct, reconstruct, and dismantle cultural materials’.
30 
Carrithers points to examples of cultural materials: ‘social values or ways of 
                                                 
27 Carrithers, above n 4, 26-7. 
28 Wolf, above n 5, 387 
29 Carrithers, above n 4, 27. 
30 Wolf, above n 5, 387.  
  64categorising the world’. There is also a shift in the imagery from the older 
version to the new. If the earlier images were akin to ‘objects in a museum’, 
then the newer version is more like ‘a cinematic … movie-goer’s imagery’.
31  
 
  Wolf does not jettison the work based on the earlier version of the story. 
After all, the goal of anthropology remains the same: to understand. But he 
thinks the disassembling undertaken by those guided by the earlier version also 
needs to be reassembled so we see societies as ‘open systems ... inextricably 
involved with other aggregates, near and far, in weblike, netlike connections’.
32 
Hence, a reassembled system is therefore a system of relationships that ‘possess 




34   
  
Relationships subject human populations to their imperatives, drive people 
into social alignments, and impart a directionality to the alignments 
produced. The key relationships … empower human action, inform it, and 
are carried forward by it.  
 
Three features of cultures 
 
Drawing upon the way that Carrithers and Wolf explain cultural 
diversity, Tully identifies cultures as ‘overlapping, interactive and internally 
negotiated’. This new understanding contrasts with the earlier approach to 
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  65culture underpinning the ‘inherited normative vocabulary’ of contemporary 
legal and political thought.
35 Clifford Geertz made a similar point. He observed 
that theorists tend to continue to uphold variations of the old view inherited 
from the age of European imperialism, of humans situated in independent, 
closed and homogeneous cultures and societies, and so generate the familiar 
accompanying dilemmas of relativism and universalism.
36
 
Underpinning the norm of ‘one nation, one state’ are two assumptions. 
One is the idea that all ‘cultures worthy of recognition should be nations’; the 
other that ‘nations should be recognised as states’.
37 Together these assumptions 
promote the nation-state as the  solution for those seeking recognition. 
Furthermore, since the nation-state is the ‘primary unit’ governing international 
relations,
38 then these relations also rest upon the validity of these two 
assumptions. Yet as noted in the last chapter, recent history demonstrates that 
forcing overlapping cultures to conform to the ‘one nation, one state’ norm has 
led to many tragedies.  
 
In his second feature, Tully insists that cultures are ‘interactive … 
overlap geographically and come in a variety of types’. Furthermore, they are 
‘densely interdependent in their formation and identity’. He observes that our 
contemporary times should be understood as ‘intercultural rather than 
multicultural’ because of the massive migrations of the past century. Therefore, 
                                                 
35 Tully, above n 1, 10. 
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  66citizens are members of ‘more than one dynamic culture’ and the experience of 
‘crossing’ cultures is ‘normal activity’.
39  
 
In his third feature, Tully notes that cultures are ‘not internally 
homogeneous’. Rather they are ‘continuously contested, imagined and 
reimagined, transformed and negotiated, both by their members and through 
their interaction with others’.
40
 
Lastly, Tully observes that if we accept that cultures have three features, 
then ‘the experience of cultural difference is internal to a culture’.
41 Hence, he 
concludes that the meaning of any culture is ‘aspectival rather than essential 
...’
42 He acknowledges that this is probably the ‘most difficult aspect of the new 
concept of culture to grasp’. Contrasting it with the ‘older, essentialist view’ 
(Carrithers describes it as an ‘older version’), Tully explains that the ‘other’ and 
the ‘experience of otherness were by definition associated with another culture’. 
In this older version, one’s own culture ‘provided an identity in the form of a 
seamless background or horizon against which one determined where one stood 
on fundamental questions’ (whether this identity was ‘British’, ‘modern’, 
‘woman’ or whatever). The newer explanation of culture acknowledges that 
‘cultural horizons’ change ‘as one moves about, just like natural horizons’. 
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  67A recent example from Australia helps to illustrate the differences 
between the older, essentialist view of culture and the newer acknowledgment 
that culture is aspectival and based on relationships. In mid-August 2005, a 55-
year old Aboriginal man from a remote community in the Northern Territory 
was found guilty of sexually abusing a 14 year old Aboriginal child. The elder 
told the court that the child had been ‘promised to him as a wife under 
Aboriginal law’ at the age of four. The Northern Territory Supreme Court was 
told that ‘after rumours the teenager had sex with her boyfriend, the man hit her 
with a boomerang and had sex with her’. Before the court he pleaded guilty to 
aggravated assault and having sex with a child. Chief Justice Brian Martin said: 
‘It is always difficult when Northern Territory law is in conflict with traditional 
Aboriginal law, but you and other members of your community, and other 
Aboriginal communities throughout Australia, must understand Northern 
Territory law is the law that must be obeyed by everyone, including Aboriginal 
men who have grown up under traditional law.’ He added that ‘I hope these 
proceedings today, and that the sentence I will impose upon you, will get the 
message through to all members of the community that what you did to the 
young child was wrong.’ According to the report in The Australian newspaper, 
when sentencing the elder to ‘24 months in prison, suspended after one month’, 
Chief Justice Martin is also reported to have said that he had a ‘great deal of 
sympathy’ for the offender and the ‘difficulties he had in moving between 
traditional culture and Territory law’.
44
 
The following day a number of prominent Aboriginal women rejected 
the one-month jail sentence. Boni Robertson said it was ‘no deterrent whatever’ 
                                                 
44 Ashleigh Wilson, ‘Child-sex elder gets one month’, The Australian, 18 August 2005, 1-4. 
  68to men who thought they could violate women’. Robertson, an academic, 
headed a 1998 inquiry into violence in Indigenous communities in Queensland. 
‘How many times have our women to be rejected by the courts – to have 
horrendous crimes committed against them – with the perpetrators claiming it is 
a cultural right?’, Ms Robertson asked. ‘Nobody has a right to violate a young 
girl, physically or sexually. This man knew he was doing wrong and he should 
be sentenced appropriately’.
45 Prominent New South Wales Aboriginal and 
State Labor MP Linda Burney said that ‘[a]ll cultures change and adapt with 
time and circumstance and, in my view, underage sex of promised girls is one 
area where Aboriginal culture needs to change.’ Continuing this theme, she 
added, that ‘[w]e can’t want, on one hand, our fundamental human rights 




According to the accounts in The Australian, the court defence advanced 
on behalf of the elder argued his actions were in accordance with traditional law 
and this should be considered a mitigating factor. Applying Tully’s view about 
culture, the defence appears to be premised on the older, essentialist idea that 
Aboriginal culture remains static and unchanged. In contrast, the responses of 
Boni Robertson and Linda Burney show that among Aboriginal people there is 
no one view of what their law should be today. Furthermore, Burney explicitly 
contests the essentialist view, considering that the adoption of a human rights 
perspective should have a profound effect in modifying traditional law.  
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  69Hidden constitutions 
 
If modern constitutionalism is underpinned by an essentialist view of 
culture, then what sort of constitutionalism rests upon the idea that culture is 
‘overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated’? Challenging the belief that 
diversity is only a contemporary experience, Tully relates that as the 
presumption of a universal constitutional form is abandoned ‘a vast 
undergrowth of cultural diversity and its partial recognition in constitutions has 
begun to come to light …’ He identifies two sites where ‘hidden constitutions’ 
have been discovered in recent times. The first is in the ‘writings and 
constitutional arrangements of the agents of justice who have sought to come to 
terms with powerful, non-European cultures, immigrants, women and national 
minorities fighting for cultural survival’. The second is in the ‘applications of 
constitutional law in particular cases, especially but not exclusively in the 
common law of Commonwealth countries and international law’.
47  
 
So while the modern constitution comprises features that place obstacles 
in the way of recognising cultural claims, it is important not to presume this to 
be synonymous with the contemporary constitutional language. Rather, 
contemporary constitutionalism is a ‘composite of two dissimilar languages’: a 
“dominant, ‘modern’” language and a “subordinate, ‘common-law’ or simply 
‘common language’”. Tully says the latter language is also connected to other 
non-European languages of constitutionalism.
48  
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  70Hence, while a tendency toward uniformity has dominated European 
thinking, there have also been instances of ‘subordinate areas of constitutional 
theory and practice’ that ‘have been open to the recognition and accommodation 
of different cultures …’ These ‘hidden constitutions of contemporary societies’ 
have been concealed by the dominance of the language of modern 
constitutionalism ‘and the narrow use of its central terms’.
49 Tully cites two 
examples: the ‘earlier varieties of whiggism and civic humanism’.
50
  
The ancient constitution of England 
 
The common language has been located in the common law, the judge-
made decisions originating in ancient England prior to the twelfth century.
51 It 
has also been associated with a particular way of thinking about English history 
as well as guiding responses to day-to-day events. In his 1957 study on the 
Ancient constitution and the feudal law, John Pocock focused on seventeenth 
century thinking in the debates over the significance of common law. He 
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  71explained that the adherents of what he calls the ‘Common-law Mind’ presumed 
that:
52   
 
The common law was the only law their land had ever known, and this by 
itself encouraged them to interpret the past as if it had been governed by 
the law of their own day; but in addition the fact that the common law was 
a customary law, and that lawyers defined custom in a way which heavily 
emphasised its immemorial character, made even more radical the English 
tendency to read existing law into the remote past.  
 
The principal source for information about the ancient constitution and 
common law is Sir Edward Coke whose Reports were published in eleven parts 
over 15 years from 1600 and whose Institutes of the Laws of England were 
published from 1628 to 1644.
53 Indeed, as Pocock observed, Coke ‘did more 
than any other man to summarize it and make it authoritative’.
54 In Coke’s time 
the ancient constitution was taken as a short-hand reference to the ‘whole body 
of English law – including the customs of the high court of parliament’.
55 
Writing about this topic, Corinne C. Weston described Coke as the ‘oracle’ of 
‘common law and statutory law’. While both influenced political thought, ‘it 
was common law that gave ancient constitutionalism its distinctive flavour’.
56
 
Coke explained that customs ‘attain force of law by title of prescription’. 
Weston observes that this principle ‘became conspicuous in Stuart discourse 
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  72when it was applied to ancient customs embodying rights and liberties’. Before 
customs ‘could be deemed prescriptive … they had to have existed before (or 
beyond) time of memory without written record to the contrary’. Usually the 
date of Richard I’s coronation, September 1189, was considered the divider 
between memory and those decisions that were made before the ‘time of 
memory’. In order to be deemed prescriptive, it was necessary for the customs 
to be ‘exercised regularly and constantly before and after 1189; usage must have 




This meant that the whole body of English law, including the customs of 
the high court of parliament, could be represented as immemorial.
58 As Pocock 
observed in the Ancient constitution and the feudal law, the ‘belief in the 
antiquity of the common law encouraged belief in the existence of an ancient 
constitution, reference to which was constantly made, precedents, maxims and 
principles from which were constantly alleged, and which was constantly 
asserted to be in some way immune from the king’s prerogative action’.
59
 
In the seventeenth century, this outlook came under sustained challenge.  
Leading this challenge was Thomas Hobbes, the political philosopher, 
mathematician and linguist.
60 He sought to ‘make men believe, that the Kings of 
England were absolute monarchs … the Parliaments of England merely nothing 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Pocock, above n 6, 233. 
59 Ibid. 46. 
60 Burns, above n 8, 678. 
  73but shadows’.
61 He devoted the greater part of his Dialogue of the Common 
Laws and much of Behemoth to refuting the idea that the ‘law is law because it 
is immemorial custom’. He also sought to discredit ‘artificial reason’, the idea 
advanced by Coke to describe ‘the accumulated and refined wisdom of many 
generations, which none but a professional could comprehend and no individual 
intellect, however great, could have produced’.
62
 
  Hobbes argued that the law was two things: it was the ‘dictate of a 
perfectly simple and universal natural reason’, which ‘enjoined those things 
which were good for our self-preservation’; and that laws were made ‘by the 
command of the sovereign, not because he possessed greater or less natural 
reason, but because he had been instituted by men in the state of nature to 
enforce a certain mode of living which natural reason enjoined’.
63
 
Hobbes used the following logic: ‘law may be custom, but custom alone 
has no binding force; for custom to become law requires that there should 
already exist an authority capable of making law by his injunctions. Therefore 
no law can be immemorial; before there can be law there must be a sovereign; 
and every law must have been made at a particular point in time.’
64
 
The lawyer and judge Sir Matthew Hale wrote a detailed response to the 
argument that a sovereign existed prior to decisions upon laws.
65 Hale’s 
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  74Reflections was written sometime before 1675 and several years before Hobbes’ 
work was published. It is presumed that Hale gained access to Hobbes’ 
arguments through the circulation of the latter’s unpublished manuscript.
66  
 
Hobbes’ points were politically controversial, since it had long been 
known that King James I considered ‘that all laws, customs and privileges were 
derived ultimately from his will’. Pocock observed that this polarisation opened 
up ‘an ideological gap … which could not be easily bridged’. The ‘ancient 






Hobbes and Hale also differed over the reasoning they applied to 
constitutionalism. Hobbes suggested that constitutionalism was based on 
universal and essential rules. Thus, he said if people expect their constitutional 
association to be anything other than a ‘crasie building, such as hardly lasting 
out their own time’, then it must be built with ‘the help of a very able 
Architect’.
68 Continued this theme, he said: ‘The skill of making and 
maintaining Common-wealths consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique 
and Geometry; not (as Tennis play) on Practice onely.’
69  
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  75Hale countered this argument by stating that ‘men are not borne Cōmon 
Lawyers, neither can the bare Exerciss of the Faculty of Reason give a man a 
Sufficient Knowledge of it, but it must be gained by the habituateing and 
accustomeing and Exerciseing that Faculty by readeing, Study and observation 
to give a Man a compleate Knowledge thereof’ (sic).
70 Hale argued that:
71  
 
it is not possible for men to come to the Same Certainty, evidence and 
Demonstration touching them as may be expected in Mathematicall 
Science, and they that please themselves w
th a perswasion that they can w
th 
as much evidence and Congruitie make out an unerring Systeme of Laws 
and Politiques equally applicable to all States and Occasions as Euclide 
demonstrates his Conclusions, deceive themselves w
th Notions w
ch prove 
ineffectual, when they come to particul
r application (sic).  
 
Tully sums up Hale’s reply as ‘the skill of making and maintaining a 
constitutional commonwealth is not a matter of a solitary, clever person 




In his ‘radical reappraisal of the political theory of Hobbes’,
73 Quentin 
Skinner explains that when Hobbes first developed his views about scientia 
civilis in the late 1630s, it was above all against the humanist ‘cast of thought 
that he sought to define himself and his project’.
74 Skinner says the initial view 
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  76that Hobbes articulated was that humanity’s ‘aim should be to argue deductively 
in such a way that any rationale person who accepts our premises will feel 
compelled to endorse the conclusions we derive from them’.
75 Hobbes 
developed his approach as a solution to the disunity and irregularity he 
considered was promoted by adherence to the ancient constitutions.
76
 
The views articulated by Hale were typical of the Renaissance humanist 
culture.
77 As mentioned earlier, the reasoning associated with this culture 
embraced the watchword of audi alteram partem. Skinner translates this as 
‘always listen to the other side’. He says in moral and political debates, this 
‘commitment stems from the belief that … it will always be possible to speak in 
utramque partem’, that is ‘arguing on both sides’.
78 This outlook presumes it 
‘will never be possible to couch our moral or political theories in deductive 
form’.
79 On these premises, Skinner says the ‘appropriate model will always be 
that of a dialogue’ where there is a ‘willingness to negotiate over rival intuitions 
concerning the applicability of evaluative terms’.
80 Thinking about the 
implications of this outlook for the study of recognition, Tully reasons it is 
always possible to speak on the other side because the criteria used for the 
application of moral and philosophical concepts ‘are so various and 
circumstantial, rather than essential and universal’ that any particular case 
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  77examined is ‘always open to more than one description and evaluation’ through 
using comparisons and contrasts with other cases.
81  
 
While Hobbes subsequently modified his views,
82 his initial views were 
taken as a model by the ‘theorists of modern constitutionalism’. Tully says one 
aspect of this model of reasoning is its reliance on the monological contributions 
of individuals. Typically, with this form of reasoning the set piece keynote 
monologue or written contribution is used to address issues in dispute and are 
considered as a way to move forward. Listening is not valued by this form of 
reasoning as the presumption is to ‘win’ people to a rational view. Furthermore, 
it does not provide the experiences to engage in cultural negotiations. Such 
skills must come from elsewhere.  
 
Another feature of monological reasoning is its propensity to seek 
‘essential definitions and deducing general rules that any rational person would 
be compelled to accept’.
83 Elements of such an outlook are typically seen in 
constitutional contests about which definition will dominate. Its downside is its 
sidelining of the full range of uses for a concept and how it is practiced 
elsewhere by focussing on defining its essential characteristics.
84 In other words, 
definition-forming can become a substitute for engaging in dialogue with others 
about how they can be recognised by contemporary society.  
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  78The debate over changes to the federal Marriage Act is a case in point. It 
is an example of how adherents of modern constitutionalism can actively use 
language to block claims for recognition. In 2004, the Howard Government 
redefined marriage to clarify that it only applied to a man and a woman. The act 
now says that marriage ‘means the union of a man and a woman to the 
exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life’.
85 With some attention 
now on why Australia is not following Britain’s path and legalising same sex 
unions, Howard justified his government’s action on nothing more than a 
personal belief that ‘marriage is for men and women’. Nick Miller characterised 
it as irrational argument covering ‘Blind stubborn conservatism and unadmitted 
homophobia.’
86 Hence, the recognition of same sex marriage was blocked by a 
prime minister who used his powerful position to modify an act of parliament.  
 
In light of Hobbes’ argument that scientific reasoning should be applied 
to constitutionalism, Tully considers scientific practice. While essentialist 
approaches are not applicable to constitutionalism, they also do not accurately 
capture  all the activities undertaken by scientists. As Tully notes, there are 
examples of natural scientists studying individual cases, advancing partial and 
competing sketches, drawing analogies with other cases as well as discussing 
their findings with as many colleagues as possible.
87 Thus, it may be argued that 
both forms of reasoning are used within the natural sciences. 
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  79The philosophy of constitutionalism articulated by Hobbes early in his 
life, along with the contributions of many others, eventually overwhelmed the 
humanist philosophy exemplified by Chief Justice Hale. Skinner argues the 
Hobbes/Hale debate is the ‘historical juncture’ for this shift from a ‘dialogical to 
a monological style of moral and political reasoning’.
88 Tully notes the irony 
that ‘successive monological theories’ have been accompanied by debates and 





The dialogical form of reasoning may not have a high profile, but it 
certainly has a long pedigree under the label casuistry. Casuistry comes from the 
Latin word casus, or case. It is described as an approach to ethical problems ‘in 
which the circumstances of cases affect the cases of general rules.
90 In their 
history of moral reasoning, Jonsen and Toulmin explain that those who 
originally practiced this activity looked to theologians and jurisprudents for 
‘theoretical justification’. An explicit methodology was not formulated, so 
Jonsen and Toulmin explain that only a study of the casuists’ actual practice 
‘reveals the steps they consistently took but seldom reflected on’.
91  
 
Jonsen and Toulmin identify six steps as ‘noteworthy for an 
understanding of the casuistic method’:
 92   
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  80•  the ‘reliance on paradigms and analogies’; 
•  The ‘appeal to maxims’; 
•  An ‘analysis of circumstances’; 
•  ‘[D]egrees of probability’; 
•  The ‘use of cumulative arguments’; and, 
•  The ‘presentation of a final resolution’. 
 
If the examples of common law cases are considered, it is possible to see 
that these provide lessons, not just about their outcome, but also about the 
method of arriving at the decision. Jonsen and Toulmin argue that ‘those 
philosophers who study the common law have always been familiar with the 
power that legal claims derive from historical precedents’. They also point out 
that if ‘we go back even to Coke or Clarendon, the history of Anglo-American 
common law has never despised case studies’.
93 Looking at the area of personal 
injury, they say ‘one can scarcely make sense of the evolution or the meaning of 
tort concepts
94 without tracing the key cases by which equitable resolution of 
personal injury suits gave rise, successively, to concepts of negligence, and 
concepts of strict liability’. Following the study of anthropological and 
historical documents Jonsen and Toulmin ask:
95
 
How far have current paradigmatic, or ‘type’ cases, of, say, benefit and 
injury, veracity and falsehood, changed down the centuries? 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 2-3. 
94 Tort comes from the Latin word tortus, meaning twisted or crooked. Now is used to refer to a 
‘wrongful act or omission for which damages can be obtained in a civil court by the person 
wronged, other than a wrong that is only a breach of contract’. See Martin, above n 51, 467. 
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  81In what respects, if any, do such taxonomic changes refine people’s moral 
conceptions and improve their moral discrimination? (Attitudes toward the 
treatment of children or animals are fruitful topics for such case studies.) 
To what extent are the variations in the conception of honor, say, from 
nation to nation to be found in other moral conceptions also? Or are some 
shared ideas about, for example, loyalty and treachery or cruelty and 
kindness within the family more widespread in the actual practices of 
different peoples? 
 
While they believe that there will be philosophers who adopt a ‘tough-
minded’ anti-historical stance and say ‘these issues are irrelevant to their 
inquiries’, anyone who ‘feels the force of the historical links and rhetorical 
parallels between the arguments of common morality and common law, can find 
in the riches of the various casuistical traditions a valuable and largely untapped 
source of material for philosophical reflection and historical analysis’.
96
  
Jonsen and Toulmin add some specific comments on the practical form 
of reasoning, explaining that:
97  
 
If general, abstract theories in moral philosophy are read against their 
historical and social backgrounds, they will need to be understood not as 
making comprehensive and mutually exclusive claims but, rather, offering 
us limited and complementary perspectives on the whole broad complex of 
human conduct and moral experience, personal relations, and ethical 
reflection. So, interpreted, none of these theories tells us the whole truth 
… Instead, each of them gives us part of the larger picture.  
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  82 
Influenced by these ideas, Tully says ‘like many practical activities that 
are mastered by examples more than by rules, understanding a general concept 
consists in being able to give reasons why it should or should not be used in any 
particular case by describing examples with similar or related aspects, drawing 
analogies or disanalogies of various kinds, finding precedents and drawing 
attention to intermediate cases so that one can pass easily from familiar cases to 
the unfamiliar and see the relation between them’. Guided by this approach, for 
instance, the last chapter considered seven different types of recognition. Tully 




Applying this view of moral reasoning in Strange multiplicity, Tully 
undertakes a survey of the historical formation of modern constitutionalism, 
identifying features that ‘exclude or to assimilate cultural diversity’.
99 He 
contends these features are found in the writings of contemporary political and 
constitutional theorists,
100 and he engages with the ideas of Thomas Paine, John 
Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and Samuel Pufendorf among others 
theorists.
101 He outlines a series of examples in the Aboriginal and common–law 
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  83traditions where the three conventions have been applied.
102 He discusses the 
stance expressed by English Chief Justice Hale, the 1832 judgement of United 
States Chief Justice of Supreme Court John Marshall in Worcester v Georgia
103 
and the 1664 Two Row Wampum Treaty of the Haudenosaunee in America.
104 
An additional chapter focuses on examples where ‘diverse federalism’ has been 
adopted. Here Tully discusses the confederation of the provinces leading to the 
formation of Canada in 1867, the Québec Act of 1774, linguistic minorities in 





  The writings of the Austrian twentieth century philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein are also relevant when thinking about language and 
constitutionalism.
106 His Philosophical Investigations introduces an analogy 
between language and an ancient city to illustrate how people acquire 
understanding. It is a ‘maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, 
and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a 
multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses’. He 
asks if ‘our language is complete’ and implies it may never be so when he 
considers whether it was complete ‘before the symbolism of chemistry and the 
                                                 
102 See Chapter 4: ‘The historical formation of common constitutionalism: the rediscovery of 
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  84notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it’. These are, ‘so to 
speak’, the ‘suburbs of the language’.
107 As Tully observes, ‘like a city’, 
language grows up in ‘a variety of forms through long use and practice, 




  Like a city, words can have multiple meanings and considering 
the different kinds of sentences, Wittgenstein continues:
 109  
 
Say assertion, question, and command? – There are countless kinds: 
countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, 
‘sentences.’ And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and 
for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, 
come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.  
 
Wittgenstein uses the term ‘language-game’ to promote the idea that the 
‘speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’.
110 Just as a 
guide can point to diverse housing styles within a city, so we can find 
overlapping language additions from other periods.
111  
 
Others who study Wittgenstein’s ideas make similar points. For instance, 
Monk describes Wittgenstein reflections in the Philosophical Investigations 
about an earlier work he and the celebrated mathematician Bertrand Russell had 
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  85undertaken on language. Monk said they were ‘misled, by concentrating on one 
type of language, the assertoric sentence, into trying to analyse the whole of 
language as though it consisted of nothing but that type, or as though the other 
uses of language could be analysed as variations on that basic theme’. Monk 
comments that Wittgenstein and Russell ‘had had too rigid a notion of 
proposition, and the purpose of the language-game method was, so to speak, to 
loosen such notions’.
112 Similarly, McGinn writes that ‘Wittgenstein’s concept 
of a language-game is clearly to be set over and against the idea of language as a 
system of meaningful signs that can be considered in abstraction from its actual 
employment. Instead of approaching language as a system of signs with 
meaning, we are prompted to think about it in situ, embedded in the lives of 
those who speak it.’
113  
 
Application to constitutionalism 
 
While Tully’s presentation of Wittgenstein’s language games in Strange 
multiplicity is not new, his view that constitutionalism is best understood as a 
language is original. Earlier we saw that Tully describes contemporary 
constitutionalism as comprising both modern constitutionalism as well as other 
languages that have been ‘elbowed aside’ so that they are hidden from the 
attention of many of the participants in contemporary societies.
114 Tully applies 
Wittgenstein’s ideas about language to constitutionalism, observing that ‘it is 
the language that has been woven into the activity of acting in accordance with 
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  86and going against modern constitutionalism’. Thus, it involves the meaning of 
terms such as constitutionalism and other associated terms such as ‘sovereignty, 




Explaining why constitutionalism is like a language, Tully uses 
Wittgenstein’s analogy of language and city. He writes that like a city 
contemporary constitutionalism has evolved with a ‘variety of forms’ that 
through ‘long use and practice’ have gained authority. Like a city, 
constitutionalism does not have a ‘uniform constitution imposed by a single 
lawgiver’. However, like a city, there are also ‘areas of it that have been made 
regular by reforms, just like some newer neighbourhoods of a city’.
116   
 
Tully also says like a language, constitutionalism cannot be understood 
through a singular comprehensive theory, but ‘is woven into the practices and 
institutions of contemporary societies’. He notes that a language ‘is too 
multiform to be represented in a theory or comprehensive rule that stipulates the 
essential conditions for the correct application of words in every instance’. He 
argues this is analogous with a city since ‘there is no such comprehensive view 
of the constitution of a city’.
117 Wittgenstein made a similar point when he 
describes language as ‘a labyrinth of paths’ where you ‘approach from one side 
and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and 
                                                 
115 Ibid. 36.  
116 Ibid. 104.  
117 Id. 
  87no longer know your way about’.
118 On this basis then, ‘like a constitutional 
association, language is aspectival’.
119
 
Such an approach contrasts with the normative political and legal 
vocabulary. In Western thought, constitutionalism is often defined in ways that 
do not take account of the breadth of contemporary claims for recognition. In 
Strange multiplicity Tully uses constitutionalism in a broader sense to 
encompass all these types of claims and to discuss those features involved in 
constituting ‘modern political associations’.
120 Referring then to the claims of 
the nationalist movements, he describes these as movements ‘seeking to be 
constitutionally recognised as either independent nation states or as autonomous 
political associations within various forms of multinational federations and 
confederations’.
121 Compare this to the meaning expressed in the Oxford 
Dictionary of Politics. Here ‘constitution’ is described as the ‘set of 
fundamental rules governing the politics of a nation or subnational body’.
122 
Tully’s approach is broader on two counts. While constitutionalism certainly 
includes rules, it does not stop there. Character, conventions, outlook, vision and 
culture are also encompassed by ‘constitutionalism’. Nor does he restrict 
constitutional recognition to the claims of nationalists. To the extent that the 
other types of claims seek modifications to or an independent political 
association, Tully considers they too are constitutional demands. Because the 
concern here is to examine the diverse claims for recognition and protection, 
constitutionalism will also be used in this broad sense.  
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  88 
From Tully’s perspective, constitutionalism has a ‘labyrinth of terms and 
their uses from various periods’ and their use could be considered analogous to 
negotiating our way around Wittgenstein’s city. Tully explains that the 
‘theorists and citizens who inhabit these modern suburbs are accustomed to their 
straight and narrow ways, characteristic forms of thought and relatively stable 
uses, and they tend to presume that their ways should determine the whole’. 
They presume that a modern constitution should consist of ‘some combination’ 
of the ‘seven essential features’. Tully says modern theorists do not see it as one 
possible arrangement about how a neighbourhood might be organised, but as a 
‘comprehensive rule by which all political associations’ should be guided.
123 
Among the modern theorists, the ‘terms and uses of those terms’ associated with 
modern constitutionalism have ‘come to be accepted as the authoritative 
political traditions of interpretation of modern constitutional societies’. It is 
within this frame that descriptions, reflections, criticisms, changes, and indeed 




Tully gives the ‘craving for generality’ of modern constitutionalism as 
another reason for drawing his analogy. Wittgenstein considered that one source 
of this craving lies with ‘our preoccupation with the method of science’ and he 
suggested this is accompanied by a ‘contemptuous attitude toward the particular 
case’.
125 He explained that the view that a general term is understood through 
                                                 
123 Tully, above n 1, 104-5.  
124 Ibid. 36. 
125 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The blue and brown books: preliminary studies for the ‘Philosophical 
investigations’, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 18 (“The blue and brown books”); Tully, 
above n 1, 105. 
  89finding ‘the common element of all its applications’ is one that has ‘shackled 
philosophical investigation’. Not only had this ‘led to no result’, but it had also 
‘made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone 
could have helped … to understand the usage of the general term’.
126 Drawing 
out the analogy between the ‘image of an ancient city’ and language, Tully says 
this craving ‘overlooks and generates a contemptuous attitude toward the 
irreducible multiplicity of concrete usage’.
127    
 
The craving for generality is reflected in the essentialist quest to 
determine the ‘right’ definition rather than a focus on what different 
perspectives are attempting to achieve. This quest for generality can lead to an 
examination of the term ‘constitutionalism’ where this is undertaken without 
any reference to other claims for recognition. Once this method is adopted 
disagreements are confined to ‘the interpretation and application of this great 
map … This map is then projected over the whole, hiding the diversity 
beneath.’
128 This method does not bring us closer to resolving problems but 
creates obstacles in the way of their resolution. Instead, Wittgenstein (as well as 
Tully) emphasises that the different uses of the term can become apparent once 
participants engage in a dialogue about the constitutional association they seek.  
 
Tully also discusses how knowledge of a general rule is gathered, 
drawing upon Wittgenstein’s analogy between rules and sign-posts. Arguing 
that the ‘application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules’ Wittgenstein 
asks, ‘Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?’ 
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  90Continuing this theme, he probes further: ‘Does it shew (sic) which direction I 
am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or 
cross-country?’ Developing this logic, Wittgenstein concludes that ‘the sign-
post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room 
for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical 
proposition, but an empirical one.’
129 A recent visit to England’s North 
Yorkshire Moors brought this analogy home to me. A friend and I travelled 
down many narrow country lanes over a few days. In addition to the frequent 
sign-posts, we were assisted by a small-scale ordinance survey map providing 
lots of detail of the villages of the region. Did the assistance provided by both 
sets of ‘rules’ ensure that we were never lost? Well, yes, most of the time it did, 
but not always. Fortunately though, we weren’t lost for too long.  
 
Wittgenstein argues that ‘there is a way of grasping a rule which is not 
an interpretation’, but which is exhibited in what is called ‘obeying the rule’ 
and ‘going against it’ in actual cases. Moreover, in discussing his use of the 
term ‘interpretation’, Wittgenstein says it is not helpful to say that ‘every act 
according to the rule is an interpretation’, rather restricting its use to 
circumstances where it is substituted for another ‘expression of the rule’.
130
 
Drawing upon this analogy, Tully comments “If I am in doubt about 
how to interpret and follow the rule, or if I can interpret it in endless ways, then 
the rule and its interpretation ‘do not determine meaning’.” Nevertheless, the 
analogy is still well made, for the meaning about rule-following does not only 
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  91come from a study of the rules. This is why driving tests always have a written 
component about ‘the rules’ and a practical component where the learner 
demonstrates their skill in driving the vehicle. That is, the meaning of rule-
following also comes from practice. Indeed, when it comes to constitutionalism, 
as Tully says, ‘even if a theorist could provide a theory which specified the 
exhaustive conditions for the interpretation and application of the general terms 
of constitutionalism in every case, as modern theorists … have sought to do’ 
this will not enable us to fully understand constitutionalism. There will always 




On this basis Tully advances an alternative approach to that articulated 
by modern constitutional theorists. He describes the understanding of a general 
term as ‘nothing more than the practical activity of being able to use it in 
various circumstances’. He says such ‘a grasp is not the possession of a theory, 
but the manifestation of a repertoire of practical, normative abilities, acquired 




In discussing his analogy of the sign-post, Wittgenstein also noted that 
custom is an element of how we proceed when we arrive at a road junction. He 
explains that when a person uses a sign-post to guide them on their journey, it 
presumes they are acquainted with the idea of using sign-posts. Describing the 
circumstances where ‘obeying a rule’ occurs, he observed that it is ‘not possible 
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  92that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a 
rule’. Similarly, it ‘is not possible that there should have been only one occasion 
on which a report was made, an order given or understood’. Hence, to obey a 
rule or to carry out other activities such as making a report, playing a game of 
chess ‘are customs (uses, institutions)’.
133 Similarly, Tully makes the point that 
the ‘uses of general terms’ are ‘intersubjective’ practices or ‘customs’, like 
tennis or the ‘practice’ of law.
134  
 
As has been implied throughout the discussion of Wittgenstein’s 
description of language as a game, Tully also considers that contemporary 
constitutionalism to be ‘a game in which the participants alter the conventions 
as they go along’.
135 Indeed, it is through this path that women succeeded in 
challenging their exclusion from many aspects of society. For instance, the 
campaign to extend franchise to women challenged and succeeded in modifying 
the norm that participation in elections was the province of men only. The 
change was achieved through emphasising that the restriction to male only 
voting was inconsistent with adherence to the idea of equality.
136  
 
Because the game does not occur in an idealised situation, but within the 
authoritative traditions of interpretation, it can be distorted by those who seek to 
use their ‘instrumental power’ to exclude claims from public discussion or to 
reframe them in ways that suit a particular interpretation. Thus, the language of 
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  93modern constitutionalism ‘holds in place a picture of a modern constitution that 
consists of seven features’.
137  
 
Contemporary constitutionalism   
 
The analogy between constitutionalism and language also significantly 
enriches a general understanding of contemporary constitutionalism. Tully 
describes contemporary constitutionalism as ‘exceedingly complex’, 
‘comprising a vast network of conventions and ways of employing terms 
developed over hundreds of years’. He says a ‘relatively narrow range of 
familiar uses of these terms’ have come to be accepted as authoritative in the 
political traditions of contemporary societies. He identifies three of the most 
important Western ‘traditions of interpretation’ as liberalism, nationalism and 
communitarianism. When a demand for constitutional recognition is judged by 
those in authority ‘to contradict the norms of constitutionalism’, Tully says what 
they mean is that it is ‘incompatible with the range of normal usage’ for these 
terms in their tradition of interpretation of contemporary constitutionalism.
138  
 
Tully advocates a different approach to constitutionalism. He explains 
that the ‘apparent incompatibility can be dissolved simply by pointing to 
distinctions and uses in the language of contemporary constitutionalism’ that the 
influence of the traditions of interpretation ‘causes us to overlook, yet which are 
perfectly justifiable’.
139 Indeed this is the approach he adopts in discussing the 
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  94rediscovery of cultural diversity.
140 Here he shows that the prevailing language 
of these traditions of interpretation ‘has elbowed aside entire areas of the 
broader language of constitutionalism … which provide the means of 
recognising and accommodating cultural diversity’.
141   
 
While contemporary use may suggest constitutionalism is narrowly 
defined, Tully argues that despite the wishes of the traditional interpreters, 
constitutionalism is much more complex and ‘is neither exclusively imperial nor 
exclusively European’. While its modern features ‘were developed in the age of 
European imperialism’, it is ‘also the language in which anti-imperial struggles’ 
have been fought inside and outside Europe over the same period. Similarly, the 
struggles of women for constitutional recognition have been articulated through 




Hence, Tully considers it a ‘misrepresentation’ to view the language of 
contemporary constitutionalism as a ‘monolithic masculine, European and 
imperial structure’ that must somehow be swept away ‘if the first step of 
recognition is to be just’.  Instead, he views contemporary constitutionalism as 
composed of complex sites ‘of interaction and struggle’ within Europe, but also 
with non-European peoples and cultures. He says the language of 
constitutionalism has been shaped by these contests ‘and formed by other 
cultures in ways that European imperial writers would find unrecognisable’, 
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  95citing Eric Wolf and Edward Said in support of this contention.
143 Said, for 
instance, observed that if ‘we look back at the cultural archive, we begin to 
reread it not univocally but contrapuntally, with a simultaneous awareness both 
of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against 
which (and together with which) the dominant discourses act’.
144
 
If the notion that contemporary constitutionalism has a monological 
tradition is to be successfully challenged, then it is necessary to reflect upon the 
origins of constitutional languages. People gain their constitutional traditions 
through long use and practice. When writing about norms, Tully says they 
‘gradually gain their authority by acts in conformity with them and by appeals 
to them by both sides, as warrants of justification, when they are 
transgressed’.
145 While these comments are specifically made about the 
language of common constitutionalism, modern constitutionalism too gained 
authority in European/American thought through similar processes. As was 
considered in Chapter 2, this language gained authority so that a ‘picture’ is held 
‘in place … consisting of seven main features’.
146  
 
  When writing about the long use of constitutional traditions, Tully 
clearly had in mind at least several hundred years since the tensions between 
modern and common constitutional languages originated over four hundred 
years ago.
147 While he locates the origins of modern constitutionalism in the 
seventeenth century, the beginnings of common constitutionalism occurred 
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  96much earlier. Coke identified the customs of common law as existing before the 
‘time of memory’. Writing in the early part of the seventeenth century, Coke 
identified customs that ‘could be deemed prescriptive’ because they existed 
longer than four hundred years ‘without written record to the contrary’.
148  
 
 Contemporary  constitutionalism, as distinct from modern 
constitutionalism, exhibits features that both reflect its flexibility and 
adaptability while other aspects point to its enduring stability and ‘its power to 
exclude and assimilate’. Tully points out how court judgements exhibit 
regularity in their ‘use of the terms of constitutionalism’ and that these frame 
public discussions of a constitutional society. While those in a discussion may 
or may not agree to use these terms in the ways used in a particular judgement, 
their agreement and disagreement with the judgement rest upon some sort of 
‘implicit agreement’ about the usage of the terms.
149 Wittgenstein makes a 
similar point in the Philosophical Investigations when in response to the 
question ‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?’ he says ‘It is what human beings say that is true and false; and 




The constitutional language is not just held in place by agreement in the 
use of terms, but also by the regular activities of a modern constitutional 
society. Parliaments, the courts, other aspects of bureaucracy, police, election 
voting and even protests, each have their common modes of operating and these 
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  97serve to contribute to stabilising the way in which claims are dealt.
151 The 
myriad of small decisions these organisations make contributes to stabilising the 
institutional framework.  
 
When the familiar terms are used as a backdrop to a claim for 
constitutional recognition, they serve as a normative foundation for a public 
discussion in two distinct ways. For instance, if in an a priori sense the only 
legitimate concept of a nation is defined as that being associated with a state,
152 
then those who seek to have their distinct culture recognised as a nation, such as 
Indigenous people, may have their claims rejected on the grounds that this 
conception is incompatible with the nation-state. The claimants are then obliged 
to redescribe their claims in the ‘prevailing language of constitutionalism’. As 
Tully observes, this is not the end of the matter though because the redescribed 
claim is then ‘critically adjudicated’ with conventional criteria for particular 
terms being used to test the claim. For instance, terms such as ‘nation’, a ‘right 
of self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty’ each function to provide the normative 
grounds that provide the basis to evaluate a particular claim. While the language 
of modern constitutionalism has some distinct features, within this frame 
different schools of thought in the liberal, nationalist and communitarian 
traditions interpret the claim slightly differently and will jockey for position.
153  
 
Another tendency exhibited by modern constitutionalism is a preference 
to view constitutionalism as an imposition or explicit agreement favourably 
contrasted to customary forms of association. The contrast between the ‘new’ 
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  98‘modern’ constitution and the ‘older traditional view’ is discussed by McIlwain. 
He says that traditionally the term ‘constitution … was applied only to the 
substantive principles to be deduced from a nation’s actual institutions and their 
development’, that is taking account of its custom and practice.
154 This is 
reflected in the classical definition advanced by Bolingbroke in 1733 where he 
described a constitution as the ‘assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, 
derived from certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects 
of public good, that compose the general system according to which the 
community hath agreed to be governed.’
155 Hence, this definition can embrace 
the ‘conscious formulation by a people’ as well as their custom and practice.
156
 
Tully says that Bolingbroke’s definition has a strong historical 
foundation. The Greek meaning for constitutional law, nomos, embraced both 
‘what is agreed by the people’ and ‘what is customary’. Tully employs 
Sophocles’ Antigone to dramatise this contrast. Creon defends the constitutional 
laws of Thebes ‘since they had been deliberately imposed by men’. Antigone 
though protests that the constitution ‘fails to recognise the underlying 
assemblage of customs of family, hearth and burial, to which the people are 
subject’. Haemon tries to persuade Creon, unsuccessfully as it turns out, that 
‘both aspects of a constitution must be conciliated if justice is to be served’.
157 
Tully argues it is false to develop the contrast between imposition and custom 
and that both can reflect the consent of a free people. Relating his point to 
Bolingbroke’s definition, he explains that ‘the reason why the customary ways 
                                                 
154 McIlwain, above n 7, 3. 
155 Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke, ‘A dissertation upon parties’ (1733-4) in The works of 
Lord Bolingbroke, reprinted 1967, (London: F. Cass 1844), Vol II, 88. 
156 McIlwain, above n 7, 2-3. 
157 Tully, above n 1, 60. 
  99of the people have the authority of constitutional law’ is that they are the 
expression of the ‘agreement of the people’.
158 Thus, recalling the debate 
between Hale and Hobbes referred to earlier in this chapter, the stance taken by 
Hobbes reflected a view that limited constitutionalism to the imposition of the 
king (and not of a free people), whereas Hale emphasised constitutionalism 
arising from long use and practice.  
 
For this reason, when people seek to have their claims recognised they 
are also wishing to broaden the meaning of constitutionalism so they are 
included. That is, they wish to have their customs and practices recognised. For 
instance, when Aboriginal people at the United Nations demand recognition as 
‘nations’ with a ‘right to self determination’ they are arguing that the prevailing 
criteria and the terms employed should be revised so that they are included. 
From the outline presented by Tully about constitutional languages, it becomes 
possible to see that the demands of Aboriginal people are part of the umbrella of 





While Tully’s approach to constitutionalism may appear at first glance to 
be completely new, it actually rests firmly on four distinct themes. The first of 
these is its support for the continuity of custom. This is brought out in the 
contrasting attitudes between the ancient and modern constitutionalism as noted 
by Bolingbroke and McIlwain. On one side is an emphasis on the continuity of 
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  100ancient laws and customs; on the other was the idea of founding a new 
constitutional basis. Another theme is based upon practical skills honed by 
experience. Hale was the exemplar in articulating the seventeenth century 
response to Hobbes’ picture of the expert with an a priori knowledge. A further 
theme arises from the long tradition of moral reasoning in European history that 
Jonsen and Toulmin locate as existing from the time of Aristotle onwards. They 
emphasise the particularity developed from case examples rather than general 
abstract theory. The fourth theme comes from Wittgenstein’s writings on 
language games. From the latter’s work Tully establishes the analogy between 
language and constitutionalism. Together though these themes hold the promise 
of addressing contemporary constitutional problems by a very different method 
than that proposed by modern theorists. In Strange multiplicity, Tully weaves 
these strands together in a convincing fashion that provides a persuasive and 
innovative contribution to the debate over constitutionalism.  
 
Thus constitutionalism is not advanced through the development of new 
theories but is achieved through a ‘humble and practical dialogue’ in which the 
participants exchange ‘limited descriptions of actual cases, learning as they go 
along’.
160 Tully builds both upon the anthropological work of Carrithers and 
Wolf and the Cambridge tradition of examining historical moral and political 
theory. He determines that he would ‘survey the language employed in the 
current debate over recognition in order to identify the shared conventions (the 
distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that 
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  101are taken for granted in the course of the debate) which render recognition 
problematic and give rise to the range of conflicting solutions’.
161  
 
To the question: ‘Can a modern constitution recognise and accommodate 
cultural diversity?’, Tully answers in the affirmative and says this can occur if 
constitutionalism is reconceived as a form of activity where cultural diversity 
can be accommodated. Abandoning the presumption of constitutionalism as 
monolithic and viewing it instead as an extremely complex network of 
conventions it becomes possible to identify the influence of different 
constitutional languages upon contemporary thought.  
 
Some possible challenges can be anticipated to the application of Tully’s 
alternative approach to the events around Mabo. It is unlikely that the 
examination in the last chapter in identifying the features of modern 
constitutionalism will be contentious. After all, the descriptions are familiar to 
those engaging with both historical as well as contemporary political thought. 
Nor is it likely that relating the historical clashes between those who embraced 
modern constitutionalism and those who defend common constitutionalism will 
be controversial, except perhaps among those who specialise in ancient history. 
 
One area though that is likely to be controversial is Tully’s application 
of Wittgenstein’s views on language to the study of constitutionalism. Another 
theme that may be challenged is its specific application to the examination of 
the claims of Indigenous people in North America. One reason for such 
objections is that at first glance Tully’s approach appears inconsistent with the 
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  102particular difficulties that Indigenous peoples in Commonwealth countries have 
experienced in gaining recognition in the twentieth century. It is, therefore, a 
reasonable request that a more specific examination be undertaken where the 
conventions of common constitutionalism can be considered in order to assess 
their basis to recognise and accommodate the claims of Indigenous people. This 
should also help to clarify the differences between ideas elaborated by Tully and 
those of other scholars writing about Indigenous claims at common law. This 
task is the focus of the next chapter.  
  103 
  104Chapter 4: 
Common constitutionalism and the claims 
of Indigenous peoples 
 
 
[The] philosophy and practice of constitutionalism [is] informed by the 
spirit of mutual recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity … 
[consists] … in the negotiation and mediation of claims to recognition in a 
dialogue governed by the conventions of mutual recognition, continuity 
and consent.   
   James  Tully,  Strange multiplicity
1
 
Having outlined the core ideas underpinning an alternative approach to 
understanding constitutionalism, this chapter focuses on the language of 
common constitutionalism and its application to the claims of Indigenous 
peoples. An explanation will be provided as to why Tully argues that common 
constitutionalism is able to provide a just basis to the recognition of Indigenous 
peoples through the guidance of its conventions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
Tully indicates that this language was expressed on several occasions at sites of 
the common law of Commonwealth countries.
2 In this chapter some of the 
applications of this language will be considered and specific examples are 
discussed about how the three conventions guide a number of the common law 
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  105decisions. In addition, the three conventions will be compared to the works of 
two scholars who have also considered common law’s ability to recognise the 
claims of Indigenous peoples. Contributing further evidence as to the suitability 
of the three conventions a comparison between this alternative language and the 




Tully’s ideas are compared to those outlined in Common law aboriginal 
title by  Canadian scholar Kent McNeil. McNeil uses legal doctrine to 
demonstrate the precedence for recognising ‘outstanding aboriginal land claims 
in any territory originally made British by settlement’.
4 Another scholar, Robert 
A. Williams (Jr), concentrates on American Indian in Western legal thought and 
draws very different conclusions. He concluded that a ‘will to empire proceeds 
most effectively under a rule of law’. Describing the common law as a 
‘discourse of conquest’, he charges that it has denied ‘fundamental human rights 
and self-determination to indigenous tribal peoples’.
5 Unlike Tully and McNeil, 
Williams does not elaborate a distinct way forward for common law. Rather, he 
contends that the ‘West’s vision’ can only be modified once a vision has been 
articulated and defined by ‘contemporary tribalism’.
6  
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  106The conventions of common constitutionalism 
 
   Tully explains that the three conventions of common constitutionalism 
have become ‘authoritative’ over centuries of constitutional practice, ‘including 
criticism and contestation of that practice’. They gradually gained their 
authority through acts being taken ‘in conformity with them and by appeals to 
them by both sides, as warrants of justification, when they are transgressed’.
7
 
Mutual recognition is a short-hand phrase referring to each party 
recognising the other party on their own terms. Hence, it cannot simply be the 
‘recognition of each culture in the same constitutional form’.
8 Instead, mutual 
recognition is based upon conceiving constitutionalism as an activity, an 
‘intercultural dialogue’, where ‘culturally diverse sovereign citizens … 
negotiate agreements on their forms of association over time in accordance with 
the three conventions …’
9  
 
The classic formulation about how to achieve mutual recognition was 
provided by John Marshall, the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in his judgement on US-Aboriginal relations in the 1832 case 
Worcester v the State of Georgia.
10 The case concerned Samuel Worcester, a 
citizen of the state of Vermont who entered the land of the Cherokee Nation 
with their permission to carry out missionary work. The state of Georgia 
indicted him because he entered the state without a licence or a permit from its 
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  107Governor. Charged for the absence of a permit he was sentenced to four years 
hard labour. Worcester subsequently appealed to the US Supreme Court.
11
 
In considering the appeal, Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
12
 
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a 
distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other 
and the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing 
themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to comprehend the 
proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have 
rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or 
over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other 
should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which 
annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors. 
 
That is, he considered that the ‘Indian nations have always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time 
immemorial ...’
13 His decision affirmed the recognition of the Cherokee Nation, 
finding that the laws of Georgia had no force and that the citizens of Georgia 
had no right to enter the Cherokee Nation ‘but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves ...’ For this reason, he found that the act under which Worcester was 
found guilty should not have been applied.
14
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  108Tully observes though that ‘if the Aboriginal peoples of America’ are 
recognised as ‘independent nations’, as Marshall argues, ‘the initial conditions 
of constitutional theory and practice in North America’ do not reflect any of the 
formulations identified with the language of modern constitutionalism. Instead, 
the approach adopted by the Cherokee Nation and the British in their 
negotiations was to agree on a ‘form of mutual recognition’.
15 In this example, it 
involved both parties recognising the other as independent, self-governing 
nations, or in the words of Marshall, they are ‘asserted by one, and admitted by 
the other’.
16 Tully argues that the ‘initial reason’ why the Crown negotiators 
‘recognised the Aboriginal peoples as nations is that they did not redescribe the 




For instance, William Johnson, the chief Crown negotiator, told the 
Lords of Trade in 1763 that the ‘Indians of the Ottawa Confederacy ... and also 
the Six Nations ... all along considered the Northern parts of Northern America, 
as their sole property from the beginning; and although the conveniency of 
Trade, (with fair speeches and promises) induced them to afford both us and the 
French settlements in their Country, yet they never understood such settlement 
as a Dominion, especially as neither we, nor the French ever made a conquest of 
them’. Summarising their attitude, Johnson states that the ‘Indians ... are not 
subject to our Laws and they consider themselves as a free people’.
18
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  109Some general comments about the forms of mutual recognition may be 
of assistance. The form chosen is guided by the initial identification of those 
seeking cultural recognition. Two distinct aspects are involved. One arises from 
using the ethic of self-identification, so that those seeking recognition can speak 
‘in one’s own cultural voice’ and identify how they wish to be described. This is 
crucial to establishing cultural respect and ‘civic dignity’.
19 The other aspect 
concerns the practical steps considered necessary to achieve the recognition of a 
particular culture. As discussed in Chapter 3, in this respect constitutionalism 
has a broader meaning than its association with a particular constitution. In 
some cases, it is possible that mutual recognition may be established through 
legislative changes that do not involve changes to a constitution. For instance, 
the recognition of same-sex relationships may take the form of legislative 
amendments to establish the basis for recognition. With other claims, however, 




As a concept consent has a long presence in common law. In his book on 
the subject, Young said it is a ‘very ancient idea in our law that a person was 
deemed to have consented …’
20 Today it plays a central role in the relations 
between individuals and between individuals and corporations. For instance, a 
marriage or a contract where a party does not consent is usually considered 
invalid. Likewise, rape is deemed to have occurred if consent was not given to 
                                                 
19 Tully, above n 1, 34. 
20 P.W. Young, The law of consent, (Sydney: The Law Book Company Limited, 1986), 4. 




Consent has also been integral to relations between states since the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia.
22 Moreover, it is generally considered that lawful 
government is based upon the consent of the people.
23 It has also been applied 
to relations between peoples under some form of common protection. For 
example, it was relevant to the Worcester v Georgia case that treaties were 
made between the Cherokee Nation and the United States government. Part of 
the terms was for the government of the United States of America to extend 
protection to the Cherokee Nation. The treaties were made in 1735 at Hopewell, 
in 1791 at Holston as well as several at Philadelphia and Washington City, ‘all 
of which ... [were] duly ratified by the Senate of the United States of 
America’.
24 Respecting these treaties, the boundaries between the United States 
and Cherokee Nation were to be ‘described ... by mutual consent’.
25
 
Chief Justice Marshall considered that while European governments 
possessed a right of ‘discovery’ over part of America, this ‘could not affect the 
rights of those already in possession ...’ Thus, Marshall said that ‘discovery’ 
only provides an exclusive right against other European nations to settle and 
acquire land from the Aboriginal occupants. It was an ‘exclusive principle’ that 
                                                 
21 Elizabeth A. Martin (Ed), A Dictionary of Law, Fourth Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 97, 380-1.  
22 Hermann Kinder & Werner Hilgemann, The Penguin Atlas of World History: Vol 1: From the 
Beginning to the Eve of the French Revolution, Translated by Ernest A. Menze, with maps 
designed by Harald and Ruth Bukor, (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1974), 255; Tully, above n 
1, 8. 
23 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: The 
MacMillan Press, 1992), 272-5.  
24 Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 538 (1832). 
25 Ibid. 555. 
  111‘shut out the right of competition among those who had agreed to it: not one 
which could annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it’. Thus, 
while it provides an ‘exclusive right to purchase’, it is not founded upon ‘a 
denial of the right of the possessor to sell’.
26
 
Chief Justice Marshall also rejected other theoretical approaches not 
based upon consent such as those that treated Aboriginal people either as 
individuals or as cultural minorities within sovereign European-type institutions. 
After reviewing the content of the Treaty of Peace signed with the Cherokee 
Nation, Marshall stated that these ‘articles are associated with others, 
recognizing their title to self-government. The very fact of repeated treaties with 
them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker 
power does not surrender its independence – its right to self-government, by 
associating with a stronger and taking its protection.’
27
 
Generalising from this experience, Tully argues that the form of consent 
should always be tailored to the form of mutual recognition of the people 
involved.
28 In this case, Chief Justice Marshall noted this form was the treaty 
system made between the Indian nations and the British, which the United 
States inherited following the war of independence. Marshall noted the ‘treaty, 
in its language, and in its provisions, is formed as near as may be, on the model 
of treaties between the crowned heads of Europe’.
29 Tully notes that on this 
approach, the ‘Crown negotiated, and continues to negotiate, with the First 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 543-4; Tully, above n 1, 123.  
27 Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 560-1 (1832).  
28 Tully, above n 1, 123. 
29 Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 550 (1832). 
  112Nations to purchase territory from them, to gain their recognition of Crown 
government in America, and to work out various relations of protection and co-
operation over time’. He considers that in ‘one of the most generous acts of 
recognition and accommodation in history, the Aboriginal nations in turn 
negotiated, and continue to negotiate, to cede land and settle boundaries, 
recognise the legitimacy of Crown governments and work out relations of 
protection and co-operation’.
30 Thus, consent is based upon the Crown 
governments, and their successors, respecting the equal and prior sovereignty of 




The convention of continuity expresses a respect for the cultural 
identities of each party. Tully argues the convention to continue a people’s 
customary ways and forms of government into new forms of constitutional 
associations with others is the ‘oldest in Western jurisprudence’. Conversely, to 
discontinue them without their explicit consent would breach the convention of 
consent. In early modern law of nations this convention held even in the case of 
conquest. ‘If the conqueror recognises them, either expressly or by long 




                                                 
30 Tully, above n 1, 123.  
31 Ibid. 125. 




A weak State, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the 
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of 
government, and ceasing to be a State. Examples of this kind are not 
wanting in Europe. ‘Tributary and feudatory states,’ says Vattel, ‘do not 
thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states so long as self-
government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the 
administration of the state’.  
 
Chief Justice Marshall upheld this approach and the convention when he 
considered relations between the Cherokee Nation and the United States 
government. Examining the terms of the Treaty of Holston he observed the 
‘relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more 
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and 
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master’. On these grounds, it was 
‘equally inconceivable’ that the Cherokee Nation would have ‘devested [sic] 




History shows though that the convention of continuity has frequently 
not been respected. Tully explains that when Norman law was introduced 
following the conquest of England by William in the eleventh century, it held 
the view that a ‘new constitutional association’ discontinues or ‘extinguishes’ 
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33 Ibid. 554-5. 
  114the ‘pre-existing customs and ways of a people’.
34 Thomas Hobbes presented 
the classical defence of constitutional discontinuity in Leviathan, arguing that a 
modern constitution should have precedence over the irregularity of the former 
customs. Considering the circumstances where a ‘Soveraign of one Common-
wealth ... subdue a People that have lived under other written Lawes’, he argued 
that they would be governed by ‘Civil Lawes of the Victor, and not of the 
Vanquished Commonwealth’. For instance, ‘where there be divers Provinces, 
within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of 
Lawes, which commonly are called Customes of each severall Province, we are 
not to understand that such Customs have their force, onely from Length of 
Time; but that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for 
the Constitutions, and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by 
vertue of the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present 
Soveraigns’. Hobbes asserted that the principle to be followed is that ‘all Lawes, 
written, and unwritten, have their Authority, and force, from the Will of the 
Common-wealth; that is to say, from the Will of the Representative’ [sic].
35 As 
Tully observes, this view denies the provinces autonomy and lacking ‘the 
authority to enter into constitutional negotiations’. Rather, authority is derived 
‘from the imperial Crown’.
36
 
Tully is particularly mindful of the applicability of the three conventions 
to minority cultures since they ‘seek recognition and accommodation within the 
institutions they share with members of the majority cultures of contemporary 
                                                 
34 Tully, above n 1, 125.  
35 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Richard Tuck, (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge, 1991), 185-6. 
36 Tully, above n 1, 145.  
  115societies’. He notes they are ‘more vulnerable because they cannot claim their 
own political institutions to protect their cultures’.
37 As noted earlier, he says the 
‘many-splendoured voices’ of women deserve to be ‘heard and recognised in 
appropriate and equitable ways’. Moreover, he says these claims test the 
credentials of the language of common constitutionalism. For if the three 
conventions do not support the ‘just demands of women and cultural minorities 
to amend these imperial institutions, they are useless ...’ However, he 
demonstrates by a series of examples that indeed the conventions ‘can be 
adapted to these complex cases and applied analogously to recognise and 
accommodate the cultural diversity of these citizens in just ways’.
38
 
The conventions and common law 
 
Tully has a different approach to constitutionalism than McNeil in 
Common law aboriginal title and Williams in The American Indian in western 
legal thought. It is therefore important to determine the attitudes of the latter 
two scholars toward the three conventions. 
 
McNeil does not consider the significance of recognition to Indigenous 
people, nor does he reflect upon its meaning in the context of a native title 
doctrine. Instead, its significance, and McNeil’s support for recognition, is 
implied by the logic of the argument he develops that under British colonial law 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 165.  
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  116Indigenous peoples are entitled to claim similar rights to those available to non-
Indigenous peoples. His concluding comments summarise his goal:
39  
 
All too often these people [Indigenous people] have been unfairly dealt 
with in the past because it was thought that their claims did not have a 
legal basis. A major aim of this book has been to dispel this false 
impression by showing even by the colonizers’ own rules indigenous 
people did – and in some cases, no doubt still do – have title to lands 
occupied by them. With this kind of legal argument behind them, 
indigenous people should be in a position to negotiate from strength. One 
can only hope that the result will be a just resolution of claims which have 
been ignored or denied for far too long. 
 
However, McNeil’s comments on the acquisition of territory do inform 
us about common law policy toward recognition. He says that the European 
powers had no guidance in the principles to apply. He writes that at the ‘dawn of 
the colonial era towards the end of the fifteenth century, there were no set rules 
of the acquisition of territories which were not already within the jurisdiction of 
a recognized sovereign’.
40 This opinion differs from Tully’s in two respects. 
Tully argues there is evidence to show that guidance was available to the 
European countries on how to proceed in its relations with other peoples. The 
second difference is the presumption underpinning McNeil’s examination is to 
treat the Indigenous land claims as non-constitutional. That is, and drawing an 
analogy with Tully’s investigation, McNeil’s work is written in the language of 
modern constitutionalism. This is partly because of the nature of his enquiry, 
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  117which is principally ‘doctrinal rather than jurisprudential’. However, it also 
reflects the context in which his discussion of Indigenous claims is located. 
Hence, as McNeil acknowledges, the ‘morality of the colonization process, the 




McNeil is explicit though in discussing the convention of continuity and 
refers to Brian Slattery’s thesis, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian 
Peoples as Affected by the Crown’s Acquisition of Their Territories. McNeil 
agrees that, “whatever the constitutional status of a colony (whether conquered, 
ceded, or settled), pre-existing private property rights would continue by virtue 
of what Slattery termed the ‘doctrine of continuity’, in the absence of seizure of 
privately-held lands by act of state during the course of acquisition of territorial 
sovereignty by the Crown, or subsequent confiscation by legislation”.
42 That is, 
his argument, based upon his examination of legal doctrine, is a diluted form of 
the continuity as explained by Tully. Legal doctrine states that continuity is to 
be subordinated to the ‘right’ of the sovereign to seize privately held lands. 
However, the norm of consent has almost no presence in McNeil’s work.
43  
 
Like McNeil, Williams does not explicitly discuss recognition. 
Nevertheless, his support for the convention is implied throughout his book both 
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  118from his critique of the ‘discourse of conquest’ to his promotion of an 
alternative vision embodied in the principles of Gus-Wen-The (also known as 
the Two Row Wampum Treaty). As he observes of this vision, at its core ‘is the 
idea that freedom requires different peoples to respect each other’s vision of 
how their respective vessels should be steered’.
44 The imagery of two ships 
travelling side by side down a river also permeates Tully’s work as he conveys 
the idea of ‘recognising and negotiating cultural diversity in a post-imperial 
age’.
45 A direct engagement with the ideas of recognition could have 
strengthened Williams’ thesis, allowing him to develop a contrast between the 
English stance articulated in the 1763 Proclamation and the eventual course that 
was adopted. 
 
The main reason why Williams and McNeil do not highlight the 
conventions of common constitutionalism is because they are not key to their 
respective theoretical frames. This is not to suggest the consent of Indigenous 
peoples is unimportant to the authors. Indeed, McNeil suggests ‘just solutions to 




Common law not uniform 
 
Neither McNeil nor Williams stress the contingent nature of common 
law, but present the experience of common law as either uniform or failing that, 
deficient. In the discussion of the 1832 Worcester v the State of Georgia case 
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  119Chief Justice Marshall articulated British relations with American Indians 
through the language of common constitutionalism, but McNeil only briefly 
refers to this decision, dismissing it as ‘inconsistent with Marshall’s earlier 
decisions … and …. [in conflict] with later authority’.
47 This dismissal probably 
follows from McNeil’s main purpose, as noted earlier. Similarly, while 
Williams discusses a number of Chief Justice Marshall’s judgements, the 
Worcester v the State of Georgia case is not mentioned. 
 
Williams’ presumption that common law is uniform is also linked to the 
purpose of his work: to identify the main factors shaping the unjust seizure of 
the lands occupied by American Indians. Unlike Tully, he does not see any 
significance in the language of those colonists who challenged the dominant 
outlook. This becomes apparent when comparing the respective attitudes of 
Tully and Williams toward Samuel Wharton. Wharton was a participant in the 
treaty negotiations with the American Indians and wrote Plain facts: being an 
examination into the rights of the Indian nations of America to their respective 
territories.
48    
 
Tully notes that while Locke argued the convention of consent ‘did not 
apply to Aboriginal peoples’ Wharton used the ‘Two treaties to defend their 
property and government’.
49 Tully notes that in Plain Facts Wharton also 
provided an account of the treaty system between British North America and the 
Aboriginal nations.
50  
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  120Williams acknowledges Wharton’s ‘remarkable document’ as providing 
‘perhaps the most radical statement on the topic of Indian rights in the 
Revolutionary era’.
51 However, he also dismisses Wharton and his 
collaborators’ motives: these ‘speculators in Indian land grants never regarded 
themselves primarily as crusaders for a racially neutral form of American 
egalitarianism that demanded recognition of the Indians’ title to their lands’. 
Instead, since land was the most important commodity for the colonists, he says 
they engaged with ‘Indian land rights’ as a ‘fungible commodity’.
52  
 
Williams traces the revolutionary-era struggle between those who shared 
Wharton’s outlook and the other two competing discourses: ‘the centralising 
feudal discourse of the Crown’s right of conquest of Indian lands’ and the 
“charter-based discourse of the ‘landed’ colonies”. He concludes that the idea of 
‘defending the right of Indians to own and freely sell their lands … failed to 
retain currency in American colonizing discourse’ by the time the ‘new 
Constitution was signed’ in 1787.
53 Moreover, in demonstrating the doctrine of 
discovery was unjust to American Indians for Williams it was not crucial to 
consider whether Wharton articulated a different constitutional language.  
 
Coke and colonialism 
 
Likewise, when Williams links the ‘English Conquest of Virginia’ with 
the writings of the Italian Protestant exile Alberico Gentili and the English 
common law chronicler Sir Edward Coke to illustrate the ‘basic themes of 
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  121English colonizing discourse’ he is not concerned with examining the writings 
of those English lawyers who spoke in an anti-colonial language.
54 Thus, Hale’s 
rejoinders to Hobbes’ ideas, discussed in the last chapter, are not mentioned in 
Williams’ book.  
 
Williams skilfully traces the emergence of the idea of the ‘West’s 
mandate to conquer the earth and to examine its inaugural applications in the 
New World’.
55 It would be a mistake though to infer from his work that the 
common law is a priori a colonialist instrument whose attitude can be pre-
determined. While Williams makes the case that common law in America was 
used as a colonist instrument against American Indians, this should not be 
generalised to conclude this was the case throughout the common law world. As 
Tully shows by describing a number of cogent examples in Strange multiplicity, 
the common law can reflect the influence of more than one constitutional 
language. To determine whether space exists for the recognition of the distinct 
customs of a people it is necessary to examine the specific jurisdictional 
experience.  
 
Distinction between common law and common constitutionalism 
 
Comparing the works of McNeil and Williams to Tully’s does provide 
an appreciation of the distinction between common law and common 
constitutionalism. Tully tends to use common law and common 
constitutionalism interchangeably. At first glance then, because Tully locates 
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  122the expression of another language in common law,
56 it may be thought he is 
attributing something unique to the common law as an institution. However, if 
the task is to identify the influence of particular languages on decisions, it is not 
possible a priori to presume that all countries where the common law exists will 
necessarily reflect the language of common constitutionalism. These are 
particular experiences that may or not arise elsewhere. A strength of Williams’ 
book is to demonstrate that in the United States the general trend in the common 
law was to embrace the ‘Doctrine of Discovery’. This doctrine was used to 
justify the conquest and colonisation of American Indians. Tully concurs when 
he writes that as ‘the settlers gained the upper hand in the nineteenth century, 
the Aboriginal and common-law system was overwhelmed by the theory and 
practice of modern constitutionalism’.
57
 
Another reason to make a distinction between common law and common 
constitutionalism is because there are many inconsistencies among the countries 
where common law has been embraced. McNeil brings this out in his thorough 
discussion of the application of the ‘Doctrine of Common Law Aboriginal 
Title’. Comparing the United States, Canada and Australia in 1989, he 
emphasises that ‘the judiciaries of the three common law jurisdictions’ have 
‘approached the matter in different ways’.
58 Hence, it is only through comparing 
the principles applied in each jurisdiction that one can assess the influence of 
particular constitutional languages.   
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  123Human rights and Indigenous peoples  
 
A further reason for the distinction between common law and common 
constitutionalism is that this language can be applied to circumstances 
independent of the specific applications at common law. For instance, the 
language can be compared to the human rights conventions, particularly those 
that focus on the rights of Indigenous peoples. While Tully does not discuss 
human rights in any detail in Strange multiplicity, he does mention that ‘hidden 
constitutions have been discovered … in international law’.
59
 
The first point about the human rights conventions is that they have 
profoundly shaped contemporary constitutionalism. While support for the 
concept of human rights arose before the Second World War, it was the colossal 
human destruction in that war that ensured the central role of human rights in 
the Charter of the United Nations and the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948. Article 1(3) of the Charter identifies that a key 
purpose of the United Nations is ‘in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental rights for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion’.
60 For Western countries today, the words ‘human 
rights’ are shorthand for a set of values that are both aspirational as well as a 
yardstick to judge the practices of governments. It has resulted in an additional 
qualification being placed upon the activity of sovereign governments. The 
spectre of mass popular support for the rise of Nazism and Adolf Hitler in 1930s 
Germany brought home to the world that binding the convention of consent to 
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  124sovereignty was not sufficient to guide just relations between peoples.
61 
Additional conventions were also needed to ensure that a majority do not 
persecute individuals and minorities and to provide international standards to 
guide the practice of states.
62   
 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two 
international covenants have been ratified concerning Civil and Political Rights 
and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Considerable work has also been 
done on a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
63 
Additionally, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Together these initiatives and 
standards mark a shift in contemporary constitutionalism and provide a new 
context for Indigenous peoples. Dias says this implies that Indigenous peoples 
should be able to join with ‘all the other peoples that make up the State on 
mutually-agreed upon and just terms’. While not explicitly discussing 
constitutionalism, Dias echoes many of the themes discussed by Tully when she 
says this ‘process does not require the assimilation of individuals, as citizens 
like all others, but the recognition and incorporation of distinct peoples in the 
fabric of the State … on mutually-agreed and just terms’.
64
 
Comparing the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to 
the language of common constitutionalism suggests the former is guided by the 
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  125three conventions of continuity, consent and mutual recognition. The 
Declaration is explicitly based upon an acknowledgement of the right of 
‘Indigenous peoples … to self-determination’. Moreover, just as Tully says 
mutual recognition must be adapted to a form that meets the needs of both 
cultures,
65 so too the Declaration provides for Indigenous peoples to exercise a 
‘right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and 
local affairs …’
66 Article 39 also talks of conflict resolution occurring through 
‘mutually acceptable and fair procedures’ that consider the ‘customs, traditions, 
rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned’.
67 The convention 
of continuity also underpins the Declaration. Article 4, for instance, states 
Indigenous peoples have the ‘right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal 
systems, while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State’.
68 Consent is also 
explicitly mentioned in Articles 10, 20, 27 and 30.
69 A r t i c l e  1 0  s t a t e s  t h a t  
Indigenous peoples shall not be ‘forcibly removed from their lands or 
territories’ and that no relocation shall take place without the ‘free and informed 
consent of the indigenous people concerned and after agreement on just and fair 
compensation, and, where possible, with the option of return’.
70
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  126Conclusions 
 
This chapter has focussed on the language of common constitutionalism, 
considering its applicability to the claims of Indigenous peoples. It commenced 
by looking in some detail at the three conventions in order to demonstrate that 
together they provide a just basis for relations between peoples. Together these 
conventions also provide a guide to negotiating constitutional change.  
 
Comparing Tully’s work to the studies undertaken by McNeil and 
Williams demonstrates that rather than challenging his findings, Tully’s ideas 
provide a way to understand the claims of Indigenous peoples independent of 
their framing within a modern constitutional language. McNeil and Williams 
only partially embrace the common constitutional conventions and their works 
reflect tendencies to present the common law tradition as uniform which 
obscure the clashes over the recognition of the claims of Indigenous peoples. 
Moreover, if the starting point is to examine the particular experiences of a 
country it is necessary to differentiate between the common law as an institution 
and the language of common constitutionalism. Indeed, looking at 
constitutionalism in this way helps to appreciate that those identifying with the 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, seek to modify the 
language of contemporary constitutionalism so that the Draft Declaration’s 
ideas are heard and accommodated. 
 
Tully argues that a modern constitution can recognise and accommodate 
cultural diversity ‘if it is conceived as a form of accommodation of cultural 
diversity’. This conclusion is not a mere abstract hypothesis, but supported by 
  127the actual presence of an alternative language. Thus, the contemporary language 
of constitutional thought and practice does not need to be totally abandoned. It 
does not need to be ‘defended against any claim of cultural recognition’. Nor 
though should it be totally rejected ‘for its male, imperial and Eurocentric 
bias’.
71 Rather, it can be modified so that unjust aspects of modern 




When Tully developed his alternative understanding of 
constitutionalism, leading him to pose the question about whether a constitution 
can recognise and accommodate cultural diversity, it arose out of particular 
cultural experiences. The North American experiences with the claims made by 
Aboriginal people of America and the French-speaking minority and the initial 
responses of the British colonial authorities and now by contemporary American 
and Canadian governments have informed his thinking. Indeed his book is full 
of examples of the claims for cultural recognition of Aboriginal people and the 
French-speaking minority where the common constitutional conventions have 
been applied or rejected. No doubt the richness of these experiences has played 
a part in convincing Tully to embrace this language to overcome some of the 
most ‘irreconcilable conflicts of the present’.
73  
 
If these ideas are to assist in understanding the Mabo events, we must be 
convinced that a constitution can recognise and accommodate cultural diversity 
and whether there is sufficient experience with the conventions of common 
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  128constitutionalism to embrace the language as the answer to Indigenous and non-
Indigenous relations in Australia. The next chapter focuses on reconciling the 
alternative understanding of constitutionalism with Australia’s constitutional 
experiences. 
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Chapter 5: 
Australia’s European and Indigenous 
constitutional traditions  
 
Laying the ground work for the examination of the Mabo events the past 
three chapters have analysed various aspects of Tully’s philosophy contrasting 
the languages of modern and common constitutionalism. In a way this chapter 
provides a bridge between the ground work and the examination proper. What 
will be undertaken here is to outline a way of applying this understanding of 
constitutionalism to take account of Australia’s experiences of constitutional 
relations with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.  
 
In assessing whether this understanding of constitutionalism is 
applicable to Australia, four aspects of its constitutional experience are 
discussed. Concerning Australia’s dominant constitutional tradition, the aim is 
to clarify whether this tradition reflects the influence of modern 
constitutionalism. Another matter is to ascertain how the cultures of Indigenous 
people are presented by contemporary constitutional scholars. A third matter to 
consider is Australia’s experience with treaty making with Indigenous peoples. 
If indeed experience is an important ingredient to building good relations 
between non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples then does the overall absence 
of treaty-making preclude the possibility that common constitutionalism has 
been embraced in this country? Related to the absence of treaty-making is the 
lack of experience in implementing the convention of mutual recognition.   
  131   
 
Several works about constitutional and governance in Australia are 
engaged with to discuss these matters. Tony Blackshield and George Williams 
have prepared several editions on Australian constitutional law and theory: 
commentary and materials. In this chapter the third edition has been used.
1 
Cheryl Saunders, the Director of Comparative Constitutional Studies at the 
University of Melbourne has written a work designed to make the Constitution 
accessible to a broader audience. The second edition of It’s your Constitution: 
Governing Australia today was published in 2003.
2 Over a thirty year period 
Peter Hanks has been involved with several editions considering Australian 
constitutional law. In the latest edition of the series his colleagues are Patrick 
Keyzer and Jennifer Clarke. This edition contains a chapter specifically looking 
at “’Indigenous’ People and Constitutional Law”.
3 Melissa Castan and Sarah 
Joseph provide a ‘contemporary view’ of ‘Federal constitutional law’. A 
significant part of their final chapter on ‘contemporary themes in federal 





The discussion of Australia’s constitutional traditions begins by briefly 
reviewing the general points Tully made about constitutionalism. Chapter 3 
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brought to the fore the view argued by Tully that constitutionalism has a more 
inclusive meaning than usually acknowledged in contemporary writings.
5 Other 
constitutional scholars such as McIlwain agree. They argued that 
constitutionalism includes not only the ‘conscious formulation of the people’ 
but also their custom and practice.
6  
 
Tully contrasts this understanding to the way constitutionalism is 
presented by the ‘prevailing schools of modern Western constitutionalism’. 
Adherents of the modern constitutional language tend to focus exclusively on 
agreements, often overlooking other important constitutional experiences arising 
from custom and practice or through incorporating and transforming these 
experiences into the ‘classic theories of modern constitutions’.
7   
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Australia has at least two distinct 
constitutional traditions. One is inherited from British colonisation and such 
principles of English law as might be applicable to the colonies
8 and whose 
influence is found in the adoption of a written constitution: the ‘conscious 
formulation of the people’.
9 The other originates with the customs and practices 
of Australia’s first inhabitants, the Indigenous peoples.  
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Cornell University Press, 1947), 2-3.  
7 Tully, above n 5, 61.  
8 See T. D. Castle & Bruce Kercher (Eds), Dowling's Select cases, 1828 to 1844: decisions of 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales, (Sydney : Francis Forbes Society for Australian Legal 
History, 2005) for the reception of English law in early nineteen century cases in the colony of 
New South Wales.  
9 Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Constitution, (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1993).  
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What support is there among other constitutional commentators for such 
a conceptual view? Many contemporary texts suggest a general agreement that 
Australia has a constitutional tradition similar to other modern Western 
democracies. Nevertheless, only a few contemporary Australian writers on 
constitutional law discuss this tradition in any detail,
10 which suggests it is 
largely taken as a given, rather than arising as a reflection of contested ideas. 
However, Blackshield and Williams do describe this tradition of ‘civil and 
political’ liberalism, defined as ‘the liberty of individuals to engage in activities 
important for self-expression or political participation and … [seeking] 
constitutional arrangements to protect those activities from excessive state 
intervention’.
11 This tradition is also confirmed indirectly through the influence 




Blackshield and Williams also noted this ‘broad orientation’ is 
compatible with a very wide range of political theories and practices. They go 
on to publish an extract from Cranston on Liberalism where English, French, 
German and American varieties of liberalism are discussed and compared.
13 
 
                                                 
10 See for instance, Castan, & Joseph, above n 4; Greg Craven, Conversations with the 
Constitution: not just a piece of paper, (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd, 
2004); Guy Aitkin & Robert Orr, Sawer’s The Australian Constitution, Third Edition, 
(Canberra: Australian Government Solicitor, 2002); Hoong Phun Lee & George Winterton 
(Eds), Australian constitutional perspectives, (Nth Ryde, Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd, 
1992); George Winterton, H.P. Lee, Arthur Glass & James A. Thomson, First Edition, 
Australian federal constitutional law: commentary and materials, (Sydney: LBC Information 
Services, 1999).  
11 Blackshield & Williams, above n 1, 27. 
12 Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, ‘Federalism in Australia and in Other Nations’ in Greg Craven, (ed), 
Australian Federation: Towards the Second Century, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1986), 20.  
13 Blackshield & Williams, above n 1, 28-30.  
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On the basis of this assumption, it is reasonable to expect that a detailed 
examination of Australian events will locate examples where the influence of 
modern constitutionalism is apparent. It is also possible this inquiry will identity 
some differences in the expression of this language unique to Australia. That is, 
just as it is possible to identify American, German and French varieties of 
liberalism, it is likely that Australia has its own distinct characteristics.  
 
However, much more needs to be understood about this inherited 
tradition than is discussed in the texts on constitutionalism. Compared to the life 
of an individual 218 years may appear a long time, but compared to the 
thousand plus years of English common law it is but a brief interlude.
14 Some 
questions can challenge the assumption that all matters about this tradition can 
be taken for granted. Did Australia inherit the English constitutional tradition 
and all its conventions and precedents? Or is what is presented in the name of 
this tradition actually a narrower and one-sided appreciation of something much 
richer and more complex? Another series of questions concern the White 
Australia policy, its origins and impact on constitutionalism. In the latter half of 
the twentieth century, international declarations and conventions have focussed 
on human rights, cultural rights and Indigenous peoples. What has been the 
impact of these developments upon Australia?  
 
  It is important to apply a constitutional languages thesis to the Mabo 
events because none of the answers to these questions can be determined a 
priori ‘through the use of reason’, but only through gaining empirical 
                                                 
14 In a recent article about the debate among historians about terra nullius Wilfred Prest also 
makes a similar point. See ‘History cries out for more charity’, The Australian, 18 January 2006, 
25. 
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knowledge.
15 Furthermore, the questions cannot be answered just by examining 
the 1992 decision
16 and subsequent events. It is necessary to consider the British 
acquisition of Australia, the attitude expressed by the courts in embracing the 
doctrine of terra nullius, Federation, the 1967 referendum and the 1988 High 
Court decision that allowed the Meriam People’s claim for recognition to be 





Clarification is also necessary on what the scholars of contemporary 
constitutionalism have to say about the distinct traditions of Indigenous people 
in Australia. Many explicitly acknowledge the existence of an Indigenous 
tradition. For instance, Blackshield and Williams observe that ‘the legal and 
governmental structures’ in the United States have accommodated continued 
recognition of the ‘legal and governmental structures of the native American 
tribes’. They consider whether such an accommodation is possible in Australia 
and whether reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australia is 
possible without it. They argue these are questions fundamentally important for 
the theory and practical politics of ‘Australian constitutionalism’.
18 
 
Cheryl Saunders looks at the origins of Australia’s constitutional history 
in her 2003 book It’s your Constitution: Governing Australia today and notes 
that most of us ‘tend to think of Australia’s constitutional history as beginning 
                                                 
15 Simon Blackburn (Ed), The Oxford dictionary of philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 119 
16 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1. 
17 Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
18 Blackshield & Williams, above n 1, 176.  
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in 1770 ...’ She says that over time Aboriginal people ‘developed their own 
rules to govern themselves, as all communities do’.
19 Hanks, Keyzer & Clarke 
speak of ‘indigenous legal systems’, which implies going beyond an 




It is also apparent that Blackshield and Williams are mindful that 
constitutionalism also includes Indigenous custom and practice. They noted that 
‘the pattern of colonial settlement and expansion unfolded against the 
background of an older, perhaps competing, source of constitutive normative 
order for Australia: namely, the diverse patterns of normative belief and 
authority expressed through the various traditions and practices of the 
indigenous Australian peoples’.
21 Moreover, they also caution against 
presuming that Australia’s Indigenous peoples have a singular tradition. They 
write that ‘it is clear that’ Australia’s Indigenous peoples ‘have severally the 
kind of cultural identity which might entitle them, under emerging norms of 
international law, to rights of self-determination’.
22 Blackshield and Williams, 
however, do not back up their comments with a detailed examination of 
parliament’s response to the High Court’s decision.  
 
It is not clear from the remarks of the other scholars that they consider 
constitutionalism inclusive of Indigenous custom and practice. For instance, 
Hanks, Keyzer and Clarke describe constitutionalism as ‘concerned with ways 
                                                 
19 Saunders, above n 2, 13. 
20 Hanks, Keyzer & Clarke, above n 3, 76. 
21 Blackshield & Williams, above n 1, 175.  
22 Ibid. 204. 
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in which the power of the state is organised and applied, with the relationship 
between the different institutions which exercise the power of the state and with 
the relationships between those institutions and other individual and social 
interests’.
23 This definition does not quite convey a sense that this also includes 
Aboriginal customary law. It also contrasts with statements by prominent 
Indigenous people that they consider the inclusion of customary law is posed by 
Mabo. For instance, prominent Cape York leader Noel Pearson says that ‘[o]ne 
of the implications of the decisions in Mabo is that Aboriginal law and custom 
is now a source of law in this country’.
24  
 
The general lack of attention to examining the constitutional 
perspectives of Indigenous people and its significance for settlement is another 
reason to use a philosophy of constitutional languages to examine the Mabo 
events. The results of such an endeavour are likely to provide further knowledge 




The third issue that needs clarifying is Australia’s history of treaty-
making with Indigenous people. Tully uses ‘treaty constitutionalism’ to describe 
the pattern of treaty-making and emphasise the significance of this form of 
mutual recognition to constitutional developments. Indeed, the treaty can be 
seen as its classical form, which is why Tully drew upon the case of Worcester v 
                                                 
23 Hanks, Keyzer & Clarke, above n 3, 10. 
24 See Noel Pearson, ‘From remnant title to social justice’ in Murray Goot & Tim Rowse (Eds), 
Make a better offer: the politics of Mabo, (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press Australia Ltd, 1994), 
181-182. 
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Georgia.
25 Tully related that ‘hundreds of treaty negotiations’ occurred between 
the ‘agents of the Crown and the Aboriginal nations from the 1630s to 1832’. 
The Worcester v Georgia court case reviewed this history of treaty making. 
Tully also notes that treaty-making was revived in Canada in the early 1970s 
when the ‘first contemporary treaty constitution was negotiated between Cree, 
Naskapi and Inuit nations and the Québec and Canadian governments’.
26   
 
Australia does not have anything like this sort of tradition of treaty 
constitutionalism. There is only one reference to a treaty with Aboriginal people 
in Australia and recent examinations of the 1835 treaty between John Batman 
and Aboriginal people have led scholars to challenge its authenticity. This 
agreement involved deeds over two tracts of land: one around Port Phillip Bay; 
the other around the Bellarine Peninsula (near Geelong).
27 Hanks, Keyzer and 
Clarke say of the agreement:
28 
 
It purported to cede land – half a million acres – in exchange for an 
initial payment, plus a ‘yearly rent or tribute’, of blankets, 
tomahawks, knives, scissors, looking glasses, handkerchiefs, flour 
and clothing.  
 
Nevertheless, the agreement was not recognised, with Governor Burke 
proclaiming all such treaties void since ‘only the Crown could enter such 
treaties’. Furthermore, there is more than an element of doubt about whether the 
                                                 
25 Tully, above n 5, 117-8; Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832).   
26 Ibid. 118, 136.  
27 Alastair H. Campbell, John Batman and the Aborigines, (Melbourne: Kibble Books, 1987), 
100. 
28 Hanks, Keyzer & Clarke, above n 3, 79. 
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treaty was actually made. Hanks, Keyzer and Clarke suggest that it was ‘almost 
certainly a fraud’.
29 After closely examining the deeds and other records about 
the events, Campbell also challenges its authenticity. He concluded it was a 




The absence of treaty constitutionalism is one reason why constitutional 
scholars do not make extensive comments about the implications flowing from 
accommodating another constitutional tradition or provide an explanation for 
the difficulties involved in its achievement.
31 Nevertheless, this should not be 
taken to indicate that the language of common constitutionalism will also be 
absent from the Mabo debate. While undoubtedly Tully’s findings about the 
presence of common constitutionalism relate to the treaty constitutionalism 
tradition, the two are distinct elements. Indeed, it is demonstrated in later 





Australia also lacks experience with mutual recognition. Chapter 3 
discussed a number of examples where Tully explains the concept of mutual 
recognition.
32 At its heart, mutual recognition is about a dialogue between 
partners where each negotiator participates in ‘his or her language, mode of 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Campbell, above n 26, 103, 106.  
31 Hanks, Keyzer & Clarke, above n 3, 78. 
32 Tully, above n 5, 117-124. 
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speaking and listening, form of reaching agreement, and way of representing the 
people, or peoples, for whom they speak’.
33 Neither the High Court nor federal 
Parliament readily provides a basis for mutual recognition between Indigenous 
and other Australians since internally neither has a basis to provide for the 
distinct representation of Indigenous people. Importantly though, while the 
Australian Constitution does not provide such a basis,
34 it does not preclude the 
federal parliament from legislating for the establishment of commissions or 
councils that can provide distinct representation of Indigenous peoples.  
 
Furthermore, neither the federal parliament nor the High Court is 
structured for an intercultural dialogue. Chapter 3 discussed the contemporary 
tendency to rely on monological contributions to drive change. While 
informally within the High Court, there may well be some scope for an 
intercultural dialogue between parties, in its formal judgements the High Court 
usually issues one (if the bench is of a singular view) or more monological 
statements. Likewise, while the federal parliament provides some informal 
opportunities for dialogue, its emphasis is on the individual contribution by its 
members. Thus, if dialogue is to formally address the claims of Indigenous 
people in Australia, direct negotiations must be initiated and new bodies 





                                                 
33 Ibid. 129.  
34 Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Constitution, above n 9. 
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Conclusions 
 
Summarising the matters examined in this chapter, the first concerned 
the dominant, non-Indigenous, constitutional influence. It was noted that while 
it is accepted that Australia shares its constitutional tradition with other ‘modern 
Western democracies’ the constitutional texts do not discuss the tradition in the 
detailed way required to determine the influence of specific constitutional 
languages. Furthermore, while constitutional scholars engage in some 
discussion of Indigenous traditions few explicitly acknowledge that the custom 
and practice of Indigenous people is part of constitutionalism. The lack of 
attention to the detail of Indigenous and non-Indigenous traditions in the 
constitutional texts is a compelling reason to undertake an examination to 
discover the influences of constitutional languages on Australian events.      
 
Where the traditions of treaty constitutionalism and mutual recognition 
have been absent, using a philosophical approach to examine the Mabo events 
needs consideration. Given this absence and the lack of discussion about why 
Australia’s constitutional frame faces difficulties in accommodating the claims 
of Indigenous people, the emphasis of any examination must favour detection 
over advocacy. This is because unless there is evidence that the language of 
common constitutionalism is used by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples, it is hardly wise to advocate such a language as the solution to the 
difficulties they face in gaining recognition. After all, the first step in finding a 
solution to recognition is to use the ‘ethical watchword of the post-imperial 
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age’: ‘listen to the voices of others’.
35 An explanation of the constitutional 
languages used in the debates over the claims may also help to focus attention 
on how recognition, culture and constitutionalism are conceived and how 
Australia can accommodate cultural differences. Before you can move forward, 
you first must understand what is happening around you.  
 
Additionally, such an inquiry needs to examine a number of other related 
aspects: whether various constitutional languages were influential around the 
events leading up to Mabo, in the High Court’s decision, and in the subsequent 
debates about native title and treaty and reconciliation. This will help to 
determine whether a similar tension exists in Australia between the languages of 
modern constitutionalism and common constitutionalism as described by Tully 
about Canada. Such an enquiry will also discuss the relationship between the 
politics of Mabo and the constitutional languages; the constitutional influence of 
the White Australia policy; how support for human rights covenants has 
impacted on the events; and whether Australia’s dominant institutions of 
governance embrace the language of modern constitutionalism.  
                                                 
35 Tully, above n 5, 34. 
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The languages before Mabo 
 
 
You are also with the consent of the natives to take possession of 
convenient situations in the country in the name of the King of Great 
Britain ...  
Admiralty Instructions to Captain Cook
1 
 
This thesis seeks to discern the influences of constitutional languages on 
relations with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples around Mabo. This 
chapter begins the investigation, commencing with the events prior to that 
decision and reviewing the two hundred plus years since Britain colonised the 
country. The aim in this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive narrative, but 
to identify the influences of the languages on key events. For convenience these 
are discussed chronologically. 
 
The works of several historians help our enquiry. Henry Reynolds, the 
prolific Australian writer, has produced many books about Indigenous peoples 
in early Australia. His material was cited in one of the High Court judgements 
about the social and political organisation of Indigenous peoples.
2 Law of the 
land, first published in 1987 discusses the legal and social relations affecting 
                                                 
1 British Admiralty Instructions to Captain Cook, cited by Garth Nettheim, ‘ “The Consent of 
the Natives”: Mabo and Indigenous Political Rights’ in Essays on the Mabo Decision, (North 
Ryde, NSW: The Law Book Company Limited, 1993), 103.  
  145land from the time of English occupation until contemporary times.
3 Aboriginal 
sovereignty was produced after the Mabo decision and details how the Court 
dealt with this concept.
4 Stuart Macintyre’s A Concise history of Australia was 
helpful for the events under discussion.
5 A 1993 article by Pat Stretton and 
Christine Finnimore focuses on Aborigines and the Commonwealth franchise, 
providing invaluable detail on these developments.
6 In his work on Australia’s 
race relations, Andrew Markus reviews their evolution from the time of 
colonisation until 1993.
7 This is particular helpful in discussing both trends and 
the detail of changes. A more recent book by Bain Attwood, Andrew Markus, 
and others focuses on the 1967 referendum, addressing the common 
misconception that this event itself accorded franchise to Indigenous peoples.
8 
John Summers prepared a research paper for the Parliamentary Library 
focussing on the relationship of federal parliament to Indigenous peoples from 
the time of Federation until the 1967 referendum.
9  
 
Nonie Sharp’s No ordinary judgment provides a cross cultural 
perspective on the Mabo claim. In placing this into a broader context, Sharp also 
                                                                                                                                    
2 Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, 81 footnotes 286, 290 (Deane and Gaudron JJ) 
(“Mabo v. Queensland (No 2)”).  
3 Henry Reynolds, The law of the land, 2nd Edition, (Ringwood, Vic: Penguin Books Australia 
Ltd, 1992) (“The law of the land”).  
4 Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal sovereignty: reflections on race, state and nation, (St Leonards, 
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), (“Aboriginal sovereignty”).  
5 Stuart Macintyre, A Concise history of Australia, (Cambridge, UK: Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge, 1999). 
6 Pat Stretton and Christine Finnimore, ‘Black Fellow Citizens: Aborigines and the 
Commonwealth Franchise’, Australian Historical Studies, 25 (101), 1993, 521-535.  
7 Andrew Markus, Australian race relations, 1788-1993, (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 
1994).  
8 Bain Attwood, Andrew Markus et al, The 1967 referendum, or, When Aborigines didn’t get 
the vote, (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies, 1997).  
9 John Summers, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia and Indigenous Peoples 
1901-1967, The Vision in Hindsight: Parliament and the Constitution: Paper No 10, 2000-01, 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 2000).  
  146considers two earlier court cases in detail: the 1971 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty 
Ltd
10 case and Mabo (No 1).
11 Several other works present a legal analysis of 
the events. Bartlett’s Native title in Australia contains two particularly relevant 
chapters, one concerning the common law history of native title before the 
Mabo decision.
12 The other chapter focuses on the constitutional framework of 
native title, particularly relevant to the discussion of Federation, the 1967 
referendum, and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (the RDA).
13 A legal paper 
by Bryan Keon-Cohen focuses on the ‘Mabo litigation’, drawing upon his 
personal involvement with the cases.
14 Chapter 3 of McNeil’s Common law 
aboriginal title  concerns ‘The Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty by the 
Crown’. Here he summaries the history of these principles in English law.
15 
Australian constitutional law and theory: commentary and materials by Tony 
Blackshield and George Williams contains a chapter on ‘Indigenous Peoples 
and the Question of Sovereignty’,
16 a matter directly pertinent to the events 
studied in this chapter. Lastly, Garth Nettheim discusses Captain Cook’s 
instructions in the context of considering consent and Indigenous political rights 




                                                 
10 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 (SC(NT)) (“Milirrpum v Nabalco”). 
11 Nonie Sharp, No ordinary judgment: Mabo, the Murray Islanders’ land case, (Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Studies, 1996), 171-186; Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186 (“Mabo v Queensland ”).  
12 Richard H. Bartlett, Native title in Australia, Second Edition, (Chatswood, NSW: 
Butterworths, 2004), 1-14. 
13 Ibid. 83-91; Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
14 B. A. Keon-Cohen, ‘The Mabo litigation: a personal and procedural account’ in Melbourne 
University Law Review, Vol 24, 2000, 893-951.   
15 Kent McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 108-133. 
16 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian constitutional law and theory: 
commentary and materials, Third Edition, (Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 2002), 175-
240. 
  147Rights of acquisition dependent upon consent 
 
This examination begins by considering the attitudes expressed toward 
the acquisition of Australia.
18 Tully says that one of the norms of common 
constitutionalism is that existing constitutional relations should be upheld, even 
in cases where countries are conquered. Thus, a conqueror has ‘no rights over 
the prevailing system of property and form of government unless the people 
consent to its alteration’.
19 Clearly, British Admiralty instructions to Captain 
Cook before his departure were consistent with this norm:
20 
 
You are likewise to observe the genius, temper, disposition and number of 
the natives, if there be any, and endeavour by all proper means to cultivate 
a friendship and alliance with them, making them presents of such trifles 
as they may value, inviting them to traffick, and shewing them every kind 
of civility and regard: taking care however not to suffer yourself to be 
surprized by them, but to be always on your guard against any accident 
[sic]. 
 
You are also with the consent of the natives to take possession of 
convenient situations in the country in the name of the King of Great 
Britain, or, if you find the country uninhabited take possession for His 
Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions as first discoverers 
and possessors. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
17 Nettheim, above n 1, 103-126. 
18 Chapter 7 will undertake  a more thorough examination of the High Court’s attitude to the 
acquisition of settled territory. 
19 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 150.  
  148Captain Phillip’s Second Commission establishing the Colony of New 
South Wales was written in a similar vein. He was directed to ‘endeavour by 
every possible means to open an intercourse with the natives, and to conciliate 
their affections, enjoining all our subjects to live in amity and kindness with 
them’. Justices Deane and Gaudron later observed that the ‘act of State 
establishing the Colony’ indicated two important things: it was envisaged that 
‘some lands within the Colony would become Crown lands and be available 
both for the establishment of the penal settlement and for future grants of Crown 
land to emancipated convicts and new settlers’; and ‘the native inhabitants ... 
would be protected ...’ They would not be subjected to ‘any unnecessary 
interruption in the exercise of their several occupations’.
21 That is, there was 
nothing in the instructions contrary to the common constitutional norm of 
continuity that ‘pre-existing native interests in lands in a Colony were [to be] 
respected and protected’.
22 The Instructions also confirm that the Admiralty 
sought to follow the convention of consent. 
 
The presumption of an empty land 
 
The Instructions were not implemented. Captain Cook ‘neither sought 
nor obtained’ the consent of the ‘natives’ to ‘British assertions of sovereignty 
and ... settlement’.
23 Instead, the territory now known as Australia was treated as 
thought it was empty. It was deemed to have been ‘acquired by settlement’, a 
classification of English common law usually applied to territories that were 
                                                                                                                                    
20 British Admirality Instructions to Captain Cook, cited by Nettheim, above n 1, 103. 
21 Second Commission Instructions, cited in Mabo v. Queensland (No 2), above n 2, 73 (Deane 
and Gaudron JJ). 
22 Mabo v. Queensland (No 2), above n 2, 71-2 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
  149‘unclaimed and uninhabited’.
24 Members of Cook’s expedition observed 
‘Indians’, but concluded that the interior was ‘totaly uninhabited’ [sic].
25  
 
The courts subsequently gave effective support to Cook’s approach. 
Instead of respecting the consent of the original inhabitants, several Australian 
court cases embraced what Tully describes as a ‘doctrine of discontinuity’ 
where the ‘pre-existing customs and ways of the people’ are discontinued or 
‘extinguished’.
26 These reinforced the view that the ‘denial of native title and 
the dispossession of the Aboriginal people afforded no wrong in law’.
27  
 
Feudal principles were cited as the authority in several of these cases. 
While this may have been a short-hand reference to a system of tenure treating 
all lands as held ultimately ‘of the King’,
28 the lack of differentiation between 
title to territory and title to land was used to justify the acquisition of all lands 
including that occupied by Indigenous peoples. That is, it was both presumed 
that title to ‘territory and title to lands went hand in hand’ and that the land was 
vacant. In other words, as McNeil notes, Australia though inhabited when 
‘acquired by settlement, was treated as though it were vacant and the land there 
were waste’.
29 The attitude that the Crown has the right on acquisition to seize 
                                                                                                                                    
23 Nettheim, above n 1, 103. 
24 McNeil, above n 15, 113, 121. 
25 Cited in Reynolds, Aboriginal sovereignty, above n 4, 17-8. 
26 Tully, above n 19, 125.  
27 Bartlett, above n 12, 2; see also Keon-Cohen, above n 14, 899. 
28 In Chapter 7,  discussion will also occur about the view that the ‘king holding title to all 
lands’ is largely fictional rather than factual. 
29 McNeil, above n 15, 135, n 5; Bartlett, above n 12, 1. 
  150any land it so chooses can be readily associated with the doctrine of 
discontinuity and the modern constitutional language.
30 
 
In some of these cases the inhabitants were described as nomadic, which 
suggests that this was another factor in the failure to reconsider the basis for 
settlement. For instance, a nomadic reference occurred in the 1833 case, 
Macdonald v Levy.
31 Justice Burton wrote that New South Wales should be 
considered an uninhabited country at the time of its settlement. The reason he 
advanced was that the ‘wandering tribes of its natives, living without certain 




Nomadism was an idea attributed to Vattel at the end of the eighteenth 
century in The Law of Nations. He asked ‘if a nation may lawfully take 
possession of a part of vast country, in which they are found none but erratic 
nations, incapable, by the smallness of their numbers to people the whole?’ He 
answered that their ‘removing their habitations through these immense regions, 
cannot be taken for a true and legal possession’. This, he said, justified ‘the 
people of Europe … finding land of which these nations are in no particular 
want, and of which they make no actual and constant use, may lawfully possess 
it, and establish colonies there’.
33 This attitude reflected modern 
constitutionalism and a ‘stages view of human history’, where failure to 
                                                 
30 Tully, above n 19, 125.  
31 Macdonald v Levy (1833) 1 Legge 39. 
32 Justice Burton, cited by McNeil, above n 15, 121. 
33 Emmerich de Vattel, cited by Reynolds, Aboriginal sovereignty, above n 4, 53; Mabo v. 
Queensland (No 2), above n 2, 21. 
  151cultivate land was considered adequate justification to deny rights that 
Europeans would seek for themselves.
34 
 
Support for continuity of native title 
 
While some presumed the land empty, a number of officials spoke the 
common constitutional language and sought to recognise the continuity of 
native title. During negotiations between the Colonial Office in London and the 
South Australian Colonization [sic] Commission in 1835, Lord Glenelg 
expressed concern over the extent of the proposed colony. For this ‘would 
extend very far into the interior of New Holland, and might embrace in its range 
numerous tribes of People whose Proprietary Title to the Soil we have not the 
slightest grounds for disputing’.
35 Though ultimately ineffective, the Letters 
Patent of 1836 sought to protect ‘the rights of any Aboriginal Natives [of South 
Australia] to the actual occupation or enjoyment in their own persons or in the 
persons of their descendants of any land therein now actually occupied or 
enjoyed by such Natives’.
36 Moreover, comments by the permanent head of the 
Imperial Colonial Office, James Stephen, noted on a dispatch he received from 
South Australia in 1841 suggest he adhered to the norm of continuity. He wrote 
it is ‘an important and unexpected fact that these tribes had proprietary rights in 
the Soil - that is, in particular sections of it which were clearly defined or well 
understood before the occupation of their country’.
37 Western Australia 
provided for a right to access land where pastoral leases were issued. An Order-
                                                 
34 Tully, above n 19, 64-5, 126. 
35 Lord Glenelg, cited by Reynolds, The law of the land, above n 3, 42.  
36 Henry Reynolds, cited in Mabo v. Queensland (No 2), above n 2, 81 (Deane & Gaudron JJ). 
37 James Stephen, cited in Mabo v. Queensland (No 2), ibid. 81 (Deane & Gaudron JJ).  
  152in-Council was issued in 1850 to provide for the ‘full right to the Aboriginal 
natives of the said Colony at all times to enter upon any unenclosed or enclosed, 
but otherwise unimproved part of the said demised premises for purposes of 
seeking their subsistence therefrom in their accustomed manner ...’
38 
 
Some settlers also respected this norm. Reynolds noted that by the 1830s 
‘well-informed settlers knew that Australia was a patchwork of clearly defined 
tribal territories and that local blacks defended their territory against both 
Europeans and traditional enemies’.
39 The Methodist missionary Joseph Orton 
said that the Aborigines had a ‘right of property in the lands of their birth 
right’.
40 George Robinson thought they were ‘the legitimate proprietors of the 
soil’ because it was ‘the land of their forefathers’.
41 A South Australian pioneer 
argued the ‘rights of the original possessors’ were ‘not at all affected by Acts of 
Parliament or Commissioner’s instructions: their right rests upon principles of 
justice’. The pioneer said that it is ‘impossible to deny the right which the 
natives have to the land on which they were born, from which age after age they 
have derived support and nourishment, and which had has received their 
ashes’.
42 Around this time these issues were debated in a variety of books, 
newspapers, speeches, letters and diaries.




                                                 
38 1850 Order-in-Council, Western Australia, cited by Bartlett, above n 12, 347. 
39 Reynolds, The law of the land, above n 3, 35. 
40 Joseph Orton, cited in ibid. 72. 
41 George Robinson, cited in id. 
42 ‘South Australian Pioneer’, cited in ibid. 73.  
43 Ibid. 72-3.  
  153Federation and Indigenous peoples 
 
The creation of the Commonwealth Federation in 1901 marked a new 
stage in relations with Indigenous peoples. The movement leading to its creation 
begins in the 1840s. Over the next few decades, the British parliament enacted 
constitutions as each colony gained representative government, the last being 
Western Australia in 1889.
44 In the 1890s proposals for a federation were 
pursued in earnest and in 1901 the six colonies came together to establish the 
Commonwealth of Australia.
45 The new governing structure did not end the 
powers of the colonies. Rather, the Commonwealth was prescribed specific 




This movement has a feature that can be identified with the language of 
common constitutionalism. Each of the colonies freely consented by referenda 
of the people
47 to join the proposed federation.
48 This was explicitly reinforced 
in the new constitution with a clause stating every ‘power of the Parliament of a 
Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall ... continue as at the 
establishment of the Commonwealth ...’
49  
                                                 
44 Macintyre, above n 5, 92; Bartlett, above n 12, 86, n 13. 
45 Western Australia agreed to join the Commonwealth after the passage of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act, but prior to Federation on 1st January 1901. See P. Parkinson, 
‘Tradition and Change in Australian Law’ in Blackshield and Williams, above n 16, 147. 
46 See ‘Outline’ in Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Constitution, (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), vii, s 107 (“The Australian Constitution”); 
Constitutional Commission, ‘Final Report of the Constitutional Commission’ in Blackshield and 
Williams, above n 16, 179-180. 
47 Women were only able to participate in the referenda in South Australia and Western 
Australia.  See D Cass and K Rubenstein, ‘Representation of Women in the Australian 
Constitutional System’ reprinted in Blackshield and Williams, above n 16, 64.  
48 P. Parkinson, ‘Tradition and Change in Australian Law’ in Blackshield and Williams, above 
n 16, 147.  
49 The Australian Constitution, above n 46, s 107. 
  154The convention of consent though was not extended to Indigenous 
peoples. Indeed, they were specifically excluded from participating in the 
referenda in Queensland and Western Australia. In Queensland s 6 of the 
Elections Act 1885 states that no ‘aboriginal native of Australia, China, or of the 
South Sea Islands ...’ other than freehold owners of land can vote. In Western 
Australia, a similar disqualification was imposed by s 12 of the Constitution 
Amendment Act 1893.
  While the other colonies did not formally exclude 
Indigenous peoples from a right to vote, it appears that few exercised their 
vote.
50 Also influencing Indigenous peoples’ voting entitlements in New South 
Wales was ‘anyone receiving aid from the State or charitable institutions was 
not entitled to be enrolled’.
51 This was also the case in Victoria.
52 
 
Moreover, the lack of participation of Indigenous peoples was no doubt 
influenced by prevailing attitudes. A prominent vocal opponent of extending 
franchise to Aborigines was Isaac Isaacs, later a High Court judge. He told the 
House of Representatives that he thought Aborigines had not the ‘intelligence, 
interest or capacity’ to vote.
53 Another prominent individual, Henry Higgins, 
thought it ‘utterly inappropriate to grant the franchise to the aborigines or ask 
them to exercise an intelligent vote’.
54 One year after Federation, the new 
Commonwealth Parliament adopted the Franchise Act. Following debate, this 
was amended to include a provision stating that no ‘aboriginal native of 
Australia, Asia, Africa or the islands of the Pacific, except New Zealand, shall 
be entitled to have his name placed on the electoral roll, unless so entitled under 
                                                 
50 Id.; Stretton and Finnimore, above n 6, 522. 
51 Stretton and Finnimore, above n 6, 522, n 4. 
52 Summers, above n 9, 3.  
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  155Section 41 of the Constitution’.
55 Section 41 states that no ‘adult person who has 
or acquires a right to vote at elections for the more numerous House of the 
Parliament of a State shall, while the right continues, be prevented ...’ from 
voting in federal elections.
56 That is, the exclusionary provision was modified 
only to accommodate those already on a state roll.  
 
The new constitution specifically barred federal parliament from 
legislating on behalf of Indigenous peoples. Section 51 (xxvi) made provision to 
legislate on behalf of the ‘people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in 
any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws’.
57 However, it 
did let the Commonwealth legislate for other ‘racial minorities’. Sir Robert 
Garran, a leading constitutional expert in the first half of the twentieth century, 
considered the ‘real subject-matter of the section was meant to be introduced 
races, like the kanakas in Queensland, for whom special laws might be 
necessary’.
58 Attwood and Markus suggest that Melanesians were the main 
political focus for its inclusion. Melanesians began to be recruited to Australia 
from the mid-1860s to provide field labour for the Queensland sugar industry. 
The power was in parallel with immigration legislation, the aim being to 
achieve uniformity between states. Nevertheless, despite not being the primary 
focus of this provision there was also ‘no view that indigenous peoples … 
should be included’ in the federal constitution.
59 That is, it was based upon a 
view that supported racial discrimination. A statement by Sir Edmund Barton, 
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  156Australia’s first Prime Minister, and one of the High Court’s first judges, also 
confirms this. He told the 1898 Constitutional Convention that the clause was 
necessary to let the Commonwealth ‘regulate the affairs of the people of 
coloured or inferior races who are in the Commonwealth’.
60 
 
The second exclusionary reference to Aboriginal people concerned the 
national census. Section 127 stated that in ‘reckoning the numbers of people of 
the Commonwealth or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal 
natives shall not be counted’.
61 When this was discussed at the Constitutional 
Convention before 1901, South Australian delegate Dr John Cockburn protested 
that the provision would exclude Aborigines from the vote. Alfred Deakin and 
Edmund Barton ‘assured him that his fears were groundless’. Richard 
O’Connor, a lawyer from New South Wales, reminded him that a clause had 
already been passed to safeguard their right to vote. However, this was not so 
since he was referring to what became s 41, addressing the relationship between 
state and commonwealth franchise.
62 Scholars agree on the ‘best evidence 
available, the main purpose’ of the section relates to the ‘apportionment of 
funds – to formulas for the distribution of government revenues on the basis of 
population – and the apportionment of parliamentary seats’. Attwood & Markus 
argue the clause rests on an assumption, unchallenged at the time, that 
Aboriginal people were ‘inferior’ and ‘not the equal of European citizens’. This 
was used to justify that they should not ‘expect the same level of government 
                                                                                                                                    
59 Attwood, Markus et al, ibid, 1; see also Summers, above n 9, 2. 
60 Sir Edmund Barton, cited by Blackshield and Williams, above n 16, 181. 
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  157expenditure or to participate in the political process’.
63 These negative 
references reflected prevailing attitudes. Attwood & Markus suggest that they 




The states retained powers concerning land and Indigenous peoples. As 
Britain established colonial governments, these were invested with ‘the entire 
management and control of the waste lands belonging to the Crown ... including 
all royalties, mines and minerals’.
65 As Bartlett observes, this power was 
‘always ... exercised as though it empowered the States to deny, diminish or 
extinguish Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights to traditional land’.
66 The 
states could obtain land whenever they required as no legal impediments existed 
to stop its seizure.
67   
 
The events surrounding Federation reflect a mixture of three 
constitutional languages. The view that the consent of the settlers to joining the 
Federation should be sought by referendum reflects the language of common 
constitutionalism. Federation itself though is identified with a specific set of 
institutions associated with the language of modern constitutionalism. 
Blackshield & Williams write that the ‘constitutional laws, traditions and 
practices ... were ... overwhelmingly British (and especially English)’. This 
influence is responsible for the ideas of representative and responsible 
government. The United States heavily influenced the ‘modelling of the 
                                                 
63 Attwood, Markus et al, above n 8, 2.  
64 Ibid. 1. 
65 Bartlett, above n 12, 86.  
66 Ibid. 66.  
  158proposed system of government’, and the ‘concepts of federalism, separation of 
powers and judicial review’.
68 A further link to modern constitutionalism says 
Federation is the founding moment of democratic politics in Australia. It is this 
event that represents the ‘mythical agreement between the people’;
69 Federation 
marked the beginning of the ‘imagined community’ called the Australian nation, 
to which we all ‘belong ... and enjoy equal dignity as citizens’.
70  
 
This imagined community did not extend to Indigenous peoples. In 
failing to respect the continuity of their cultures in the governing relations for 
the Federation, the Founding Fathers effectively embraced the doctrine of 
discontinuity. The exclusionary stance was premised on the view that 
Indigenous peoples were racially inferior, nomadic and unworthy of being 
accorded rights associated with civilised peoples. In this respect it reflects 
another constitutional language: White Australia. This differs from the modern 
constitutional language because, rather than emphasising cultural uniformity 
among all inhabitants, it is based on the perceived racial superiority of 
Europeans.  
 
The campaign for federal power 
 
Inevitably, the push for the Indigenous right to vote became intertwined 
with moves to give the Commonwealth the power to legislate on their behalf. As 
early as 1910 a proposal for the Commonwealth to assume this power was 
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  159raised when the Commonwealth assumed responsibility for governing the 
Northern Territory (previously held by South Australia). Attwood and Markus 
write that at the time ‘it was the hope of the small minority of white Australians 
who took an interest in Aboriginal welfare that the Commonwealth government, 
representing all white Australians and with the resources of the nation at its 
disposal, would set an example for the states in its treatment of Aborigines’. A 
Royal Commission on the Constitution was held between 1929 and 1931.
71 A 
minority of the commissioners recommended that the federal Government 
assume responsibility for Aboriginal Affairs. The federal Government accepted 
the majority view to maintain the status quo.
72  
 
In the 1930s the campaign for constitutional change intensified when 
humanistic, scientific and feminist organisations were joined by Aboriginal 
activists. The secretary of the Australian Aborigines’ League, William Cooper, 
argued for a uniform national policy equitably financed by all taxpayers. In 
January 1938, an Aboriginal ‘Day of Mourning’ was held in Sydney to protest 
the sesquicentennial celebrations of Captain Cook’s landing in 1788. Cooper’s 
organisation and the Aborigines Progressive Association, led by Jack Patten and 
Bill Ferguson, requested a new deal for Aborigines. They demanded ‘a National 
Policy for Aborigines’ and ‘Commonwealth Government control of all 
Aboriginal Affairs’ as well as a Commonwealth Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs 
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  160to ‘raise all Aborigines throughout the Commonwealth to full Citizen Status and 
civil equality with the whites in Australia ...’
73 
 
During the Second World War, the federal Government sought the 
power to legislate for Aborigines. In 1942, a constitutional convention called by 
the Curtin Labor Government recommended that some powers be transferred to 
the Commonwealth for five years following the war. Because not all states 
passed the necessary legislation, the Government held a referendum in 1944. 
The proposal concerning Aborigines was one of 14 designed to enable the 
Commonwealth to begin post-war reconstruction without legislative restriction. 
Attorney-General H.V. Evatt said that the Aboriginal initiative was influenced 
by Australia’s new responsibility for New Guinea and the role it expected to 
play in the South-West Pacific and to head off any ‘likelihood of international 
criticism of Australia’s treatment of its own indigenous people’. The 
referendum was supported by 2 million of the 4.3 million votes cast, with a 
majority vote achieved in only two states. Its defeat was partly attributed to the 
requirement that electors approve all 14 changes in one package, rather than 
vote on each individual measure.
74 
 
The push for federal control of Aboriginal affairs re-emerged in public 
discourse during the 1950s. The campaign for another referendum was launched 
in April 1957 at an Aboriginal-Australian Fellowship meeting held in the 
Sydney Town Hall attended by more than 1500 people.  Feminist, labour 
activist and executive member of the London-based Anti-Slavery Society, Jessie 
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  161Street, returned to Australia in December 1956 and plunged into the campaign. 
Street, the secretary of the Australian Council for Civil Liberties, Brian 
Fitzpatrick, and Christian Jollie Smith drafted a petition supporting ‘human 
rights’ for Aborigines and calling for changes to two aspects of the 
Commonwealth Constitution. One was to delete the words ‘other than the 
aboriginal race in any State’ from s 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution; the other to 
delete s 127 excluding Indigenous people from the census. The Aboriginal-
Australian Fellowship established in Sydney by Pearl Gibbs, Bert Groves and 
Faith Bandler also became involved.
75 The following year a national 
organisation to coordinate the campaign was established, which eventually 
became known as the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI). In the three months to September 1958, 
25,988 signatures were collected and presented to parliament but Territories 
Minister Paul Hasluck was unmoved. He stated the ‘practical task of advancing 
[Aboriginal] welfare and aiding their assimilation was of far more importance at 
the present time than taking fine points regarding the meaning and intention of 
an obscure section of the Constitution’.
76 Indeed, his department said that the 
‘Commonwealth and State Governments agree that the only future for 
Australia’s 74,000 aborigines is assimilation’ (sic).
77   
 
However, the campaign continued to gain momentum with a 
parliamentary joint committee recommending the repeal of s 127 and the ALP 
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  162federal conference adopting the two constitutional changes as policy.
78 The 
Liberal-Country Party Government ‘agreed’ that s 127 ‘should be removed’ but 
argued that removing s 51(xxvi) ‘would be a move in the wrong direction’.
79 An 
equal pay case that sought to extend the award conditions in the Northern 
Territory cattle station industry to Aborigines began in 1965;
80 the same year as 
the Freedom Ride throughout country New South Wales exposed a degree of 
racial discrimination unlike any previous protest. Several months later the 
Menzies Government introduced a bill to provide for a referendum to repeal s 
127,
81 which was passed by federal Parliament but deferred. Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies considered several possibilities including the repeal of the 
whole head of power, but decided against this because it was thought that s 
51(xxvi) might be needed in future.
82 In January 1966, when Harold Holt 
replaced Menzies as Prime Minister, his Attorney-General Billy Snedden 
recommended amending s 51(xxvi), but Cabinet did not agree. However, 
following the lodgement of another FCAATSI petition in February 1967, the 
Government reversed its position
83 and the subsequent referendum on the two 
changes recorded 90.77 per cent support,
84 a resounding yes, widely interpreted 
as affirming the equality of Indigenous peoples.
85  
 
With the success of the constitutional changes, the Commonwealth won 
the power to make special laws with respect to Indigenous people, although the 
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  163decision to amend rather than remove s 51(xxvi) still defined people in terms of 
‘race’. However, the changes gave federal Parliament the power to legislate for 
the people of any ‘race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special 
laws’.
86 Before the referendum, Holt had also overhauled Australia’s racially 
discriminatory ‘White Australia’ policy and signed the United Nations 
International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD).
87 The convention rejects ‘any doctrine of superiority 
based on racial differentiation’ as ‘scientifically false, morally condemnable, 
socially unjust and dangerous’. The parties to it resolved to adopt ‘all necessary 
measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and 
manifestations, and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices in order 
to promote understanding between races and to build an international 
community free from all forms of racial segregation and racial discrimination’. 
It also imposes obligations on parties to prohibit racial discrimination.
88 
 
The changes around this time indicated an evolution away from the idea 
of a culturally homogeneous Australia. No longer was it possible to limit entry 
to Europeans, ‘White Australians’ as they were called in the language of race. 
From the mid-1960s onwards, overt measures of discrimination against 
Aborigines were removed and in 1962 they gained the right to vote in 
Commonwealth elections, and access to pension, unemployment and maternity 
allowances.
89  
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  164 
In terms of constitutionalism, this was the beginning of a differentiation 
between a constitutional frame established to recognise European interests and 
one that was prepared to remove racial background from its gate keeping role on 
citizenship. The referenda marked a shift away from the language of White 
Australia: Indigenous people were to be accorded equality. The changes also 
reflected the influence of the language of human rights on campaigners for the 
referendum. John Chesterman emphasises the crucial role of the participants and 
particularly the Indigenous contribution to this struggle in his recent book.
90 
 
The Yirrkala land case 
 
Three years after the referendum a land claim used the constitutional 
changes as the basis for its legal argument. The campaign by the Yolngu People 
based at Yirrkala in north-eastern Arnhem Land, which began several years 
earlier, protested their exclusion from consultation regarding the federal 
Government’s grant of mining rights. The grant provided bauxite mining 
company Nabalco Pty Ltd use of land the Yolngu People regarded as their own. 
The Yolngu people sent a petition painted on bark to the Commonwealth 
Parliament seeking a hearing for their views. While a committee was established 
and ‘accepted’ some of their arguments, the Government proceeded with its 
mining agreement.
91 Legal action eventually commenced in Darwin, a region 
then under federal administration, challenging the right ‘to grant a mining lease 
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  165without the approval of the inhabitants of the Aboriginal Reserve’. The Court 
found that the Commonwealth was not obliged to obtain approval.
92 A second 
case, known as the Yirrkala land case or Gove Land Rights Case, relied upon 
the 1967 changes to the Australian Constitution.
93 It was argued that the federal 
Government could only acquire property on ‘just terms’.
94 Therefore, a failure 




While the claim failed, Justice Blackburn rejected the idea that 
Indigenous people were too backward to have a system of laws in place. In 
doing so, he abandoned a key argument associated with the language of White 
Australia. He found that the evidence shows a,
 96   
 
subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the 
people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was 
remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a 
system could be called ‘a government of laws, and not of men’ it is that 
shown in the evidence before me.  
 
Australian law now rejected the idea that the first inhabitants of the 
country were socially backward, but was not yet prepared to totally abandon the 
doctrine of terra nullius. Justice Blackburn rejected the claim for recognition on 
factual and legal grounds. He was ‘not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, 
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  166that the plaintiffs’ predecessors had in 1788 the same links to the same areas of 
land as those which the plaintiffs now claim’.
97 He determined that the 
claimants had failed to establish that ‘the relationship of the clan to the land 
[was] proprietary’,
98 despite the claimants putting forward abundant evidence to 
show they had a proprietary interest in land. According to Williams, this 
outcome occurred because Justice Blackburn presumed that economics was the 
basis of proprietary interest. Williams reasons that since the claimants’ beliefs 
were external to economics, these were not relevant in establishing a proprietary 
interest.
99 This indicates that Justice Blackburn used a feature of modern 
constitutionalism when he addressed the claim: he presumed that the European 
emphasis on economics and property was the only legitimate basis to 
demonstrate proprietary interests.
100 He was unable to find a way for two 
culturally distinct sets of laws to coexist.   
 
In looking at the legal basis to the claim, Blackburn examined other 
common law jurisdictions colonised by the British, in particular the United 
States, Canada and New Zealand. He concluded that ‘no doctrine of communal 
native title has any place in any of them, except under express statutory 
provisions’. On this basis he concluded that the ‘doctrine does not form, and has 
never formed, part of the law of any part of Australia’. Commenting on this 
statement, Bartlett noted that the ‘wealth of authority recognising native title at 
common law is so considerable as to render Justice Blackburn’s assertion ... 
                                                                                                                                    
96 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (Gove Land Rights Case), cited by Blackshield and Williams, 
above n 16, 177. 
97 Justice Blackburn, cited by Williams, above n 91, 191. 
98 Williams, ibid. 199. 
99 Ibid. 201; Sharp, above n 11, 103.  
100 Tully, above n 19, 64-5. 
  167almost incomprehensible’.
101 In rejecting a basis for communal native title, 
Justice Blackburn effectively rejected the convention of continuity. He 
continued to uphold the legal presumption that treated Australia as unoccupied 
when colonised.  
 
He also felt bound by the series of statements made obiter dicta where 
earlier court rulings had assumed that the Australian colonies could be classified 
as settled.
102 These earlier cases included Cooper v Stuart (1889), Attorney-
General v Brown (1847), Williams v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913), and 
Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge (1959). Blackshield and Williams note 
though that in all of these cases the relationship of ‘any indigenous system’ to 
the ‘transplanted British system of Crown grants, reservations and dedications 
of land’ was ‘never in issue’.
103  
 
Aboriginal Land Rights Commission 
 
The failure of the claim in Milirrpum v Nabalco fuelled legislative 
action around land rights and for the first time one of the common constitutional 
conventions was articulated around Indigenous people. In February 1973, the 
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  168newly elected Whitlam Government appointed Justice Woodward to head up an 
Aboriginal Land Rights Commission. This marked the first time that the 
recognition of Indigenous land rights was explicitly considered. Its Second 
Report, delivered in April 1974, outlined broad objectives to achieve the 
‘recognition of land rights for Aborigines’. While its aim was ‘preserving and 
strengthening all Aboriginal interests in land and rights over land which exist 
today, particularly all those having spiritual importance’,
104 the report did not 
recommend recognising land claims of those dispossessed. Instead, it proposed 
some ‘basic compensation in the form of land’ be provided for those 
‘irrevocably deprived of the rights and interests which they would otherwise 
have inherited from their ancestors, and who have obtained no sufficient 
compensating benefits from white society’.
105 The report also proposed that the 
norm of consent generally be respected, at least for those still occupying their 
lands. It stated that Aboriginal interests in land should not be further ‘whittled 
away without consent, except in those cases where the national interest 
positively demands it - and then only on terms of just compensation’.
106  
 
The Aboriginal Land Rights Commission spurred legislative action by 
the Whitlam Labor Government, and the Fraser Coalition Government 
continued this initiative. Initial legislation addressed Queensland discriminatory 
laws and established a legal basis for the work of Aboriginal Councils and 
Associations, and land rights in the Northern Territory. Preceding the election of 
the Whitlam Government, South Australia adopted lands rights legislation in 
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  1691966. Other states followed in the subsequent three decades, except Western 




Land rights legislation adopted by the federal parliament to apply to the 
Northern Territory represented a high water mark. The Whitlam Government 
introduced the legislation before it was dismissed in November 1975, but the 
Fraser Government drafted a new bill that left out some important provisions.
108 
Under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth),   
Aboriginal Land Commissioners were appointed to hear claims on behalf of 
traditional Aboriginal owners, and Land Councils were established to manage 
their interests. The Act stipulated that the Land Councils had to be satisfied that 
the traditional owners of the land understood the nature and purpose of a 
proposed exploration licence grant and ‘as a group ... consent to it’.
109 While the 
Act was significantly amended in 1987, consent of the traditional owners to 
mining was retained although it was required before an exploration licence was 
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  170Racial discrimination legislation 
 
In 1975 legislation prohibiting racial discrimination was enacted by the 
Commonwealth government to give effect to CERD.
111 Three sections of the 
RDA are particularly significant. Section 9 ‘proscribes the doing of an act’,
112 
which makes it unlawful to racially discriminate. This covers any act that 
involves a ‘distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life’.
113  
 
Section 10 relates to the enjoyment of a right and is not limited to 
existing legal rights.
114 It covers laws within Australia to ensure that ‘persons of 
a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin ... enjoy that right to the 
same extent as persons of that other race, colour or national or ethnic origin’.
115 
It is comparative and as Justice Deane was later to observe, it provides ‘a moral 
entitlement to be treated in accordance with standards dictated by the 
fundamental notions of human dignity and essential equality which underlie the 
international recognition of human rights ...’
116 The provision is explicitly 
linked to Article 5 of the Convention, which states that the rights to be protected 
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Section 8 exempts ‘special measures’ provided for in Article 1, 
Paragraph 4 of the Convention. This article defines special measures as those 
‘taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial 
or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in 
order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial 
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence 
lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that 




The RDA originates from the language of human rights and can be used 
to provide a degree of protection of Indigenous rights. Sections 9 and 10 of the 
RDA provide protection to economic, social and cultural rights. In stipulating 
that the ‘recognition, enjoyment or exercise’ of human rights be unimpaired, 
Section 9(1) comes closest to acknowledging the need to recognise the distinct 
cultures of each people.
119 Tully says that mutual recognition ‘cannot be simply 
the recognition of each culture in the same constitutional form’,
120 but while the 
RDA does not specifically refer to the right of people to have a constitutional 
form of their own choice, it does not preclude this possibility. However, the 
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  172RDA is silent upon the historical continuity of a people’s culture or on the need 
to gain their consent over matters affecting them (‘what touches all should be 
agreed to by all’).
121 The Convention is more expansive on these matters. 
Article 2 obliges a government to protect ‘certain racial groups ... for the 
purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. In addition, Article 5 specifies a ‘right’ of everyone to 
enjoy economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to ‘equal 
participation in cultural activities’.
122 
  
Coe v Commonwealth 
 
Eight years after the Northern Territory Supreme Court ruling on the 
Yirrkala land case, another claim for recognition came before the High Court. 
Unlike the earlier case involving a specific area of land, this was more far-
reaching and extended across the continent. In Coe v Commonwealth,
 
Aboriginal barrister Paul Coe sought recognition of the sovereignty of the 
‘Aboriginal community and nation of Australia’. On their behalf, he sought 
declarations and relief ‘in respect of the occupation, settlement and continuing 
dealing in the lands comprising the Australian continent ...’
123 In his statement 
of claim, Coe noted that from ‘time immemorial prior to 1770 the aboriginal 
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  173nation had enjoyed exclusive sovereignty over the whole of the continent now 
known as Australia’.
124 He later sought leave to amend the statement of claim. 
Justice Mason dismissed the application when it came before him. Coe then 
appealed to the Full Court.
125  
 
In a 2-2 decision, Justices Gibbs and Aickin dismissed the appeal, their 
opinion prevailing pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). They described the 
proposed amended statement of claim as containing ‘allegations and claims that 
were quite absurd and so clearly vexatious as to amount to an abuse of the 
process of the court’.
126 Justice Gibbs stated that the ‘aboriginal [sic] people of 
Australia ... had no legislative, executive or judicial organs by which 
sovereignty may have been exercised’.
127 His comments suggest a belief that 
sovereignty could only be expressed via such institutions. That is, he associated 
sovereignty with a particular set of European institutions, an indication of the 
influence of the language of modern constitutionalism on his thinking.
128 In his 
dissenting judgement, Justices Jacobs also rejected the claim for sovereignty. He 
considered that the ‘part of the proposed amended statement of claim’ disputing 
the ‘validity of the British Crown’s and now the Commonwealth of Australia’s 
claim to sovereignty’ was ‘embarrassing and could not be allowed’. It was not 
‘cognizable in a municipal court’ since sovereignty implied an exclusive 
concern with ‘matters of the law of nations’.
129 From these comments, it might 
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However, the case also produced the first signs within the High Court of 
preparedness to use the language of common constitutionalism. Justices Jacobs 
and Murphy, dissenting on the issue of the dismissal of the appeal, argued that 
‘it states matters which raise a question which ought to be determined’.
131 They 
drew a distinction between those matters dealing with sovereignty and those 
concerning the doctrine of terra nullius. In the statement of claim, Coe argued 
that the country was conquered and Justices Jacobs and Murphy considered this 
part of the claim should be tested in court.
132 Justice Murphy also addressed the 
view expressed by the Privy Council in Cooper v Stuart that Australia was 
peacefully annexed. He observed that Indigenous people ‘did not give up their 
lands peacefully, they were killed or removed forcibly from the lands by the 
United Kingdom forces or the European colonists in what amounted to 
attempted (and in Tasmania almost complete) genocide’. Regarding the 
statement of the Privy Council, he described this as either ‘made in ignorance’ 
or a ‘convenient falsehood to justify the taking of aborigines’ land’. Justice 
Murphy considered that Coe was ‘entitled to endeavour to prove that the 
concept of terra nullius had no application to Australia’ and that ‘the lands were 
acquired by conquest’. Indicating his reasoning on where this may lead Justice 
Murphy said it ‘may rely, in the alternative, on common law rights which would 
arise if there were peaceful settlement’. Furthermore, regardless of whether it 
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  175‘was acquired by conquest or peaceful settlement’, the plaintiff is ‘entitled to 
argue that the sovereignty acquired by the Crown did not extinguish’ ownership 
rights and that ‘they have certain proprietary rights (at least in some lands) and 
are entitled to declaration and enjoyment of their rights or compensation’.
133  
 
Retreating from injustice 
 
In the 1985 Gerhardy v Brown case,
134 Justice Deane added some 
comments that indicated his opposition to the doctrine of terra nullius. ‘[T]o the 
extent that one can generalize’, he said, the society of Aboriginal people in 
Australia was not ‘institutionalized and drew no clear distinction between the 
spiritual and the temporal. The core of existence was the relationship with and 
the responsibility for their homelands.’ This was neither individual nor clan 
‘owned’ in a European sense but which provided ‘identity of both in a way 
which the European settlers did not trouble to comprehend’. Furthermore, the 
‘imposed law, based on an assertion of terrae nullius, failed completely to 
acknowledge, let alone protect’ (sic).
135 This candid and critical observation 
placed the legal doctrine into a broader cultural context.  
 
Citing Milirrpum v  Nabalco as a reference, Justice Deane noted that 
almost two centuries on, the ‘generally accepted view remains that the common 
law is ignorant of any communal native title or other legal claim of the 
Aboriginal clans or peoples even to ancestral tribal lands on which they still 
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  176live’. He also contrasted the Australian doctrine with the common law in the 
United States. He observed that the,
 136  
 
common law of this land has still not reached the stage of retreat from 
injustice which the law of Illinois and Virginia had reached in 1823 when 
Marshall CJ, in Johnson v McIntosh, accepted that, subject to the assertion 
of ultimate dominion (including the power to convey title by grant) by the 
State, the ‘original inhabitants’ should be recognized as having ‘a legal as 
well as just claim’ to retain the occupancy of their traditional lands.  
 
While careful to avoid any suggestion that the law in Milirrpum v 
Nabalco was incorrect
137 Justice Deane’s statement implying acceptance of the 




Mabo protected by RDA 
 
The message from some of the judges in the Coe v Commonwealth case 
that it was reasonable to test the application of the doctrine of terra nullius was 
probably not lost on potential claimants.
139 Given that the judges considered the 
origins of private property were not exclusively tied to the actions of the Crown, 
it was now possible that native title could be considered to have survived a 
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  177change of sovereignty. Here was an opportunity to test whether this path could 
lead to recognition. Within three years of the Coe v Commonwealth case, the 
Mabo claim was lodged in the High Court against the state of Queensland. Its 
genesis began with informal meetings among the Meriam People in 1981 where 
plans were made to begin a court case to gain recognition.
140 They claimed 
rights to three islands at the northern end of the Great Barrier Reef in the Torres 
Strait. The Meriam People had lived on the islands for generations before the 
first European contact. The naming of these islands as the Murray Islands 
originated with the captain of the Pandora in 1791. In the Meriam Mir language 
of the inhabitants, the islands are known as Mer, Dauar and Waier. Mer is the 
largest.
141 In their claim, the Meriam People said they had ‘inhabited and 
exclusively possessed the islands, since time immemorial, and that they had 
land rights over them’. The claim stated that the islands were annexed in 1879 
and ‘had become part of the Colony of Queensland’. However, it also went on 
to claim that the ‘Crown’s sovereignty was subject’ to their land rights and 
‘based upon local custom and traditional native title’. The Meriam People 
sought declarations regarding the existence of their land rights and injunctions 
restraining Queensland from impairing them.
142  
 
In response, the Queensland government denied the existence of the land 
rights claimed. Its defence was modified in 1985 following its action in the 
Queensland parliament to adopt the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act 
(the Coast Islands Act). This legislation specifically sought to cover the islands 
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  178claimed by the Meriam People. It retrospectively declared that every ‘disposal 
of the island or part thereof ... in pursuance of Crown lands legislation ... shall 
be taken to have been validly made ...’ Section 5 of the Coast Islands Act 
declared that no ‘compensation was or is payable to any person ... in respect of 
any right, interest or claim alleged to have existed prior to the annexation of the 
islands ...’
143 In his second reading speech, the Queensland minister declared 
that the objective of the legislation was to extinguish ‘traditional legal rights’.
144  
 
Responding to this, the plaintiffs put forward three broad reasons as to 
why the act could not extinguish their claim. Firstly, ‘if the Act was within the 
power of the Queensland Parliament it was ineffective to extinguish native title 
because it did not expressly so provide’. Secondly, it was ‘wholly inconsistent’ 
with the RDA and was therefore ‘inoperative by reason of the Commonwealth 
Constitution s 109’.  Thirdly, it was beyond the power of the Queensland 




In February 1986, Chief Justice Gibbs of the High Court ordered that the 
‘issues of fact raised in the case’ be remitted to the Supreme Court of 
Queensland. By the end of that year, Justice Moynihan began to hear evidence 
from the Meriam People.
146 With the common law claim now hinging on a legal 
ruling, the High Court considered the impact of the legislation, bringing down 
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  179its decision in December 1988.
147 Before the High Court decision, the plaintiffs 
agreed that if the Coast Islands Act was upheld they would refrain from 
pursuing their claim.
148 At stake then was the recognition of native title and with 
it the possibility of using the common constitutional language to articulate a 
change to the relationship with Indigenous peoples. If the Court found the 
Queensland legislation lawful it would provide a legal basis to extinguish the 
traditional rights of the Meriam People and put an end to the claim.  
 
In its decision the High Court focussed principally upon the role of the 
RDA  in protecting Indigenous land claims from unilateral state government 
action. In a 4-2 decision, the Court found that the Queensland legislation did not 
comply with the RDA and s 107 of the Commonwealth Constitution made it 
inoperable to the extent of its inconsistency.
149 In support of the majority 
position were two separate judgements.   
 
Justices Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron in their majority judgement 
focussed on s 10 of the RDA, which relates to ‘the enjoyment of a right’. They 
noted that this concerns human rights rather just legal rights. In particular, they 
referred to Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states that no one shall be ‘arbitrarily deprived of his property’ and that 
arbitrarily was interpreted to mean not only ‘illegally’ but also ‘unjustly’.
150 
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  180Against this background, the judges asked whether the ‘Meriam people 
enjoy the human right to own and inherit property - a right which includes an 
immunity from arbitrary deprivation of property - to a more limited extent than 
other members of the community’. They determined that by ‘extinguishing the 
traditional legal rights’ of the Meriam People the Coast Islands Act ‘abrogated 
the immunity of the Miriam people from arbitrary deprivation of their legal 
rights in and over the Murray Islands’. It ‘impaired’ their ‘human rights’ while 
leaving unimpaired the corresponding human rights of those whose rights ‘in 
and over the Murray Islands’ came from elsewhere.
151  
 
Justice Deane provided the other judgement. Like his colleagues in the 
majority, he too focussed on s 10 of the RDA, which he considered involved the 
protection of human rights.
152 He found that the,
 153 
 
purpose, operation and effect of the [Coast Islands] Act would, on the 
confined construction which I would give it, be to extinguish traditional 
proprietary rights and interests of the Torres Strait Islanders which 
survived annexation to the extent that their existence would invalidate or 
render ineffective subsequent dealings or acts ‘purporting to be in 
pursuance of Crown lands legislation’. 
 
Since this deprived the Meriam People of a right enjoyed by other 
persons, he found it amounted to ‘discriminatory treatment’ and was 
inconsistent with s 10(1) of the RDA.
154  
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  181Justice Wilson, dissenting from the conclusions of the four justices, did 
not find that the Coast Islands Act discriminatory, denying its ‘practical effect’ 
was to ‘create an inequality’. He reasoned that since the ‘plaintiffs were alone in 
the enjoyment of traditional rights’ its effect is to ‘remove a source of 
inequality’. Henceforth, the Meriam People ‘will enjoy the same rights with 
respect to ownership of property and rights of inheritance as every other person 
in Queensland of whatever race’.
155 Justice Dawson did not decide on the 
matter. He considered that whether or not s 10(3) protected the plaintiffs could 
only be addressed once ‘questions of fact [around the claim] are determined’.
156 
Chief Justice Mason ‘expressed no opinion’ on these matters. While not finding 
the  Coast Islands Act discriminatory, he considered it dependent upon 
determining ‘the precise nature and extent’ of their native title, a matter not yet 
considered by the Court.
157  
 
This decision revealed two very different approaches toward the 
application of the RDA to native title. The first, adopted by Justices Brennan, 
Toohey, Gaudron, and Deane, presumed that two culturally different, but equal 
land laws could co-exist, reflecting the language of human rights. While Justice 
Wilson identified uniqueness in native title, Sharp says he was more ‘formally 
logical’, but that behind this ‘formality lies the assumption that there is only one 
law - English law’. Justice Dawson and Chief Justice Mason followed a similar 
logic. Their views centred on the need to ‘determine the equivalence or 
otherwise of the rights claimed by the Murray Islanders’. By applying this 
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  182method, the protection of the RDA could only occur if the ‘rights of ownership 
were equivalent to the rights of ownership enjoyed by others’. This implied the 
uniqueness of native title would be a barrier to its protection. Unspoken, but 
underpinning the three judgements was the view that only European law was 
worthy of protection. As Sharp observed, the ‘hypothesis in all three minority 
judgements is that the cultural difference to which the Meriam plaintiffs gave 
expression carries an intrinsic cultural inferiority ...’
158 The judgements reflected 
the language of modern constitutionalism where culture is discounted, which 
reveals a disrespect for a non-English culture.
159 The first approach of the High 
Court provided a basis to protect culturally different land relations; the latter 
rendered the RDA useless for this purpose. 
 
Having found the Queensland legislation inconsistent with the RDA, the 
majority did not need to examine whether it was within the power of the 
Queensland parliament to extinguish native title. Instead, they followed the 
‘assumption that the plaintiffs could establish the land rights claimed’.
160  
 
However, the minority judges had to examine this matter if they were to 
consider all the arguments made by the plaintiffs for protection. Justice Wilson 




•  was ‘not limited in its power to deal with the waste lands of the Crown’; 
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  183•  was empowered to ‘deprive a person of property without compensation ...’; 
and, 
•  did not interfere with the ‘judicial process’ by extinguishing the rights of those 
who sought to assert them.
  
 
Queensland Supreme Court - gains and losses 
 
The High Court’s decision that the Queensland legislation did not 
extinguish traditional land rights meant the claim could proceed. When initially 
lodged, the Mabo claim also included sea rights, but this aspect was withdrawn 
in 1989. The Commonwealth government then withdrew from the legal 
proceedings leaving the Queensland government to stand alone in disputing the 
land claims.
162 The claim proceeded and the Supreme Court of Queensland 
resumed its hearings in May 1989.
163  
 
When the original claims came before the Court, the individuals brought 
them forth on their and their family groups’ behalf. The Supreme Court heard 
evidence over 67 days in Brisbane in 1986, at Mer and Thursday Island in 1989 
and again in Brisbane in 1989. Much of the evidence comprised oral testimony 
                                                                                                                                    
161 Ibid. 188 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ); 201-2 (Wilson J); Bartlett, above n 12, 18-9. 
162 Initially the Commonwealth Government was also sued since some of sea claimed was 
outside Queensland’s jurisdiction. The claim to sea rights was withdrawn in 1989. Keon-Cohen 
says this was because the ‘evidence, as it then stood, was too thin and because the  ‘remote sea 
claims were the only areas of interest’ to the Commonwealth. Justice Moynihan’s Determination 
also rejected the sea claims. See Keon-Cohen, above n 14, 937 & footnote 321. Sharp, citing 
McIntyre, states that the decision was taken for ‘strategic reasons’ to avoid unnecessarily 
antagonising the Commonwealth it was decided to ‘focus on the main question: to establish the 
existence of common law title’.  See Sharp, above n 11, 202. See also Frank Brennan, One land, 
one nation: Mabo: Towards 2001, (St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1995), 11 
163 Sharp, above n 11, xii.  
  184from Meriam witnesses,
164 and was not a claim for ‘communal native title’, as 
considered by Justice Blackburn in Milirrpum v Nabalco. During the Supreme 
Court hearings the Meriam claimants made clear there is ‘no concept of public 
land owned by the community in Meriam society ...’
165 They presented the 
Court with ‘the boundaries of their village and garden lands’. They claimed 
usufructuary rights, rights for the use and enjoyment of property. They also 
cited ‘Murray Island law’, which many of them identified explicitly as ‘Malo’s 
Law’ as authority for how they ‘cultivate and conserve the land and its produce 




Malo’s Law is a ‘set of religiously sanctioned rules’ to which the people 
‘feel bound to observe’. The eight clans ‘occupy clan territories facing and 
extending across the sandbeaches’. Allotments of ‘land, foreshore and reef flats’ 
are owned by the ‘eldest son on behalf of the lineage or family ...’
167 Sharp 
noted that the plaintiffs argued that contemporary ‘Meriam culture is ongoing 
and developing, not frozen in tradition’. However, there is also ‘an essential 
continuity in the system of land tenure, in other institutions and beliefs’.
168 Their 
link to land is ‘two-sided: they both own land and belong to it, a dual relation of 
right and responsibility’.
169 When they initially formulated their claim, they 
‘unanimously reaffirmed their wish for inalienable freehold tenure’.
170  
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  185The dispute over the claim had features familiar from earlier struggles 
between those already in occupation and a new colonising force. In this case, 
the Meriam witnesses explained that the local court established by the 
Queensland administration ‘was a new vehicle for the exercise of their 
traditional law’, which provided a basis for the continuity of their traditional 
title. Disputing this, the Queensland government argued that the ‘court system 
constituted a decisive break with the past’, echoing those who have emphasised 
discontinuity as evidence for their authority.
171 
 
In November 1990, Justice Moynihan delivered the determination of the 
Court.




•  the evidence established that the Meriam ‘recognise the continuance of claims 
to garden plots’; 
•  traditional rules of ‘inheritance continue for village residential land’; and, 
•  the evidence revealed ‘no notion of title by vacant possession, and no notion of 
relinquishment of title by abandonment’. 
 
However, Justice Moynihan also rejected the claim ‘to the operation of a 
system of indigenous law’. Sharp says this was ‘fatal to the process of 
understanding Meriam social life, Meriam meaning systems and the character of 
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  186the Meriam people’.
174 In particular, it neglected the significance of Malo law 
‘as a belief system and as a moral-legal order’.
175 Comparing this with the 
Milirrpum case Sharp says that this neglect occurred because the 
‘interrelationships with the land’ were reduced ‘to the economic dimension’.
176 
This aspect continued a theme expressed in the earlier court case in which there 




This chapter has traced the main contours affecting the relationship with 
Indigenous peoples from the time of colonisation of Australia and concluding 
with the Queensland Supreme Court decision on the Meriam claim. Relating 
this to the findings about language and games in Chapter 3, participants as 
diverse as a clerk in the Colonial Office, an attendee at a constitutional 
convention, or an Aboriginal representative seeking equality have acted in a 
language game to shape and re-shape constitutionalism. Summarising the 
events, they have revealed elements from three distinct languages. 
 
An idea associated with the language of White Australia was the 
perception that non-Europeans were inferior. Another idea was the view that 
Indigenous people were too backward to have a system of governance. The 
presumption that the land is empty upon colonisation was a thread that guided a 
series of court cases as well as influencing Federation. The idea that the land 
was empty upon colonisation is one that the languages of both White Australia 
                                                 
174 Ibid. 154. 
175 Ibid. 158.  
  187and modern constitutionalism share. Or to put it another way, at least two 
distinct rationales were advanced for the seizure of the lands of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The White Australia perspective draws this 
conclusion from its attitudes about racial inferiority. Associated with the 
modern constitutional perspective is the absolutist view that when the Crown 
acquired territory it also gained ownership to all lands. Certainly, as discussed 
earlier, Tully presents evidence of ‘many modern theorists’ upholding the 
‘doctrine of discontinuity’.
177 The establishment of a federal government, 
particularly the governance relations was also reflective of influence of modern 
constitutional thinking.  
 
Since the distinction between the White Australia and modern 
constitutional languages is introduced in this chapter, a bit more should be said 
about why White Australia is not treated as a variant of modern 
constitutionalism. The central feature of White Australia is not based upon the 
justification of cultural uniformity, as is modern constitutionalism. Rather, it 
emphasises perceived racial differences between Europeans and other peoples. 
Through controls on immigration and policies toward Indigenous people, non-
Europeans were effectively excluded from the Australian nation. In this respect, 
this outlook is not based on one of the main forms of recognition associated 
with modern constitutionalism. Equality of individual citizens was not accorded 
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  188to non-Europeans.




On several occasions the language of common constitutionalism was 
expressed: consent in the Admiralty Instructions to Captain Cook and the 
Second Commission of Captain Phillip as well as by some members of the 
Colonial Office and individual settlers. Consent was also reflected in the view 
that referenda in each colony were required to establish the Federation. But 
consent was not actually exercised in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.  
 
The language of human rights was increasingly influential after World 
War II. It was significant in the campaign for the changes to the 1967 
referendum and the High Court’s decisions about the Queensland legislation. 
Ideas associated with the language of White Australia were abandoned. For 
instance, the courts eventually rejected the idea that Indigenous people were 
inferior. From the 1960s onwards, government policy shifted. The White 
Australia policy was abandoned, as migration from throughout the world was 
belatedly deemed acceptable. There were signs that various jurisdictions were 
inclined to provide a form of legal recognition of Indigenous land titles. The 
high point of this shift was the Northern Territory legislation and its adherence 
to the convention of consent. This trend was also reflected in the High Court, 
with some judges encouraging the submission of claims for recognition.  
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  189The last event examined in this chapter was the early stages of the 
Meriam claim. Two points are particularly relevant. The comments of the High 
Court minority in Mabo No 1 regarding the power of a parliament to extinguish 
native title signaled that this would be a key issue when the recognition of 
native title was directly considered. The other point is that the Queensland 
Supreme Court’s determination indicated some of the difficulties faced by the 
Australian legal system in recognising ‘Interests of a Kind Unknown to English 
Law’.
180 While the Meriam claim made significant progress, the failure to 
respect Malo Law was an indication of the enduring pressure to make sense of 
another culture by drawing upon concepts from a more familiar constitutional 
language.  
 
How the constitutional languages are reflected in the High Court’s 
decision concerning the Meriam People’s claim for recognition is the focus of 
the next chapter. It was undisputed that the Meriam People had occupied Mer 
Dauar and Waier islands in the Torres Strait for ‘generations before the first 
European contact’. However, the Queensland Government contested their claim 
for recognition that they were entitled to the islands as either ‘owners … 
possessors ... occupiers … or … as persons entitled to use and enjoy the 
lands’.
181 
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  190Chapter 7:  
The High Court’s Mabo decision  
 
The breaking of the silence on 3 June 1992 may be of a different order to 
those breaks which have gone before: gradually everyone had to listen to 
the voice of the High Court, even though by no means everyone wished to 
do so. As the news of the decision reverberated across the world, it began 
to break apart the assumption of an Australian nation without Aborigines 





In her chronicle tracing the lengthy and complex path leading to the 
eventual success of the claim brought by Eddie Mabo and the Meriam People, 
Nonie Sharp captures the extraordinariness of the High Court’s judgement and 
sounds a caution about its provisional character. In examining the claim and 
initial developments Chapter 6 showed that from the 1960s onwards there was a 
retreat from the doctrine of terra nullius and a desire to place relations on a 
different footing. When the case came before the Queensland Supreme Court, 
Justice Moynihan noted a ‘Meriam sense’ of ‘an enduring relationship with 




                                                 
1 Nonie Sharp, No ordinary judgment: Mabo, the Murray Islanders’ land case, (Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Studies, 1996), 207-8. 
  191This chapter focuses on the languages employed in the Mabo decision 
itself. In engaging with the complexities of legal theory the intention is not to 
consider the legal merits of the decision. Rather, this detailed examination is 
undertaken to demonstrate how the influence of the modern constitutional 
language suppressed the possibility that the three conventions could be 
respected. The examination proceeds by following the logic the High Court 
judges themselves employed in examining the subject matter. The different 
themes considered are the High Court’s attitude toward: 
 
•  Australia’s original inhabitants; 
•  sovereignty; 
•  settlement and occupation; 
•  radical title; 
•  whether pre-existing interests survive an act of State; 
•  the claims for recognition; 
•  the impact of grants upon recognition; 
•  the attitude toward gaining the consent of Indigenous land holders; 
•  whether a fiduciary obligation arose to protect Indigenous land holders; 
•  the impact of the Racial Discrimination legislation; 
•  the consequences arising from embracing a wrong doctrine; and, 
•  compensation for unilateral extinguishment of native title. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
2 Ibid. 171. 
  192Literature for this examination draws upon several sources. Chapter 9 of 
Nonie Sharp’s No ordinary judgment provides a cultural perspective on the 
High Court decision.
3 Two works by Kent McNeil are used, one being his 
foundational work Common law aboriginal title.
4 The other is his 1996 critique 
of the Mabo decision.
5 I am greatly indebted to his analysis in helping to clarify 
some of the legal assumptions involved, particularly the Court’s attitude toward 
the unilateral extinguishment of native title. Another reference point for its legal 
basis is Richard Bartlett’s Native title in Australia. Chapter 2 on the protection 
and recognition of native title in the Mabo decisions and Chapter 8 concerning 
its constitutional framework are particularly relevant.
6 In their 1993 publication, 
Gary D. Meyers and John Mugambwa review the central themes of the Mabo 
decision.
7 Tony Blackshield and George Williams review the decision in 
Chapter 5 on ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Question of Sovereignty’.
8 In a 
contribution to an assessment of the initial federal legislation, Garth Nettheim 
considers the relationship between native title and international law.
9 Lastly, but 
by no means least, were the separate judgements of the High Court decision. 
Based on the short statement provided by Chief Justice Mason and Justice 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 171-186.  
4 Kent McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) (“Common law 
aboriginal title”).  
5 See Kent McNeil, Emerging justice?, (Saskatchewan, Canada: Native Law Centre, University 
of Saskatchewan, 2001), (“Emerging justice?”), 357-408 for reprint of ‘Racial Discrimination 
and Unilateral Extinguishment of Native Title’. The article was originally published in 1996 in 
the Australian Indigenous Law Reporter. All references in this thesis are to Emerging justice?. 
6 Richard H. Bartlett, Native title in Australia, Second Edition, (Chatswood, NSW: 
Butterworths, 2004), Chapter 2, 15-32; Chapter 8, 83-91. 
7 Gary D. Meyers & John Mugambwa, ‘The Mabo Decision: Australian Aboriginal Land Rights 
in Transition’, (23 Environmental Law, 1993), 1203-47. 
8 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian constitutional law and theory: 
commentary and materials, Third Edition, (Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 2002), 175-
240. 
9 Garth Nettheim, ‘Native Title and International Law’ in Margaret A. Stephenson, (Ed), Mabo: 
the native title legislation, (St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1995), 36-48 
(“Native Title and International Law”).  
  193McHugh, it is presumed that on the aspects discussed below they agreed with 
the propositions put forward by Justice Brennan.
10  
 
Attitudes toward original inhabitants 
 
This part of the inquiry begins by considering the attitude of the High 
Court toward the original inhabitants. A majority of the Court rejected the 
proposition that Indigenous people were too backward to be organised and so 
rejected a key element of the language of White Australia. In rejecting this 
proposition, they were obliged to engage with two key themes considered by 
Justice Blackburn in the 1971 Milirrpum v Nabalco case (Milirrpum).
11 While 
concurring with Justice Blackburn on the first theme, the rest of the bench 
disagreed with him on the second.  
  
The first theme concerned whether a system of laws was in existence 
before British acquisition. Six of the seven judges affirmed this point. Given 
that the judges were prepared to acknowledge the distinct culture of the 
Indigenous inhabitants, this suggests an adherence to an aspect of the language 
of common constitutionalism. Justice Brennan cited the judgement of Justice 
Blackburn in Milirrpum  to the effect that the evidence shows a ‘subtle and 
elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people led their 
lives ...’ Justice Toohey commented that it was ‘inconceivable that indigenous 
inhabitants in occupation of land did not have a system by which land was 
utilised in a way determined by that society. There must, of course, be a society 
                                                 
10 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, 7 (“Mabo v Queensland (No 2)”).  
11 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 (SC (NT)).  
  194sufficiently organised to create and sustain rights and duties, but there is no 
separate requirement to prove the kind of society, beyond proof that presence on 
land was part of a functioning system.’ Likewise, Justices Deane and Gaudron 
rejected the idea that Australia’s ‘Aboriginal people’ should be ‘treated as a 
different and lower form of life whose very existence could be ignored for the 




Unlike his colleagues, Justice Dawson was not prepared to acknowledge 
the distinct culture of the Indigenous inhabitants. He does refer to ‘a system’ 
applying on the Murray Islands, not in discussing Justice Moynihan’s Supreme 




A system, such as that which apparently existed prior to annexation, 
whereby the control and disposition of land depended on what was 
acceptable in terms of social harmony and on the capacity of the individual 
to impose his will on the community, does not seem to me to amount to 
any sort of custom, whether or not characterised as a system of laws, 
regarding the control and disposition of land. 
 
The second theme concerns whether the lands were either socially and/or 
legally empty before colonisation.
14 In the 1889 case of Cooper v Stuart Lord 
                                                 
12 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 26 (Brennan J), 82 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 146 
(Toohey J, Italics in original).  
13 Ibid. 125 (Dawson J). 
14 Richard Bartlett argues that the High Court ‘did not reject the concept of terra nullius in 
international law as applicable to Australia’. This view is not central to the scope of thesis and is 
therefore not examined. See above n 6, 23. 
  195Watson declared Australia was ‘practically unoccupied’ and ‘without settled 
inhabitants or settled law’.
15 Rejecting this proposition, and linking it to the 
language of White Australia, Justice Brennan said the ‘facts as we know them 
today’ do not fit the ‘absence of law’ or ‘barbarian’ theory ‘underpinning the 
colonial reception of the common law of England’.
16 Justices Deane and 
Gaudron also rejected the idea advanced in the four earlier legal cases that ‘New 
South Wales had been unoccupied for practical purposes’ when colonised.
17 
Justice Toohey acknowledged the lands were inhabited and therefore considered 
that the doctrine of terra nullius had no authority. Confining his comments on 
this matter to the Murray Islands, Justice Toohey categorically stated: ‘One 
thing is clear ... The Islands were not terra nullius.’
18 Later, he said that the 
‘operation of the notion’ of terra nullius ‘only arises in the present case because 
of its theoretical extension to the Islands. But clearly it can have no operation’.
19 
Justice Dawson did not state the lands were unoccupied when colonised. 
However, he did consider earlier court declarations of land occupied by 
Indigenous people as ‘waste land’ as strongly defendable in legal doctrine,
20 
thereby affirming another aspect associated with the language of White 
Australia.   
 
The judges recognising the Meriam claim were acutely aware that 
continuing adherence to a doctrine factually flawed and linked to theories long 
                                                 
15 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 141 (Toohey J), citing Justice Watson.  
16 Ibid. 26. 
17 Ibid. 78 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
18 Ibid. 141. 
19 Ibid. 142.  
20 Ibid. 93, 115 (Dawson J).  
  196discredited risked undermining the authority of the common law.
21 Justice 
Brennan was the most expansive on this point:
 22  
 
… the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified as 
terra nullius no longer commands general support, the doctrines of the 
common law which depend on the notion that native peoples may be ‘so 
low in the scale of social organisation’ that it is ‘idle to impute to such 
people some shadow of the right known to our law’ can hardly be retained. 
If it were permissible in past centuries to keep the common law in step 
with international law, it is imperative in today’s world that the common 





By accepting that a system of laws existed before the British acquired 
Australia, the majority of the judges implied the Indigenous inhabitants were 
sovereign peoples.
23 However, the judges did not explore this matter further, 
and so carefully kept within the bounds of modern constitutional language and 
its interpretation of sovereignty as tied to territory acquired by a nation. It 
appears that they were guided in this respect by the prevailing legal doctrine 
concerning the acquisition of territory. Legal doctrine now divides such claims 
for recognition between two distinct branches (and by inference into different 
jurisdictions), which makes it exceedingly difficult for any new sovereignty 
claims to succeed. McNeil explains that territorial sovereignty is considered to 
                                                 
21 Nettheim, above n 9, 38. 
22 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 28 (Brennan J). 
  197involve ‘questions of international and constitutional law’ whereas title to land 
is considered a ‘matter of proprietary rights, which depends for the most part on 
the municipal law of property’.
24 McNeil also noted that the ‘municipal law 
criteria for determining whether territorial sovereignty has been acquired are not 
necessarily the same as those of international law’. For instance, in the case of 
English law, power to acquire new territory is assigned to the Crown ‘as part of 
its prerogative’, and held ‘that a declaration of sovereignty by the Crown, even 
if inconsistent with international law, is conclusive’. Therefore, international 
law cannot be used ‘in English law courts ... to invalidate a positive assertion of 
sovereignty by the Crown’.
25  
 
Following these principles, the Court said it was precluded from 
examining the validity of an act of state concerning the acquisition of Australia. 
For instance, Justice Brennan affirmed the statement by Justice Gibbs in the Sea 
and Submerged Lands case that the ‘acquisition of territory by a sovereign state 
for the first time is an act of state which cannot be challenged, controlled or 
interfered with by the courts of that state’. Following English law, he considered 
that a prerogative act was a legitimate ‘act of state’. Since the Murray Islands 
were ‘annexed by an exercise of the prerogative evidenced by the Letters 
Patent’, he said this was a ‘mode of acquisition recognised by the common law 
as a valid means of acquiring sovereignty over foreign territory’. He also 
observed that adherence to this principle ‘precludes any contest between the 
                                                                                                                                    
23 Ibid. 2 (Brennan J, Mason CJ and McHugh concurring). 
24 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 108.  
25 Ibid. 111.  
  198executive and judicial branches of government as to whether a territory is or is 
not within the Crown’s Dominions’.
 26 
  
Similarly, Justices Deane and Gaudron noted that under ‘British law in 
1788, it lay within the prerogative power of the Crown to extend its sovereignty 
and jurisdiction to territory over which it had not previously claimed or 
exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction’. They considered that the ‘exercise of that 
prerogative ... was an act of State whose primary operation lay not in the 
municipal arena but in international politics or law’. The ‘validity of such an act 
of State (including any expropriation of property or extinguishment of rights 
which it effected) could not be challenged in the British courts’. Expressing the 
opinion that the Meriam claim did not involve any ‘question of constitutional 
power’, they had no doubt that the High Court must accept ‘that the whole of 
the territory’ was ‘validly’ established as a ‘settled’ British colony. Justice 
Dawson also considered the annexation of the Murray Islands ‘an act of state’ 
which remains ‘legally effective’. Justice Toohey, the seventh member of the 
Court, did not explicitly comment on this matter, but implied agreement with his 
colleagues.
27   
 
The precise wording of the claim suggests the claimants were mindful of 
the prevailing constitutional language on sovereignty. The Meriam People did 
not challenge the proposition that the Crown acquired sovereignty to the Murray 
Islands. Indeed, their claim is premised on the assumption that the British 
                                                 
26 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 20 (Brennan J). 
27 Ibid. 58 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 91-2 (Dawson), 140 (Toohey J). 
  199Crown acquired sovereignty of the islands. Nor did they claim nationhood.
28 
Instead, they concentrated on asserting only those aspects of the language of 
common constitutionalism necessary to gain recognition of their claim. If they 
had sought recognition of their sovereignty or nationhood, it is possible a fuller 
explanation from the Court would have been forthcoming. In the absence of an 
explicit claim around sovereignty, interpretations of the Court’s view and the 
possibilities available diverge.
29 Tully suggests an ‘inherent right of self-
government comes along with native title’,
30 which means an assessment of the 
decision must at least consider the Court’s attitude toward circumstances where 
legislative and executive extinguishment occurs without the consent of the 
native title holder. These matters will be considered later in this chapter.  
  
Settlement and occupation 
 
Now the Court’s attitude toward settlement and occupation will be 
considered. McNeil writes that at one time ‘the only means of acquiring 
territorial sovereignty recognised by common law were the derivative modes of 
descent and conquest’. He added that the latter ‘probably’ encompassed 
‘cession’, in reference to the transfer of sovereignty over territory by way of a 
treaty.
31 In conquered and ceded territories it was presumed that local laws and 
                                                 
28 See ibid. 92 (Dawson), 138 (Toohey J). 
29 See Blackshield and Williams, above n 8, 228-9; Garth Nettheim,  
‘The Consent of the Natives’ in Essays on the Mabo Decision, (Nth Ryde, NSW: Law Book 
Company Ltd, 1993), 108-112; Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal sovereignty: reflections on race, 
state and nation, (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996); Lisa Strelein, ‘Missed Meanings: 
The language of sovereignty in the Treaty debate’, Paper delivered to Treaty Advancing 
Reconciliation Conference, Murdoch University, 26 June 2002, 3-6. [Available at 
www.treaty.murdoch.edu.au, accessed 12/02/2004]; James Tully, ‘A Fair and Just Relationship’, 
Meanjin, Vol 57, No 1, 1998, 146-166 (“A Fair and Just Relationship”). 
30 Tully, A Fair and Just Relationship, above n 29, 160. 
31 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 112-3; Elizabeth A. Martin, (Ed), A 
Dictionary of Law, Fourth Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 66.  
  200customs, ‘unless unconscionable or incompatible with the change in 
sovereignty’ would remain in force until altered or replaced by the Crown.
32 
Tully draws attention to the norm that in such circumstances existing 
constitutional relations should be upheld. ‘The customs and ways of a 
conquered people continue until the conqueror expressly discontinues them.’
33 
Tully does not refer to the qualifications ‘unconscionable’ or ‘incompatible’, 
suggesting that these have arisen from subsequent legal cases. McNeil refers to 
further modification, no doubt to take account of the democratisation of 
sovereignty. For instance, the Crown only held the power ‘to make laws not 
contrary to fundamental principles until a representative legislative assembly 
was promised or created’.
34  
 
In the case of settled territories, McNeil says legal doctrine considers 
English law ‘accompanied the colonists to the extent that it was applicable to 
local circumstances’. As a consequence, in such circumstances the Crown ‘had 
no legislative authority’ apart from statute,
35 but did have the ‘power to set up 
courts of justice and constitute a representative assembly’. McNeil says these 
general rules were ‘well settled before the end of the eighteenth century’, 
although their practical application led to some adjustments later.
36 For instance, 
in conquered and ceded territories where ‘local law was unsuitable for 
Europeans, the colonists were held to be subject to English law instead’.
37 In 
settled territories with Indigenous populations, ‘the importation of English law 
                                                 
32 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 113.  
33 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 125 (“Strange multiplicity”).  
34 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 113-4.  
35 Ibid. 114-5.  
36 Ibid. 115. 
  201by the settler community did not necessarily abrogate pre-existing customary 
law’. Therefore, McNeil observed, the ‘extent to which English law was 
introduced and local law retained was thus a variable depending on the 
circumstances of each particular colony’.
38 
 
As was seen in the last chapter, several court determinations declared 
Australia ‘practically unoccupied’ when settlement was established. In 
considering the claim of the Meriam People, the High Court was obliged to 
revisit this matter. Six judges followed accepted legal doctrine and drew a 
distinction between the categories of conquest and settlement. For instance, 
Justices Deane and Gaudron said in ‘cases of cession and conquest, the pre-
existing laws of the relevant territory were presumed to be preserved by the act 
of State constituting the Colony but the Crown, as new Sovereign, could 
subsequently legislate by proclamation pending local representative 
government’. However, in the case of a ‘settled Colony’, this was ‘quite 
different’: ‘Where persons acting under the authority of the Crown established a 
new British Colony by settlement, they brought the common law with them’. It 
was considered that only ‘so much of it was introduced’ as was ‘reasonably 
applicable to the circumstances of the Colony’. Justices Deane and Gaudron 
said that this ‘left room for the continued operation of some local laws or 
customs among the native people and even the incorporation of some of those 
laws and customs as part of the common law’.
39 
 
                                                                                                                                    
37 Id.   
38 Ibid. 115-6.  
39 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 22-25 (Brennan J), 58 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
  202These judges affirmed that ‘once the establishment of the Colony was 
complete ... the English common law, adapted to meet the circumstances of the 
new Colony, automatically applied throughout the whole Colony as the 
domestic law ...’ Retrospectively bringing the Indigenous inhabitants 
individually under the protection of common law, Justices Deane and Gaudron 
noted that from that time ‘both the Crown and its subjects, old and new, were 
bound by that common law’.
40 In doing so, the judges embraced one of the 
cornerstones of the language of modern constitutionalism in treating the 
Indigenous inhabitants as individuals in a unitary state. They did not consider 
whether the Indigenous inhabitants wished to embrace different constitutional 
norms.
41   
 
The judges did not review whether settlement was an appropriate 
classification, instead they presumed it was essential to severe its link with the 
idea that the country was uninhabited. Justice Brennan expressed their view on 
this matter when he said the ‘settlement of an inhabited territory is equated with 
settlement of an uninhabited territory ...’ at least as far as ‘ascertaining the law 
of the territory on colonisation’.
42 The nature of the claim may have been a 
factor in this. Justice Toohey comments that the ‘plaintiffs accept that the 
Islands were settled by Britain rather than conquered or ceded’.
43 Moreover, the 
judges appear to have considered the matter of classification largely historical 
since the rights of Indigenous inhabitants could continue under settlement.
44 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 59 (Deane and Gaudron), see also 25-6 (Brennan J), 142 (Toohey J). 
41 Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 15. 
42 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 25 (Brennan J), 60 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 142 
(Toohey J).  
43 Ibid. 142 (Toohey J). 
44 Some legal commentary has suggested the court should have considered classification. 
Richard Bartlett argues that settlement is the ‘analogous doctrine at common law’ of the 
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Justice Dawson does not examine the distinctions between conquest and 
settlement. While he accepted that common law applied throughout the colony, 
he saw ‘no need to classify the Murray Islands as conquered, ceded or settled 
territory’. He considered the islands annexed by the application of ‘the law of 
Queensland’.
45 Nevertheless, it is also apparent that he applies this more broadly 
than the Murray Islands. Since he treated ‘all land in the colony as unoccupied’ 
prior to European settlement,
46 he therefore considered any review of the 
classification issues unnecessary.  
   
Radical and beneficial titles 
 
As was seen in the last chapter, in several earlier court decisions 
affecting relations with Indigenous people in Australia it was presumed that 
when the British colonised Australia it also gained ownership to all lands. Citing 
Thomas Jefferson, Tully relates that the idea that ‘all lands in England were held 
either mediately or immediately of the crown’ was ‘first introduced by William, 
the Norman’. This was an attempt by ‘Norman lawyers’ to impose further 
‘feudal burdens’ on the common-law property of ‘free born Englishmen under 
the guise of the Norman fiction of discontinuity.’
47 It appears that English law 
eventually embraced these ideas and extended them internationally so they are 
                                                                                                                                    
international classification terra nullius. This implies that he considered that conquest was the 
only appropriate way to classify the acquisition of Australia (since there is no evidence of 
cession occurring). See above n 6, 22-3. Blackshield and Williams also comment that in 
“correcting the terra nullius error without fully working out the consequences for the 
‘conquered’/‘settled’ distinction, the Court may have left its historical re-analysis incomplete”. 
See above n 8, 205.  
45 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 106 (Dawson J).  
46 Ibid. 6 (Dawson J).  
47 Thomas Jefferson, cited by Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 153.  
  204now fundamental to the doctrine of tenures. McNeil acknowledged as much, 
though in slightly different words. He states that ‘[a]ll lands in the hands of 
subjects are held of some lord, ultimately the Crown, who is lord paramount 
over every parcel of non-Crown land in the realm’ and this ‘fundamental 
principle is the basis of the doctrine of tenures’.
48 Significantly, this principle is 
today also acknowledged as ‘mainly a fiction of law’
49 and not a statement of 
fact about the situation immediately preceding the Norman invasion.
50 McNeil 
argues this fiction cannot be employed by the Crown to ‘require a person who is 
in possession of land to prove his right by producing a royal grant, for in most 
cases no grant exists’.
51 
 
However, what is English law does not necessarily apply elsewhere. 
Indeed, in Scotland the King was not deemed paramount lord of all land; but the 
‘English view favoured a universal application of the doctrine of tenure’.
52 This 
highlights that propensity in Western constitutionalism to universalise what was 
essentially a unique experience.
53 From this has developed the maxim that the 




If it was fiction that the Crown owned all lands, then how was it that the 
earlier court cases in Australia considered the Crown had gained ownership of 
all lands? McNeil considers the ‘medieval’ experience ‘obscured’ the 
                                                 
48 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 79. 
49 Ibid. 84. 
50 See ibid. 83.  
51 Ibid. 84. 
52 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 32 (Brennan J). 
53 Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 69. 
  205‘fundamental distinction between territorial sovereignty and title to land’. He 
says these are two quite distinct powers. The former is mainly a ‘matter of 
jurisdiction, involving questions of international and constitutional law’. The 
latter refers to the ownership and title to land. This depends for the ‘most part on 
the municipal law of property’.
55 He noted that regardless of whether one 
continues to adhere to the fiction of the sovereign’s original ownership of all 
lands, it is ‘not a prerequisite to sovereignty in English law’ that all lands are 
possessed and owned by the sovereign.
56 In other words, he argues that English 
law continued to affirm the norm of continuity that existing rights to land are 
maintained even when a country is conquered.
57 
 
In Mabo, six of the judges differentiated between territorial sovereignty 
and title to land.
58 Such a step was crucial to create space for acknowledging the 
continuity of ‘pre-existing customs and ways’ of Indigenous people.
59 Justice 
Brennan, for instance, used radical title to describe territorial sovereignty and 
beneficial title for ownership of land. He said that ‘it is not a corollary of the 
Crown’s acquisition of a radical title to land in an occupied territory that the 
Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of that land to the exclusion of 
indigenous inhabitants’. Similarly, Justices Deane and Gaudron considered that 
‘upon the establishment of the Colony, the radical title to all land vested in the 
                                                                                                                                    
54 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 134. 
55 Ibid. 108. 
56 Ibid. 109.  
57 Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 125. 
58 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this point further. However, Edgeworth 
considers the extent to which its application in Australia differs from that applied in England, 
concluding that the doctrine of tenure, “to the extent that it applies in Australia, is but a shadow 
of its English self”. See Brendan Edgeworth, ‘Tenure, allodialism and indigenous rights at 
common law: English, United States and Australian land law compared after Mabo v. 
Queensland’, Anglo-American Law Review, 1994, Vol 23 No 4, Oct-Dec, 397-434.   
59 Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 125. 
  206Crown’. Its ‘practical effect ... was merely to enable the English system of 
private ownership of estates held of the Crown to be observed in the Colony’. 
Justice Toohey also observes that ‘the distinction between sovereignty and title 
to or rights in land is crucial’.
60 In doing so, the judges embrace a premise 
consistent with the common constitutional doctrine of continuity: it is possible 
to maintain title to land even if the sovereignty of a territory changes.  
 
In considering the impact of wrongly presuming that sovereignty also 
provides ownership to all lands. Justice Brennan points out that it was ‘only by 
fastening on the notion that a settled colony was terra nullius that it was possible 
to predicate of the Crown the acquisition of ownership of land in a colony 
already occupied by Indigenous inhabitants. It was only on the hypothesis that 
there was nobody in occupation that it could be said that the Crown was the 
owner because there was no other’.
61 Justices Deane and Gaudron pointed to 
two cases, Attorney-General v Brown
62 and Cooper v Stuart
63 that supported the 
proposition ‘that New South Wales had been unoccupied for practical 
purposes’. Justice Toohey also observed that it ‘was only with the colonising of 
territories that were uninhabited or treated as such that settlement came to be 
recognised as an effective means of acquiring sovereignty ...’
64 
 
Justice Dawson did not follow his colleagues in modifying the 
theoretical understanding of the introduction of the doctrine of tenure. Looking 
                                                 
60 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 34 (Brennan J), at 60 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 140 
(Toohey J).  
61 Ibid. 31 (Brennan J).  
62 Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312. 
63 Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286.  
64 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 77-8 (Deane and Gaudron JJ), 141 (Toohey J, italics 
added). 
  207specifically at the claim, he reasoned that ‘upon annexation, the ultimate title to 
the lands comprising the Murray Islands vested in the Crown’. He considered 
that this a ‘necessary consequence of the exertion of sovereignty by the Crown 
for, under the system of law which the Crown brought with it, the ultimate title 
to land - sometimes called the absolute or radical title - resides in the Crown’. 
He added ‘that upon annexation of the Murray Islands the Crown became the 
absolute owner of the land and such rights as others might have in it must be 
derived from the Crown and amount to something less than absolute 
ownership’.
65 That is, his position echoes that advanced by Norman law: that the 





In order for a native title claim to succeed, the judges would have to 
consider one more potential obstacle arising from an act of state: its effect upon 
the ‘pre-existing interests’, the rights ‘held under local law prior to the Crown’s 
acquisition of a territory’.
67 McNeil identifies two legal perspectives on whether 
the Crown must provide explicit acknowledgment to protect the private property 
of local inhabitants. One perspective is known as the recognition doctrine, the 
irony of the label apparently escaping its adherents.
68 In this view, any rights 
existing before the acquisition by a new sovereign depend on an explicit 
acknowledgement by the Crown. This perspective has its precedents in several 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 93 (Dawson J).  
66 Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 125.  
67 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 161. 
68 McNeil, above n 4, 165-171. 
  208decisions of the Privy Council and Australian courts.
69 Other cases cited in its 
support include Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secretary of State for India, 
Secretary of State v Bai Rajbai, Asrar Ahmed v Durgah Committee, Ajmer and 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States.
70 McNeil noted that the practical 
implications of this perspective extend beyond the Crown acquiring all lands to 
render inhabitants ‘trespassers in their own homes’ and their ‘personal 
possessions’ ‘Crown property’.
71 Like the Norman view, this perspective 
follows the norm of discontinuity.
72  
 
The other perspective draws on a line of authority that presumes private 
property rights continue after a change of sovereignty. Where inhabitants can 
continue local laws and property rights without the Crown’s intervention, any 
recognition of their rights would be unnecessary. No matter which classification 
of acquisition in international law, these laws and rights presume to continue. 
This presumption is called the doctrine of continuity.
73 Cases cited in its support 
include Re Southern Rhodesia, Amodu Tijani, Guerin v R, Calder v A G British 
Columbia and Delgamuukw v British Columbia.
74 McNeil argued that the first 




Both of these perspectives are subordinate to the Crown’s prerogative 
powers because they assume when the Crown acquires territory through 
                                                 
69 Meyers & Mugambwa, above n 7, 1211. 
70 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, at 142-3 per Toohey J.  
71 McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, above n 4, 165. 
72 Tully, Strange multiplicity, above n 33, 125.  
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  209exercising an act of state it can do as it pleases toward the local inhabitants. As 
such, legal arguments that support the continuity of private property after a 
change of sovereignty depend on the Crown not seizing such property. 
However, and significantly for this inquiry, they also reflected the struggles 
between the two languages Tully refers to. The ‘recognition doctrine’ echoes the 
Norman assertion of discontinuing pre-existing interests and also considers the 
act of state as foundational and beyond the challenge of the courts. In this sense, 
it echoes the seventh feature of modern constitutionalism by rendering the act of 
state above question and backgrounding democratic politics. Such an approach 
also has a strongly imperialistic flavour and is inconsistent with contemporary 
democratic principles and respect for popular sovereignty.
76 
 
The presumption private property continues with a change of 
sovereignty is a hybrid comprising elements of both the languages of modern 
constitutionalism and common constitutionalism. From modern 
constitutionalism, it takes the idea that the new sovereign through an act of state 
can seize private property. From the language of common constitutionalism 
comes the presumption that private property rights continue after acquisition if 
their seizure is not exercised. While Tully argues for a modern constitution 
‘trimmed of’ features that ‘violate the three conventions’,
77 contemporary legal 
doctrine turns this on its head. The common conventions are ‘trimmed’ to be 
consistent with the language of modern constitutionalism. 
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  210In Mabo, the plaintiffs argued on behalf of the Meriam People that ‘the 
interests their predecessors enjoyed in the Islands prior to annexation survived 
acquisition by the British Crown and became a dimension of common law’.
78 In 
other words, they argued that the norm of continuity applied to their 
circumstances. Rejecting this view, the Queensland government argued ‘pre-
existing customary rights and interests in land are abolished upon colonisation 
of inhabited territory, unless expressly recognised by the new sovereign’.
79 This 
echoes the view expressed in Norman law that a new constitutional arrangement 
discontinues or extinguishes pre-existing customs or ways of a people.
80  
 
Six of the judges agreed the survival of these rights were not dependent 
upon the explicit recognition of the Crown. Justice Brennan observed that where 
‘a proprietary title capable of recognition by the common law is found to have 
been possessed by a community in occupation of a territory, there is no reason 
why that title should not be recognised as a burden on the Crown’s radical title 
when the Crown acquires sovereignty over that territory’.
81 On this basis, he 
embraced the ‘preferable rule ... that a mere change in sovereignty does not 
extinguish native title to land’. This ‘equates the indigenous inhabitants of a 
settled colony with the inhabitants of a conquered colony in respect of their 
rights and interests in land ...’
82 Justice Toohey considered the ‘so called 
doctrine of continuity’ is ‘more persuasive and should be followed’. He cited 
Lord Sumner in the Privy Council in Re Southern Rhodesia
83 that ‘... upon a 
                                                 
78 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 137 (Toohey J).  
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82 Ibid. 41 (Brennan J). 
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  211conquest it is to be presumed, in the absence of express confiscation or of 
subsequent expropriatory legislation, that the conqueror has respected [private 
property rights] and forborne to diminish or modify them’. Moreover, he 
considered that ‘seizure of private property by the Crown in a settled colony 
after annexation has occurred would amount to an illegitimate act of state ...’ 
Justices Deane and Gaudron preferred the ‘guiding principle’ expressed in 
Adeyinka Oyekan v Musendiku Adele
84 where the Privy Council held that the 
‘assumption that pre-existing rights are recognised and protected under the law 
of a British Colony’ as it ‘accords with fundamental notions of justice’.
85  
 
Justice Dawson was the only judge to support the so-called recognition 
doctrine, arguing that any rights to land did not survive annexation. Referring to 
the conclusion of Justice Hall in the 1973 Canadian case of Calder v Attorney-
General of British Columbia
86 he said ‘if what Hall J meant was that traditional 
native title somehow survived the exertion of sovereignty by the Crown 
independently of any recognition of it by the Crown ... I am unable to agree’.
87 
Thus, if any connection to land survived, Justice Dawson reasoned it could only 
be ‘an occupancy which the Crown, as absolute owner, permits to continue’.
88  
 
The act of state is inconsistent with the common constitutional 
conventions because it holds that a new sovereign can unilaterally extinguish 
the rights of those inhabiting a country. The doctrine is one thing, but its 
particular application is something else again. Because no evidence was 
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  212forthcoming to demonstrate that when Australia was acquired Britain had to 
extinguish any of the rights of the existing inhabitants, then native title rights 
could survive the British acquisition of sovereignty even though the court 
upheld the act of state. Thus, Justice Brennan decided that ‘the antecedent rights 
and interests in land possessed by the indigenous inhabitants of the territory 
survived the change in sovereignty’. Likewise, Justice Toohey determined that 
‘traditional title may exist after annexation because it is not precluded by Crown 
ownership of occupied lands and because it arose regardless of the positive 
recognition by the Crown ...’
89 
 
Claims for recognition 
 
In deciding that pre-existing interests may survive the British acquisition 
of the territory, the Court majority proceeded to consider whether a basis exists 
for common law recognition of native title. At the end of the last chapter, Justice 
Moynihan’s findings that established the continuity of the Meriam People’s land 
tenure system were noted. These findings were provisional because they 
depended on the Court deciding the central question around recognition. 
 
The particular claim before the Court centred on the statement lodged on 
the Meriam People’s behalf that they ‘have been since prior to annexation by 
the British Crown, entitled to the Islands: (a) as owners; (b) as possessors; (c) as 
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  213occupiers, or (d) as persons entitled to use and enjoy the Islands’. According to 
Justice Toohey, the plaintiffs ‘put their claim on three bases’:
90 
 
•  ‘That the interests their predecessors enjoyed in the Islands prior to annexation 
survived acquisition by the British Crown and became a dimension of the 
common law ...’; 
•  that ‘their predecessors acquired a possessory title as a consequence of the 
operation of the common law in the new colony’; and, 
•  that ‘they could establish, as of today, local legal customary rights’. The 
plaintiffs said, ‘legal customs exercised by the Meriam people today, though 
different from common law, should prevail so long as certain conditions are 
met. The customs must be certain; they must have been exercised since ‘time 
immemorial’ without interruption; they must be reasonable and not oppressive 
at the time of their inception; they must be observed as of right and not 
pursuant to any licence or permission granted by another; and they must not be 
inconsistent with any statute law.’  
 
Relevant to the Court’s thinking on how to address the claim was that 
work had already been done on articulating a common law basis to recognise 
native title. In Common law aboriginal title McNeil demonstrated two ways that 
Indigenous people can gain recognition of their traditional rights via legal 
doctrine. One way is to prove the existence of their customary laws at the time 
the Crown acquired sovereignty, relying upon the presumption that those rights 
continued. However, McNeil considered significant obstacles may arise to such 
an approach because in ‘territories which lack a history of judicial ascertainment 
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  214of indigenous systems of land tenure, the problems of proving relevant customs 
may be insurmountable’.
91 Another way is to claim exclusive occupancy at the 
time of acquisition and ‘claim title thereto by virtue of the common law’ applies 
‘in the settlement from that moment on’. McNeil considered such a claim for 
common law Aboriginal title is easier since legal doctrine generally considers 
occupation is prima facie proof of possession.
92  
 
 In considering the claim, Justice Toohey engaged with McNeil’s work. 
He differentiates between ‘two kinds of interest’ the plaintiffs’ can claim.
93 One, 
traditional title, was similar to what McNeil describes as customary law.
94 Its 
origin ‘lies in the indigenous society occupying territory before annexation’. Its 
‘specific nature and incidents correspond to those of the traditional system of 
law existing before acquisition of sovereignty by the Crown’. Adding a note of 
caution, he said it was ‘important to appreciate that, particularly with respect to 
traditional title’ the use of the term ‘title’ is ‘artificial and capable of 
misleading’. He observed that the rights ‘claimed by the plaintiffs ... do not 
correspond to the concept of ownership as understood by the land law of 
England developed since feudal times, and by the later land law of Australia’. 
Title ‘is no doubt a convenient expression and has the advantage that, when 
recognised by the law of Australia ... it fits more comfortably into the legal 
system of the colonising power.’
95 Placing this in a cultural context Toohey said 
this is ‘a special collective right vested in an Aboriginal group by virtue of its 
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  215long residence and communal use of land or its resources’.
96 Justice Toohey 
also said that this type of title was previously argued in ‘land rights cases ...’ 
This is recognised by the common law, ‘though what is required to establish that 
recognition is a matter of contention’.
97 After reviewing the issues surrounding 
annexation, he concluded, ‘traditional title to land ... is presumed to continue 
unless and until lawfully terminated’. Since he was referring to the ‘indigenous 
inhabitants’ of Australia as a whole, it is arguable that he found a basis for 




The second form, common law Aboriginal title, ‘has no existence before 
annexation since it is said to arise by reason of the application of common law’. 
Justice Toohey explained that not only the ‘existence’ of this form, but also ‘its 
nature and incidents are determined entirely by principles of common law’.
99 
Since Justice Toohey accepted that claims for possession can be made at 
common law, it is also clear that he presumes the existence of this form of 
recognition. This presumption is confirmed by his statement that at ‘common 
law conduct required to prove occupation or possession will vary according to 
the circumstances ...’
100 When he examines the grounds for the existence of 
common law native title, he found that ‘prima facie all indigenous inhabitants in 
possession of their land on annexation are presumed to have a fee simple 
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  216estate’.
101 Moreover, Justice Toohey observed that the ‘proposition that 
possession of itself gives rise to a right in the plaintiff to recover possession, if 
lost, is supported by principle’. That is, without ‘evidence to the contrary’, the 
‘presumption arising from proof of the plaintiff’s possession’ stands.
102 On this 
reasoning a ‘title arising from prior possession can be defeated either by a 
defendant showing that he or she ... has a better, because older, claim to 
possession or by a defendant showing adverse possession against the person for 
the duration of a limitation period’.
103 
 
When considering the basis to recognise traditional title (as he called 
native title), Justice Toohey directly addressed the view expressed by Justice 
Blackburn in Milirrpum that recognition is dependent upon ‘proof ... that the 
Aboriginal interests be proprietary’.
104 He noted that in ‘English and Australian 
decisions two requirements have emerged: that the interests said to constitute 
title be proprietary and that they be part of a certain kind of system of rules’.
105 
Looking elsewhere for guidance, Justice Toohey turns to the ‘North American 
courts’. Analysing the 1980 Canadian case, Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development,
106 he observed that ‘[u]ltimately, 
traditional title has a common law existence because the common law 
recognises the survival of traditional interests and operates to protect them’. He 
added that ‘it would defeat the purpose of recognition and protection if only 
those existing rights and duties which were the same as, or which approximated 
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  217to, those under English law could comprise traditional title’. He concludes that 
‘inquiries into the nature of traditional title are essentially irrelevant’ to 
determining ‘the existence or non-existence of traditional title’. Rejecting 
Justice Blackburn’s view, he determined that ‘requirements that Aboriginal 
interests be proprietary or part of a certain kind of system of rules are not 
relevant to proof of traditional title’.
107  
 
However, the other five judges held that pre-existing interests survived 
the British acquisition of Australia and were not guided by either of McNeil’s 
approaches. Justice Brennan began his comments on the ‘nature and incidents of 
native title’ by clarifying the general relationship of native title to common law. 
He noted that native title has ‘its origins in and is given its content by the 
traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the 
indigenous inhabitants of a territory’. Furthermore, given its distinct origins, it is 
‘not an institution of common law’.
108 Thus, where Indigenous people ‘have a 
connection with the land … its incident and the persons entitled thereto are 
ascertained’ according to the ‘laws and customs of the indigenous people who ... 
have a connection with the land’.
109 He does not make a general prescription 
about its nature instead he considered the ‘nature and incidence of native title 
must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference’ to ‘laws and customs’.
110 
Thus, its nature may vary with some native title being ‘classified by the 
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  218common law as proprietary, usufructuary or otherwise’.
111 Justice Brennan is 
also reluctant to confer the term ‘ownership’ on native title. When discussing 
the claim for the Murray Islands, he said ownership is ‘a term which connotes 
an estate in fee simple or at least an estate of freehold’. He said that this ‘may be 




Justice Brennan referred to cases that dealt with the conquest of Ireland 
and Wales for precedent in the recognition of land relations that originate 
outside common law. He observed that in both cases it was ‘held that the 
inhabitants who had been left in possession of land needed no new grant to 
support their possession under the common law and they held their interests of 
the King without a new conveyance’. While in these cases the Courts ‘were 
speaking of converting the surviving interests into an estate of a kind familiar to 
the common law’, he saw ‘no reason why the common law should not recognise 
novel interests in land, which not depending on Crown grant, are different from 
common law tenures’.
113 A little later, commenting on the 1608 Case of 
Tanistry he said that the ‘Irish custom of tanistry
114 was held to be void because 
it was founded in violence and because the vesting of title under the custom was 
uncertain’. For these reasons, he said the common law did not recognise the 
Irish custom of tanistry because its perceived inconsistency ‘precluded the 
recognition of the custom by the common law’.
115 He observed that at ‘this 
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  219stage in its development, the common law was too rigid to admit recognition of 
a native title based on other laws or customs, but that rigidity has been relaxed, 
at least since the decision of the Privy Council in [the 1921 case of] Amodu 
Tijani’. Despite the relaxation, Justice Brennan finds consistency in principle 
between the 1608 case and the Mabo claim. He stated the common law has a 
‘general principle’ that it will ‘recognise a customary title only if it is consistent 
with the common law’.
116 That is, recognition should be subordinated to the 
language of modern constitutionalism. 
 
Applying this general principle to Australia, Justice Brennan considered 
that ‘traditional native title’ is not consistent with common law, but that it 
should be treated as ‘an exception’ and recognised. Nevertheless, he considered 
that some limitations must be placed upon the recognition of native title. He 
observed that ‘recognition by our common law of the rights and interests in land 
of the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony would be precluded if the 
recognition were to fracture a skeletal principle of our legal system’.
117 Later, he 
said that he considered the ‘doctrine of tenure’ central to ‘land law’ and this 
‘could not be overturned without fracturing the skeleton which gives our land 
law its shape and consistency’.
118 Added to this are comments that ‘Crown 
grants should be seen as the foundation of the doctrine of tenure’ and ‘is an 
essential principle of our land law’.  He observed that it is ‘far too late in the day 
to contemplate an allodial or other system of land ownership’.
119 Moreover, land 
in Australia ‘has been granted by the Crown’ and is ‘held on a tenure of some 
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  220kind and the titles acquired under the accepted land law cannot be disturbed’.
120 
Hence in several respects, Justice Brennan considered that the common law 
recognition of native title should be restricted by the application of the doctrine 
of tenure. 
 
However, Justice Brennan opposed limiting native title to familiar 
common law concepts. He cited the 1921 case Amodu Tijani where the Privy 
Council drew attention to the tendency to ‘render [native] title conceptually in 
terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under 
English law’.
121 He also considered it ‘wrong ... to point to the inalienability of 
land’ by a community and, by ‘importing’ definitions of ‘property’ which 
‘require alienability under the municipal laws of our society, to deny that the 
indigenous people owned their land’. Somewhat reluctantly he conceded that if 
‘it be necessary to categorise an interest in land as proprietary in order that it 
survive a change of sovereignty, the interest possessed by a community that is 
exclusive possession of land falls into that category’.
122  
 
Unlike McNeil, Justices Deane and Gaudron did not consider native title 
a customary right, but restricted their attention to any post-act of state 
circumstances. They say ‘any claim by the Aboriginal inhabitants to such lands 
by reason of possession or occupation after the establishment of the Colony 
must be justified by ordinary common law principles or presumptions which 
apply and (at least theoretically) applied indifferently to both native inhabitants 
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  221and Europeans (eg possessory title based on a presumed lost grant)’.
123 Later, 
they observed that the ‘content’ of ‘common law native title’ will ‘vary 
according to the extent of the pre-existing interest of the relevant individual, 
group or community’. It ‘may be an entitlement of an individual through his or 
her family, band or tribe, to a limited special use of land in a context where 
notions of property in land and distinctions between ownership, possession and 
use are all but unknown’. In contrast, it may be ‘a community title’ which is 
practically ‘equivalent to full ownership’.
124 
 
Like Justice Brennan, Justices Deane and Gaudron also favourably cite 
Amodu Tijani, including the advice that this ‘tendency’ must be ‘held in check 
closely’ since ‘[a]s a rule, in the various systems of native jurisprudence 
throughout the Empire, there is no such full division between property and 
possession as English lawyers are familiar with’.
125 They also indicated that 
they do not believe recognition should be limited to what can be strictly defined 
as ‘rights of property’. That is, it should not be ‘confined to interests which were 
analogous to common law concepts of estates in land or proprietary rights’. 
Citing authority from Amodu Tijani and Adeyinka Oyekan v Musendiku Adele, 
they noted that these ‘assume’ that the traditional interests of the native 
inhabitants are to be so respected ‘even though those interests are of a kind 
unknown to English law’. Not only is that view ‘supported by other authority’, 
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However, Justices Deane and Gaudron argued that even where it 
approaches ‘full ownership’ native title ‘is subject to three important 
limitations’. The first relates to alienation. The judges described this as resulting 
from a ‘right of pre-emption in the Sovereign’. This precluded ‘alienation 
outside that native title system otherwise than by surrender to the Crown’. A 
second limitation was that native title is ‘only a personal ... right’ and therefore 
‘it does not constitute a legal or beneficial estate or interest in the actual land’. 
The third limitation was that it is ‘susceptible of being extinguished by an 
unqualified grant by the Crown of an estate in fee [sic] or of some lesser estate 
which was inconsistent with the rights under the common law native title’.
127 
On these grounds, they determined it ‘does not found an assumption of a prior 
lost grant ...’
128 Thus, like Justice Brennan, the judges considered the quality of 
native title limits the ability of common law to provide recognition, but these 
rights are not ‘illusory’ or ‘no more than a permissive occupancy’.
129 Rather, 
these can ‘approach the rights flowing from full ownership at common law’. 
Thus, they think it inappropriate to force native title ‘to conform to traditional 
common law concepts’ and instead ‘accept it as sui generis or unique’.
130 
 
While Justice Dawson held the survival of any pre-existing interests 
depended on the explicit recognition by the Crown, he presumed there was no 
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  223evidence of this occurring. Without the existence of any native title rights, he 
held that any connections to land could be no more than a permissive occupancy 
of the Crown.
131 In justifying this view, he advanced a theoretical model 
ascribing rights to land as proprietary. He contrasted these with usufructuary 
rights, which he considered were ‘by definition, not proprietary in nature’. 
Having established this contrast, he said that the ‘separate claims made by the 
plaintiffs to Aboriginal title and usufructuary rights would appear to be based 
upon the notion that Aboriginal title is proprietary in nature’. Since his a priori 
model is inconsistent with the common law protecting usufructuary rights, he 
rejects the claim. He said that the ‘weight of authority rather suggests that 
Aboriginal title is of its nature also non-proprietary and carries with it little if 
anything more than usufructuary rights’.
132  
 
In summing up the various judgements, while six of the judges 
considered the acquisition of sovereignty did not prohibit the continuity of pre-
existing interests in Australia they were divided on the extent to which those 
interests can be recognised post-acquisition. However, these differences did not 
preclude the recognition of the claim of the Meriam People. Justice Brennan 
finds that this was a ‘communal title’
133 and they are ‘entitled as against the 
whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the island of Mer 
...’
134 In particular, it is ‘effective as against the State of Queensland’.
135 Justices 
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  224Deane and Gaudron found that the ‘common law native title of the Murray 
Islanders in relation to land in the Murray Islands survives’,
136 apart from that 
involving specific leases issued prior to the lodgement of the claim.
137 After 
examining the legislative and executive acts carried out following the separation 
of Queensland from New South Wales, they found that none of these ‘had the 
effect of extinguishing the existing rights of Murray Islanders under common 
law native title’.
138 Justice Toohey considered the possibility that the interests of 
the claimants survive annexation and that their predecessors acquired a 
‘possessory title as a consequence of the operation of the common law in the 
new colony’.
139 In considering the first form, said that the ‘traditional title of the 
Meriam people survived the annexation of the Islands ...’
140 Examining the 
grounds for common law aboriginal title, he reasons that ‘since the Meriam 
people became British subjects immediately on annexation, they would seem to 
have then acquired an estate in fee simple’.
141 He considered that the onus then 
lies with the defendant to show that the Queensland Government has a better 
claim. While he determined that the Meriam People ‘may have acquired a 
possessory title on annexation’, he does not ‘reach a firm conclusion’ since not 
all matters are ‘fully explored’.
142 Justice Dawson is the only judge to reject the 
claim completely. Citing the creation of a reserve as evidence of the ‘exertion 
by the Crown of its rights over the Murray Islands’, he concluded ‘any 
                                                                                                                                    
135 Ibid. 55 (Brennan J).  
136 Ibid. 89 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
137 Ibid. 90 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
138 Ibid. 89 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
139 Ibid. 137-138 (Toohey J).  
140 Ibid. 160 (Toohey J). 
141 Ibid. 165 (Toohey J).  
142 Ibid. 167 (Toohey J).  




The impact of legislation and grants upon native title 
 
Earlier in this chapter I referred to leases affecting the recognition of the 
Meriam claim. Leases over two different areas were involved. Following the 
annexation of the Murray Islands by Queensland a special lease of two acres on 
Mer was granted to the London Missionary Society in 1882. In later years, 
further leases were granted to the same piece of land. Subsequently, the lease 
was transferred to the Australian Board of Missions, and then to trustees of the 
Board. Another lease was ‘purportedly granted’ in May 1931 to two lessees who 
were not members of the Meriam People under the Land Act 1910-1930 (Qld). 
The 20 year lease involved the whole of the islands of Dauar and Waier in the 
establishment of a sardine factory.
144 Thus, bound up with the question of 
recognition of the claims was the status of these leases, the power of the Crown 
to issue leases and to legislate about land that was now claimed by the Meriam 
People.  
 
The claimants did not directly challenge the Crown’s right to extinguish 
native title, instead they argued that this had not been exercised (a point agreed 
by the Queensland Government) and, furthermore, that with this right the 
Crown held fiduciary obligations to provide protection.
145 That is, they did not 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 124 (Dawson J). 
144 Ibid. 52 (Brennan J).  
145 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 138, 150 (Toohey J); McNeil comments that 
‘executive extinguishment was not a major concern for the plaintiffs in Mabo No 2, and so there 
  226seek to overturn the view associated with the language of modern 
constitutionalism that the Crown has a general right to extinguish native title. 
Instead, it appears they hoped that if their argument succeeded, protection 
would be provided through the upholding of a fiduciary obligation by the 
Crown.  
 
McNeil argued that authority for the executive to extinguish titles arises 
in two ways. If valid legislation ‘unambiguously conferred authority on the 
Executive to extinguish’ a title, then it has the legal power to carry this out if it 
acts ‘in accordance with statutory authority’. Alternatively, this authority can be 
provided by royal prerogative. On these grounds, he argued that if ‘valid 
legislation in an Australian jurisdiction unambiguously conferred authority on 
the Executive to extinguish native title, whether legislatively or executively … 
the Executive would have the legal power to carry out the extinguishment if it 
acted in accordance with the statutory authority’.
146 This reflects the influence 
of modern constitutionalism in that it presumes government can act on behalf of 
all the people regardless of their cultural background. 
 
So what did the Court have to say about the impact of legislation and 
grants upon native title?
147 The six judges recognising the Meriam claim 
affirmed that the ‘exercise of a power to extinguish native title must reveal a 
clear and plain intention to do so’ if such an action is taken by a parliament. 
Justice Brennan adds this ‘requirement ...  flows from the seriousness of the 
consequences to indigenous inhabitants of extinguishing their traditional rights 
                                                                                                                                    
was no reason for their counsel to argue generally against it’. See McNeil, Emerging justice?, 
above n 5, 408. 
146 McNeil, Emerging justice?, above n 5, 365.  
  227and interests in land ...’ Justice Toohey argued that this is ‘subject to a 
consideration of the implications that arise in the case of extinguishment 
without the consent of the titleholders’, a matter examined later in this chapter. 
 
Justice Brennan also commented on the Court’s limitations in 
challenging a decision of a legislature. He said that the ‘sovereign power may or 
may not be exercised with solicitude for the welfare of indigenous inhabitants 
but, in the case of common law countries, the courts cannot review the merits, 
as distinct from the legality, of the exercise of sovereign power’.
148  
 
However, the judges supporting recognition of native title divided over 
whether issuing of grants meant its extinguishment. Chief Justice Mason and 
Justices McHugh, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron (as well as Justice Dawson) 
generally agreed that native title ‘can be extinguished either by a grant of a 
freehold or lesser estate or by appropriation by the Crown, to the extent the 
grant or appropriation is inconsistent with the continuing enjoyment of native 
title’.
149 Justice Toohey ‘did not find it necessary to decide whether the Crown 
at common law could extinguish traditional title (as he called native title) by 
grant or appropriation’. Moreover, he was critical of the proposition that 
traditional title ‘could be extinguished by unilateral executive act without the 
consent of the native titleholders’ (his views on consent is discussed in detail 
later in this chapter).
150 
                                                                                                                                    
147 The Court’s view of the Crown’s fiduciary obligations is discussed later in this chapter.  
148 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 46 (Brennan J); see also 84 (Deane and Gaudron 
JJ), 152-3 (Toohey J). 
149 McNeil, Emerging justice?, above n 5, 369; Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 49-51 
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152-153 (Toohey J).  
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In his review of the decision, McNeil observed that the majority view 
was based on the idea that the Crown can grant freehold title without first 
demonstrating that it had acquired title to the land. He described this view as 
inconsistent with the general principle of common law ‘where the Crown claims 
a title to land it must prove its title like anyone else’.
151 McNeil charged that 
Justice Brennan provided ‘virtually no legal authority for his rules of 
extinguishment’, but instead adopted ‘a pragmatic rather than a principled 
approach’.
152 The Court majority provided a different treatment for native title 
from other titles. McNeil argued the ‘rules of extinguishment’ created by ‘the 
majority … are racially discriminatory’ and ‘destroy the equality of the 
Indigenous peoples before Australian law’.
153 In other words, in terms of 
constitutional languages, he charged the Court has embraced the language of 
White Australia.  
 
A particular claim, but general rules  
 
The claim made on behalf of the Meriam People only addressed those 
aspects of the Crown’s power to extinguish traditional title directly involved 
with their claim. The impact of the doctrine adopted by the Court majority does 
not wholly deny the claim of the Meriam People. They (with Justice Toohey 
agreeing) set aside the lands where leases had been issued for future 
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  229consideration.
154 That is, not all aspects of the claim were resolved by this 
decision and the impact of the new legal framework was not fully tested.
155   
 
But while the claim was particular, the Court majority adopted general 
rules applicable Australia-wide.
156 Some of these rules rejected aspects of the 
language of White Australia: the ‘enlarged notion of terra nullius’ and the 
characterisation of ‘indigenous inhabitants as people too low in the scale of 
social organisation to be acknowledged as possessing rights and interests in 
land’.
157 Some principles facilitate native title claims being brought forward. 
Others though establish a national basis to extinguish any native title deemed 
inconsistent with Crown grants.
158  
 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 
Michael Dodson said extinguishment is wrong as it provides a legal basis to 
dispossess a people of their traditional connections to land.
159 In embracing 
recognition and extinguishment the judges mixed together elements of both 
common and modern constitutionalism. On behalf of the European-originating 
constitutional association, the High Court was prepared to unilaterally impose 
an ‘accommodation’ and declare a national basis to limit recognition of native 
                                                 
154 ‘Putting to one side the islands of Dauar and Waier, the parcel of land leased to the Trustees 
of the Australian Board of Missions and any other parcels appropriated for use for 
administrative purposes inconsistent with native title...’ the judges declared that ‘the Meriam 
people are entitled, as against the whole world, to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of 
the lands of the Murray Islands’. See Mabo v Queensland (No 2, above n 10, at 2 (Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
155 The Meriam People eventually obtained a consent determination of native title in respect of 
the formerly leased lands on Dauar and Waier Islands in June 2001. See Passi v Queensland 
(2001) FCA 697. 
156 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 3 (i) (Brennan J), 3 (xv) (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
157 Ibid. 2 (iii) (Brennan J). See also ibid. 2 (xxv) (Deane & Gaudron JJ).  
158 Ibid. 3 (xiii) (Brennan J), 4 (xx) (Deane & Gaudron JJ).  
159 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), 80-81. 
  230title. While recognition is identified with common constitutionalism, 
extinguishment is associated with the doctrine of discontinuity. Furthermore, the 
decision to create national rules for extinguishment draws on the modern 
constitutional tradition. Moreover, if McNeil is correct, then by not applying the 
same rules in relation to grants and native title as applied to other titles, the 
Court also drew upon the legacy of White Australia by not providing the 
protection to Indigenous people accorded to other Australians. 
  
Absence of consent 
 
As mentioned earlier, Justice Toohey did not agree with the theoretical 
framework adopted by his colleagues. However, he did not feel obliged to 
elaborate principles on executive power that were to be applicable Australia-
wide.
160 He found that generally traditional title ‘is capable of extinguishment 
by clear and plain legislation or by an executive act authorised by such 
legislation’.
161 However, in the absence of this authority he was critical of the 
reasons advanced to justify the use of an extraordinary power by the executive 
to extinguish traditional title without the consent of titleholders.  
 
He examined three rationales frequently advanced to justify such action. 
One was that it was a ‘concomitant of an assertion of sovereignty’. He noted 
that this rationale was advanced in the 1823 Johnson v McIntosh
162 case on the 
relationship between Indian title to land and the US government’s power. 
                                                 
160 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, at 5-6 (xxxiii)-(xxxix). It appears a typographical 
error was made since these points were not attributed to Justice Toohey. However, they do 
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161 Ibid. 160 (Toohey J).  
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  231However, he observed that linking this to sovereignty does not itself 
demonstrate how this is different to other titles: this power ‘is subject to 
constitutional statutory or common law restrictions to terminate any subject’s 
title to property by compulsorily acquiring it’.
163 In other words, this authority 
does no more than demonstrate the general power of the Crown to extinguish 
titles; it does not justify why the executive should have a special power in 
relation to traditional title. 
 
Another rationale is that it is part of British colonial policy to protect the 
interests of Indigenous inhabitants. Justice Toohey observed that this rationale 
considers the Crown’s power is ‘the corollary of the general inalienability of 
title, which itself constituted a means of protecting aboriginal people from 
exploitation by settlers’.
164 However, this rationale blurs Crown power with the 
inalienability of title rather than properly considering them as distinct issues. He 
noted the contention that native title is inalienable was the subject of debate, but 
he observes that ‘in any event, a principle of protection is hardly a basis for a 
unilateral power in the Crown, exercisable without consent’.
165  
 
The third rationale for the extraordinary power comes from an ‘inherent 
quality’ in traditional title. Those who embrace this rationale often characterise 
the title as a ‘personal and usufructuary right’ and draw its distinction from 
proprietary rights. It is argued that the former is ‘inherently weaker and more 
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  232susceptible to extinguishment’.
166 However, as Justice Toohey noted, the Privy 
Council in 1921 ‘cautioned against attempting to define aboriginal rights to land 
by reference to the English law notion of estates’. He also noted that this 
warning was ‘heeded in recent cases’. He rejected the idea that unilateral 
extinguishment is deduced from the nature of the traditional title. He describes 
such an inquiry as ‘fruitless and ... unnecessarily complex’. Rather, he 
considered that the ‘specific nature of such a title can be understood only by 
reference to the traditional system of rules’. Furthermore, he concluded that the 
‘nature’ of the title ‘will not determine the power of the Crown to extinguish the 
title unilaterally’.
167 Therefore, McNeil observed, Justice Toohey rejected 
‘Deane and Gaudron JJ’s primary justification for the Crown’s power of 
extinguishment, namely that native title is merely a personal right’.
168 
 
Justice Toohey did not fully elaborate an alternative approach. He 
considered this unnecessary since ‘this is not a matter the court was asked to 
consider ... [e]xcept in the context of the lease to the London Missionary Society 
and the lease granted over Dauer
169 and Waier ...’
170 However, he added some 
words to amplify his approach:
171 
 
Where there has been an alienation of land by the Crown inimical to the 
continuance of traditional title, any remedy against the Crown may have 
been lost by the operation of limitation statutes. And nothing in this 
                                                 
166 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 152 (Toohey J).  
167 Id.; McNeil, Emerging justice?, above n 5, 399.  
168 McNeil, Emerging justice?, above n 5, 399. 
169 Justice Toohey prefers to spell it as Dauer, but notes that it ‘also spelt Dauar and Dawar’. 
See Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 137 (Toohey J). 
170 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 153 (Toohey J); McNeil, Emerging justice?, above 
n 5, 399-400.  
  233judgement should be taken to suggest that the titles of those to whom land 
has been alienated by the Crown may now be disturbed. 
 
While not a fully elaborated position, the stance of Justice Toohey 
provides more favourable conditions for the expansion of common 
constitutionalism. He argued the Crown is obliged to prove its acquisition of 
title. In the context of the Meriam claim he said that the Crown ‘could not have 
acquired original title by occupancy as a matter of fact because it had no 
presence in the colony before settlement and occupation of land by Indigenous 
inhabitants would have excluded occupancy by the Crown after annexation, 
except in land truly vacant’.
172 Moreover, Justice Toohey made plain that he 
rejected any basis to unilateral executive extinguishment.
173 Furthermore, 
referring to the doctrine of tenure he considered that if the ‘fiction of original 
Crown ownership’ is to be maintained, then it would be answered by ‘the fiction 
of a lost Crown grant’ to be accorded ‘to the indigenous occupiers’.
174 He 
attempted to apply the ‘enlarged doctrine consistently’
175 and adopts an 





It was noted earlier that the Meriam People claimed that the Crown 
holds a particular fiduciary obligation to them arising from several factors:
177  
                                                                                                                                    
171 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 153 (Toohey J). 
172 Ibid. 165 (Toohey J). 
173 Ibid. 153 (Toohey J). 
174 Ibid. 166 (Toohey J).  
175 Edgeworth, above n 58, 432. 
176 McNeil, Emerging justice?, above n 5, 404. 
177 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 156.  
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•  annexation over their land to which they did not consent;  
•  the relative positions of power of the Meriam People and the Crown in right of 
Queensland in regard to their interests in the islands; and, 
•  the history of relations between the Crown and the Meriam People since 
annexation.  
 
The fiduciary claim was based on court decisions in the United States 
and Canada that found that a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
government and Indian tribes. Crown responsibilities to Maori people ‘in the 
nature of fiduciary duties’ were also recognised in New Zealand.
178 
 
Justice Toohey was the only judge to undertake a detailed examination 
of this matter. He noted that the Queensland government argued that ‘there is no 
source for any obligation on the Crown to act in the interests of traditional 
titleholders and that, given the power of the Crown to destroy the title, there is 
no basis for a fiduciary obligation’. He responded on two grounds. Firstly, ‘it is, 
in part at least, precisely the power to affect the interests of a person adversely 
which gives rise to a duty to act in the interests of that person, the very 
vulnerability gives rise to the need for the application of equitable principles’. 
Secondly, the defendant’s argument was ‘not supported by the legislative and 
executive history of Queensland in particular and of Australia in general’. In 
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  235support he cites the policy of ‘protection’, ‘creation of reserves, [and] removal 
of non-Islanders from the Islands in the 1880s’.
179  
 
Looking at the specifics of the claim of the Meriam People, he observed 
that their ‘power to deal with their title is restricted in so far as it is inalienable, 
except to the Crown’. This ‘power to alienate land the subject of the Meriam 
people’s traditional rights and interests and the result of that alienation is the 
loss of traditional title’ and their ‘corresponding vulnerability’ gives rise to a 
fiduciary relationship.
180 He also observed that the ‘fiduciary obligation on the 
Crown’ is ‘rooted in the extinguishability of traditional title’ and ‘is in the 
nature of the obligation of a constructive trustee’. The nature of the obligation 
arising, he said, ‘may be tantamount to saying that the legal interest in the 
traditional rights is in the Crown whereas the beneficial interest in the rights is 
in the indigenous owners’.
181 The content of this obligation ‘will be tailored by 
the circumstances of the specific relationship from which it arises. But, 
generally, to the extent that a person is a fiduciary he or she must act for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries.’
182 A fiduciary obligation on the Crown ‘does not 
limit the legislative power of the Queensland Parliament, but legislation will be 
a breach of that obligation if its effect is adverse to the interests of the 
titleholders, or if the process it establishes does not take account of those 
interests’.
183 Later in his judgement, he made plain he considered that the 
obligation extends further than ensuring traditional title is not extinguished. He 
explains that ‘[a]nything done by the defendant [the Queensland Government] 
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  236constituting interference with that title would, on the view I have taken, be a 
breach of a fiduciary obligation ...’
184  
 
In taking this stance, Justice Toohey specifically acknowledged that the 
Crown gains a power to extinguish traditional title with annexation. Conversely, 
the Meriam People are restricted in the exercise of that title. Embedded then in 
this obligation is a recognition that the Meriam People did not consent to the 
annexation of the Murray Islands. In this way, Justice Toohey sees a fiduciary 
obligation on the Crown because of the absence of consent, that is, the Crown 
has to take responsibility for its wrongful actions. His approach is reflective of 
the language of common constitutionalism,
185 and, furthermore, by providing a 
unique protection to native title it provides a practical way of respecting a title 
with origins outside the common law. 
 
However, the other justices did not share his view. Justice Dawson noted 
the suggestion that in ‘Canada, as in the United States, the Crown in fact has a 
broader responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to its Aboriginal 
peoples’. However, he reasoned that ‘once it is accepted, as I think it must be, 
that Aboriginal title did not survive the annexation of the Murray Islands, then 
there is no room for the application of any fiduciary or trust obligation ...’
186 
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  237Justice Brennan briefly addressed the matter, indicating that if ‘native title were 
surrendered to the Crown in expectation of a grant of a tenure to the indigenous 
title holders, there may be a fiduciary duty on the Crown to exercise its 
discretionary power to grant a tenure in land so as to satisfy the expectation ...’ 
Since the Meriam People were not alienated from their land he considered it 
‘unnecessary to consider the existence or extent of such a fiduciary duty in this 
case’.




Justice Toohey was the only judge to consider whether Queensland 
legislation contravened the Commonwealth’s Racial Discrimination Act (the 
RDA).
188 He considered whether a breach of fiduciary obligation is inconsistent 
with the RDA. If, for instance, the Queensland Government sought to interfere 
with the Meriam People’s enjoyment of the islands, and failed to provide 
compensation on just terms, would this ‘be in contravention of s 9 or s 10’ of 
the  RDA? He argued that this needs consideration in the context that 
‘[o]rdinarily land is only acquired for a public purpose on payment of just terms 
...’
189 Referring to Mabo No 1,
190 Justice Toohey noted that s 10 of the RDA 
relates to the ‘enjoyment of a right, not to the doing of an act and the right 
referred to in s 10(1) need not be a legal right’. He also drew attention to Article 
5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
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  238Discrimination.
191 The article states that the rights to be protected are far 
broader than property rights and include political, civil, economic, social and 
cultural rights.
192 Justice Toohey then commented that the ‘right to be immune 
from arbitrary deprivation of property is a human right, if not necessarily a legal 
right, and falls within s 10(1) of the Act, even if it is not encompassed within the 
right to own and inherit property to which Art 5 refers’.
193 
  
He then specifically considered,
 194  
 
whether extinguishment of the traditional title of the Meriam people 
without the compensation provided for in the Acquisition of Land Act 
1967 (Qld) means that, by reason of a law of Queensland, persons of a 
particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin do not enjoy a right that 
is enjoyed by persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin or 
enjoy a right to a more limited extent than those persons.  
 
Citing grounds that the Meriam People’s claim for declaratory relief is 
of a ‘general nature’, Justice Toohey elaborates his approach similarly. He 
found that traditional title ‘may not be extinguished without the payment of 
compensation or damages to the traditional titleholders of the Islands’. He also 
ordered that while traditional title is ‘subject to the power of the Parliament of 
Queensland and the power of the Governor in Council of Queensland to 
                                                 
191 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 168 (Toohey J). 
192 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination reprinted 
in RDA, above n 188, Schedule, Article 5.  
193 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 169 (Toohey J). 
194 Ibid. 169 (Toohey J).  




Consequences of wrong policy 
 
While they did not examine whether the Crown held a fiduciary 
obligation to native title holders, Justices Deane and Gaudron did comment that 
‘at the time the Murray Islands were annexed to the Colony, it was a doctrine of 
the domestic law of Queensland ... that pre-existing native interests in relation to 
land were preserved and protected’.
196 This comment was made in the context 
of a thorough examination of the consequences of implementing a policy that 
served to dispossess Indigenous people of their land.  
 
Reviewing their approach to determine its significance to the respective 
languages, as discussed earlier, Justices Deane and Gaudron presumed that the 
acquisition of Australia was classified as occurring by settlement at common 
law, as distinct from conquest or cession. They noted, however, that ‘this left 
room for the continued operation of some local laws or customs among the 
native people and even the incorporation of some of those laws and customs as 
part of the common law’.
197 Moreover, they held that the Court has a 
responsibility to consider whether the act of state excluded native title rights 
which would ‘otherwise exist under the domestic law ...’
198  
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  240Hence, in considering the claim of the Meriam People, the justices were 
obliged to consider the effect of acquisition upon the local laws and customs of 
the traditional inhabitants of the Murray Islands. They noted that common law 
was introduced into New South Wales when Captain Philip ‘caused his second 
Commission to be read and published ...’
199 The laws of this colony became the 
laws of Queensland on the separation of the two colonies in 1859. By the terms 
of the Coast Islands Act and the Governor’s Proclamation, the Murray Islands 
were annexed and became subject to Queensland law. So, at this time the 
Meriam People became, at least in theory, British subjects entitled to common 
law rights and privileges.
200  
 
Turning to the particulars, the justices noted that Captain Cook’s 
activities or the Royal Instructions ‘were in no way directed to depriving the 
native inhabitants of the ownership of any land in which they had an interest 
under their law or custom’. Likewise, the subsequent Royal Instructions to 
Governor Phillip in 1787 were unambiguous:
201 
 
You are to endeavour by every possible means to open an intercourse with 
the natives, and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all our subjects to 
live in amity and kindness with them. And if any of our subjects shall 
wantonly destroy them, or give them any unnecessary interruption in the 
exercise of their several occupations, it is our will and pleasure that you do 
cause such offenders to be brought to punishment according to the degree 
of the offence.  
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They then proceeded to examine the cases affecting native title, 
comparing these decisions with the Royal Instructions. They noted that 
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd 
202 was the only reported decision ‘directly dealing 
with the merits of an Aboriginal claim to particular traditional tribal or 
communal lands’. Justices Deane and Gaudron identify its two essential 
features: that the ‘doctrine of common law native title had no place in a settled 
Colony except under express statutory provisions’;
203 and the approach of Re 
Southern Rhodesia
204 is followed where “pre-existing native interests are not 
assumed to be recognised ... unless they fall within the category of ‘rights of 
private property’”. While rejecting both these propositions, they noted that the 
decision of Blackburn J is also based on ‘some general statements of great 
authority’ of the four earlier Australian cases.
205 These are Attorney-General v 
Brown,
206 Williams v Attorney-General,





Their analysis finds that in each of these four cases ‘the reasoning 
supporting one or both of the broad propositions that New South Wales had 
been unoccupied for practical purposes and that the unqualified legal and 
beneficial ownership of all land in the Colony had vested in the Crown, consists 
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  242of little more than bare assertion’.
210 They determined that while a re-
examination of the validity of these propositions would not normally be 
‘justified’, they considered the two propositions to be extraordinary since they 
‘provided the legal basis for the dispossession of the Aboriginal peoples of most 
of their traditional lands’. Noting their significance the justices comment:
211 
 
The acts and events by which that dispossession in legal theory was 
carried into practical effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of 
this nation. The nation as a whole must remain diminished unless and until 
there is an acknowledgment of, and retreat from, those past injustices. 
 
Rejecting these two propositions, the justices found that the common 
law ‘recognised and protected ... the traditional Aboriginal rights in relation to 
the land’. This was in accordance ‘with the basic principles of English 
constitutional law applicable to a settled Colony’. Moreover, the ‘sovereignty of 
the British Crown did not, after the act of State establishing the Colony was 
complete, include a prerogative right to extinguish by legislation or to disregard’ 
these rights ‘by executive act’.
212  
 
They then proceeded to note that a failure to observe the directions of 
the act of state will ‘involve a wrongful infringement by the Crown of the rights 
of the Aboriginal title-holders’. Justices Deane and Gaudron considered this 
situation had come about through the combined effect of three factors: the 
‘personal nature’ of native title; the ‘absence of any presumption of a prior grant 
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  243to the Aboriginal title-holders’; and that the ‘applicable principles of English 
land law was that native title would be extinguished by a subsequent 
inconsistent grant of the relevant land by the Crown ...’
213 Thus, they found that 
an obligation arising out of the introduction of common law rests upon the 
Crown to recognise and protect native title.  
 
The approach Justices Deane and Gaudron adopted is significant in 
terms of the two languages. While not directly challenging the language of 
modern constitutionalism and its view that sovereignty cannot accommodate the 
recognition of Indigenous peoples in Australia, they found a constitutional basis 
at common law to recognise and protect native title. As with the view expressed 
by Justice Toohey, their approach rests on the convention of consent, that is, the 
absence of consent gives rise to an obligation on the part of the Crown. So, 
while Justice Toohey and Justices Deane and Gaudron differed over its nature, 
they share a common view that the Crown has a specific obligation not to 




Justices Deane and Gaudron trace the common law presumption against 
extinguishing without the consent of the titleholder to the act of state. This 
envisages ‘the native inhabitants of the Colony would be protected and not 
subjected’ to ‘any unnecessary interruption in the exercise of their several 
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  244occupations’.
214 Having identified this obligation, they considered it infringed if 
native title were extinguished ‘against the wishes of the native title-holders’.
215 
If ‘common law native title is wrongfully extinguished by the Crown ... 
compensatory damages can be recovered’.
216 When Justice Toohey examined 
the particular claim of the Meriam People, he finds that their traditional title was 
not extinguished and that they did not ‘seek compensation or damages in respect 
of any past interference’ with their rights and interests. However, he also found 
that if extinguishment had occurred, it ‘would involve a breach’ of the fiduciary 
obligation of the Crown.
217 Hence, we can determine that the two judgements 
find that compensation arises from a breach of the obligation to protect native 
title. To this, though, should be added an important caveat: both judgements 
also note that the practicalities of gaining compensatory damages may be 
affected by statute of limitation provisions.
218 Furthermore, when specifically 
considering the impact of legislation upon native title, the three judges preferred 
the norm of continuity.
219 Citing Lord Atkinson, Justice Toohey said ‘an 
intention to take away the property of a subject without giving to him a legal 
right to compensation for the loss of it is not to be imputed to the Legislature 
unless that intention is expressed in unequivocal terms’.
220  
 
Justice Brennan did not express an explicit view on Crown obligations to 
native title holders. However, a brief judgement by Chief Justice Mason and 
Justice McHugh states that ‘subject to the operation of the ... [RDA] ... neither of 
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219 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 85 (Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
  245us nor Brennan J agrees with the conclusion to be drawn from the judgements of 
Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ that, at least in the absence of clear and 
unambiguous statutory provision to the contrary, extinguishment of native title 
by the Crown by inconsistent grant is wrongful and gives rise to a claim for 
compensatory damages’. They also added: ‘We are authorised to say that the 
other members of the Court agree with what is said in the preceding paragraph 
about the outcome of the case’.
221 Thus, among the six justices recognising the 
Meriam People’s claim they divided 3-3 over whether to respect the convention 
of consent. In other words, they divided on ‘whether native title could be 
extinguished without consent or compensation in the absence of legislative 
authority’.
222 Presumably to emphasise that a majority of the Court opposed 
compensation, Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh added an additional 
sentence. ‘We note that the judgement of Dawson J supports the conclusion of 
Brennan J and ourselves on that aspect of the case since his Honour considers 






This chapter has assessed different aspects of the Mabo decision against 
the common constitutional conventions, showing the particular influence of 
different constitutional languages. These concluding comments will ascertain 
the overall character of the High Court’s decision.  
                                                                                                                                    
220 Lord Atkinson cited by Justice Toohey, ibid. 152-3 (Toohey J). 
221 Ibid. 7 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
222 Bartlett, above n 6, 29.  
223 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 7 (Mason CJ and McHugh J).  
  246 
Recalling the discussion about mutual recognition in Chapter 4, Tully 
describes how in Worcester v the State of Georgia
224 Chief Justice Marshall of 
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Cherokee people 
considered themselves a distinct nation. In this case, Chief Justice Marshall also 
noted that the ‘Indian nations have always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial ...’
225  
 
Compared to the approach taken by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester 
v the State of Georgia, the consequences arising from the Mabo decision do not 
concern just one claim. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Court extended 
the principles it adopted in relation to the Meriam People Australia-wide. But in 
deciding to extend these principles they also pre-empt the courts hearing the 
voices of other Indigenous peoples speak about its impact on their particular 
laws and customs. The Court majority presume that the compromise constructed 
in relation to the Meriam People’s claim is appropriate for all other Indigenous 
people throughout the country without first gaining their consent. Put another 
way, the Court behaved in an important respect as though this was a ‘normal’ 
case where it could treat the Australian population as homogenous. It 
unilaterally imposed a solution on behalf of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people alike. In this respect, it acted in a modern constitutional way.  
 
                                                 
224 Worcester v the State of Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832) (“Worcester v the State of 
Georgia”); Tully, above n 33, 117-124. 
225 Worcester v the State of Georgia, above n 223, 559. 
  247So the key question posed by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v the 
State of Georgia was not voiced in the High Court. What forms of recognition 
do Indigenous peoples wish to have? Only Justice Toohey was cautious enough 
to avoid developing general rules concerning the extinguishment of ‘traditional 
title’ beyond those that arose from the ‘clear and plain intention’ of 
legislation.
226 In contrast, the Court majority set the ground-rules for the 
extinguishment and recognition of claims across the country. As Blackshield 
and Williams noted, the Court ‘recognised the customary laws and entitlements 
of indigenous peoples only to the extent that the norms of the constitutionally 
established nation allowed or required such recognition’.
227  
 
If an analogy is made with a ship,
228 then the Court effectively said ‘we 
agree that a ship of recognition is launched, but we’re going to unilaterally 
determine who is going to board the ship’. Indeed, the Court applied an 
approach to a host of other decisions about for instance, commerce, state and 
federal relations or immigration. Furthermore, while cultural recognition is very 
different to each of these matters, by acting unilaterally the Court treated it as 
similar and did not limit its decision so the prior agreement of Indigenous 
peoples throughout the country could be sought as to who could board the ship 
and what would be its cargo.  In such circumstances, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders were obliged to support the ship’s launch and work within the 
                                                 
226 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 10, 5 (Toohey J).  
227 Blackshield & Williams, above n 8, 176.  
228 I am indebted to Tully’s use of the black bronze canoe sculptured by Bill Reid as a metaphor 
for his story which I have adapted to describe the particular circumstances in Australia. Tully 
explains that Reid is a ‘the renowned artist of Haida and Scottish ancestry from the Haida nation 
of Haida Gwaii (the Queen Charlotte Islands) off the northwest coast of Great Turtle Island 
(North America)’. See Tully, above n 33, 17.  
  248modern constitutional restrictions if they wished to pursue the recognition of 
native title.  
 
Furthermore, the majority adopted three features that significantly 
limited the number of passengers able to board the ship since recognition of 
native title could only occur in narrowly defined circumstances. Each of these 
restrictions reflects the influence of the language of modern constitutionalism:  
 
•  the ability of the legislature to extinguish native title if specified by a clear and 
plain intention; 
•  that native title will be extinguished by executive acts that are inconsistent with 
its existence; and, 
•  there is no requirement to pay compensation in either circumstances. 
 
Another consequence of this unilateralist approach was that any claims 
for recognition as a distinct nation would likely be blocked. In other words, 
when some Indigenous people responded by saying ‘we want to add some more 
conceptual cargo to the ship’, the Court said ‘no, we’re going to determine what 
goes on the ship, no one else’. Indeed, this was confirmed the year after the 
Mabo decision when Chief Justice Mason ruled against a claimant charged with 
an offence under the laws of New South Wales and who sought to be tried 
instead by the Bandjalung Nation. Chief Justice Mason said such an approach 
offended ‘the principle that all people should stand equal before the law’,
229 that 
                                                 
229 Walker v New South Wales (1994) 182 CLR 45. 
  249is, ‘recognition of an independent sovereignty in Aboriginal peoples is unlikely 
to be accepted by the courts’.
230  
 
In the context of its unilaterally-imposed compromise, the Court rejected 
theories associated with language of White Australia. This is illustrated by the 
Court’s rejection of the idea the lands were terra nullius before colonisation and 
its acceptance that a system of laws were in existence before British acquisition.  
 
In rejecting the language of White Australia the Court was guided by 
aspects of the language of human rights. This influence is demonstrated when it: 
 
•  considered the doctrine was factually incorrect and out of step with 
international law; 
•  modified legal theory to differentiate between radical and beneficial titles; and, 
•  rejected the idea that pre-existing interests necessarily end with a change of 
sovereignty. 
 
The minority judgements also had the potential to fill the ship with a 
more robust basis to recognise native title. These include: 
 
•  Justice Toohey’s finding that a fiduciary obligations exists on the part of the 
Queensland Government to the Meriam People; 
•  the finding of Justices Deane and Gaudron that it would be wrong to extinguish 
native title without the consent of the titleholder;  
                                                 
230 Blackshield & Williams, above n 8, 228.  
  250•  together these positions provided a basis that obliges the Crown to compensate 
for wrongful extinguishment; and, 
•  the finding by Justice Toohey that the Crown was obliged to prove its right to 
acquire title. 
 
With the conclusion of the Mabo decision, the focus effectively shifted 
to federal parliament. Questions were thus posed for that body. Should the 
ship’s cargo be expanded so that the ship became a broader vehicle for cultural 
recognition? Or should it continue to provide a more limited service focussing 
on native title? Another related question was who should steer the ship? Should 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people jointly steer the ship? How the Keating 
government responded to these challenges is the focus of the next chapter.  
  251 
  252Chapter 8: 




Mabo is an historic decision - we can make it an historic turning point, the 
basis of a new relationship between indigenous and non-Aboriginal 
Australians. The message should be that there is nothing to fear or to lose 
in the recognition of historical truth, or that the extension of social justice, 
or the deepening of Australian social democracy to include indigenous 
Australians. There is everything to gain. Even the unhappy past speaks for 
this. 




In the last chapter an analogy with a ship was introduced to make some 
points about the High Court’s approach to the recognition of native title. It was 
argued that the Court effectively determined who and what was allowed on to 
the ship. This chapter will consider why the Keating government did not convert 
the native title ship into a ship of reconciliation, but affirmed that the cargo and 
passengers on the Mabo ship should remain basically as established by the High 
Court. Also, while the Keating government occasionally allowed some say by 
                                                 
1 Prime Minister Keating cited by Frank Brennan, One land, one nation: Mabo: Towards 2001, 
(St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1995), 42. 
  253Indigenous people in the direction of the ship, it did not change the rules of 
steerage.  
 
The period to be examined covers the time from the Court’s June 1992 
decision to the adoption of native title legislation in December 1993. The 
following issues and events are considered in chronological order: 
 
•  the significance the Keating government placed on the Mabo decision; 
•  its response to Mabo; 
•  the decision to introduce native title legislation; 
•  the June 1993 Council of Australian Government (COAG) meeting of state and 
federal governments; 
•  Labor’s approach to the involvement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples in crafting the legislation; and, 
•  party attitudes to Mabo, federal/state relations and to the legislation.  
 
A crucial primary source to understanding the attitudes expressed by the 
different parties is the Hansard weekly transcripts of parliamentary proceedings 
of both chambers of federal parliament. The Senate debate was richer than that 
in the House of Representatives because the Senate comprises more parties. It 
was noticeable that senators from the Australian Democrats and Greens (WA) 
aired some very different concerns from their counterparts in the major parties. 
These differences were particularly pronounced when the legislation reached the 
committee stage and amendments proposed by the minor parties were 
considered. The detailed examination that unfolds in this chapter is essential to 
  254gaining an understanding of both the differing party philosophies as well as how 
each sought to influence the outcome of the decision. Sometimes, a contribution 
by a particular individual also drew attention to this or to a disagreement with 
their own party. The transcripts also provided the detail of each amendment 
proposed and the arguments articulated for and against its adoption. A brief 
inquiry into the draft legislation was undertaken by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Senate Standing Committee). 
The committee could not agree on its recommendations and so both Majority 
and Dissenting Reports were produced as well as a personal statement from 
Australian Democrats Senator Sid Spindler.
2  
 
Several official publications also assist with this examination. One is a 
government discussion paper (the Discussion Paper) released in June 1993. Its 
writers cautioned that it is not a ‘statement of Government policy or its legal 
advice’, but ‘an analysis of the issues’.
3 However, it can be taken as indicative 
of the thinking of those developing the government’s policy. Its general 
approach and principles did form the basis of the native title legislation. A 
specific chapter concerns negotiation and consent.
4 An appendix to the 
Discussion Paper also contains A Framework of Principles
5 and this had 
ministerial approval as a focus for a ‘discussion of the next steps’.
6 The Native 
                                                 
2 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Report on Native Title Bill 1993, (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1993) (“Senate Report on Native Title Bill 1993”). 
3 Commonwealth Government, Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, Discussion 
Paper, June 1993, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 13 (“Mabo: 
The High Court Decision on Native Title”).  
4 Ibid. 60-9. 
5 A Framework of Principles, reprinted in Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, ibid. 
98-106 (“A Framework of Principles”); Robert Tickner, Taking a stand, (Crows Nest, NSW: 
Allen & Unwin, 2001), 122.  
6 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 3, 99. 
  255Title Bill and two explanatory memorandums are also crucial to a description of 
the government’s response.
7 When the Senate completed its changes to the 
Native Title Bill, a schedule of the amendments as well as a supplementary 
explanatory memorandum was produced.
8 Following the adoption of the 
amended Bill in December 1993, the federal Attorney-General’s Department 
produced the legislation with commentary.
9 The first operational report on 
native title by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice 
Commissioner also examines the legislation and its impact ‘on the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights of Indigenous Australians’.
10  
 
Other material specifically considered the legislation or provided general 
background material that is relevant to the analysis of specific issues. Justice 
Toohey’s review of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
focuses on the implementation of the act, a chapter specifically discussing ‘Land 
Councils and Group Consent’.
11 The year following the legislation’s adoption 
Murray Goot and Tim Rowse edited a collection of material around the Keating 
government’s ‘waking up’. This referred to the realisation that ‘it was time for 
non-indigenous Australians to make a better offer’ than that provided by the 
                                                 
7 Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth); House of Representatives, The Parliament of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth) Explanatory Memorandum Part A, (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 1993) (“Explanatory Memorandum Part A”); House of 
Representatives, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth) 
Explanatory Memorandum Part B, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1993).  
8 The Senate, Native Title Bill 1993: Schedule of the amendments made by the Senate, 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1993); Senate, Native Title Bill 1993: Supplementary 
Explanatory Memorandum, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1993). 
9 Attorney-General’s Department, Native title: legislation with commentary by the Attorney-
General’s Legal Practice, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994) 
(“Native title: legislation with commentary”). 
10 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), 1. 
11 Mr Justice Toohey, Seven years on, Report to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and related matters, (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1984), 56-8. 
  256Hawke Labor government in the 1980s.
12 Frank Brennan’s One land, one 
nation: Mabo: Towards 2001 contains two chapters that discuss the events 
around the legislation as well as its content.
13 Tony Blackshield and George 
Williams provide a specific chapter on ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Question of 
Sovereignty’ in Australian constitutional law and theory: commentary and 
materials.
14 Richard Bartlett’s Native title in Australia also contains a chapter 
considering the ‘Political and Legislative Responses to Mabo’.
15  Mabo: The 
Native Title Legislation comprises another useful compilation of material 
focussed on the legislative response to the High Court’s decision.
16 Lastly, 
Robert Tickner’s Taking a stand is invaluable in providing detailed information 
about disputes within the government over the crafting of the legislation.
17 
 
The significance of Mabo 
 
The initial reaction of the Keating government to the Mabo decision 
indicates that they too shared many of the presumptions of the High Court 
majority in Mabo. Like the six judges recognising the Meriam People’s claim, 
the government rejected the idea that the Indigenous people present in the 
country before annexation were not sovereign. In October 1992, the Prime 
Minister welcomed the High Court decision as ‘historic’ and ‘a threshold and 
                                                 
12 Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (Eds), Make a better offer: the politics of Mabo, (Leichhardt, 
NSW: Pluto Press Australia Ltd, 1994), cover.  
13 Brennan, above n 1, Chapter 2: ‘The politics of Mabo’, 38-80, Chapter 3: ‘Commonwealth 
Native Title Legislation’, 81-103. 
14 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian constitutional law and theory: 
commentary and materials, Third Edition, (Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 2002), 175-
240. 
15 Richard H. Bartlett, Native title in Australia, Second Edition, (Chatswood, NSW: 
Butterworths, 2004), 33-44.  
16 M.A. Stephenson (Ed), Mabo: the native title legislation, (St Lucia, Qld: University of 
Queensland Press, 1995).  
17 Tickner, above n 5. 
  257positive one for the nation’.
18 The following year, when introducing native title 
legislation to Parliament, he spoke of the ‘pernicious legal deceit of terra 
nullius’.
19 Minister of Aboriginal Affairs Robert Tickner later described the 
previous doctrine as ‘discredited’ and a ‘legal fiction that provided the 




Like the High Court majority, federal Labor did not consider the 
decision implied the recognition of all traditional connections to the land. 
Reviewing the High Court’s decision the authors of the June 1993 Discussion 
Paper noted that there ‘was general acceptance by the majority that 
extinguishment will have resulted from the valid grant of freehold title ...’ 
Relying on this view, they concluded that for ‘areas of land in Australia held 
under valid grants of freehold title the decision in Mabo (No. 2) offers no 
prospect of a successful assertion of native title’.
21 From this they determined 
the ‘decision itself does not support a proposition that native title has legal 
primacy over statutory titles’.
22 The rejection of this proposition was taken as a 
given by the authors. Unlike Justice Toohey, they did not examine whether this 
conformed to common law precedents or was an appropriate norm to 
implement.  
 
                                                 
18 A Framework of Principles, reprinted in Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, 
above n 3, Appendix, 98. 
19 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 11, 1993, 2877 (16 November 1993). 
20 Tickner, above n 5, 83. 
21 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 3, 16.  
22 Ibid. 20. 
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considered Mabo ‘made clear that, like other legal rights, including property 
rights, native title can be dealt with, extinguished or expropriated by valid acts 
of the Crown’. From this, they concluded ‘the legal position’ was that ‘native 
title holders would not have an absolute right of consent over such actions by 
the Crown’.
23 The analysis of this issue was at best cursory. Particularly 
noticeable is that the authors did not engage with, or even acknowledge, the 
position of Justice Toohey, which is a serious gap since he conducted the only 
extensive examination in Mabo of the general principles pertaining to consent 
and unilateral extinguishment.   
 
When the Discussion Paper authors considered whether the Crown holds 
a fiduciary obligation to native title holders, they were more thorough in their 
summary of the Court decision. They commenced by noting the Meriam 
People’s claim that the Crown held a fiduciary responsibility to recognise and 
protect their traditional interests had its basis in prior US, Canadian and New 
Zealand decisions. They observed that Justice Brennan said ‘recognition of the 
power of the Crown to extinguish native title without compensation is 
inconsistent with the existence of the general fiduciary duty asserted by the 
plaintiffs’. They also acknowledged that Chief Justice Mason and Justice 
McHugh agreed with this view. Furthermore, they accepted that in ‘rejecting 
any rights to compensation’ Justice Dawson ‘would not support the existence of 
a fiduciary duty’.
24 On this basis, they determined that a majority ‘seems to 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 62.  
24 Ibid. 19.  
  259reject any general fiduciary duty’.
25 The Framework of Principles did not 
mention the issue, which suggests that the Keating government did not think it a 
priority. 
 
The authors also acknowledged the minority Court views about the 
fiduciary obligations of the Crown. They noted that Justice Toohey was the 
‘only Justice to accept unequivocally the plaintiffs’ argument’. They also 
observed that while Justices Deane and Gaudron ‘recognised the power of the 
Crown to extinguish native title’ the judges “concluded that extinguishment 
would be ‘wrongful’ and a right to compensation would exist unless excluded 
by clear and unambiguous legislative provision”. The Discussion Paper authors 
noted that it ‘is arguable that the basis of their view of this right to 
compensation is the operation of ordinary common law rules concerning 
acquisition of property so that its existence gives no support to the existence of a 
fiduciary duty’. Nevertheless, the reference to ‘wrongful’ extinguishment could 
be ‘relied upon as reflecting the existence of such a duty’.
26  
 
Response to the Mabo decision 
 
The announcement in October 1992 of a 12-month consultation period 
about the consequences of Mabo marked the first step in the Keating 
government’s response to the decision.
27 State and territory governments were 
specifically consulted, as were the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 20.  
26 Ibid. 19.  
27 Tickner, above n 5, 92; Bartlett, above n 15, 33.  
  260Commission (ATSIC), the Land Councils and the peak industry bodies.
28 An 
early government discussion paper prepared in October 1992 suggested several 
ways to proceed, including a statutory framework to codify native title as well 
as a specialist statutory tribunal to adjudicate claims. It also canvassed the 
option of ‘negotiation of settlements between governments and indigenous 
people’, as carried out in Canada. The paper stated this could be achieved by 
either complementary Commonwealth, state and territory legislation or 
alternatively by Commonwealth legislation based solely on the 
Commonwealth’s constitutional powers.
29 Thus, it appeared that Indigenous 
people could be directly involved in negotiating a settlement.  
 
The government signalled that it would proceed slowly, listen carefully, 
and generally encourage the view that a new order was forthcoming. Setting a 
tone for its response, Prime Minister Paul Keating spoke at Sydney’s Redfern 
Park on 10 December 1992. The event marked the launch of the United Nations 
International Year of the World’s Indigenous People. Keating told the audience 
the ‘starting point’ to ‘find just solutions to the problems which beset the first 
Australians ... might be to recognise that the problem starts with us non-
Aboriginal Australians. It begins ... with that act of recognition. Recognition 
that it was we who did the dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and 
smashed the traditional way of life.’ Keating described the Mabo judgement as 
‘an historic decision - we can make it an historic turning point, the basis of a 
new relationship between indigenous and non-Aboriginal Australians’.
30 
 
                                                 
28 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 3, 10-1. 
29 Bartlett, above n 15, 33.  
30 Tickner, above n 5, 95; see also Brennan, above n 1, 41-2. 
  261The government, though, was preoccupied with the implications of 
possible land claims and addressing business concerns for urgent action about 
the possibility that acts after the Racial Discrimination Act
31 (the RDA) came 
into force would now be invalid. There was also concern that clear guidelines 
were needed for future acts by governments. In January 1993, the 
interdepartmental committee of government officials (IDC) recommended 
against adopting a ‘North American approach’ to ‘negotiating regional 
settlements of native title’, a stance eventually adopted because such an 
approach would entail ‘a very long and difficult negotiation’ that was ‘not … 
practicable ... dealing with immediate land management issues’.
32  
 
Compared to the perspective of the language of common 
constitutionalism, this effectively rejected the possibility of establishing a 
federal process for mutual recognition. While the native title boat was to 
continue it was to be kept separate from the already existing boat of 
reconciliation. Hence, this was one of the most significant decisions of the 
Keating government. As noted in Chapter 5, Australia does not have a tradition 
of mutual recognition. Nevertheless, a federal government does have the legal 
authority to put in place the institutional arrangements to achieve such a 
relationship, something not considered available to the High Court. For 
instance, it has the ‘power to make laws … with respect to external affairs’
33 
and is a respondent to several international human rights conventions and 
                                                 
31 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
32 Draft Report, cited by Bartlett, above n 15, 33-4. 
33 Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Constitution, (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1993), s 51 (xxvi) (“The Australian Constitution”), s 51 (xxix). 
  262covenants that could provide the necessary authority.
34 In the absence of a 
process of mutual recognition where the claims could be heard on their own 
terms, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were obliged to engage in 
language games to ensure that concepts adopted did not further erode their 
position.  
 
Native title legislation 
 
Instead, the Keating government proposed to introduce federal native 
title legislation;
35 thus separating the resolution of native title claims from the 
other claims. The Discussion Paper authors gave three reasons for this. In their 
opinion, issues such as ‘self-determination (including greater autonomy and 
cultural integrity) are not well understood in the wider community …’ Other 
issues such as self-government and new constitutional arrangements ‘are not yet 
defined’. They ‘would require further development before being given detailed 
consideration’. They note that resolving these ‘wider, longer term issues … will 
not be easy. The issues are complex, sensitive, and sometimes emotive. There is 
no doubt that they will require extensive discussion by governments, as well as 
by the indigenous and wider Australian community’. A second reason was the 
expectation that the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation would discuss these 
issues ‘particularly in the major conferences and consultation program it has 
developed’. Their third reason was that the ‘immediate land management 
                                                 
34 Australia accepts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. See Garth Nettheim, ‘ Native Title and International Law’ in Margaret 
A. Stephenson (Ed), Mabo: the native title legislation, (St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland 
Press, 1995), 40. 
35  Brennan, above n 1, 42.  
  263challenges’ raised by Mabo ‘can and should be addressed quickly …’
36 Robert 
Tickner provided a fourth reason. He noted that some prominent Indigenous 
representatives advocated a treaty or negotiated agreement between government 
and Indigenous people. However, he said the state and territory governments 




Comparing the proposal to legislate with the language of common 
constitutionalism, suggests it is based on an assumption that eliminates ‘cultural 
diversity as a constitutive aspect of politics’.
38 To put it another way, and 
highlight its contrast with the language of common constitutionalism, the use of 
legislative solutions marginalises the idea that the government and Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples will negotiate a settlement.  
 
Recognition and ‘land management’ 
 
Another indication of the influence of modern constitutionalism on the 
government’s thinking was its tendency to describe its legislation as ensuring 
‘certainty for land management’. In the public discussion over the draft 
legislation, the government frequently emphasised its priority to ensure this was 
met. For instance, the Discussion Paper authors wrote that in ‘the national 
interest, it is necessary in light of the Mabo decision - which recognises an 
interest in land after more than 200 years of failure to do so - to consider 
                                                 
36 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 3, 96-7. 
37 Tickner, above n 5, 110.  
38 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 63.  
  264carefully how future land management would best be conducted ...’
39 This 
emphasis skewed the discussion away from considering the significance of 
recognition and the cultural distinctness of native title toward managing its 
implications for existing title holders. 
 
Noel Pearson, then the director of the Cape York Land Council, rejected 
this characterisation of the legislation. He argued that to ‘treat Aboriginal title as 
a land management issue ... ignores the question of the right to self-
determination in accordance with the laws and customs the court has explicitly 
said gives the title its particular form’. He said ‘Aboriginal people see Mabo as 
essentially about the recognition of indigenous human rights’ and the ‘treatment 
of Mabo should be located within concepts of indigenous human rights being 
developed internationally’. Pointing to the experiences in Canada, the US and 
New Zealand, he observed that ‘Aboriginal people will take significant account 
of the standards applied to indigenous people in those countries where 




The term ‘land management’ is associated with the language of modern 
constitutionalism, the features of which are discussed in some detail in Chapter 
3 and is alluded to here as a task associated with arrangements adopted by a 
‘modern sovereign state’.
41 Hence, when Noel Pearson objected to the use of 
this term and sought to focus on the right of self-determination he was also 
making a general point about the language of the debate: that it should be 
                                                 
39 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 3, 39. 
40 Noel Pearson, ‘Law must dig deeper to find land rights’, The Australian 8 June 1993, 11. 
41 Tully, above n 38, 67-68. 
  265discussed in the common constitutional language and not in modern 
constitutionalism. 
 
The RDA and past grants  
 
Another issue where both modern constitutional and human rights 
languages were influential was the protection accorded to native title by the 
RDA and its impact on past grants. Chapter 6 discussed how the High Court’s 
1988 decision considers the RDA provided partial protection to native title 
against unilateral extinguishment,
42 so a state government cannot unilaterally 
extinguish native title in a racially discriminatory manner. The human rights 
language had placed a caveat on the actions of state governments. Therefore, the 
enactment of the RDA provided a degree of protection for the continuity of 
native title.  
 
Citing the 1988 decision, a claim could be made at common law that 
native title was protected against the issuing of grants in a discriminatory way. 
Following the 1992 decision the Keating government appeared increasingly 
concerned at the possibility of this arising. Advice provided to the government 
by the Attorney-General’s Department in October 1992 ‘briefly’ canvassed ‘a 
potential difficulty relating to land which has been the subject of a grant since 
the RDA was passed’.
43 The following February, the Australian Mining Industry 
Council (AMIC) produced a paper on the issue. It argued that the combined 
effect ‘of the RDA and the High Court decision in Mabo No. 1 is to place at risk 
                                                 
42 Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186 (“Mabo v Queensland No 1”).  
43 Tickner, above n 5, 101. 
  266some existing titles, including mining interests ... gained after the passage of the 
RDA in what would otherwise have been native title land’.
44 That is, they used 
the modern constitutional language to undermine any protection accorded by the 
RDA. Their concern is also reflected in the June 1993 Discussion Paper. The 
authors of this paper wrote that the effect of finding the issuing a grant was 
discriminatory could have ‘two possible results’:
45 
 
•  That ‘the RDA protects native title from extinguishment and renders the 
relevant legislation or acts under that legislation wholly or partly invalid’; or 
•  That ‘the RDA operates so as to provide a right of compensation for the 
extinguishment of native title’. 
 
In February 1993, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
advised that to avoid the first possibility arising, ‘the Commonwealth will need 
to legislate to make clear that nothing in the RDA is inconsistent’.
46 Hence, one 
motive for the federal government’s introduction of native title legislation was 
to block the possibility of native title gaining RDA protection.  
 
At the end of May, the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory said he 
had sought and received federal government cooperation to secure mining leases 
at McArthur River.
47 This was advocated as a way to ensure that existing grants 
were validated and protected against being declared racially discriminatory.
48 
Tickner noted that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were ‘outraged’, 
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  267partly because it proposed to suspend the application of the RDA for the 
leases.
49 Eventually though, the Prime Minister provided reassurances that 
Labor was not going down the suspension path. At a media conference, Keating 
said the government was ‘not going to be forced into validation, by suspending 
... [it], discriminatory actions carried out in the past, and in so doing remove 
from ... Aboriginal Australians, a right which all other Australians have to 
litigation in the courts’.
50 However, this did not completely close off the 
possibility of circumventing the RDA’s protection of native title. When AMIC 
advised that legislative action should be taken to undermine the protection of the 
RDA, it also ‘suggested that the validation of titles’ could occur ‘as a special 
measure under the RDA’. AMIC Chair Peter Burnett said ‘legislation could be 
framed to represent a ‘special measure’ under section 8’ of the RDA.
51 While 
this was presented as a benign or ‘legally creative way’ to proceed,
52 it can be 
used to nullify the protection accorded by the RDA and it was used in this way 
with respect to past acts.  
 
At a media conference, Prime Minister Keating said grants issued before 
Mabo were not wrongful since they were carried out in ignorance. In justifying 
this view, he made a distinction between ‘innocent discrimination’ and a ‘wilful 
disregard of people’s interests’.
53 In response to this characterisation, Noel 
Pearson noted that its ‘underlying rationale is that because Aboriginal title was 
not recognised then, their conduct was innocent’. Pearson said this ‘obscures the 
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  268truth’, and that many of these titles ‘were obtained in extremely unconscionable 
circumstances and were the subject of legal appeals (which, before Mabo, were 
mostly unsuccessful)’. Also, the ‘title takers frequently knew of traditional 
Aboriginal interests. In many cases they rode roughshod over Aboriginal 
objections.’ He implied that the government’s stance did not accord with 
Indigenous wishes and that a process of mutual recognition was needed. Pearson 
said that the ‘onus is on the Prime Minister to translate his vision for a new 
national identity for Australia into a principled and just resolution of indigenous 
claims’. Observing that ‘[y]ou cannot force reconciliation, nor can you impose 
solutions,’ he said that the legislation ‘must receive the endorsement of 





Consent was another concept of the common language discussed by the 
authors of the Discussion Paper. They indicated that in the government-initiated 
consultation opinions reflected two distinct positions. Characterising their own 
view as adhering to ‘the principle of non-discrimination’, they said that ‘native 
title holders should be treated no less favourably than holders of other 
comparable interests in land’. Hence, ‘to the extent a comparable title holder has 
a right of consent over an activity affecting the land, so would the native title 
holder’. The writers also observed that the ‘same would apply to rights of 
negotiation on a proposed activity affecting the land’.
55
 Therefore, in comparing 
Indigenous people’s claims to land to that of existing title holders, they focussed 
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  269on a dimension that did not take into account the significance of the cultural 
aspect of the claims. The problem they created was thus similar to the one noted 
earlier when they described native title as a land management issue.  
 
The Discussion Paper authors also raised a second position that 
considered the non-discrimination position inadequate and that viewed native 
title as sui generis, ‘an interest in land in its own right with its own 
characteristics’. The authors acknowledged the ‘special attachment of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to land is beyond doubt, and is of 
profound significance’. Another aspect of this argument was ‘not that native 
title is equivalent to such other interests - rather that it is, in its own right, no 
less important or deserving of protection’.
56  
 
Pearson criticised the shortcomings of simply applying the ‘the principle 
of non-discrimination’ to native title. He explained that this was ‘treating 
Aboriginal title as analogous to a freehold or other interest derived from the 
Crown’. He said this was ‘not appropriate’ since ‘[s]o much has been lost ... in 
the past 200 years [that] Aboriginal people are entitled to expect special 
protection for what remains’. The ‘loss or impairment of that title’ was ‘not 
simply a loss of real estate. It is a loss of culture.’ Challenging the approach 
advocated in the Discussion Paper he said equating their titles with ‘normal’ 
titles ‘obscures the very nature of Aboriginal title’. Since this ‘arises out of the 
customs and laws of the Aboriginal titleholders ... nothing in mainstream titles 
is comparable’. Instead, Indigenous people were ‘entitled to expect special 
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  270protection for what remains’.
57 Tickner also observed that “while dealings on a 
‘non-discriminatory basis’ have a superficial appeal, they are a denial of any 
right of negotiation or control by Aboriginal people of what could happen on 
their lands, especially in relation to mining.”
58  
 
Pearson also pointed out that to ‘treat Aboriginal title ... like normal 
titles’ is to adopt a ‘fallacy’. He explained that ‘strict adherence to the notions of 
formal equality compounds inequality because it fails to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of difference, particularly of culturally distinct minorities’. He said 
the IDC embraced a notion of formal equality, and that to treat native title in this 
way ‘obscures the very nature of Aboriginal title’.
59 He noted in the case of 
Gerhardy v Brown
60 that Justice Brennan warned of these dangers. On that 
occasion, Justice Brennan said,
61   
 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms may be nullified or impaired by 
political, economic, social, cultural or religious influences in a society as 
well as by the formal operation of its laws. Formal equality before the law 
is an engine of oppression destructive of human dignity if the law 
entrenches inequalities ‘in the political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life’.  
 
A position based on the application of formal equality to native title also 
presumes cultural uniformity. It is like treating native title as if its 
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  271distinctiveness could be put to one side. Drawing on the modern constitutional 
language, it presumes native title is reducible to what is shared with other titles. 
By contrast, Pearson sought to assert the uniqueness of native title and a desire 
to have this recognised and protected. In doing so, he challenged the modern 




Discussion Paper response 
 
In responding to the sui generis position, the Discussion Paper authors 
identified three areas requiring a response:
63 
 
•  ‘future grants of interest in land’;  
•  the ‘validation of mining interests granted since ... the Mabo decision’; and, 
•  the ‘validation of mining titles issued between 1975 and June 1992’. 
 
They began their examination of these issues by rejecting a general 
application of the norm of consent. In support of their view they cited the Mabo 
decision that ‘like other legal rights, including property rights, native title can be 
dealt with, extinguished or expropriated by valid acts of the Crown’. From this, 
they determined that ‘the legal position is that native title holders would not 
have an absolute right of consent over such actions by the Crown’.
64 However, 
this rationale blurs the boundaries between the situation at the time of writing 
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  272and what they considered it should be. That is, they collapsed the normative 
concerns into what was considered legally permissible. This indicated they 
followed a presumption of the modern constitutional language and considered a 
parliament should treat native title like other matters.
65 However, because 
federal Parliament can create and extinguish rights to property, if it so desired it 
could legislate to protect consent rights. Furthermore, to adopt a course of 
respecting consent has precedent in the 1976 Northern Territory land rights 
legislation.
66 Moreover, the authors did not address the call made in the 
Aboriginal Peace Plan at the end of April 1993 to uphold the norm that 
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Title [is] not to be extinguished or 
impaired unilaterally without consent.’
67  
 
In rejecting the principle of consent rights, the authors did not advance 
any reasons in support of their stance. It appears though that the Keating 
government opposed imposing on miners a process similar to that existing in the 
Northern Territory. Following enactment of the legislation in 1976, the mining 
industry was strident in campaigning to have consent rights overturned. It 
claimed that the Act frustrated Australia’s ‘special responsibility to make its 
resources available to the world community on equitable terms’.
68 While ALP 
policy at the time of Mabo formally supported this right of veto by Aboriginal 
people over mining and other activities on their land, Robert Tickner said there 
was ‘zero chance of Cabinet support for such a policy’.
69 He also wrote that the 
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  273Prime Minister ‘had already ruled out Aboriginal people having any kind of 
veto in line with the NT Land Rights Act ...’
70 He said that officials from the 
Queensland Premier’s Department were ‘adamant that Aboriginal people should 
have no rights of consent additional to those exercised by other landowners’.
71 
Tickner said that because of the general lack of sympathy in the government for 
the consent principle, he ‘argued for modified consent rights’.
72 
 
Having rejected consent as a general principle, the writers of the 
Discussion Paper considered some grounds where ‘additional rights of consent’ 
for native title holders could be provided in relation to actions affecting their 
land. However, they confined their examination to the impact of future actions 
on native title. Effectively their position placed on the table limited future 




•  ‘additional protection against compulsory acquisition by governments’; and, 
•  the ‘special attachment to the land could also be reflected in enhanced 
requirements for negotiation ...’  
 
The writers noted that a qualified right of consent could be enshrined in 
legislation by three different approaches:
74 
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  274•  an inclusive approach specifying the circumstances where this would apply; 
•  an exclusive approach where it is presumes that consent applies and exceptions 
are listed; and, 
•  a hybrid of the above approaches. 
 
A similar approach was outlined in the Framework of Principles where 
the Ministers included three points that address the ‘Right of Consent’. Point 12 
specified a native title holder ‘should not have a right of veto over grants of 
interest in land existing as at 30 June 1993 and the rights conferred by those 
grants should not be required to be re-negotiated’. Point 13 stated that the 
‘principle of non-discrimination’ will apply to ‘a future grant of interest over 
native title land ... [where] ... a right of consent is enjoyed by other comparable 
title holders’. Point 14 stated that ‘in recognition of the special attachment’ to 
their land, ‘including especially protection of sacred sites ... there could be 
additional rights of consent for native title holders ...’
75   
 
The Keating government’s initial position (it changes after the COAG 
meeting) on consent indicated this was a hybrid solution, not respecting the 




The Keating government’s attitude toward the payment of compensation 
for the extinguishment of native title will now be considered. In developing its 
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  275attitude toward this matter, the Keating government could not simply apply the 
view expressed by the High Court majority in Mabo regarding the impact of 
grants. They were also obliged to consider the 1988 decision
76 protecting native 
title from state-initiated racially discriminatory legislation.
77 The authors of the 
Discussion Paper noted that ‘it would be technically possible to extinguish or 
impair native title either with or without compensation’. They indicated that this 
would involve amending the federal RDA legislation as well as state legislative 
changes,
78 which implied the consent of state governments was necessary. 
However, they also indicated some of the political and legal obstacles to this 
course of action. The authors judged that it ‘would be unacceptable to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and to others in the community at 
large.’ It would also ‘probably put Australia in breach of its international 
obligations’ under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
79 To ensure compliance with the ‘RDA and 
Australia’s international obligations’, the authors advocated the payment of 
compensation ‘in relation to extinguishment or impairment of native title’.
80 The 
Framework of Principles followed a similar approach stating that legislation 
‘should establish parameters for compensation when a grant is made over native 
title land, rather than leaving this for resolution by the courts.’ In the 
Framework of Principles, the Ministers added that the ‘holders of existing 
grants should not be required to pay retrospective or prospective compensation 
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  276as part of the validation process.’ Instead, this ‘burden should be borne by the 
Commonwealth and the State/Territories’.
81 
 
The government presumed that compensation was an adequate response 
to the unilateral extinguishment of native title where grants were issued before 
the Mabo decision. The draft native title legislation stipulated that in instances 
of a ‘category A past act’ covering grants ‘made before 1 January 1994’, native 
title holders were ‘entitled to compensation for the act’.
82 It said justice 
‘requires that, if acts that extinguish native title are to be validated or to be 
allowed’, the government was obliged to provide ‘compensation on just terms ... 
and with a special right to negotiate its form’.
83 It appeared this was based on 
extending the application of s 51(xxxi) concerning the ‘acquisition of property 
on just terms’ to cover the extinguishment of native title.
84  
 
In part this approach indicated a culturally sensitive response to 
Indigenous peoples. When the High Court majority made its 1988 decision, the 
term property was interpreted in a broad sense, taking account of Article 5 of 
CERD. The human rights specified included the ‘right to own and inherit 
property’. Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
‘Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others.’ On this basis Justices Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron noted that while 
‘the human right to own and inherit property (including a human right to be 
immune from arbitrary deprivation of property) is not itself a legal right, it is a 
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  277human right the enjoyment of which is peculiarly dependent upon the provisions 
and administration of municipal law.’
85 By following this approach, the federal 
government was culturally sensitive and adhered to the language of common 
constitutionalism.   
 
However, the position they advocated on compensation was not 
dependent on gaining the support of the traditional owners; their consideration 
of compensation for the extinguishment of native title was not based upon the 
convention of consent. They were silent about whether they thought it wrong to 
extinguish native title and so they differed from Justices Deane, Gaudron and 
Toohey in Mabo who found that the unilateral extinguishment of native title 




The Keating government drew an important distinction between past 
actions and future grants. In the case of future grants, it considered there was a 
‘need to recognise native title’. Thus, the authors of the Discussion Paper wrote 
it was ‘unacceptable that the situation be allowed to persist whereby grants of 
interests in land which may impact on native title interests and be inconsistent 
with the RDA can continue to be made with an assurance of retrospective 
validation’.
86 Nevertheless, their words should not be taken to imply they 
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  278supported the norm of recognition being applied more generally to future grants. 
Rather, they considered two ‘broad options’ are available:
87 
 
•  changing ‘existing laws and procedures governing dealings in land in order to 
take account of common law native title’; or 
•  converting native title ‘into statutory title in order to bring it within the purview 
of existing laws. This would involve extinguishing native title and providing 
the native title holder with statutory title. This could be either as part of a 
compulsory regime, or through negotiation’.  
 
Under the first option, they outlined its general parameters:
88 
 
•  grants ‘do not of themselves extinguish native title rights’; 
•  native title rights ‘are, however, subject to or restricted by a grant for the period 
of the grant’; 
•  the grant ‘must be made in a non-discriminatory manner, and with 
compensation for the restriction’;   
•  pre-existing native title rights ‘revive at the expiry of the grant’; and, 
•  in ‘exceptional’ cases, where it would be ‘necessary to extinguish native title 
this should only be done by negotiation or compulsory acquisition’. 
 
The authors identified four arguments in favour of converting native title 
to statutory title:
89 
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•  it ‘would automatically bring the titles within the purview of existing law and 
would be a simpler task than amending legislation ...’; 
•  the ‘content of the title - the set of rights involved would be clear and familiar’, 
compared to the ‘many questions unanswered’ following the High Court 
decision; 
•  by ‘equating native title with familiar statutory title(s), the task of determining 
... compensation where some grant over land is made would be eased’; and, 
•  if ‘the approach was allied with a reasonable time limit for claims to be made, 
at the end of that period there would be a finite, manageable situation’. 
 
In government circles there was debate about proposals to convert native 
title to statutory title. Differences concerned whether the norm of consent was 
applicable or not. The authors of the Discussion Paper were at best ambiguous 
about whether conversion should happen without consent. They identified a 
possible objection that Indigenous peoples may ‘see a title grounded in common 
law as more secure than statutory title’. However, rather than considering the 
relevance of consent, the authors merely observed the current legal situation. 
They implied that since the then current situation already left Indigenous people 
vulnerable to ‘legislative extinguishment ... if the legislature was so minded’ 
such objections would not be warranted.
90 
 
However, in their Framework of Principles the Ministers explicitly 
rejected the idea of compulsory conversion. They stated: a ‘Codification of 
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  280Mabo or compulsory conversion of common law native title to statutory title(s) 
are not acceptable options.’
91 They added, though, ‘voluntary conversion is 
acceptable i.e. if this is desired by the native title holder’.
92 The Ministers’ 
general approach was that statutory land rights ‘should be complementary to, 
rather than a substitute for, recognition of common law native title’.
93  
 
Elsewhere in the Framework of Principles, the Ministers indicated that 
they envisaged exceptional situations where ‘... all or part of a native title needs 
to be extinguished’. They said ‘this should only be done by negotiation or 
compulsory acquisition ...’ The rationale advanced in support of this was that ‘at 
a minimum ... in an equivalent way and in the same circumstances as another 
title holder’s rights could be extinguished’.
94 This statement echoed the dispute 
mentioned earlier over the term land management. Discussion of the attitudes 
within the government to future grants does demonstrate the influence of the 
modern constitutional language and a drift away from common 
constitutionalism.  
 
COAG and the parliamentary strategy 
 
The next key development in post-Mabo events was the June 1993 
COAG meeting, the regular gathering of heads of state and commonwealth 
governments. An examination of the debate at this meeting provides an 
opportunity to compare the Keating government’s response to those emanating 
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  281from the state governments. At the beginning of May that year Prime Minister 
Keating confirmed that his government would ‘develop a position’ on Mabo 
that it would take to COAG.
95  
 
Differences between the state and federal governments were to some 
extent influenced by different perceptions of their constitutional responsibilities 
and the languages in which these were expressed. Before Federation, the 
colonies (the name was changed to states at this time) were invested with the 
entire management of land, which they retained.
96 The states also retained 
powers over the ‘aboriginal race’. The Commonwealth was specifically denied 
this power, although it could legislate for the people of ‘any [other] race’. As 
noted in Chapter 6, this clause was amended by the 1967 referendum so that the 
Commonwealth could enact ‘special laws’ regarding Indigenous peoples,
97 and 
from this time this power was used to pass laws for the ‘protection of 
Aboriginal people’. There have been several instances where this power was 
used to ensure federal legislation was adopted to outlaw discrimination in 
Queensland and protect community self-management.
98  
 
Another power available to federal parliament is the ‘external affairs’ 
power.
99 In 1966, Australia signed the United Nations CERD.
100 To meet its 
obligations to this convention, the federal Parliament adopted the RDA in 1975. 
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  282In the 1982 case, Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen a High Court majority affirmed 
the RDA fitted the constitutional description of the ‘external affairs’ power.
101 
 
The relationship between state and federal legislation is specifically 
addressed in the federal Constitution. The ‘inconsistency of laws’ power 
specifies that where ‘a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the 
Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be invalid’.
102 Chapter 6 discussed how in the 1988 Mabo No 1 
case the High Court found that Queensland legislation that sought to deny 
Indigenous rights to traditional land by extinguishment without compensation 
was racially discriminatory. Since the RDA has precedence over state 




Two factors suggested cooperation between the states and 
Commonwealth on native title. One was the possibility that existing titles in 
both jurisdictions could be found discriminatory. Since the RDA was federal 
legislation, state legislation alone on native title could be vulnerable to further 
challenges similar to the 1988 case. Another factor was the desire to enact 
national standards and avoid marked differences in native title regimes across 
jurisdictions. Two other factors, though, pulled in a very different direction. The 
1967 referendum was widely interpreted as a referendum in favour of extending 
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  283equality to Indigenous people.
104 The enactment of the RDA in 1975 added to 
political and legal expectations that a federal government would act to protect 
native title from state government threats of unilateral extinguishment. 
 
Before Mabo, state governments saw nothing wrong in dispossessing 
Indigenous people of their land.
105 Following the Aboriginal Land Rights 
Commission some state governments adopted land rights legislation, but 
Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory attended to the 
protection of mining and pastoral interests to which any recognition of native 
title was thought a threat.
106 As was seen in Chapter 6, the state government in 
Queensland opposed the Meriam People’s claim and Western Australia was the 
only state not to enact land rights legislation.
107 Moreover, the defeat of the 
Lawrence Labor government in Western Australia in March 1993 ushered in a 
government hostile to Mabo.
108 In such circumstances, an agreement without the 
direct participation of Indigenous people was likely to involve significant 
compromises at their expense.
109  
 
At the COAG meeting, Keating sought agreement with the states, having 
‘consistently made it clear’ in Mabo Ministerial Committee meetings that ‘it 
was a prime objective ... to get the states on board’.
110 Keating conceived the 
native title legislation as meeting ‘twin goals’: ‘to do justice to the Mabo 
decision in protecting native title and to ensure workable, certain, land 
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  284management’. Viewing Mabo in this way, and since the ‘bulk of dealings in 
land is done by the states and territories’, Keating presumed it was essential for 
their participation.
111 Tickner also indicated that the Keating thought ‘if the 
states and territories could be persuaded to come on board then the Mabo 
outcome would result in a deeper and more substantive shift in the nation’s 
consciousness’.
112   
 
Following the Mabo decision, some states had argued against enacting 
any federal legislation. The Western Australian government was the most 
belligerent in this respect. The premier of that state argued that the states should 
‘decide questions of native title arising out of the Mabo judgment’.
113 Some 
such as Queensland and New South Wales supported working with the 
Commonwealth to develop a ‘consistent national approach’.
114 Some opposed 
specific proposals of the Keating government. For instance, the Victorian 
Premier opposed the establishment of a tribunal, arguing that it would kill new 
investment.
115 The premiers of South Australia and Queensland and the chief 




At the meeting, there was no indication from the state governments that 
they perceived native title as a constitutional matter. Indeed, they provided less 
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  285room for the accommodation of Indigenous culture than the federal government. 
The premiers of Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania told the meeting that 
‘governments should legislate to extinguish native title’;
117 presumably 
regardless of the attitudes of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders affected. At 
the end of the meeting, a statement indicated they had accepted the ‘High Court 
judgment in mabo [sic] that there is native title’. Putting these bland words to 
one side, the meeting did not even agree to the partial recognition of native 
title.
118 Almost immediately afterwards, four states announced their own plans 
to legislate. Their actions effectively scuttled any immediate prospects of a 
common position between the federal and state governments.
119 The Keating 
government then declared it would ‘legislate to establish national minimum 
standards regardless of whether it reached agreement with the states’.
120 
 
The COAG meeting also divided over what attitude to take toward 
future acts. The Victorian premier proposed that where land was needed for 
mining or other developments, the ‘state would provide the necessary title’. If, 
however, Indigenous people sought ‘possessory title’ and ‘if title were proven, 
compensation, not land would be provided ...’
121  
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  286Furthermore, there were sharp divisions over consent. It was reported 
that Keating ‘alarmed many premiers ... by suggesting that the power of veto 
should extend to sacred sites, areas of cultural significance and living areas’, but 
‘sources said a compromise was being negotiated’.
122 Another report spoke in 
similar terms, adding that Queensland joined the ‘Liberal States in voicing 
strong reservations about the extent of Aboriginal veto under Canberra’s 
proposals’. The Victorian Premier concerned that the power of veto would be 
extended declared it ‘the thin edge of the wedge’.
123 These reactions were in 
response to the Keating government’s proposal to provide limited consent 
‘where a right of consent is enjoyed by other comparable title holders’.
124 
Reportedly, the states were ‘unanimously opposed to the Commonwealth’s view 




Later, Keating argued that his government’s draft legislation was one 
that any reasonable state government could support. He said that states and 
territories ‘that wish to see a national system with proper recognition of their 
land management responsibilities and with fairness to Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people, will find it in this bill. We will be happy to cooperate 
with them.’ Contrasting the federal legislation with the legislation from Western 
Australia, he rejected the view that no space should be provided to recognise 
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•  ‘compulsory, wholesale extinguishment of native title - a title embodied in the 
common law, and the inherent right of Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders 
who meet the criteria’; 
•  ‘the mandatory replacement of this by a statutory title - a title only conferred at 
the pleasure of government, and which can be extinguished in particular cases 
virtually at a minister’s whim’; and, 
•  a ‘land management regime which provides only the flimsiest protections for 
Aboriginal people - protections far less than other land-holders enjoy’. 
 
COAG and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
 
This chapter commenced by highlighting the Keating government’s 
emphasis on creating ‘a new relationship with indigenous and non-Aboriginal 
Australians’.
127 Events around the COAG meeting were also helpful in 
clarifying the extent a new relationship was established with the Commonwealth 
and state governments.  
 
The federal government had another opportunity to include Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander representatives in negotiations with the states when 
this was proposed in the lead up to the COAG meeting. Pat Dodson, chair of the 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, wrote to Keating proposing meetings 
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  288occur with ‘representatives of the broader indigenous community’. He also 
argued for the establishment of a sub-committee that could facilitate a dialogue 
between industry groups and Indigenous people.
128 It appears the Keating 
government did not act upon this proposal.
129 
 
At the COAG meeting, a group of Indigenous people protested outside 
to draw attention to their exclusion and to their demands.
130 Their complaints 
about lack of access to the meeting drew a response from the Prime Minister’s 
office. He invited Aboriginal Provisional Government representatives Michael 
Mansell and Geoff Clarke to share their concerns with him. While rejecting 
their proposal to address the meeting, he accepted a letter outlining their 
concerns about the federal government’s draft Mabo response.
131
  Thus, the 
historical spectre of Indigenous people ‘being liable to be dispossessed at the 
whim’ of executive government again loomed large.
132 Tickner thought there 
could be ‘nothing worse than the heads of government stitching up a deal in a 
closed room to shape the future rights, or lack of them, of indigenous 
Australians’.
133 This spectre was only avoided when negotiations between the 
states and Commonwealth broke down.  
 
The COAG events indicate the influence of various  constitutional 
languages. As discussed in Chapter 5, Noel Pearson considered Mabo meant 
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  289‘that Aboriginal law and custom is now a source of law in this country’.
134 Yet, 
there was no indication that this was heard by the federal and state governments. 
This contrasts with the situation in Canada and the view that constitutional 
space exists for Aboriginal self-government.
135 To proceed along such a path 
would have indicated an embracing of the language of common 
constitutionalism. Conversely, the failure to expand the COAG meeting to 
include Indigenous peoples in the decisions about the legislation or establish a 
new body for that purpose indicated the influence of modern constitutional 
thinking.  
 
However, Labor was to consult with Indigenous peoples. Speaking of 
relations between ‘Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians’ when 
introducing the native title legislation to Parliament, Keating said joint work had 
‘extended the frontier of our mutual understanding’. The ‘most outstanding, but 
by no means the only, example of this has been the participation of 
representatives of the combined Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Organisation Working Party in the unprecedented negotiations leading to this 
legislation’.
136 Rowse later observed that the ‘supposition that certain 
Aboriginal people did speak for a nation-wide indigenous constituency became 
essential to the Prime Minister’s management of the consultations leading up to 
the presentation of the Native Title bill’.
137 
 
                                                 
134 Noel Pearson, ‘From remnant title to social justice’ in Goot & Rowse, above n 12, 181. 
135 See, for instance, Kent McNeil, ‘Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal 
Governments’ in Emerging justice?, (Saskatchewan, Canada: Native Law Centre, University of 
Saskatchewan, 2001), 184-214 and James Tully, A Fair and Just Relationship’, Meanjin, Vol 57, 
No 1, 1998, 146-166.
  
136 House of Representatives Hansard No 11, 1993, 2883 (16 November 1997). 
137 Tim Rowse, ‘The principles of Aboriginal pragmatism’ in Goot & Rowse, above n 12, 193 
(italics in original). 
  290Nevertheless, there were instances where Labor clearly did not pursue 
consultation. The most prominent example was over the McArthur River mine. 
When they became aware that the Northern Territory and federal governments 
had reached agreement at the end of June to validate the leases covering the 
McArthur River Mine without their participation, Tickner said ‘Aboriginal 
people were outraged and openly accused the Prime Minister of betrayal’. He 
recounted that although he was Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs, he too was not ‘consulted about this decision’.
138 This starkly 
drove home the point that while the Keating government consulted with 
Indigenous people more than some governments, this did not demonstrate 
adherence to the convention of consent, but reflected a shift toward the language 
of modern constitutionalism and away from the exclusionary approach of White 
Australia that characterised Federation.   
 
While Indigenous representatives had meetings with the federal 
government about the legislation, some Aboriginal groups were concerned the 
process marginalised them. The Senate Standing Committee noted this when 
they conducted a round of public hearings about the federal legislation in early 
December 1993. Hearings were held in Brisbane, Darwin, Perth and 
Canberra.
139 The ‘Majority View’ presented by Victorian Labor Senator Barney 
Cooney noted that a ‘number of Aboriginal groups and some individuals argued 
that the Aboriginal negotiating team was unrepresentative of them’. They were 
critical of this team “for ‘doing a deal’ with the Prime Minister without 
authority and without satisfactory consultation”. This report, though, also noted 
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  291the ‘negotiating team made it clear that they negotiated only on their own behalf 
of the people they represented directly’.
140 The report also noted that a ‘number 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander spokespersons said that the government 
should not legislate until Aboriginal and Islander people had a full 
understanding of the rights revived by the High Court decision’.
141 
 
Party attitudes to Mabo 
 
The High Court decision 
 
Now considered will be the attitudes expressed within federal Parliament 
to Mabo. Many ALP members spoke only positively about the High Court’s 
decision, raising no concerns that it might provide an inadequate basis for 
recognition. For instance, the member for the Queensland seat of Morton, Mr 
Gibson, told the House of Representatives the Court had followed common law 
precedent ‘consistent with British common law ...’
142 Another Queensland 
representative, the member for Oxley Mr Les Scott, told the same chamber that 
the  Mabo judgement ‘laid the foundation for justice’.
143 The comments of 
Senator Beahan suggested he was unaware that English common law can 
provide a basis for people dispossessed to reclaim their land. He told his 
colleagues that ‘[m]ost Aboriginal people have ceased to enjoy any traditional 
relationship with their former land’ and ‘any native title interests were 
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  292extinguished long ago’.
144 The only ALP member to dissent from his party’s 
approach was Graeme Campbell, the ALP member for the rural Western 
Australian seat of Kalgoorlie. He considered the High Court ruling 
‘irresponsible’ and the work of ‘a rogue High Court’. In his view only one 
judge, ‘Mr Justice Dawson, got it right.’
145 
 
The Liberal Party was divided in its attitude toward Mabo. South 
Australian MP Christopher Pyne supported the decision and said it had ‘righted 
a 200-year-old wrong’.
146 His colleague, Ms Trish Worth was more expansive. 
She said the ‘moral way is that course of action which will best enable 
Aboriginal and Islander Australians to craft their own future free from 
disadvantage and discrimination and in a state of harmony with other 
Australians which is founded on an honest appreciation of our shared history’. 
She said ‘[f]undamental to this approach is an acknowledgment of native title 
and the legitimacy of the Mabo decision’.
147 Opposition Leader Dr John 
Hewson was lukewarm and formalistic. He told the House of Representatives: 
‘We on this side of the House accept the existence of native title as declared by 
the High Court, and we recognise the equal right of indigenous people as 
Australian citizens to the enjoyment and protection of their rights.’
148 His 
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  293Many other Liberals though voiced strident opposition to the decision. 
South Australian Senator Nick Minchin, later to become the minister 
responsible for negotiating the Howard government’s Native Title Amendment 
Bill through federal Parliament, described the High Court decision as ‘probably 
the most controversial and revolutionary decision ... in its history’. He said it 
had ‘upset a very long tradition of evolution, not revolution, in the development 
of the common law in this country’. Minchin said ‘ordinary Australians 
instinctively sense that in that judgment the High Court went way beyond what 
is the norm for that court. I think the High Court and the government are quite 
out of step with public opinion.’
150 In a similar fashion, South Australian MP 
Ian McLachlan spoke of ‘the discrimination inherent’ in the High Court 
decision and the draft legislation.
151 
 
Nationals parliamentary leader Tim Fischer supported the doctrine of 
terra nullius. He said ‘Aboriginal dispossession was sad but inevitable’, the 
result of the ‘social Darwinism which pervaded white colonial culture and the 
expansionary competitiveness of the European superpowers’. Terra nullius ‘as a 
concept meant that the native inhabitants did not intensely utilise their land, as 
much as simply traversing it, living as a nomadic people’. He also rejected the 
Court’s view that a system of laws was in existence before British acquisition. 
He said the ‘reason no treaties were made does not represent a denial of 
Aboriginal existence but, rather, that there was no leadership or cultural 
structure with which to negotiate’.
152 Others were more guarded. The National 
leader in the Senate, Senator Boswell, formally noted that the High Court ‘ruled 
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  294that native title exists’ but interpreted the decision as limited, so that 
‘Aborigines and Islanders can [only] claim unalienated crown land’.
153 
 
Like the ALP, the Australian Democrats welcomed Mabo. Party leader 
Cheryl Kernot spoke of the ‘lie of terra nullius’ defended ‘only by relying on an 
archaic and Eurocentric view of the world which denied responsibility for our 
real history’.
154 Kernot said the decision ‘should have meant the recognition of 
bare legal rights for Aboriginal peoples and some attempt to provide redress for 
the 90 per cent of indigenous people who will not benefit from Mabo’.
155  
 
The Greens (WA) were the only party to express concerns that Mabo did 
not provide an adequate basis to recognise native title. Senator Christabel 
Chamarette noted the High Court decision ‘held some good news for Aboriginal 
people, which was that it recognised the legal lie of terra nullius and 
acknowledged the existence of native title and prior occupancy of Australia by 
Aboriginal people’.  She then went on to speak of ‘the bad news ... from the 
point of view of justice for Aboriginal people’ was that the ‘High Court decision 
also said that valid acts of state and federal governments were able to extinguish 
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  295Federal/state relations 
 
Earlier it was noted that the Labor government did not support 
Indigenous people participating in direct negotiations with the state and federal 
governments about native title. For the Liberal-National Coalition, the essential 
question was agreement between the federal and state governments and the 
failure to achieve this was cited as the reason they refused to support the Native 
Title Bill. Dr Hewson claimed ‘the bill ignores the responsibility of the states 
and territories under the constitution for land management. This legislation is 
simply a grab for Canberra to increase its control over the constitutional 
responsibility of the states and territories in the area of land management.’
157 
Likewise, Tim Fischer said the ‘government had not attempted serious 
negotiation … with the states’.
158  
 
In their attitude to federal/state relations, both parties followed one of the 
premises of modern constitutionalism by presuming that Mabo had no 
implications for these relations and that COAG should proceed as normal. In 
this respect they treated Federation as almost above democracy, or as Tully 
noted, a ‘modern constitution thus appears as the precondition of democracy, 
rather than a part of democracy’. This is in contrast with a democratic spirit 
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  296The draft legislation 
 
The draft native title legislation was introduced to federal Parliament on 
16 November 1993.
160 Reflecting the influence of the language of human rights 
the preamble stated the ‘Australian Government has acted to protect the rights 
of all of its citizens, and in particular its Indigenous peoples, by recognising 
international standards for the protection of universal human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. In support of this assertion it pointed to Australia’s 
‘ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and other standard-setting instruments such as the 
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil 
and Political Rights’, the ‘acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights’ and the ‘enactment of legislation such as the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986’.
161  
 
The preamble also went someway to accommodate the distinct culture of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people when it stated that ‘where 
appropriate, the native title should not be extinguished but revive after a 
validated act ceases to have effect’. While it does not express support for the 
convention of consent, the preamble did propose a compromise between the 
languages of modern constitutionalism and common constitutionalism when it 
states: ‘Justice requires that, if acts that extinguish native title are to be validated 
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  297or to be allowed, compensation on just terms, and with a special right to 
negotiate its form, must be provided to the holders of native title.’
162 
  
As noted, in its initial response to the Mabo legislation about past acts, 
the Keating government used a mix of the languages of common and modern 
constitutionalism. One of the ‘main objects’ of the bill was the recognition of 
native title which fits with the language of common constitutionalism. However, 
the legislation also provided for the extinguishment of native title, specifying 
that ‘native title is not able to be extinguished contrary to this Act’.
163 In doing 
so, the bill used the language of modern constitutionalism. The bill identified 
four different categories of past acts.
164 For instance, a ‘past act consisting of the 
grant of freehold estate’ is a ‘category A past act’ where it ‘was made before 1 
January 1994 ...’ While some other qualifications were provided, essentially it 
covered all past grants of freehold estates except those granted ‘only to or for 
the benefit of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders’. This category also 
included grants of ‘a commercial lease, an agricultural lease, a pastoral lease or 
a residential lease’ before 1 January 1994. A similar qualification excluded 
those leases granted for the benefit of Aboriginal people or Torres Strait 
Islander people.
165 If a grant was deemed part of this category, then ‘the act 
extinguishes the native title concerned’.
166  
 
As noted earlier, when examining the approach expressed by the authors 
of the Discussion Paper, the need to validate certain past acts arose because of 
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  298concern that the RDA could leave existing titleholders vulnerable to claims of 
discrimination. The bill’s explanatory memorandum stated that the 
‘Commonwealth has examined these concerns and regards the invalidity of 
some past acts as a legal possibility’. Because of the possibility of this arising, 
‘in particular by the operation of ... [the RDA] and also potentially by other 
laws, the Commonwealth has therefore decided to include in its legislation 
provisions for the validation of such past acts, in order to remove any doubt’.
167 
 
However, a measure that went some way to ameliorate the effect of 
extinguishment on native title holders was the bill’s intention to establish a 
‘National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund’. Its purpose was to 
‘assist Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders … acquire land ... and to 
manage the acquired land in a way that provides economic, environmental, 
social or cultural benefits’ to them’.
168 The government explained that this 
initiative was based on recognising that ‘many Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people will be unable to secure native title and to benefit directly from 





A difference between the government’s pre and post-COAG views was a 
changed boundary between categories of past and future acts. As noted, the 
initial rationale held that those who ‘innocently’ acquired titles before Mabo 
would be protected. At COAG, the federal government proposed that grants 
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  299until the end of June 1993 would be validated.
170 By the time the bill was 
introduced to Parliament, the cut-off date was shifted to 1 January 1994 for acts 
and grants. The boundary between past and future was further blurred as the bill 
would also ‘validate, and enable validation, of some acts which will take place 
in the future, where these acts are linked to acts done in the past’. This included 
the exercise of options and the extension or renewal of grants made in the past, 
which excluded the revival of native title in these instances.
171 
 
The aim of the bill was to provide a framework for general recognition 
where native title can only be ‘extinguished by agreement with the native title 
holders’.
172 This application of the ‘non-extinguishment principle’
173 would 
provide native title holders with rights similar to other title holders. It also 
addressed other exceptional, McArthur River-type, circumstances by providing 
for the compulsory acquisition of native title land and ‘nothing ... prevents the 
acquisition from extinguishing the whole or the part of those rights and 
interests’. The authors of the Discussion Paper argued it should be limited to 
‘exceptional cases’,
174 but the bill let the government of the day determine the 
extent of these exceptional cases.
175 While there was some ambiguity about the 
boundary between the future act provision and the application of the non-
extinguishment principle, the bill failed to provide full protection against any 
adverse effects of a future act upon native title. 
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  300Modern constitutional language also influenced the federal 
government’s thinking about future acts. For instance, the draft legislation 
aimed to accommodate native title into the ‘national land management system’. 
A process would be established ‘to allow for grants and actions over native title 
land ... to continue in the future’ in order to treat native title claimants like 
existing title holders.
176 Hence, the explanatory memorandum stated that these 
permissible future acts would apply ‘in the same way to the native title holders 
concerned as it would if they instead held ordinary title to the land’. It was 
claimed the effect of such an act on native title would not ‘cause the native title 
holders to be in a more disadvantageous position at law than they would be if 
they instead held ordinary title to the land’.
177 
 
Consent and the right to negotiate  
 
A significant change to consent occurred between the pre-COAG 
position of the Keating government and the introduction of the draft legislation. 
Instead of qualified consent being applied, the government replaced this with a 
right to negotiate. Following the COAG meeting, consent rights was again 
raised at a cabinet meeting at the end of July. According to Tickner, the drafting 
instructions prepared by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet on 
future grants stated these must ‘proceed on a non-discriminatory basis: that is, 
grants, crown acts, extinguishment etc. can happen in relation to native title land 
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  301as they can in relation to other private interests in land’. These principles were 
to be passed on to parliamentary draftspeople to prepare the Native Title Bill.
178  
 
A lengthy cabinet meeting on 27 July 1993 resolved that the bill held ‘a 
disposition to accord to native title holders a right to be consulted on proposed 
actions affecting their land, with arbitration by the native title tribunal where 
agreement is not reached, with both consultation and arbitration to be within 
strict time limits, and for there to be a capacity for a crown (Commonwealth or 
State) override of a tribunal decision in the national interest’. The meeting made 
clear these rights were not of veto, but of negotiation where the ‘existence of 
native title had been established’.
179 Tickner considered this was the ‘best 
outcome that could have been achieved’ in a context where a right of veto was 
‘decisively and irrevocably ruled out by the Prime Minister’.
180  
 
In the case of future acts, the bill provided ‘special rights of negotiation’ 
for ‘registered native title holders and registered claimants’. However, these 
were only for ‘some permissible future acts’, such as those relating to mining, 
the compulsory acquisition by government of native title for the purpose of 
making a grant to a third party and other acts approved by the federal 
minister.
181 For mining, the negotiation rights covered the creation of a right to 
mine, its variation, or extension of the period of its effect mining leases. 
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  302However, the minister could also restrict the applicability of the right to 
negotiate provisions where it had ‘minimal effect’ on any native title.
182  
 
So, by the time the bill was introduced to Parliament, qualified consent 
rights were transformed into special negotiation rights, which signified a further 
retreat from the norm of consent. Therefore, if a dispute were to occur, native 
title holders would have to rely on moral and political persuasion rather than 
legal protection to ensure the continuity of their cultural practices.  
 




The attitudes expressed in parliament to the draft legislation will now be 
considered. Most ALP members presumed the proposed native title regime and 
recognition were one and the same. If they had misgivings, they did not raise 
these in Parliament. The Member for Moreton, Mr Gibson, declared the bill 
would ‘restore the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians to 
possession of their land’.
183 Mr Snowdon said the bill was ‘not about taking 
away anyone’s rights’ since it validated ‘invalid grants, thereby ensuring 
certainty of title ...’ His words implied the legislation would have no impact 
upon native title claimants.
184 Mr Elliot said the bill gave ‘unambiguous 
recognition and protection of native title’.
185 The Member for Franklin, Mr 
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  303Harry Quick, said the bill was ‘not about telling Aboriginal people - or finding 
out from non-indigenous Australians what they think - what is right for 
them’.
186 Campbell was again an exception, he said it would be ‘entirely 




While the Liberals divided over Mabo, they were united in opposition to 
the legislation. Dr Hewson rejected it ‘because we believe it is neither a just nor 
a workable response to the ... Mabo decision’.
188 He identified ‘two challenges’: 
that the ‘High Court has formally recognised that Aboriginal people occupied 
Australia before it was settled by Europeans’; and that ‘We also need to reaffirm 
the validity of existing land titles that were negotiated in good faith and in 
accordance with the law of the land as it then stood’. He explained that in 
‘meeting these two challenges what is needed is a sensitive, delicate and 
realistic balance’. However, the bill provided ‘no such balance’.
189 While 
recognising the need for federal legislation, he said it should be confined to 
facilitating ‘the validation of past grants’.
190 To Ms Worth, the government’s 
bill was ‘not ... a just or workable response’.
191  
 
Their National partners were concerned that the legislation did not 
protect pastoral leases. They accepted legal advice from the National Farmers 
Federation (NFF) to the effect that ‘the valid grant of a pastoral lease is almost 
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  304certain at common law to extinguish native title’,
192 Fischer was concerned to 
stop the matter being tested in court. Therefore, he said pastoral leases ‘must be 
fully validated without qualification’.
193 In a similar vein, Queensland Senator 
Bill O’Chee said the Nationals ‘recognise and accept the High Court 
decision’.
194 His speech to the Senate was overwhelmingly concerned with the 
failures of the legislation to ‘protect’ pastoralists from native title claims. 
Likewise, he was concerned the fishing industry was not provided ‘certainty’ 
because of claims ‘in respect of ... waters’. Furthermore, he considered the bill 
did ‘nothing to provide certainty for the forestry industry’ because the ‘forestry 
leases … do not extinguish native title’.
195  
 
Australian Democrats leader Ms Cheryl Kernot generally supported the 
bill. She made this clear before it was introduced to Parliament when she moved 
that the Senate commends the ‘Prime Minister for … setting a positive direction 
for the proposed Mabo legislation and … negotiating for a just outcome ...’
196 
However, the Australian Democrats’ support was ‘contingent upon extensive 
social justice measures being instigated by the Government’ to address those 
Indigenous people ‘who will not directly benefit from native title legislation’.
197 
They proposed 35 amendments to the Standing Committee.
198 Victorian Senator 
Sid Spindler said these were necessary ‘to make certain that this Bill becomes 
the basis of a just relationship between Aboriginal people and the rest of the 
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  305community’.
199 Some of the amendments sought to improve the protection 
accorded to native title claimants. For instance, amendment No 10 called for a 
new sub-clause to clause 45 of the bill (concerning pastoral leases held by 
native title claimants). The Australian Democrats also proposed to clarify the 
meaning of traditional connection so that ‘Aboriginal properties which have 
been purchased after a period of forced absence to have native title reasserted 
where traditional ownership can be established’.
200 Amendment No 25 sought 
changes to clause 197 of the bill to ensure ‘that there is no discrimination 
against hunting and fishing rights’.
201 By 16 December 1993, Labor had agreed 
to incorporate these measures into the bill.
202 The Democrats were now 
amenable to its passage before Christmas.
203 
 
The two Greens (WA) senators supported extending recognition of 
native title further than provided for by the bill. They supported the ‘greatest 
possible recognition of native title in Australian society generally, and more 
specifically by the legal system’. Gary Corr, who did research work for the two 
senators, explained that their priority was about ‘maintaining the physical basis 
for the continuing existence of native title’.
204 Before the parliamentary debate, 
they identified a ‘bottom line’ that would need to be met for them to give 
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Hansard No. 15, 1993, 5346-5355 (20-21 December 1993).  
201 Senate Report on Native Title Bill 1993, above n 2, 48. When this clause was discussed in 
the Senate the Australian Democrats supported a Greens (WA) amendment to insert a new 
clause before clause 197 addressing the ‘Preservation of certain native title rights and interests’. 
The amendment also gained the support of the Government and was agreed to by the Senate. 
See Senate Weekly Hansard No. 15, 1993, 5440-5457 (21 December 1993).  
202 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 5052-5, 5083 (16 December 1993).  
203 Ibid. 4627, 4640-1 (15 December 1993); Brennan, above n 1, 74-5. 
204 Gary Corr, ‘The avoidance of a great defeat’, Arena Magazine, June-July 1994, 42. 
  306support to the bill. This included opposition to the suspension of the RDA, 
support for a federal tribunal, validation to involve coexistence with pastoral 
leases rather than extinguishment of native title, a veto over mining for native 
title holders and a social justice package for those who could not access native 
title. While they were mindful of the ramifications of not supporting the 
legislation, they ‘needed a moral stance to support’ it.
205 During the debate, 
Senator Chamarette said that the bill contained ‘many provisions’ that ‘restrict 
native title more than the High Court ruling does’. The Greens (WA) were 
critical of the Bill’s framework. They took ‘exception’ to the link in the Bill 
between validation and extinguishment of native title. Instead, they sought the 
‘coexistence of native title and valid leases’.
206  
 
The right to negotiate 
 
There was no discussion around the norm of consent. The right to 
negotiate did not gain much attention either, although the Prime Minister did 
add some comments that clarified his view of fairness. He said the right to 
negotiate provided a ‘fair test’ ‘founded directly on a principle of non-
discrimination’. He said the ‘emphasis on Aboriginal people having a right to be 
asked about actions affecting their land accords with their deeply felt attachment 
to land. But it is also squarely in line with the principle of fair play. It is not a 
veto.’ It was apparent that Keating had in mind two instances of unfairness: that 
not to ask the opinion of Aboriginal people was unfair; and that for Indigenous 
peoples to exercise a right of consent would be unfair to miners and pastoralists. 
                                                 
205 “Interview with Senator Christabel Chamarette – Inside Mabo”, Videotape, December 1993; 
Corr, above n 257, 40-43.  
206 Senate Weekly Hansard No. 15, 1993, 5121 (18 December 1993).  
  307He spoke of ‘acquiring land for public purposes such as infrastructure 
development’ from ‘native title holders, just as they can from other land-holders 
...’ He said that the ‘integrity of the land management system will thus be 
maintained. But we insist this be achieved in a way which respects the profound 
Aboriginal connection to the land and provides appropriate protections.’
207   
 
Many Coalition MPs expressed concerns that not enough consultation 
had occurred with Indigenous people over the legislation. Dr Hewson said 
another ‘great myth that the Prime Minister has created is that this Mabo Bill 
represents a national outcome of consultation - consultation with and 
examination by the Aboriginal people’. Dr Hewson questioned the basis for the 
bill. He said the Prime Minister ‘has told us that there is Aboriginal consensus 
and agreement on this bill, but, when we look at the detail, the hollowness of 
this claim is soon revealed’.
208  
 
However, the Coalition’s concern that consultation with Indigenous 
people was inadequate should not be taken as support for the right to negotiate 
provisions. Instead, they translated this into the familiar language of modern 
constitutionalism. For instance, New South Wales Senator Sandy MacDonald 
described the right to negotiate provisions as a ‘de facto right of veto’ that 
would ‘impede economic development in this country’.
209 In opposing a veto, 
they often focussed on the Northern Territory land rights legislation.
210 For 
instance, NT Senator Grant Tambling characterised the legislation as providing 
                                                 
207 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 11, 1993, 2880 (16 November 1993).  
208 Ibid. No 12, 1993, 3406 (23 November 1993).  
209 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 4649 (15 December 1993).  
210 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth).  
  308‘an open-ended loop in the process of negotiation that constantly goes on’.
211 
Likewise, Queensland National Party Senator Ron Boswell described the ‘right 
of veto’ as ‘nothing more than a disaster for Australia’.
212 Then Liberal deputy 
leader Michael Wooldridge indicated a desire to change the rules. He advised 
Parliament to ‘admit the shortcomings of our political process attempting to 
negotiate with people who, by and large, think only locality’. He said, ‘[q]uite 




The Australian Democrats generally supported the right-to-negotiate 
procedures. However, there were instances in the debate where it had a 
difference of opinion with the ALP. When the ALP proposed to amend its own 
bill on the renewal and extension of certain acts it said this was necessary to 
provide ‘certainty’ to ‘existing property holders’.
214 This amendment would 
exclude native title holders from accessing the right to negotiate measures until 
the conclusion of the leases’ renewal, a situation confirmed by ALP Senator 
Gareth Evans.
215 He indicated that ‘Aboriginal groups ... would like this 
amendment not to proceed’. Senator Kernot considered this tipped the balance 
‘too far one way’. She cited an example of a 42-year lease with a 42-year 
option. ‘During that time, native title holders will have absolutely no say in 
what happens on their land. They will have no entitlement to approach the 
                                                 
211 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 5025 (16 December 1993).  
212 Ibid. 5274 (20 December 1993).  
213 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 12, 1993, 3602 (24 November 1993).  
214 Native Title Bill 1993 (Cth), s 24; Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 5209-10 (18 
December 1993). 
215 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 5212 (18 December 1993).  
  309mining company to seek any form of negotiation.’
216 The Greens (WA) senators 
joined the Democrats to vote against the measure. The Coalition appeared in a 
dilemma: inclined to support the government’s amendment, but not wanting to 
appear to be supportive of the bill. The result was a rare division among their 
ranks over the bill with three National Party senators, McGauren, Macdonald 
and O’Chee, voting with the government. Nevertheless, the opposition to the 
amendment was still strong enough to ensure that it failed.
217 
 
The Greens (WA) expressed concerns that the right-to-negotiate 
provisions did not give sufficient control to Indigenous people. Senator 
Chamarette pointed to international conventions concerning human rights as 
well as the UN Draft  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as 
grounds to support native title holders having ‘control over development’ and 





Following the High Court decision, the most significant government 
decision was to not proceed along a ‘North American approach’ to begin 
‘negotiating regional settlements of native title’. The government rejected the 
idea of transforming the native title ship into a more far-reaching ship of 
reconciliation. Furthermore, while the Keating government allowed Indigenous 
people to occasionally get involved in deciding the direction of the ship, it did 
not propose to change the rules to institutionalise a new way forward. 
                                                 
216 Ibid. 5211 (18 December 1993).  
217 Ibid. 5214 (18 December 1993).  
218 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 5262-5263 (20 December 1993).  
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Other events demonstrating the ship’s cargo was influenced by modern 
constitutionalism were: 
 
•  the tendency to transform native title into a ‘land management issue’; 
•  the application of formal, rather than substantive, equality to native title: the 
‘principle of non-discrimination’; 
•  its inclination to suspend the RDA to protect grants and leases; and,  
•  the shift from consent to right to negotiate; 
 
Nevertheless, it was also apparent that the language of human rights had 
some influence on the outcome. This was reflected in the following: 
 
•  the Keating government’s rejection of the language of White Australia; 
•  the preamble to the legislation; and 
•  the creation of a National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund. 
 
However, the Keating government also followed a view of human rights 
that did not embrace the three conventions of common constitutionalism. Its 
legislation was not fully consistent with a number of the articles in the Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Support for the 
extinguishment of native title where grants for freehold title were issued did not 
meet its Article 26, which stated that Indigenous peoples had a ‘right to the full 
recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and 
  311institutions for the development and management of resources, and the right to 
effective measures by States to prevent any interference with, alienation of or 
encroachment upon these rights’. Nor did it meet Article 27’s principle that 
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, 
and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free 
and informed consent’. In its defence, the Keating government would probably 
have argued that full restitution could not be achieved and that it had complied 
with the next sentence that states: ‘Where this is not possible, they have the 
right to just and fair compensation. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the 
peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and 
resources equal in quality, size and legal status.’
219 The key point though is that 
whatever steps were taken they should have respected the convention of 
consent. In this respect, the legislation was inconsistent with this convention.   
  
The examination in this chapter also indicates that the state governments 
were less inclined to support the launch of the native title boat. They sought to 
block its launch and scuttle its supplies. This is reflected in the views expressed 
at COAG that all native title should be extinguished. 
 
The developments that impacted upon native title as a result of 
subsequent court cases and the Howard government legislative amendments will 
complete the examination of how this claim was treated by the High Court and 
federal parliament.  This is the task undertaken in the next chapter. 
                                                 
219 Garth Nettheim, Gary D. Meyers & Donna Craig, Indigenous peoples and governance 
structures: a comparative analysis of land and resource management rights, (Canberra: 
Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Studies, 2002), 23. 
  312Chapter 9:  




The agreement reached between the government and Senator Brian 
Harradine if given effect to by this House and by the Senate will at long 
last deliver to the people of Australia a resolution of an extraordinarily 
difficult issue. It will provide the basis of fairly resolving an issue which 
has caused doubt and uncertainty and which over a period of almost five 
years has engendered a deterioration and not an improvement in relations 
between indigenous people and other Australians.  
Prime Minister John Howard, 3 July 1998
1 
 
The Howard government claimed its amendments corrected 
shortcomings in the federal native title legislation adopted in December 1993. In 
completing the examination of the native title debate, and continuing the 
analogy with the launch of a ship, this chapter will show that the Howard 
government sought to further limit the cargo on the native title ship and 
affirmed that Indigenous people would not be involved in its steerage. The 
period examined covers the time following the adoption of the native title 
legislation at the end of 1993 until the Howard government’s amendments were 
adopted in July 1998.  
                                                 
1 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 6042 (3 July 1998). 
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The analysis undertaken here will cover a number of major 
developments: 
 
•  the March 1995 High Court decision on the Western Australian government’s 
challenge to the Native Title Act 1993
2 (Cth) (the NTA);
3 
•  the December 1996 High Court Wik Peoples v Queensland decision (Wik)
4 
•  the political reactions to Wik; 
•  the Ten Point Plan, released in May 1997; 
•  the draft legislation, introduced in September 1997; 
•  party attitudes toward the legislation 
•  the parliamentary debate; and, 
•  the Indigenous influence on the parliamentary debate; 
 
As in the last chapter, the main source for the parliamentary debate 
comes from the Hansard transcripts of parliamentary proceedings. In late 1997 a 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Land Fund (Parliamentary Joint Committee) considered the 
Howard government's legislative agenda. The divided committee produced 
majority and minority reports. The four ALP senators on the committee and 
Australian Democrats Senator Woodley supported the minority report. Senator 
                                                 
2 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). 
3 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373 (“WA v Commonwealth”).  
4 Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 129 (“Wik”) 




The Howard government’s Native Title Amendment Bill  (NTAB) 
evolved over  several versions. The version cited here was produced at the 
beginning of 1998, following the conclusion of the first of three rounds of 
debate.
6 An explanatory memorandum to these changes is helpful, particularly 
Chapter 2 where the connections between the schedule of amendments and the 
Ten Point Plan are referenced.
7 In early 1998 the Special Minister of State, 
Senator Nick Minchin released Fairness and Balance, a summary of the 
Howard government’s response to the High Court’s Wik decision.
8 Following 
the adoption of the Howard government’s amendments in July 1998, a second 
updated edition of the legislation was produced with commentary.
9  
 
During 1996, a series of workshops to develop a position on the 
proposed amendments to the native title legislation led to the formation of the 
National Indigenous Working Group on Native Title (NIWG). The workshops 
brought together various Native Title Representative Bodies established under 
the  NTA, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), the 
Indigenous Land Corporation, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social 
                                                 
5 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Land Fund, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Tenth Report: The Native Title 
Amendment Bill 1997, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1997) (“Tenth Report”).  
6 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth). 
7 The House of Representatives, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Native 
Title Amendment Bill 1997: Explanatory Memorandum, (Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1998) (“NTAB Explanatory Memorandum”). 
8 Senator, the Hon Nick Minchin, Fairness and Balance: The Howard Government's Response 
to the High Court's Wik Decision, (Canberra: Special Minister of State, 1998). 
9 Australian Government Solicitor, Native title: legislation with Commentary by the Australian 
Government Solicitor, (Canberra: Australian Government Solicitor, 1998). 
  315Justice Commissioner and the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services 
Secretariat. From these meetings, a position paper was developed - Coexistence 
- Negotiation and Certainty.
10  
 
Other material considered the legal impact of the two High Court 
decisions and the Howard government changes. The WA government enacted 
its  Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act on 2 December 1993.
11 This 
legislation was the subject of the challenge heard in the WA v Commonwealth 
case before the High Court.
12  Richard Bartlett’s Native title in Australia 
contains several relevant chapters, focussing on the WA challenge, pastoral 
leases and Wik, and the Ten Point Plan.
13 In a 2001 article, Gary Meyers and 
Sally Raine discuss the right to negotiate provisions in detail.
14 Some material 
provided broader commentary on the legal and political events. Frank Brennan’s 
One land, one nation: Mabo: Towards 2001, provides an analysis of the High 
Court’s 1992 Mabo decision
15 and the subsequent Commonwealth native title 
legislation.
16 Journalist Michael Bachelard traces the debates over native title 
from Mabo through to the Howard government’s Ten Point Plan.
17  
 
                                                 
10 National Indigenous Working Group on Native Title (NIWG), Coexistence - Negotiation and 
Certainty, 1997 (“Coexistence - Negotiation and Certainty”).  
11 Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Act 1993 (WA); Richard H. Bartlett, Native title in 
Australia, Second Edition, (Chatswood, NSW: Butterworths, 2004), 42. 
12 WA v Commonwealth, above n 3, 373. 
13 Bartlett, above n 11, Chapters 3-5, 33-64. 
14 Gary D. Meyers  & Sally Raine, ‘Australian Aboriginal land rights in transition (Part II): the 
legislative response to the High Court’s Native Title decisions in Mabo v Queensland and Wik v 
Queensland’, (Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law, Fall 2001, 9 No 1), 95-167. 
[Accessed 8/05/2002].  
15 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1 (“Mabo v Queensland (No 2)”). 
16 Frank Brennan, One land, one nation: Mabo: Towards 2001, (St Lucia, Qld: University of 
Queensland Press, 1995). 
17 Michael Bachelard, The great land grab: what every Australian should know about Wik, 
Mabo and the ten-point plan, (South Melb, Vic: Hyland House Publishing Pty Ltd, 1998).  
  316WA High Court Challenge 
 
The Western Australian government launched a long anticipated legal 
challenge to the NTA that claimed the federal native title legislation was racially 
discriminatory and therefore contrary to the Racial Discrimination Act (the 
RDA).
18 Meanwhile, the Wororra Peoples and the Yawuru Peoples separately 
sued the State of Western Australia in the High Court for relief from the 




The WA legislation extinguished all surviving native title throughout the 
state, and the substituted ‘rights of traditional usage’. The act established a 
‘common procedure whereby grants and other interests or acquisition would 
override rights of traditional usage’. Furthermore, traditional usage could be 
‘subject to extinguishment or suspension by Ministerial notice’.
20 
 
When it came before the High Court, the WA government supported its 
legislation using arguments to those voiced by prominent Liberals in federal 
Parliament during the 1993 debate over the Native Title Bill.
21 For instance, in 
its submission the WA government argued that native title was:
22 
 
racially discriminatory in that it permits or requires the doing of acts which 
are based upon a distinction between people of the Aboriginal race and 
                                                 
18 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
19 WA v Commonwealth, above n 3, 377-8.  
20 Ibid. 376; Bartlett, above n 11, 42. 
21 Senate Weekly Hansard No. 15, 1993, 4650-1 (15 December 1993); House of Representatives 
Weekly Hansard No 12, 1993, 3438-43 (23 November 1993).  
  317people of other races; or it confers benefits on people of the Aboriginal 
race to the exclusion of all other races. 
 
Their submission also argued that the act should not be seen as a ‘special 
measure’ under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD). Rather its ‘purpose and effect is to maintain and 
entrench permanently the concept of separate rights which may be held only by 
the members of one racial group’. Since the provision only provides for 
temporary special measures, if it were identified as permanent it would fall 
outside the Convention. Furthermore, the submission argued, there were ‘no 
human rights or fundamental freedoms which the Act assists people of the 
Aboriginal race to enjoy or exercise’.
23  
 
The Wororra Peoples’ submission, argued the WA case was ‘untenable 
because implicit in it is an attempted revival of the notion of terra nullius’.
24 It 
observed that if the WA legislation were declared valid, then ‘Aboriginal people 
of Western Australia do not enjoy the right to inherit and own property 
comprising native title or immunity from arbitrary deprivation of property 
which is enjoyed by persons of other races.’
25 The submission claimed the WA 
legislation ‘treats native title in a way that no other person or group is treated’.
26 
It argued the ‘rights of traditional usage’ in the WA legislation were ‘not 
equivalent to the rights exercisable under native title or are at the very least a 
                                                                                                                                    
22 WA v Commonwealth, above n 3, 390.  
23 Ibid. 392. 
24 Ibid. 407.   
25 Ibid. 408.   
26 Ibid. 408-9.   
  318substantially impaired version of native title’.
27 Responding to the charge that 
native title does not represent a basic human right, the submission stated that 
native title ‘has been accorded the status of a property right’.
28 
 
The High Court rejected the WA government assertions that native title 
and the NTA were racially discriminatory, and instead found against the WA 
legislation. The Court unanimously concluded that the WA legislation ‘was 
inconsistent’ with s 10 of the RDA and the NTA.
29 However, the Court did not 
consider all the arguments raised about racial discrimination, because it judged 
that in the light of its finding against the WA legislation it was unnecessary to 
answer the other matters.
30  
 
The judges specifically considered the impact of the NTA on the 
recognition and protection of native title. Noting that this is stated as the Act’s 
‘first object’ they said this was “achieved by a statutory declaration ... that 
native title ‘is not able to be extinguished contrary to this Act’”. The judges 
considered the provisions that ‘permit the extinguishment or impairment of 
native title constitute an exclusive code’. Hence: ‘Conformity with the code is 
essential to the effective extinguishment or impairment of native title.’ 
Therefore, the NTA  ‘governs the recognition, protection, extinguishment and 
impairment of native title’.
31  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 410.   
28 Ibid. 409-10.  
29 Ibid. 490-1 (Mason CJ, Brennan J, Deane J, Toohey J, Gaudron, J, McHugh, J); 495 (Dawson 
J). 
30 Ibid. 491 (Mason CJ, Brennan J, Deane J, Toohey J, Gaudron, J, McHugh, J); 499 (Dawson 
J); Bartlett, above n 11, 43.  
  319The judges did not examine the inconsistencies in trying to reconcile the 
recognition and protection of native title with the contrary objects of unilateral 
extinguishment or impairing of that title. As the above comments imply, they 
considered this should be left to the discretion of federal Parliament. They did 
note, however, the High Court held in Mabo (No 1) 
32 that ‘native title was 
substantially protected against extinguishment’ by the RDA ‘on and after 31 
October 1975’. The NTA though “expressly makes ‘valid’ ... certain ‘past acts’ 
that affect native title to the exclusion of the protection extended by” the RDA. 
It also stated the RDA will not ‘affect the validation of past acts by or in 
accordance with this Act’.
33 So while not explicitly acknowledging the point, 
the analysis by the judges indicated the protection accorded to native title by the 
RDA before the enactment of the NTA was now no longer available where 
certain past acts were concerned.   
  
When noting the changed impact of the NTA upon the protection of native 
title, the judges observed that it ‘secures the Aboriginal people and Torres Strait 
Islanders in the enjoyment of their native title subject to the prescribed 
exceptions which provide for native title to be extinguished or impaired’. They 
noted three exceptions. In addition to the validation of past acts, as noted above, 
these included ‘an agreement on the part of the native title holders’ and ‘the 
doing of a permissible future act’.
34  
 
                                                                                                                                    
31 WA v Commonwealth, above n 3, 453 (Mason CJ, Brennan J, Deane J, Toohey J, Gaudron, J, 
McHugh, J).  
32 Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186. 
33 WA v Commonwealth, above n 3, 453 (Mason CJ, Brennan J, Deane J, Toohey J, Gaudron, J, 
McHugh, J).  
34 Ibid. 459 (Mason CJ, Brennan J, Deane J, Toohey J, Gaudron, J, McHugh, J).  
  320The use of ‘exception’ to describe the impact of extinguishment upon 
native title warrants further consideration. This view is bound up with the earlier 
presumption of the High Court majority in Mabo that native title was 
extinguished throughout most of Australia as a consequence of decisions by 
various state, territory and commonwealth governments.
35 This approach was 
also affirmed in the preamble to the NTA where it stated that ‘many Aboriginal 
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders, because they have been dispossessed of 
their traditional lands, will be unable to assert native title rights and interests 
...’
36 However, McNeil has argued that at common law those wrongfully 
dispossessed should be able to launch ‘an action for the recovery of land, 
against a defendant who cannot show a better title …’
37 This general approach 
is subject to the caveat that the ‘present-day holders of lands which may have 
been unlawfully taken’ are not ‘protected by statutes of limitation and registry 
or land titles Acts’.
38 That is, ‘exception’ can only be applied if it is presumed 
that native title cannot be claimed where the Crown has issued past grants of 
freehold title. 
 
Justice Dawson dissented from the majority judgement but not for the 
reasons he had advanced in the Mabo decisions. He also indicated that in Mabo 
while ‘more than one course was pursued in the majority judgements, the 
reasons for judgement of Brennan J, with whom Mason CJ and McHugh J 
agreed, departed least from what I regarded as established law and, for my 
present purposes, may be accepted as containing the basic principles for which 
                                                 
35 Mabo v Queensland (No 2), above n 13, 50 (Brennan J). 
36 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), Preamble. 
37 See Kent McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 76-7. 
38 Ibid.  305. 
  321Mabo [No 2] now stands as authority’.
39 He said that he still preferred the view 
expressed by Justice Wilson and himself in Mabo No 1 that extinguishing native 
title was not a denial of ‘enjoying the right to own property to a lesser extent 
than those of another race or ethnic origin’.
40 However, he said the ‘decisions in 
Mabo [No 1] and Mabo [No 2] must be followed in the interests of adherence to 
the doctrine of precedent and certainty in the area of property law.’
41 On these 
grounds, he concluded that ‘the intention of those who settled Western Australia 
that Crown lands should be generally available for sale without regard to native 
title did not have the consequence that native title was extinguished’. He 
explained that for this to happen, ‘it was necessary for the Crown to exercise its 
right, which Mabo [No 2] held to arise from its radical title, to alienate the land 
or to appropriate it to itself in a manner inconsistent with native title’.
42 
 
The Court essentially upheld the framework established by the NTA and 
the compromise between the language of modern and common 
constitutionalism; it also protected those who could claim under this legislation 







                                                 
39 WA v Commonwealth, above n 3, 492 (Dawson J).  
40 Ibid. 493 (Dawson J). 
41 Ibid. 374 (Dawson J).  
42 Ibid. 494-5 (Dawson J).  
  322The Wik decision  
 
Just before Christmas the following year the High Court brought down 
its Wik decision concerning pastoral leases.
43 As noted in the last chapter, the 
majority in Mabo said that native title ‘can be extinguished either by a grant of a 
freehold or a lesser estate or by appropriation by the Crown, to the extent the 
grant or appropriation is inconsistent with the continuing enjoyment of native 
title’.
44 However, on that occasion the High Court set aside any decision 
concerning the impact of leases on native title. Thus, the Wik case clarified the 
Court’s approach to pastoral leases. One course open to the Court was to take 
into account the general characteristics of pastoral leases, the particulars of the 
leases involved and the specifics of the claim. For instance, some pastoral leases 
contained a clause that protected traditional Aboriginal rights of access. 
Furthermore, as Bartlett noted, their legislative history did not suggest ‘an 
intention to exclude Aboriginal people from their traditional land’.
45 This 
implied that an a priori rule that declared all pastoral leases inconsistent with 
native title was inappropriate. The Wik people laid claim to an area of land 
subject to the Mitchellton and Holroyd leases, both of which are limited to 
pastoral use. Neither the Mitchellton, nor the Holroyd lease had an express 
reservation in favour of Aboriginal people.
46 The Thayorre People claimed land 
the subject of the Mitchellton lease.
47  
 
                                                 
43 Wik, above n 4, 129.  
44 Kent McNeil, Emerging justice?, (Saskatchewan, Canada: Native Law Centre, University of 
Saskatchewan, 2001), 369; See also above n 13, 49-51 (Brennan J), 7 (Mason CJ and McHugh 
J), 67 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
45 Bartlett, above n 11, 29. 
46 Ibid. 45. 
47 Wik, above n 4, 166 (Toohey J). 
  323In considering the claim, the Federal Court had found that the ‘each 
lease conferred rights to exclusive possession on the grantee’ and that this 
‘necessarily extinguished all incidents’ of native title concerning ‘land demised 
under the relevant pastoral lease’. When the Wik Peoples and the Thayorre 
People appealed to the High Court against this decision they advanced two main 
arguments. One was that ‘their native title was not extinguished by the granting 
of the pastoral leases’. If their claims for recognition of native title were upheld, 
they ‘coexisted with the interests of the lessees’. The Wik Peoples also ‘claimed 
declarations’ that challenged ‘the validity of special bauxite mining leases’ 
granted by the Queensland government.
48   
 
The majority of the High Court, comprising Justices Gummow, Kirby, 
Toohey and Gaudron, took into account the general relationship between 
pastoral leases and native title as well as the particulars involved in the claim. 
The minority of Chief Justice Brennan and Justices McHugh and Dawson 
adopted an a priori rule that the issuing of pastoral leases extinguished native 
title.
49 Their view was primarily expressed through the judgement of Justice 
Brennan.
50 Justice Dawson provided a brief statement that indicated he had 
followed the court’s majority judgements in both Mabo decisions and had 
‘nothing which I wish to add’ to his support for Chief Justice Brennan’s 
judgement ‘in these matters’.
51 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 131. 
49 Ibid. 132-3.  
50 Ibid. 133.  
51 Ibid. 164 (Dawson J). 
  324Justices Gummow, Kirby, Toohey and Gaudron emphasised that a clear 
and plain intention was needed to extinguish native title.
52 Furthermore, unless 
expressly stipulated by legislation they considered it presumed that native title 
would not be extinguished. This flowed from the application of a general rule of 
common law ‘applicable to all  interests’,
53 which presumed against the 
expropriation or extinguishment of ‘valuable rights relating to property without 
fair compensation’.
54 In contrast, the minority placed its emphasis on the 
consequences that flowed from the issuing of pastoral leases. In this context, 
they considered that to adopt a presumption against expropriation unless 
expressly stated in legislation was redundant. Hence, Chief Justice Brennan said 
the claims failed ‘because native title was extinguished’ when the leases were 
first issued.
55 He said that ‘it would be erroneous, after identifying the relevant 
act as the grant of a pastoral lease … to inquire whether the grant of the lease 
exhibited a clear and plain intention to extinguish native title’.
56  
 
Those who considered granting a pastoral lease extinguished native title 
proposed that ‘such a grant conferred exclusive possession of the land on the 
grantee and that entitlement to exclusive possession is inconsistent with the 
continuance of native title rights’. Justice Toohey noted: ‘Expressed with that 
generality, the proposition tends to conceal the nuances that are involved.’
57 At 
the end of his decision, he found that such an approach reduced to 
‘straightforward propositions what are in truth complex issues of law and of 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 208, 218 (Gaudron J), 182-3, 188 (Toohey J), 220, 233 (Gummow J), 279, 283-4 (Kirby 
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56 Ibid. 153 (Brennan CJ); Bartlett, above n 11, 46. 
  325fact’.
58 He also noted the Preamble to the NTA had read ‘too much’ into the 
judgements in Mabo by extending the application of inconsistency from 
freehold to ‘leasehold estates’.
59 Justice Gummow agreed. He considered ‘the 
posing of the question’ in terms of ‘whether the respective pastoral leases’ 




Chief Justice Brennan said the lessees had a ‘right of exclusive 
possession and that right was inconsistent with native title (except for non-
accessory rights, if any)’. Additionally, expressing a view on the relation of 
common law to native title, he said common law ‘could not recognise native 
title once the Crown alienated a freehold or leasehold estate under the 1910 Act’ 
of Queensland. Consequently, the common law ‘was powerless to recognise 
native title as reviving after the determination of a pastoral lease’ under the 
1910 Act.
61 Therefore, by definition this view excluded the possibility of native 
title and pastoral leases coexisting.
62  
 
The immediate issues before the Court in the Wik decision reflected a 
clash between common and modern constitutionalism. The majority focussed on 
the particulars of the case using a method associated with a case-by-case 
approach and practical reasoning as discussed in Chapter 3. The application of 
this method created space for the legal recognition of native title to coexist with 
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61 Wik, above n 4, 133; Bachelard, above n 15, 54-8. 
  326the leaseholder, that is, ‘coexistence’ conveyed a spirit of mutual recognition 
where the Indigenous culture can be recognised alongside the culture of other 
Australians. The minority, though used a method associated with modern 
constitutionalism, which embraced an a priori rule to be applied to all pastoral 
leases. This method quashed the coexistence of pastoral leases and native title. 
The minority presumed that pastoral leases created by the Crown under public 
lands legislation discontinued native title.
63 Nevertheless, the premises that 
underpinned the decision, and to which the Court majority considered it bound, 
also reflected the language of modern constitutionalism. For instance, where 
inconsistency between a pastoral lease and native title occurs, the latter would 
be extinguished. As Justice Toohey candidly observed, the appellants were 
obliged to work with the ‘language of extinguishment’, but sought to limit its 
effect.
64    
 
The reactions to Wik 
 
Political and legal factors 
 
The Howard government was elected in March 1996, nine months 
before Wik.
65 Five political and legal factors fuelled the movement to modify 
the native title legislation. One was the widely held perception that with Mabo 
the High Court had declared that the recognition of native title would have no 
impact on leasehold land. It was therefore expected that Wik would affirm this 
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  327view.
66 Following Mabo, both Labor and Coalition alike promoted this 
perception.
67 Moreover, from 1994 the Queensland government continued to 
issue leases on land that was, or had been, covered by pastoral leases, ignoring 
the ‘future act provisions’ of the NTA that obliged it to notify and seek to 
negotiate with the Indigenous groups concerned. Journalist Michael Bachelard 
estimated the leases at 800.
68 Actually, as was seen in Chapter 7, the judges set 
aside that aspect of the Meriam People’s claim concerning the impact of leases. 
Thus, when the High Court in Wik found the issuing of leases did not 
automatically extinguish native title, it left many pastoral leaseholders shocked 




  Also, pastoralists’ organisations considered the Wik solution of 
coexistence detrimental to their interests. Bachelard later wrote that the National 
Farmers Federation (NFF) ‘conducted a vicious campaign in country areas to 
convince the average farmer that extinguishment was the only reasonable 
outcome’. The leadership of the NFF had changed since the discussions over the 
1993 NTA and the new team ‘demanded nothing less than exclusive occupancy 
for pastoralists’.
70 Moreover, pastoral leases were a significant element in 
Australian land administration since over 40 per cent of the mainland was 
subject to these leases at the time of Wik.
71 
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  328A further factor that brought pressure for change was the rise of One 
Nation. The party was formed in the lead up to the March 1996 election around 
the disendorsed Liberal candidate for the seat of Oxley, Pauline Hanson. 
Hanson initially sat in the House of Representatives as an independent, but later 
established One Nation.
72 Following her election to federal parliament she 
portrayed Australia as subject to ‘a type of reverse racism ... by those who 
promote political correctness and those who control the various taxpayer funded 
‘industries’ that flourish in our society servicing Aboriginals, multiculturalists 
and a host of other minority groups’. She stated that ‘[p]resent governments are 
encouraging separatism in Australia by providing opportunities, land, moneys 
and facilities available only to Aboriginals.’ She said she was ‘fed up to the 
back teeth with the inequalities that are being promoted by the government and 
paid for by the taxpayer under the assumption that Aboriginals are the most 
disadvantaged people in Australia’. Hanson considered Australia was ‘being 
divided into black and white, and the present system encourages this’. On these 
grounds, she called for the abolition of ATSIC. ‘Reconciliation is everyone 
recognising and treating each other as equals, and everyone must be responsible 
for their own actions’, she said.
73 Hanson’s meetings attracted significant 
numbers of enthusiastic National Party supporters across the country. The 
Liberals and Nationals responded to Hanson’s rhetoric by embracing her 
concerns, whilst trying to marginalise Hanson and One Nation.
74 
 
An additional factor was the failure of the Western Australia 
government’s legal challenge to the NTA, which had important implications for 
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  329those who wanted to restrict the recognition of native title further than provided 
for by the federal legislation. If the legislation was valid, as the High Court 
found in 1995, then the only course open to those who wanted further 
restrictions was to amend it. Furthermore, while the legal challenge had failed, 
its political impact was another matter. The court case and other actions by WA 
Premier Richard Court were intended to spoil the implementation of the NTA 
and reinforce the perception that it had major practical shortcomings. For 
instance, the Western Australian government claimed, with Senator Nick 
Minchin’s encouragement, that by late 1997 a backlog of 7,000 mining titles 
had arisen, with 1,900 titles ‘caught up’ in the ‘right to negotiate’ process. This 




Lastly, a broader legitimacy for amending the NTA arose as a result of 
court clarifications about the way the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) 
administered claims. Far more claims were accepted for mediation than 
originally anticipated, which provided fuel for those who argued the system was 
clogged.
76 One case was the October 1994 Brandy decision where the High 
Court held that provisions of the RDA on the enforcement of determinations by 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) were 
invalid.
77 The decision hinged on clarifying the differences and overlap between 
judicial and administrative power. Since the NTA empowered the NNTT to 
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  330make determinations about native title on the HREOC model,
78 the latter body 
was also directly affected by this decision. Practically, it curtailed the NNTT’s 
power with the Federal Court making subsequent native title determinations.
79 
 
 Two other court cases were also relevant. The NTA specifies the form 
and the information contained in the applications lodged for a native title 
determination and the basis for its acceptance.
80 In the 1996 judgement on the 
Waanyi case the High Court found the president and registrar of the NNTT had 
acted beyond their power by rejecting a claimant’s application for a native title 
determination, which the High Court said was ‘fairly arguable’
81 A further 
matter occurred in Northern Territory v. Lane when the Federal Court declared 
once a claim was registered with the NNTT the claimant had the right to 
negotiate provisions and to notification about permissible future acts.
82 
Following the court decisions, the ALP also acknowledged the need to amend 
the NTA. In November 1995, the Keating government introduced a Native Title 
Amendment Bill into federal Parliament. However, its bill was not enacted 






                                                                                                                                    
@http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/1997-98/98bd051.htm on 22/05/2005]; NTAB 
Explanatory Memorandum, above n 6, 27-8. 
78 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 166; NTAB Explanatory Memorandum, above n 7, 27-8. 
79 Bachelard, above n 15, 16. 
80 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 62, s 63; NTAB Explanatory Memorandum, above n 7, 28. 
81 North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (Waanyi Case) (1995) CLR 595; 
NTAB Explanatory Memorandum, above n 7, 28. 
82 Northern Territory v Lane (Miriwung Gajjerong) (1995) 138 ALR 544. See NTAB 
Explanatory Memorandum, above n 7, 28. 
  331The Coalition’s initial proposals 
 
Before their campaign for election the Coalition’s comments about 
changes to native title were muted. During the 1996 federal election campaign, 
their policy included amending the NTA to ‘ensure its workability’.
84 It also 
sought an ‘early resolution’ of pastoral lease ‘uncertainties’.
85 Following the 
election, Senator Nick Minchin was appointed as parliamentary secretary for 
native title and constitutional change. Minchin conducted consultations over two 
months and produced an outline of draft legislation entitled Towards a More 
Workable Native Title Act.
86 The Coalition now shifted onto the offensive, 
promoting the necessity of significant change to the act, which culminated in the 
amendment of the NTA. It was only then that native title disappeared from the 
front pages of national newspapers. 
 
In June 1996, the Howard government introduced the Native Title 
Amendment Bill (NTAB) to parliament. The bill addressed legal matters arising 
from the court cases and also sought to convert pastoral leases from fixed term 
to perpetual. The government also wanted to broaden the range of permissible 
activities for pastoral leases, tighten the registration criteria of claims, and deny 
native title holders a right to negotiate over mineral exploration. In October 
1996, the government put forward additional amendments on the right to 
negotiate.
87 ATSIC chair Lois O’Donoghue pointed out that the NTA itself was 
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  332the product of compromise and called on the government to ‘commence serious 
negotiation’.
88 Following Wik this bill lapsed. However, the matters it raised 
were subsequently incorporated into the NTAB.
89 
 
It is noticeable that the government’s amendments did not address or 
take into account the need to recognise Indigenous land claims. Indeed, they 
were not concerned to allow space for the existence of common language 
norms, but instead were preoccupied with protecting pastoral lease holders.
90 
Moreover, as observed by ATSIC, by only enhancing the status of pastoral 




Reactions and responses to Wik  
 
Extinguishment became the watchword of the reaction to Wik as 
opposition to the recognition of native title gathered momentum. Despite Wik 
occurring just a few days before Christmas 1996, a traditionally quite political 
time, the response was swift and vocal. On Christmas Eve 1996, Prime Minister 
Howard described the High Court’s decision as ‘disappointing’. He complained 
that the judgement ‘appears to have overturned one of the fundamental 
principles on which the community’s understanding of native title had 
proceeded’. He said the decision raised ‘ambiguities and questions which must 
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  333be addressed and resolved’ and called for talks with all stakeholders.
92 In early 
January federal and state officials were told that, because of Wik, ‘more than 70 
per cent of Australian land - everything but freehold - was now open to claim’.
93   
 
Throughout January 1997 Western Australian Premier Richard Court, 
Queensland’s Rob Borbidge and Northern Territory Chief Minister Shane Stone 
made called for the extinguishment of native title. The three leaders began to act 
as a bloc and organised several meetings around the issue. On 5 February 1997, 
the three leaders released a joint discussion paper that outlined their political 
agenda. In return for extinguishment, they proposed to legislate, if necessary, to 
provide land access rights to Indigenous people, a proposal that fell well short of 
title or ownership rights. From early March 1997 their campaign was 
accompanied by an aggressive media advertising campaign funded by the NFF 
portraying Wik as a black versus white conflict.
94  
 
The three leaders garnered valuable federal support. Over the holiday 
period Acting Prime Minister, and National Party Leader Tim Fischer proposed 
legislative changes to guarantee ‘absolute certainty’ to pastoralists.
95 Later 
Fischer made his infamous promise to pastoralists to ensure the government 
delivered ‘bucketloads of extinguishment’.
96 A May 1997 public meeting in the 
Queensland town of Longreach symbolised the federal government’s agenda. 
Here Howard and Fischer committed to providing ‘certainty’ to the ‘farming 
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  334community’.
97 The modern constitutional language of extinguishment now 
dominated, and silenced any discussion of recognition.  
 
Following Wik, John Howard established a ‘Wik Taskforce’ within his 
department to provide advice and assistance for its negotiations with the states, 
territories and industry. By the end of March 1997, Howard outlined his 
legislative plan to a meeting of state and territory leaders. At this point though, 
state premiers were still holding out for full extinguishment of native title. The 
NIWG threatened to withdraw from negotiations, as the detail of the plan 
became clearer. By early April, the government released a ‘Seven Point Plan’. 
Queensland Premier Rob Borbidge still keeping up the political pressure, tabled 
legislation to allow 3000 leaseholders to convert 22 million hectares to freehold 
on 1 May 1997: this would extinguish native title. The Borbidge government 
was in a minority in the unicameral Queensland Parliament and relied on 
independent Liz Cunningham for support. However, Cunningham rejected the 
proposed legislation and the government shelved it.
98 Adding to the political 




In mid-April, the NIWG released a detailed response to the Wik decision 
called Coexistence - Negotiation and Certainty. Its position was based upon 
several key principles: non-discrimination, no extinguishment without the 
informed consent of native title holders, continuing protection of native title 
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  335provided under the NTA, and no de facto extinguishment through, for instance, 
‘unreasonable threshold’ or ‘physical connection’ tests.
100  
 
Ten Point Plan  
 
In early May 1997, the federal government released its Ten Point Plan to 
amend the NTA.
101 Four months later, the draft legislation was introduced into 
the House of Representatives.
102 Significantly, neither document addressed 
whether the proposed changes recognised and protected native title, as the NTA 
demanded.
103 By itself, this indicated that the issues were articulated almost 
exclusively in the modern constitutional language.  
 
A closer examination of the Ten Point Plan reinforces this deduction. 
Point 1 sought to validate all ‘intermediate period acts … in relation to non-
vacant crown land’. This period referred to acts between the NTA’s 
commencement of operation on 1 January 1994 and the Wik decision on 23 
December 1996. That is, compared to the 1993 legislation it sought to move the 
boundary between past and future acts up to Wik. It also sought to extinguish 
native title in all cases where governments had acted on or about land. This 
proposal went further than simply protecting pastoral leases, to cover freehold 
grants, non-mining leases and public works.
104 In most cases, the effect of 
validation was to extinguish and ‘in all cases override ... native title’.
105 In 
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  336justifying the provision the government paid no attention to the merit of 
recognising native title, instead it presumed extinguishment was the only 
justified response. 
 
Similarly, Points 2 and 4 left no space for the existence of the language 
of common constitutionalism. Point 2 sought to confirm that “‘exclusive’ 
tenures such as freehold, residential, commercial and public works” in existence 
before the operation of the NTA would ‘extinguish native title’.
106 The 
government supported this move as consistent with ‘the common law as it now 
stands’.
107 Point 4 sought to extinguish permanently any native title rights over 
‘current or former pastoral leases and any agricultural leases not covered’ under 
Point 2 ‘to the extent that those rights are inconsistent with those of the 
pastoralist’. The government wished to allow all “activities pursuant to, or 
incidental to, ‘primary production’ ”. Thus, in these circumstances there would 
be no requirement to negotiate with native title interests.
108 As noted earlier, the 
High Court majority in Wik considered that a clear and plain intention to 
extinguish native title was necessary in order for a grant to have that effect. The 
impact of short term leases, for instance, only suspended native title and revived 
it at the expiration of the lease. However, the Howard government sought to 
override these ambiguities and permanently extinguish all native title covered 
by these leases.
109 In doing so, the government dealt with these issues 
exclusively through the language of modern constitutionalism. 
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  337The future act regime of the NTA equated native title a status equivalent 
to that of freehold title holders, and therefore, native title holders could access 
certain procedural rights.
110 The Ten Point Plan sought to vary this. In Point 3 
concerning ‘government services’,
111 the government proposed that native title 
holders would have the same procedural rights ‘as other land holders’.
112 
However, Bartlett noted that the leases held by these other landholders ‘have 
always been an inferior form of tenure, much junior to freehold’.
113 This 
indicated that if this course were followed, the status of native title under future 
acts would be inferior to that of other interests.  
 
Point 9 also specified that a ‘sunset clause’ would be introduce that 
limited to six years the time ‘within which new claims would have to be made 
...’
114 The Howard government said setting such a limit would ‘encourage 
claims to be brought forward for resolution in the interests of clear and stable 
land management’.
115 However, the process of making a claim could entail 
considerable research of the pre-colonial relationship of a particular group of 
people to the land, subsequent developments and changes to the land tenure 
over that period. For these reasons, Bartlett argued the time limit potentially 
placed an ‘increased ... burden on applicants’.
116 
 
Point 5 provided statutory access rights to pastoral lease land for 
traditional Indigenous activities (eg hunting, fishing, camping, gathering and 
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  338ceremonies). However, the government proposed to make these rights 
dependent on the progress of a lodged claim and thus lasting only until claim 
determination. As Bartlett observed, this right was ‘in substitution of all native 
title rights over the land, and is subject to the rights of the lessee, or any person 
with non-native title rights’. Potentially, traditional groups could be worse off 
than before Mabo - denied the physical access to their lands and denied legal 
recognition to native title.
117 Thus, this provision entailed risks with broader 
ramifications than the recognition of native title: it raised the prospect that 
traditional practices would also be endangered.  
 
The Plan also proposed to alter significantly the right to negotiate 




•  primary production on land with non-exclusive pastoral and agricultural leases,  
estimated to cover ‘up to one half of the mainland’; 
•  reserved land, specifically including Aboriginal reserves; and, 
•  acts relating to land or waters within a town or city.  
 
Additionally, various forms of mining grants could be excluded from the 
right to negotiate if the responsible federal minister determined they were an 
‘approved exploration etc. act’. To be so determined, five conditions were to be 
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  339met, including consideration that it is ‘unlikely to have a significant impact on 
the land or waters concerned’.
119 Any renewal, regrant or extension of a right to 
mine or explore is excluded from the right to negotiate where the original 
tenement was granted after complying with the right to negotiate requirements. 








The various attitudes expressed in parliament toward the legislation will 
now be examined. The parliamentary Liberal and National parties were united 
in support of the government’s proposals. They presumed that recognition of 
native title should at best be limited to ‘vacant crown land’. Prime Minister 
Howard indicated as much when he told the House of Representatives that this 
was the ‘original basis’ of the 1993 legislation.
121 Queensland National Party 
Senator Bill O'Chee provided a similar view at the conclusion of the debate over 
the NTAB in July 1998. He said it was ‘perfectly reasonable’ for the ‘people of 
the Murray Islands’ to have their claim accepted for these were “basically 
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  340farmers who had ‘tenements’ in the legal sense of the word”. He said by 
‘occupation and usage, they were theirs, and they were perfectly capable of 
being recognised in the common law’. However, ‘the problem becomes more 
difficult when one tries to impose that concept of land ownership on the 
mainland ...’ where ‘farming of the land was not a traditional practice ... and 
where many people ... were nomadic’.
122 The government also sought to 
confirm ‘exclusive possession’ on 60,000 existing leases covering about 7.7 per 
cent of Australia.
123 Senator Minchin argued this was necessary in order to 
avoid ‘case-by-case’ court determinations.
124  
 
The government maintained that its amendment bill was respectful of 
native title. For instance, Attorney-General Daryl Williams said when 
introducing it to the House of Representatives that the government’s strategy 
was ‘built upon four key features: respect for native title; a careful balance 
among the interests of native title holders, pastoralists, resource developers and 
other Australians; reduced uncertainty; and improved workability of this vital 
piece of Australian legislation’.
125 Nevertheless, some MPs were less than 
‘respectful of native title’. Mr Wakelin, the Member for Grey in South 
Australia, described Wik as ‘disastrous’ and claimed the 1993 legislation would 
lead to a ‘shutdown of minerals and resource development’.
126 
 
The Nationals likewise supported the bill. The Leader of the National 
Party in the Senate, Queensland Senator Ron Boswell, said the bill was ‘based 
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  341on the principle of non-extinguishment and fitting within the parameters of the 
High Court Wik decision’.
127 Despite this statement, Senator Boswell clearly 
favoured extinguishing native title where pastoral leases and freehold title were 
concerned. He opposed to coexistence between pastoralists and native title 
holders; he argued  that farming families  had ‘lost what they were told they had 
in 1993 - exclusive ownership. They must now struggle with a two-title system 
on one piece of property.’
128 
 
The ALP supported the amendment of the original legislation, largely to 
address shortcomings in the existing processes. For instance, WA Member for 
Perth Stephen Smith told the House of Representatives that the original act ‘has 
seen some good outcomes and some bad outcomes’. He said the ‘worst aspect’ 
of the act had ‘seen only one out of 500 claims proceed through the tribunal’.
129  
 




•  amendments in response to the Brandy decision ‘are necessary’; 
•  a ‘workable registration’ test needs to be reintroduced following court 
decisions ‘reading it down’; 
•  provision should be made to address overlapping and multiple native title 
determination applications; and, 
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  342•  ‘Pastoralists’ rights need to be ‘particularised and confirmed’. 
 
However, the ALP considered that the NTAB ‘goes well beyond such 
requirements’ and had ‘significant moral ramifications’. They said it ‘declares 
wholesale extinguishment, with consequent massive entitlement to 




•  rode ‘roughshod over issues currently before the courts and provides 
resolutions that uniformly favour  the respondents in those cases’; 
•  denied ‘procedural fairness to indigenous people who proceed to a court 
resolution of their claims’; 
•  made ‘wholesale assertions about permanent extinguishment ...’; 
•  was ‘incompatible with both the spirit and the letter of the ...’ RDA; and, 
•  through the sunset clause, ‘in concert with the proposed blanket validation of 
so called intermediate period past acts’, has the ‘potential to deprive native title 
holders of their title rights without their knowledge and therefore their capacity 
to seek compensation’. 
 
The ALP’s approach supported common law continuing to determine 
claims for recognition of native title. They criticised the government for being 
‘prepared to accept the risk that its own legislation extinguishes native title 
where the common law provides that native title may have survived’. Thus the 
Minority Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee recommended: ‘[u]ntil 
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  343the question whether native title is permanently extinguished or merely 
suppressed is conclusively determined by the High Court, the government must 
not assume that the common law provides for more than the suppression of 
native title during the term of an inconsistent grant of interest.’
132  
 
The two Greens senators, Dee Margetts from Western Australia and Bob 
Brown from Tasmania, opposed the bill. Margetts described it as ‘an exercise in 
deception, discrimination and ultimately dispossession’.
133 Margetts said the 
debate as ‘characterised by an inability on the part of the government to 
recognise the distinct and unique relationship between Aboriginal people and 
the land’. She noted the debate had,
 134  
 
been characterised by a government that views native title purely as an 
inconvenient property right to be read down in line with the narrowest 
possible interpretation of common law. There is one word for a policy 
approach which seeks to absorb Aboriginal cultural imperatives. That 
word is ‘assimilation’ and assimilation is really only a euphemism for 
cultural genocide.  
 
Senator Brown moved that the bill be ‘withdrawn until full and adequate 
consultation has taken place’. He said the lack of consultation and negotiation 
with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and concern that the bill 
would ‘further diminish’ their ‘native title rights and … [would] greatly impede 
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  344the process of reconciliation and healing ...’
135 The motion was defeated with all 
other senators, except Senator Margetts, voting against.
136 The Greens then 
proposed to separate the bill into two, the first to deal with Indigenous land use 
agreements and procedures in response to the High Court’s Brandy decision and 
the second to deal with the rest of the issues in the bill. The aim was to allow the 
‘non-contentious’ matters to be considered quickly while a ‘proper consultation’ 
occurred on the rest.
137 During discussion of the motion, Senator Margetts ‘put 
on record’ that the NIWG ‘preferred’ that the Senate ‘reject’ the bill. However, 




The Australian Democrats modified their response to the bill as the 
debate moved from an inquiry to the committee stage. Queensland Senator John 
Woodley was a last minute inclusion on the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
following the resignation of the Australian Democrat’s parliamentary leader 
Cheryl Kernot.
139 An addendum to the committee’s report provided by the 
Australian Democrats stated that the bill’s ‘primary purpose appears to be 
establishing a framework which achieves the maximum extinguishment possible 
of native title ...’
140 At the second reading stage of the debate, Senator Woodley 
called on ‘all senators to use every ounce of intelligence, conscience and resolve 
that they have in coming weeks to change the 10-Point Plan into a plan of 
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The solutions proposed by the Greens and the Australian Democrats 
were also frequently at odds with those of the ALP. Their amendments sought to 
protect rights articulated by the NIWG. For instance, on the amendments to the 




‘let’s not have this and let’s make it clear’. The ALP says, ‘Let's take out 
the subdivision and leave it to the courts.’ The Greens, Democrats and the 
NIWG are saying ‘Let’s clarify it now to avoid the situation of future act 
provisions that we will have to come back to at some stage. Let’s clarify it 
and say that native title is not extinguished over water and airspace.’  
 
Tasmanian independent senator Brian Harradine said the legislation 
needed ‘substantial amendment before it passes this chamber’. Furthermore, he 
thought it necessary to ‘look carefully at this legislation to assess whether it 
contains any discriminatory provisions and any decisions which would 
arbitrarily extinguish native title’.
143 Senator Harradine had voted for the 1993 
legislation, but indicated he was ‘open to honourable compromise’. ‘I do hope 
that at the end of the day we come up with some piece of legislation-we have 
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  346got to have something-which, whilst it will not satisfy all the stakeholders, 
nevertheless will be a piece of legislation that they can live with’, he said.
144 
 
Commenting on the Howard government’s legislation, Hanson spoke of 
the ‘impractical, discriminatory and stupid notion of land rights, and special 
treatment for so-called minorities at the expense of everyone else’.
145 Warning 




imperative that the Australian people know and understand the 
international forces driving the Aboriginal industry and the flawed and 
divisive concept of native title. It is crucial to realise that the underlying 
blueprint and inspiration behind the creation of a separate indigenous 
nation within Canada and the impending creation of an Aboriginal nation 
within our own country is the United Nations Draft Declaration of the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
Right to negotiate 
 
The right to negotiate provisions were at the centre of the debate over 
the Howard government’s amendments. The Coalition presented these measures 
as essentially concerning procedural rights. For instance, Senator Nick Minchin 
began a contribution in December 1997 by indicating he considered that one of 
the ‘key issues that had to be addressed was: what procedural rights should 
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  347attach to the common law right to native title?’ This implied the right to 
negotiate was confined only to procedures and is not itself a question of 
substance.
147 A similar characterisation was also provided in the Commentary 
produced by the government following the adoption of the NTAB.
148  
 
Other participants considered the provisions concerned far more than 
procedures: their comments indicated that they saw it as bound up with culture 
and empowerment rather than just property. For instance, ALP deputy leader 
Gareth Evans told the House of Representatives there were ‘two very obvious 
reasons for the legitimacy’ of these provisions ‘being retained in our legislative 
package and made available on a continuing basis to people in relation to 
pastoral leases just as much as on vacant crown land’. The ‘first is that it 
amounts to a legitimate form of economic empowerment of a group of 
Australians who have been spectacularly denied respect and a capacity to 
advance themselves economically through just about the whole 200-plus years 
of Australian history’. The second reason is ‘much more hardheaded’. He 
explained that ‘if you do not allow the retention of that right to negotiate, you 
tilt out of balance the whole shape and structure of this legislation and make it 
unequivocally legislation for non-indigenous interests, legislation which does 
not protect and respect and advance the interests of indigenous people’.
149 South 
Australian ALP Senator Nick Bolkus said: ‘We are not talking about a right of 
veto; we are talking about a right that provides protection of native title as well 
as a fair process for resource development in Australia. The basis of the right is 
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  348a fair balance of interest between the need to protect native title and the culture 
that underlies that title, and to provide for compensation and the needs of 
resource developers.’
150 Additionally, the ALP argued the bill’s provisions went 
‘very much to the question of physical impact. It disregards the cultural nature 
of native title and the spiritual attachment of native titleholders to land. It is 
based on, we believe, long discredited theories of assimilation.’
151 
 
The Greens also thought that the right-to-negotiate concerned matters of 
substance and was linked to the essence of recognition. Senator Dee Margetts 
noted that the NIWG considered that a ‘proper interpretation’ of CERD and the 
RDA ‘requires that native title holders be accorded substantive and effective 
equality rather than formal equality’. Margetts went on to argue that on ‘the 
basis of that test, the right to negotiate may be a necessary element of legislation 
recognising native title, if that legislation is not to be inconsistent with the 
principles underpinning’ the RDA.
152 Margetts added that this should 
‘appropriately be seen as a recognition of the importance to native title holders 
of the power to control access to and activities on their land’.
153  
 
Australian Democrats Senator John Woodley described the provisions as 
‘recognition of the special attachment that indigenous people have to their land’. 
He observed the ‘right to negotiate is not a veto’, but ‘merely a mechanism to 
include indigenous people’. He said the ‘essence of native title, and indeed the 
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  349future act regime’ in the NTA is this ‘principle of inclusiveness’.
154 Without the 




Senator Brian Harradine also considered what was at stake was more 
than formal procedures. Specifically referring to the right to negotiate measures 
he said: ‘I have always insisted that true equality of treatment requires that the 
unique nature of native title be taken into account when governments are 
considering whether mining should be permitted on pastoral leases. The 
interests of the pastoralists and native title holders are often very different.’ 
‘Formal equality, therefore’, was not ‘sufficient’. ‘There must be essential 
equality.’ He said that the amendment he had agreed with the government to 
include in the NTA addressed the ‘state scheme’ and sought to ‘improve’ it 
through ‘certain strict criteria’.
156   
 
Senator Nick Minchin sought to present his approach to the right to 
negotiate in terms of ‘non-discrimination’. He compared and contrasted the 
1998 amendments to the 1993 legislation. With the 1993 legislation it was 
decided ‘to equate it [native title] to freehold for the purposes of a legislative 
framework’. Minchin added that in 1993 “parliament went one step further ... 
and attached a greater right than would normally attach to freehold and 
described it as ‘the right to negotiate’”.
157 Concerning ‘pastoral lease land’ 
Minchin argued native title rights ‘cannot amount to the same bundle of rights 
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  350as it can on vacant crown land or Aboriginal land’. ‘Therefore’, he said, ‘a 
different approach to procedural rights’ was ‘appropriate’ and this sought a 
‘balance between appropriate procedural processes with respect to native title 
holders and the question of mining’.
158   
 
However, those who opposed the government’s proposed changes saw 
no need to balance the right to negotiate against mining interests. Rather they 
considered the right to negotiate flowed from a requirement to recognise native 
title. That is, they saw it as linked to the convention of consent. ALP Senator 
Nick Bolkus compared the proposed amendments to the RDA and suggested 
they were contrary to the convention and left the legislation ‘open to 
constitutional challenge’.
159 Senator Margetts also referred to the RDA and the 
requirement that ‘native title holders be accorded substantive and effective 
equality rather than formal equality’. She said ‘the right to negotiate may be a 
necessary element of legislation recognising native title’.
160  
 
Another area of disagreement was the breadth of the legislation’s 
application. The Coalition wanted to limit the right to negotiate to ‘vacant 
Crown land and Aboriginal land’. The Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs Senator Herron told his colleagues the government proposed to 
‘remove the right to negotiate where it is inappropriate because of the nature of 
the rights to be granted ...’ He said this right would ‘generally remain on vacant 
crown land’, but the bill would ‘enable a State or Territory to apply its own 
regime in relation to mining’ and to other areas ‘where native title holders do 
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  351not enjoy a right to exclude others from the land or waters ...’
161 Two reasons 
were advanced as justification. One was that this was in keeping with the Mabo 
decision and the original legislation. Howard said ‘the original basis of the 
legislation was that you could only make a native title claim over vacant crown 
land’.
162 The other reason, advanced by Senator Minchin, was that a distinction 
should be made between native title on Crown land and other circumstances. In 
the former, where this could be ‘up to exclusive possession’ it would be left 
intact. Elsewhere, though, was a different matter. He considered that native title 
rights ‘are only what rights survive after you take into account of [sic] the rights 
granted to the pastoralist based on the Wik judgment’. Minchin said ‘native title 
on a pastoral lease cannot amount to the same bundle of rights as it can on 
vacant crown land or Aboriginal land. Therefore, a different approach to the 
procedural rights issue is appropriate.’
163 
 
The ALP supported the maintenance of the right to negotiate on pastoral 
leases and rejected the government’s distinction between vacant Crown land and 
pastoral leases as unimportant to its application. Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition Gareth Evans said ‘the onus must be on those who would want to 
take away the right to negotiate from those with credible common law claims to 
native title ...’ Evans observed that the right to negotiate was ‘critical ... to the 
justice and morality of this package’. He supported its retention for ‘mining on 
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  352pastoral leases’ as legislated in 1993. However, the ALP did not favour the right 
to negotiate on freehold or ‘full commercial leasehold’.
164  
 
The Greens argued that the right to negotiate should be broadly 
accessible to native title holders. Greens Senator Bob Brown said Indigenous 
people should have access to a right to negotiate on all the ‘enormous changes’ 
affecting their lives. Following the first round of the parliamentary debate, he 
described the amended bill as ‘one of dispossessing indigenous people of their 
right to negotiate about the land’. He explained that they ‘cannot negotiate in 
respect of the massive changes involving agriculture, dams, canals, the cutting 
of native vegetation and mineral exploration camps. In the off-shore region ... 
coastal indigenous people have no right to negotiate when it comes to the 
application of fishery developments, mining exploration, jetties, ports and other 
wholesale changes’.
165 This implied the Greens supported a much wider 
application of the right to negotiate than legislated in 1993. 
 
Another area of disagreement was on the origins of the right to negotiate 
provisions. The Coalition said it was solely a creation of the NTA, and had no 
basis in common law. For instance, South Australian Liberal Senator Hedley 
Chapman contended that the ‘right to negotiate was not a common law right’. 
He said it was ‘not a right enjoyed by all Australians. It is in fact a right based 
on race given by the previous government …’
166 Prominent Western Australian 
Liberal Wilson Tuckey described the provisions in the original legislation as ‘an 
invention of the Keating government’, which he said was ‘fundamental to the 
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  353opposition of most people in Australia’. He said ‘it was never a common law 
right; it could never be challenged under common law principles if this 
parliament chooses to change it’.
167 Likewise, National Party Senator Bill 




Senator Harradine also shared these views on its origins. He told the 
Senate the right to negotiate ‘enshrined’ in the NTA was ‘not a native title right’, 
but rather a ‘statutory right achieved as a consequence of ... negotiations on the 
Native Title Bill’.
169 Harradine clearly considered ‘negotiation rights’ different 
from ‘native title rights’, which are ‘common law rights’. However, he also said 
‘native title rights are worth very little without negotiation rights’.
170 That is, 




However, others argued the origins of the right to negotiate preceded the 
NTA. Senator Bolkus said it was about ‘the cultural nature of native title and the 
spiritual attachment of native title holders to land’. He considered that 
‘indigenous Australians ... got these rights through the common law’ and this 
was linked to the ‘concept of native title’.
172 Likewise Senator Woodley argued 
it was a common law right.
173  
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A rare comparison to the Northern Territory Aboriginal Land Rights 
legislation did occur, though. ALP Senator Bob Collins made the point that ‘for 
decades Aboriginal people have had a real veto’ which can ‘only be disturbed 
by ... a declaration of the Governor-General in the national interest’. He also 
noted the latter ‘had never been exercised’.
174  There were no further 
comparisons with this legislation except to offer reassurances that native title 
legislation would not provide a veto. Nor was there discussion about whether 
the right to negotiate provides a better basis to allow Aboriginal people to 
control their land. 
 
The above comments suggest that differing perspectives were articulated 
about the right to negotiate provisions. At one pole was the position expressed 
by  the Coalition representatives. They ignored the importance the right to 
negotiate provision had to culture and empowerment. Instead, they emphasised 
property rights and comparisons with other title holders. At the other pole the 
Greens, the Australian Democrats and the ALP representatives argued the right 




The first round of the Senate’s debate occurred in November and 
December 1997 when the chamber made 217 amendments to the original bill. 
The ALP and Senator Harradine joined the Coalition in support, and the Greens 
                                                 
174 Ibid. 10417 (4 December 1997).  
  355and Australian Democrats voted against the amended bill.
175 Following this 
decision, the government rejected some of the Senate’s amendments.
176 Two 
further rounds of debate occurred, in April and July 1998 because the 
government did not get a bill it deemed acceptable. On 9 April 1998, Howard 
identified the amendments with which the government disagreed, and raised 
similar objections to those made at the conclusion of the first round of the 
debate about the right to negotiate provisions, the registration test, the 
application of the RDA, and the sunset clause.
177  
 
In the first two rounds Senator Colston was absent and so Senator 
Harradine alone exercised a ‘balance of power’. If he voted with the ALP, 
Democrats and Greens he could ensure a government amendment failed. 
Following the April round, the government again rejected some of the Senate’s 
amendments
178 but support for the legislation eventuated in July 1998 when 
agreement was reached between the government and the two independent 
senators.
179 Following agreement between Senator Harradine and the 
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  356government, the legislation was reintroduced to the House of Representatives 
before being forwarded to the Senate. However, the Senate did not consider any 
amendments because the Howard-Harradine agreement was tested on a motion 
not ‘to insist on its amendments disagreed to by the House of Representatives 
and agrees to the amendments made by the House of Representatives’.
180  
 
According to Senator Faulkner, the ALP strategy over the three rounds 
of the debate was to propose amendments ‘designed to effect a real 
compromise’.
181 ALP Senator Bolkus complained there was still ‘much in the 
government’s legislation that we regard as unjust, legally uncertain and likely to 
be unworkable in practice’. But the ALP voted for the bill, because it was 
‘convinced that everyone wants this issue to be resolved as quickly as possible 
and with as much balance and certainty as possible between the competing 
interests’.
182 The ALP’s parliamentary tactics sought to maximise Senate 
support to apply leverage on the government. Hence, they supported the bill as 
amended by the Senate and voted for the amended bill in the House of 




This approach also marked a retreat from their earlier opposition to the 
Ten-Point Plan. As already noted when the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
examined native title, the ALP supported a common law determination of 
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  357claims over pastoral leases.
184 In December 1997 and April 1998, they voted in 
favour of the NTAB as amended by the Senate even though it overturned this 
provision.
185 The Deputy Leader of the Opposition Gareth Evans acknowledged 
the shift in its stance. He said on ‘the validation issue, the government got what 
it wanted with ALP support. On the issue of confirmation of past 
extinguishment, the government got everything it wanted with a couple of 
comparatively small exceptions’.
186 The ALP leader in the Senate John Faulkner 
said it considered a compromise was necessary. He said the ALP ‘could quite 
easily have adopted a destructive approach to the bill. We could have simply 
tried to vote this piece of legislation down. We have not taken that path.’ 
Rather, the ALP’s amendments were ‘designed to affect a real compromise’.
187 
The Greens and the Australian Democrats opposed the ALP’s approach. At the 
end of the first round of the debate, Senator Margetts called on the ALP and 
Senator Harradine to ‘seriously consider the implications of exposing 
indigenous land rights to this bill’.
188 
 
Australian Democrats Senator Woodley summarised the debate as a 
‘battle between the Democrats and the Greens on one side and Labor and 
Independent Senator Brian Harradine on the other, on how the Senate should 
handle the ... Ten Point Plan’.
189 The Australian Democrats and Greens were at 
odds with the ALP and the Coalition over the validation of intermediate acts - 
Point 1 of the Ten Point Plan. The intermediate period referred to the time 
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  358between the implementation of the NTA at the beginning of 1994 and continued 
until the Wik decision in December 1996. Senator Woodley said the Queensland 
Labor government had issued about 1,500 of the 2,000 ‘unlawful’ leases in this 
period, avoiding the processes of the NTA. He said this was why ‘the ALP 
supports legalising unlawful leases’ and that the differences between the ALP 
and the Coalition on this matter ‘were only a hair’s breath away’.
190  
 
Tasmanian Senator Brian Harradine was not wholly supportive of the 
government’s proposed changes to procedural rights and past acts and he also 
opposed the six-year sunset clause on the lodgement of claims.
191 He said the 
latter would likely ‘achieve the undesirable goal of propelling new claims into 
the court processes’. Harradine said ‘it would offend native title holders’ and in 
‘the name of reconciliation, I believe that is unjustifiable’. Expressing his 
passion on the matter, he said after ‘more than 200 years of dispossession, we 
would in effect be saying to indigenous people that no provision will be made to 
allow claims be submitted for mediation after an arbitrary date’.
192 
 
When the bill returned to the House of Representatives, the government 
accepted 100 amendments its senators had initiated and 25 non-government 
amendments.
193 The government reintroduced the bill to the House of 
Representatives the following March. When it moved to the Senate, the 
government threatened to call simultaneous elections for both chambers if the 
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  359Senate adopted unacceptable amendments,




The ALP’s approach in this round was probably influenced by this fear. 
The Democrats’ John Woodley told the Senate that ‘all of us were chastened 
today when we saw the indigenous people leave this parliament in tears. They 






Indigenous influence on the outcome of the amended bill was far less 
than occurred around the 1993 legislation. A feature of the Howard 
government’s approach was to exclude and marginalise their participation. The 
NIWG involved ATSIC, Native Title Representative Bodies and ‘other key 
indigenous stakeholders’ and the collaboration developed following the Howard 
government’s announcement in early 1996 that it intended to amend the 
legislation. However, the NIWG said it found it difficult to negotiate with the 
government since the latter preferred to ‘merely consult’ with them about its 
proposed changes ‘rather than negotiate’.
197  
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  360In these circumstances, the NIWG concentrated on influencing the 
senators from the ALP, Greens and the Australian Democrats. In the first two 
rounds of the debate, the latter two parties moved a number of amendments 
supported by the NIWG. At the conclusion of the second round of the debate, 
Djerrkura
198 and Geoff Clark issued a statement on behalf of ATSIC that 
described the compromise reached by the Senate as ‘unacceptable to Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people’ and ‘should be voted down’. They described 
it as ‘unfair, unjust and discriminatory’, and pointed to the ‘considerable 
extinguishment of our native title property rights in a way that goes far beyond 
the common law’.
199 Queensland Australian Democrats Senator Woodley said 
his party would not ‘support extinguishment of native title rights which may co-
exist with pastoralist rights on leasehold land’.
200 The Australian Democrats and 
the Greens had ‘co-sponsored ... the working group’s position in total’. 
Consistent with this position, both parties opposed the amended bill. Senator 
Woodley explained to the Senate that ‘it is in accordance with the wishes of 
indigenous people and in accordance with our sense of fairness, justice and 
humanity that the Australian Democrats will oppose’ the bill.
201 
 
At the conclusion of the third round of the debate, the NIWG 
complained they had ‘not been consulted in relation to the contents of the 
current Bill’ or about the final agreement. They said they ‘had not given consent 
to the Bill in any form which might be construed as sanction to its passage into 
Australian law’. Furthermore, the group insisted the amended NTA ‘can no 
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  361longer be regarded as a fair law or a law which is of benefit to the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’. The statement also said Indigenous 
‘ownership … derives from our ancient title which precedes colonisation of this 
continent and our ownership must continue, in Australian law, to be recognised 
in accordance with our indigenous affiliation with the land, waters and 
environment’.
202 They considered native title a constitutional matter and spoke 
in the language of common constitutionalism. 
 
Responding to the statement from the NIWG, Senator Minchin declared 
it an ‘extraordinary proposition ... that somehow we are meant to assume that 
legislation affecting Aboriginal people can pass this parliament only if it is 
consented to by the Indigenous Working Group’. ‘To suggest that any group 
should have any veto over legislation passed by the duly elected parliament of 
this country is quite obnoxious’, he said.
203 This confirmed that the government 
had rejected the idea of negotiation with Indigenous people, but presumed  to 




Eventually the government got the breakthrough it sought. Senator 
Harradine indicated a preparedness to break the stalemate between the two 
houses of Parliament and negotiations commenced in late June 1998 with the 
Prime Minister and the NFF. He said he wanted to ‘avert the divisive double 
dissolution race based election’ in which he believed ‘blind prejudice, 
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  362intolerance and hatred would reign’.
204 The successful outcome of the 
negotiations was finally announced on 1 July 1998.
205 Senator Harradine said 
this provided an ‘opportunity to build a national consensus over native title that 
will help to heal divisions and to build reconciliation’.
206 The impact of their 
agreement was to deliver the votes of Harradine and Colston to the government, 
thus ensuring a majority of 39 votes in the Senate. Eighty-eight amendments 
were agreed to,
207 including redefining the relationship between the RDA and 
the NTA, changes to the impact of past acts on native title, primary production, 
the right to negotiate provisions and the registration test.
208 
 
The bill was revived in the House of Representatives and the 
amendments agreed to on 3 July 1998. The ALP voted against the proposal.
209 
When this version of the bill was introduced to the Senate, the Special Minister 
of State Senator Minchin moved that ‘the committee does not insist upon its 
amendments disagreed to in the House and agrees to the amendments made by 
the House’.
210 Since no further amendment process was possible, the debate 
between 6 and 8 July 1998 was considerably shorter than with the two earlier 
rounds.
211 The Greens and the Australian Democrats opposed the bill, as did the 
ALP. In the case of the ALP, this was a marked change from their approach to 
the earlier rounds. The Senate Leader of the Opposition Senator John Faulkner 
                                                                                                                                    
203 Ibid. 5183 (7 July 1998).  
204 Ibid. 4961 (6 July 1998).  
205 Richard McGregor, ‘Howard claims Wik victory’, The Australian 2 July 1998, 1.  
206 Senate Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 4961 (6 July 1998). 
207 Ibid. 5196 (8 July 1998).  
208 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 6026-42 (3 July 1998). 
209 Ibid. 6025-6, 6063 (3 July 1998).  
210 Senate Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 4986 (6 July 1998). 
211 Parliament of Australia, Senate Procedural Information Bulletin # 126, Available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/proc_bul/bull_126.htm (Accessed 13/08/1998), 2. 
  363said that in the previous two rounds their amendments produced ‘a more 
acceptable piece of legislation that at least had some chance of survival in the 
High Court’. However, Faulkner said the legislation as agreed between Senator 
Harradine and Howard contained ‘elements that will lead to its collapse’.
212  
 
In pursuing its amendments, the government was determined to change 
the right to negotiate. Howard praised the agreement with Senator Harradine as 
a state-based regime that provided ‘equivalent procedural treatment to both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians’. He said this restored the ‘principle 
that all Australians should be equal before the law’ and rebutted ‘special 
rights’.
213 Howard used the language of modern constitutionalism to exclude 
culture from the notion of equality. 
 
The ALP, Greens and Australian Democrats understood the outcome 
differently. In attempting to amend the bill the three parties said that 
‘indigenous people were not consulted in the recent negotiations on the bill and 
notes ... that indigenous people do not consent to the bill in its current form and 
have not endorsed the bill in any previous form’. This amendment was defeated 
when the Coalition combined with senators Harradine and Colston to vote it 
down.
214 The parliamentary process was formally completed on 15 July 1998 
when the House of Representatives received a message indicating the Senate 
had agreed to its amendments.
215 Senator Harradine argued the amendments to 
the NTAB had ‘radically altered’ the ‘purpose and effect of the bill’. He claimed 
                                                 
212 Senate Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 4959 (6 July 1998). 
213 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 6042 (3 July 1998). 
214 Senate Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 5195, 5198 (8 July 1998). 
215 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 6151 (15 July 1998). 
  364the legislation upheld and preserved the ‘common law native title rights of 
indigenous people and provides the mechanism for the practical realisation, the 
efficient realisation of those rights in a way that also provides fairness and 
certainty to other stakeholders, particularly for the miners and the 
pastoralists’.
216 He said the amended bill rather than extinguishing native title 
over pastoral leases simply ‘suspends them until the lease ceases’.
217   
 
While many amendments were made to the original bill the government 
succeeded in getting the substance of its Ten Point Plan adopted. Significant 
changes were made to: 
 
•  Point 6, with restrictions on native title access to, and modifications to, right to 
negotiate provisions concerning mining;
218 
•  Point 7, with restrictions on native title access to, and modifications to, right to 
negotiate provisions concerning commercial development; and,
219  
•  Point 9, with partial amendments including the abandonment of the sunset 





                                                 
216 Senate Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 5195 (8 July 1998). See also Brian Harradine, ‘Wik 
can be made to work’, The Australian 9 July 1998, 11. 
217 Senate Weekly Hansard No 10, 1998, 5196 (8 July 1998). 
218 NTAB Explanatory Memorandum, above note 7, 20-1; Native Title Act 1993 [Consolidated 
1998] (Cth), Part 2, Division 3, Subdivision P, [88-126]; Part 2, Division 3, S 24IC [67-9]; Part 
7, S 190B-C [240-244]. 
219 NTAB Explanatory Memorandum, above note 7, 20-1; Native Title Act 1993 [Consolidated 
1998] (Cth), Part 2, Division 3, S 24GE [64-5]; Part 2, Division 3, Subdivision J, [70-3]; Part 2, 
Division 3, Subdivision P, [88-126]; Part 7, S 190B-C [240-244]. 
  365Conclusions 
 
  This chapter has shown that the outcome of this phase of the debate was 
that the recognition of native title was further restricted. The possibility that 
native title could coexist with pastoral leases was thrown overboard. Unlike the 
1993 debate, the government spoke exclusively in the language of modern 
constitutionalism. Their concern was with the impact of the legislation upon 
miners and pastoralists. No acknowledgement was made of the common 
conventions or the distinct culture of Indigenous people. It was presumed 
appropriate for the Crown to extinguish native title without the consent of the 
title holder. However, the argument over the right to negotiate provisions did 
highlight differences not aired in the 1993 debate. The Howard government’s 
view that it could amend the legislation without seeking the agreement of 
Indigenous people brings into starker relief its differences with the other parties. 
The Howard government spoke of the right to negotiate provisions in modern 
constitutional terms as though it did not concern the distinct culture of 
Indigenous people. While the ALP, Greens and Australian Democrats 
recognised the right to negotiate provisions were linked to culture and 
empowerment, using the language of common constitutionalism, they did not 
explicitly link their provision to the convention of consent.   
 
  If the constitutional language employed to consider the native title 
claims was increasingly framed in terms of modern constitutionalism, did 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples concur? As was discussed in 
                                                                                                                                    
220 NTAB Explanatory Memorandum, above note 7, 22; Native Title Act 1993 [Consolidated 
1998] (Cth), Part 7, S 190B-C [240-244]. 
  366Chapter 2, an assumption unpinning modern constitutionalism is its universal 
applicability. But an inquiry into constitutional languages in the Mabo debate 
cannot take this for granted. An explicit study of the language employed by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to articulate their claims is 
therefore required. This crucial aspect will be the subject that is addressed next. 
  367    
  368Chapter 10:  
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples and Mabo 
 
 
In Chapter 1 the different claims that were advanced by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples following Mabo were identified: native title, a 
treaty or agreement, a rewriting of the Constitution’s preamble, the removal of s 
25 of the Constitution, special seats in parliament, and an apology and 
compensation for the unjust separation of children from their parents. This 
chapter will concentrate on showing that the language employed by Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples around Mabo exhibited features of common 
constitutionalism. Another task undertaken here is to specifically examine the 
attitudes of Indigenous people to extinguishment and recognition. This will help 
in contrasting their stance with the positions adopted by the High Court and the 
federal government. 
 
This chapter will begin by examining the views expressed by the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) about Mabo and the 
views expressed several years after the decision around a treaty.
1 This will be 
                                                 
1 While the Howard Government’s April 2004 decision to abolish ATSIC has far-reaching 
consequences for the self-determination of Indigenous peoples in Australia, it is outside the 
scope of this thesis. When he announced that his government would introduce legislation to 
abolish ATSIC Prime Minister Howard stated that ‘We believe very strongly that the 
experiment in separate representation, elected representation, for indigenous people has been a 
failure’. The programs managed by ATSIC were to be ‘mainstreamed’. The government also 
announced that it would ‘appoint a group of distinguished indigenous people to advise the 
Government ... in relation to aboriginal affairs’.  See The Hon John Howard, Prime Minister, 
  369followed by an examination of the two meetings held in 1993, the first being the 
Red Centre meeting in April that year resulting in the Aboriginal Peace Plan.
2 
The second meeting was held in Eva Valley in the Northern Territory in early 
August and was attended by 400 people to ‘see if it was possible to adopt a 
common Aboriginal position on native title’.
3 The Eva Valley Statement drawn 
up at the meeting was subsequently presented to the Prime Minister.
4 Then the 
views expressed by four prominent Indigenous leaders will be considered: Noel 
Pearson, Patrick Dodson, Michael Dodson and Larissa Behrendt. During 1993, 
Pearson was the director of the Cape York Land Council, and continues to be 
associated with this region located in the far north of Queensland.
5 Patrick 
Dodson is a Yawuru man from Broome, Western Australia. He was the former 
director of the Central Lands Council and from 1991 was the inaugural 
chairperson of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (the Council).
6 His 
brother Michael Dodson was the Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Social 
Justice Commissioner and responsible for monitoring the operations of the 
Native Title Act  1993  (Cth).
7 Larissa Behrendt is Professor of Law and 
Indigenous Studies and Director of the Jumbunna Indigenous House of Learning 
at the University of Technology, Sydney.
8 
                                                                                                                                    
Joint Press Conference with Senator Amanda Vanstone, 15 April 2004. 
[Accessed@http://www.pm.gov.au/news/Interviews/Interview795.html on 15 April 2004]. An 
examination of the impact of this decision on the post-Mabo developments is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
2 Robert Tickner, Taking a stand, (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 113. 
3 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Reconciliation: Australia’s challenge, Final report to 
the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament, (Canberra: 2000), Chapter 4. (Accessed 
19/01/2004 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/2000/16). 
4 Ticker, above n 2, 153-154. 
5 Speeches and articles by Pearson are available at http://www.capeyorkpartnerships.com.  
6 Tickner, above n 2, 39. 
7 See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), 1 (“Native 
Title Report – January – June 1994”).  
8 See Larissa Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice: indigenous rights and Australia’s future, 
(Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 2003), cover. 
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Literature for this chapter comes from a variety of sources. In No 
ordinary judgment Nonie Sharp considered the significance of ‘native title in 
the reshaping of Australian identity’.
9 The year after the High Court’s decision, 
ATSIC produced an assessment of the judgement.
10 Following the decision of 
the Howard government to amend native title legislation, in 1997 ATSIC 
responded to the proposals.
11 About a year later, when the Native Title 
Amendment Bill
12 was introduced to Parliament ATSIC produced an 
assessment of the bill.
13 The final ATSIC document referred to here is Treaty: 
let’s get it right!
14 This was published around the time the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation was finalising its work in 2001. The Aboriginal 
Peace Plan and the Eva Valley Statement are taken as reprinted in Murray Goot 
and Tim Rowse’s Make a better offer: the politics of Mabo.
15 
 
In discussing the ideas expressed by the four Indigenous leaders a 
variety of presentations, talks, reports and books have been drawn on. Four talks 
and two articles written by Noel Pearson are discussed. In 2002, he delivered 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 11 in Nonie Sharp, No ordinary judgment: Mabo, the Murray Islanders’ land 
case, (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Studies, 1996), 207-232. 
10 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Current Issues: The MABO judgement, 
(Canberra: Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1993). 
11 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Proposed Amendments to the Native Title 
Act 1993, (Canberra: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1996).  
12 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth). 
13 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 - Issues 
for Indigenous Peoples, (Canberra: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1997). 
14 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Treaty: let’s get it right!, (Canberra: 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 2001) (“Treaty: let’s get it right!”). 
15 ‘The Aboriginal Peace Plan’, reprinted in Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (Eds), Make a better 
offer: the politics of Mabo, (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press Australia Ltd, 1994), 218-9 (“The 
Aboriginal Peace Plan”); ‘Eva Valley Statement’, reprinted in ibid. 233-4 (“Eva Valley 
Statement”).  
  371the fifth Annual Hawke Lecture at Adelaide Town Hall.
16 H e  a l s o  g a v e  a  
presentation to the University of Sydney’s Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 
in March 1994.
17 Two speeches that Pearson gave in 2003 are also referred to 
here. The first in June was at the Conference of the Native Title Representative 
Bodies;
18 the second to the High Court Centenary Conference on native title.
19 
Two articles are also examined, the first being an intervention in the native title 
debate in 1993;
20 the second following the High Court’s decision on the 
Miriuwung-Gajerrong claim.
21 Two speeches given by Patrick Dodson are 
discussed. The first, titled ‘Reconciliation at the crossroads’ was given at the 
National Press Club in April 1996.
22 The second was given in Canberra around 
four years later as part of the Wentworth Lecture series.
23 The first piece of 
material examined from Michael Dodson is his first report as Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner and published a year after 
the Mabo decision.
24 The following year he delivered the Ninth Frank Archibald 
                                                 
16 Noel Pearson, Fifth Annual Hawke Lecture, Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Centre, University 
of South Australia, 3 November 2002. [Accessed  www.capeyorkpartnerships.com, 
09/01/2006].  
17 Noel Pearson, ‘From remnant title to social justice’ in Goot and Rowse, above n 15, 179-184.  
18 Noel Pearson, Where we’ve come from and where we’re at with the opportunity that is Koiki 
Mabo’s legacy to Australia, Mabo Lecture, Alice Springs, 3 June 2003. [Accessed 
www.capeyorkpartnerships.com, 03/11/2005]. 
19 Noel Pearson, Land is susceptible of ownership, High Court Centenary Conference Canberra 
9-11 October 2003. [Accessed www.capeyorkpartnerships.com, 03/11/2005].  
20 Noel Pearson, ‘Law must dig deeper to find land rights’, The Australian 8 June 1993, 11. 
21 Noel Pearson, ‘Native Title’s Days in the Sun are Over’, The Age 28 August 2002. [Accessed 
www.capeyorkpartnerships.com, 09/01/2006].  
22 Patrick Dodson, Reconciliation at the crossroads, Address to the National Press Club, April 
1996, (Canberra: Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 1996) (“Reconciliation at the 
crossroads”). 
23 Patrick Dodson, ‘Beyond the Mourning Gate – Dealing with Unfinished Business’, The 
Wentworth Lecture 12 May 2000, (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Studies, 2000).  
24 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, First Report 1993, 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993) (“First Report 1993”).  
  372Memorial Lecture at the University of New England, Armadale.
25 In 1995, his 
second report as Commissioner was produced and covered the first six months 
of the implementation of the Native Title Act.
26 In Achieving Social Justice: 
indigenous rights and Australia’s future Larissa Behrendt outlined the case for 
achieving Indigenous social justice, considering the ‘seemingly paradoxical 
claims’ of Aboriginal people seeking ‘equality within the Australian state’ and 
‘defining themselves as a separate entity’.
27 
 
Lastly, a number of other sources assist in providing context and 
analysis for the events discussed. Robert Tickner’s Taking a stand relates his 
years as a minister in the Keating Government and focuses on ‘six crowded 
years in the struggle for the right of the first Australians’.
28 A Discussion Paper 
prepared by the Keating Government on the Mabo decision includes a number 
of references to the views of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
representatives.
29 Another source of information about Indigenous responses is 
provided in Murray Goot & Tim Rowse’s Make a better offer: the politics of 
Mabo.
30 A piece by Tim Rowse considered the ‘principles of Aboriginal 
pragmatism’.
31 Also drawn on is John Gardiner-Garden’s chronology of the 
                                                 
25 Michael Dodson, Cultural Rights and Educational Responsibilities, The Ninth Frank 
Archibald Memorial Lecture, September 1994, (Armadale: University of New England, 1994) 
(“Cultural Rights”). 
26 Native Title Report – January – June 1994, above n 6.  
27 Behrendt, above n 8, 14. 
28 Tickner, above n 2.  
29 Commonwealth Government, Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, Discussion 
Paper, June 1993, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993) (“Mabo: The 
High Court Decision on Native Title”). 
30 Goot and Rowse (Eds), above n 15.  
31 Tim Rowse, ‘The principles of Aboriginal pragmatism’ in ibid. 185-202. 






Considering the attitude of ATSIC to Mabo, it is noted that this body 
was established by federal legislation in 1990, and came into existence in March 
that year. ATSIC was empowered ‘to make executive budgetary and policy 
decisions about expenditure in the indigenous affairs budget’,
33 and self-
determination.
34 Reflecting the self-identification of the Indigenous peoples 
throughout Australia the organisation’s name refers to Aboriginal peoples living 
on the mainland and Tasmania and the Torres Strait Islander peoples, who 
democratically elected representatives to its regional councils.
35 This provided 
the organisation’s authority in post-Mabo negotiations.  
 
A proposal made by ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
representatives’ to the federal government following Mabo sought to establish a 
basis for mutual recognition. It sought to involve ‘Commonwealth and 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representatives’ in a ‘Settlement Process’ 
where they would ‘determine how all matters concerning Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people’s interests and rights will be resolved to enhance self 
                                                 
32 John Gardiner-Garden, ‘The Mabo debate - A chronology’ in Department of the 
Parliamentary Library, Mabo Papers, Parliamentary Research Service Subject Collection No. 1, 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994).  
33 Tickner, above n 2, 49 
34 Ibid. 48.  
35 Ibid. 51-2. 
  374determination’ and ‘to ensure’ that Indigenous people ‘can take responsibility 
for their own future’.
36  
 
Framed in the common constitutional language, issues included:
37 
 
•  funding; 
•  new Land Councils where none exist at present; 
•  a land acquisition fund; 
•  compensation, financial or otherwise; 
•  ownership and management of resources; 
•  hunting, fishing and gathering rights; 
•  ownership and control of cultural and intellectual property rights and human 
remains; 
•  inter-relationship with existing land rights legislation; 
•  new constitutional arrangements; 
•  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’s self-government; and, 
•  resolution of land alienations since 1975.  
 
ATSIC embarked on a campaign for a treaty from around the time of the 
mass rallies from May 2000. The following year it produced a booklet on the 
subject in which ATSIC’s chair Geoff Clark explained that a ‘treaty would 
fundamentally change the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
                                                 
36 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 29, 95.  
37 Ibid. 95-96. 
  375Islander peoples and non-Indigenous Australians’.
38 It was stated that ATSIC 
was ‘not negotiating a treaty’, but rather ‘promoting discussion about a treaty – 
its benefits, its difficulties, its form and its content’.
39 
 
The treaty proposal based on a convention of consent exercised between 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and other Australians reflects the 
language of common constitutionalism. Making a point similar to the one made 
by Tully in Strange multiplicity about the North American treaties




when these treaty documents were negotiated, Indigenous peoples were 
recognised as separate and sovereign peoples who had their own laws, and 
were capable as nations and tribes of forming and breaking their own 
alliances with others (including the colonial powers).    
 
The booklet acknowledged that it used the term ‘treaty’ in a different 
way to that specified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which defines a treaty in terms of ‘two or more nation states … imposing 
binding obligations on themselves and governed by international law’.
42 The 
booklet, however, argued that while ‘treaty’ is ‘most often used in the 
international law context, it can also be used to describe any agreement or 
contract between parties’.
43  
                                                 
38 Geoff Clark ‘Introduction’ in Treaty: let’s get it right!, above n 14, 1. 
39 Treaty: let’s get it right!, ibid. 24. 
40 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge: Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 117-124. 
41 Treaty: let’s get it right!,  above n 14, 3. 
42 Id.  
43 Ibid. 4.  
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The language of common constitutionalism is also used to highlight the 
lack of consent by the Indigenous peoples to Britain’s acquisition of Australia. 
The booklet states: ‘Australia has never formally recognised the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples by way of a treaty or treaties’. Despite 
instructions to Captain Cook that consent be sought, Cook ‘disregarded his 
official instructions’ and ‘did not take possession of Australia with the consent 
of Indigenous peoples’.
44 The booklet also implied that the convention of 
consent was ignored when the Howard government amended the native title 
legislation.
45 Discussing the possibility that a treaty ‘may take the form of 
legislation’ the booklet’s writers expressed concern that a ‘treaty can be 
amended by further legislation’. While ‘this may provide flexibility when new 
issues arise … it also means that some provisions can be … overridden by the 
Government without the support of the Indigenous peoples’. The authors 
complained that the NTA  was ‘amended in 1998 with no consultation with 
Indigenous peoples’ and that these amendments were ‘later considered 




The booklet argued for recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples’ cultures. It said a treaty might be ‘one way to address the 
original failure to recognise the presence of Indigenous peoples’ to recognise 
‘past injustices’ and provide ‘legal recognition of Indigenous rights’. 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 6.  
45 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth). 
46 Treaty: let’s get it right!, above n 14, 19. 
  377Additionally, it ‘may also affirm and protect Indigenous rights’, something the 
‘Constitution has not yet done’.
47 
 
The treaty booklet also briefly referred to Aboriginal sovereignty. It 
described this as ‘the ability of Indigenous peoples to act as a nation’ including 
‘the ability to be self-determining and to exercise self-government’. The booklet 
stated: ‘Even though Australian governments and courts have never recognised 
Indigenous sovereignty, many Indigenous peoples believe that sovereignty has 




Aboriginal Peace Plan 
 
Before the introduction of native title legislation to federal parliament in 
April 1993 Aboriginal groups met in Alice Springs to produce a statement of 
principles known as the Red Centre Statement. A delegation from this meeting 
then drew up an ‘Aboriginal Peace Plan’ and presented this to a meeting with 
the Mabo Ministerial Committee, the body that organised the Keating 
Government’s consultations with other interests. The Plan ‘joined together a 
special relationship with land and the right to legal recognition of native title’.
49 
The members of the Mabo Ministerial Committee included the Prime Minister 
and ‘other key ministers’.
50 Participants in the meeting with the Mabo 
Ministerial Committee included Noel Pearson, representing the Cape York Land 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 13-14.  
48 Ibid. 21.  
49 Sharp, above n 9, 219.  
50 Tickner, above n 2, 92. 
  378Council, Patrick Dodson, Wenten Rubuntja from the Council for Aboriginal 




  The Peace Plan contained an aspect that at first glance reflects the 
language of modern constitutionalism: the push for ‘[o]ver-riding 
Commonwealth legislation’.
52 Legislative solutions form part of the language of 
modern constitutionalism because parliaments form part of modern government: 
‘a specific set of European institutions’ are associated with the modern 
constitution. Tully says these include ‘representative government, separation of 
powers, the rule of law, individual liberty, standing armies and a public 
sphere’.
53 Furthermore, legislative solutions presume an underlying unity 
because they are enacted on behalf of all people within a country. Because a 
government is not bound to directly consult with Indigenous peoples about 
legislation affecting them, legislative solutions do not usually provide a basis for 
mutual recognition.  
 
However, since the Commonwealth is a signatory to a number of 
international covenants including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the international 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
54 calls on 
it to exercise its power under these covenants reflect human rights and the 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 112-113; see also Gardiner-Garden, above n 32, 153-4. 
52 The Aboriginal Peace Plan, above n 15, 218.  
53 Tully, above n 40, 67-8. 
54 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, above n 7, 12.  
  379language of common constitutionalism. Clearly, a number of prominent 
Indigenous people argued the Australian government had obligations under 
these conventions. For instance, the first Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner, Michael Dodson, argued these ‘international 
instruments are relevant to native title in that they protect property against 
arbitrary and discriminatory interference and they provide rights to the free 
exercises of culture’. He also said the ‘international community’ has an 
‘expectation … that Australia will comply with these standards in its treatment 
of the property rights of Indigenous peoples’.
55   
 
One particular element that deals with the legislation clearly associates 
the Red Centre Statement with the language of common constitutionalism. The 
Statement proposed that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
representatives were to ‘participate as members of the drafting team for all 
legislation’.
56 If implemented such an approach would overcome the problems 
with the modern constitutional view that legislation can be initiated without 
respect for the distinct cultures of Indigenous peoples.  
 
This point was reinforced sharply at the meeting with the Mabo 
Ministerial Committee when the late Rob Riley cautioned the Prime Minister:
57 
 
don’t exclude us from the process. Don’t attempt to do this without our 
involvement. Please don’t dismiss us. If you do so you can forget about 
reconciliation. If we have to we will wind people up. We will hit the 
                                                 
55 Id.  
56 The Aboriginal Peace Plan, above n 15, 219. 
57 Rob Riley cited by Ticker, above n 2, 114.  
  380streets. We will go to international forums. The one thing you, your 
colleagues, the miners, pastoralists, and the Australian people have to 
accept is that the law of the land has changed and we are going to exercise 
our rights. 
 
The Peace Plan also had many elements readily associated with the 
common constitutional language. The name itself implies a ‘Settlement Process’ 
and that the parties to a resolution are the First Peoples of the country and other 
Australians. The meeting said legislation should provide for a ‘Longer Term 
Settlement Process for [the] benefit of all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples’ and called for negotiations with ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples towards Constitutional acknowledgment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander rights’. Furthermore, the convention of consent was advanced in the 




Eva Valley Statement 
 
Another national meeting of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples was held at Eva Valley in the Northern Territory on the 3
 and 4 August 
1993 to ‘formulate a response to the High Court decision on Native Title’.
59 
Prior to this meeting, the Keating government had released its Discussion 
Paper
60 and A Framework of Principles to ‘guide’ its policy response.
61 
                                                 
58 The Aboriginal Peace Plan, above n 15, 218. 
59 Eva Valley Statement, above n 15, 233.  
60 See Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 29.  
61 ‘A Framework of Principles’ reprinted in ibid. 98-106. 
  381Although, the draft legislation had not been released,
62 by this time state 
governments, including the Goss Labor government in Queensland, had 
formally met with the federal government at a June 1993 meeting of the Council 
of Australian Governments. The state governments were ‘unanimously 




The Eva Valley meeting rejected the approach taken by the Keating 
government up to that point of seeking agreement from the state governments 
(and the exclusion of Indigenous people from the State/Commonwealth 
dialogue). In other words, the meeting did not believe that native title should be 
addressed via the modern constitutional language. Instead, they proposed a form 
of mutual recognition where the federal government would reach agreement 
about the legislation with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. It 
sought a negotiating process to achieve a ‘lasting settlement with and for the 
benefit of all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’.
64 In preparation for 
this a ‘representative body’ was nominated to ‘put forward our position … 
including the necessity to consult and negotiate with Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Peoples about these principles’.
65 
 
Consent underpinned the Red Centre Statement and indicated the 
support of participants for the common constitutional convention of consent. It 
stated that the government should only move on native title with the ‘support of 
                                                 
62 An outline of the legislation was released on 2 September 1993. See Ticker, above n 2, xxii.   
63 Ibid. 127-128.  
64 Eva Valley Statement, above n 15, 233.  
65 Ibid. 234.  
  382Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ and that the ‘development of any 
legislation’ would ‘need the full and free participation and consent of those 
People concerned’.
66   
 
The Statement also contained a vision that reflected the common law 
convention of continuity. In the second principle it called on the Keating 
government to ‘acknowledge that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Title 
cannot be extinguished by grants of any interest’. Furthermore, there should be 
recognition and protection of ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Rights’.
67 
The Statement called on the moral authority of human rights with the first dot 
point a call on the federal government to ‘honour its obligation under 
International Human Rights Instruments and International Law’.
68  
 




Examining the views articulated by prominent Indigenous leaders, this 
begins by considering those of Noel Pearson. Pearson discussed Mabo in the 
human rights language. He rejected the view that the decision was largely one of 
‘land management’ and argued it should be ‘treated as a question of indigenous 
human rights’. It should also be ‘located within concepts … being developed 
internationally’, and pointed to the ‘courts and governments in Canada, the 
United States and New Zealand’. Seen through this language it followed that the 
                                                 
66 Id; Sharp, above n 9, 221-3. 
67 Ibid. 233.  
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  383federal government should ‘take primary responsibility’ because this was 
‘required’ by Australia’s ‘international treaty obligations and the responsibility 
it assumed with the 1967 constitutional referendum to make laws with respect to 
Aboriginal people’. Pearson said ‘Aboriginal people will take significant 
account of the standards applied to indigenous people in those countries where 
recognition of aboriginal title has a much stronger history’.
69  
 
Pearson also embraced concepts from the common law language. In 
discussing the recognition of Aboriginal customary law, he noted the Australian 
Law Reform Commission ‘back in 1986 recommended a whole range of 
proposals for the recognition of customary laws’. Pearson argued one of the 
implications of Mabo was that Aboriginal law and customs had become ‘a 
source of law in this country’. Since ‘native title arises out of Aboriginal law 
and custom’ it also dictated the ‘way people will be allowed to conduct 
themselves on the land’. Even if the High Court determined that the Crown has 
sovereignty over the whole of Australia, he said ‘there remained an ‘inherent 
right to jurisdiction because our laws constitute our title and also constitute the 
society – whose title it is’.
70  
 
Pearson also discussed sovereignty and Mabo. In 1994 he said that 
‘Aboriginal people, as far as I have heard them, have never conceded 
sovereignty, it’s still very much part of the Aboriginal political agenda at a 
philosophical level’.
71 He noted though that ‘Mabo  effectively dismisses 
                                                 
69 Pearson, ‘Law must dig deeper to find land rights’, The Australian 8 June 1993, 11. 
70 Noel Pearson, ‘From remnant title to social justice’ in Goot and Rowse, above n 15, 181-182. 
71 Ibid. 183.  
  384Aboriginal sovereignty’. That is, Aboriginal claims are framed in a moral 
language that has not yet been heard by ‘most other Australians’.
72 
 
Pearson was mindful of the language that Indigenous people used around 
Mabo and that political considerations influence when and how they are 
advanced. In response to the thesis advanced by the historian Henry Reynolds
73 
that ‘the land rights cause has been weakened by conflating sovereignty with 
land ownership’, Pearson said it is claimed ‘that a consequence of recognising 
Aboriginal land ownership is the creation of black states and apartheid and 
ceding sovereignty back to Aboriginal people’. He said that he was ‘concerned 
… after Mabo … that our opponents would conflate sovereignty with land 
ownership and so force us to bat not only against the opposition to us having 
land title but also against the spectre of black nations’.
74 
 
Pearson cautioned about the timing that ideas associated with the 
common law language were placed on the political agenda occurred. He said 
that ‘to extract the best result from the [Mabo] decision – in terms of putting 
land under people’s feet – we needed to think about confining our agenda, at 
this stage, to land ownership’.
75 That is, he acknowledged that the language 
articulated by Indigenous people was not yet on the agenda and had to 
concentrate on the key aspect that is being recognised – native title. He was 
mindful of the dominant constitutional language: ‘I copped some flak for 
                                                 
72 Id. Italics in original.  
73 See Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal sovereignty: reflections on race, state and nation, (St 
Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996). 
74 Noel Pearson, ‘From remnant title to social justice’ in Goot and Rowse, above n 15, 183-184.  
75 Ibid. 184.  
  385advocating that we get land as part of our citizenship of Australia’, he said.
76 He 
clearly placed Mabo into a longer-term philosophical agenda when he said that 
the ‘more difficult questions of self–government and jurisdictional rights – 




Pearson also made two points about the failure of the colonisers to 
respect the language of common law. Drawing on the work of Henry Reynolds 
he observed that ‘there’s very strong evidence of recognition of Aboriginal title 
during the early nineteenth century’. ‘Since then there’s been a deliberate 
obfuscation of English law in this country – a denial of the very law that the 
settlers were supposed to have brought with them on January 26, 1788 – that is, 
the English common law’s respect for Aboriginal title.’ He said the ‘denial of 
that law and the failure to get colonial society to take cognisance of the 
instructions being given from the Colonial Office to the settlers out here were 
betrayals of Aboriginal people. English people betrayed Aboriginal people and 
abandoned respect for their own law in favour of frontier violence and the 





Patrick Dodson discussed continuity, a convention of the language of 
common law. In a speech delivered to the National Press Club in April 1996 he 
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  386told ‘a story to draw a picture’. He explained his grandfather had ‘taught me 
how to think about relationships by showing me places’.
79 Dodson related that:
80 
 
 He showed me where the creeks and rivers swirl into the sea. The fresh 
water meet the salt, the different worlds of ocean and river are mixing 
together. He showed me the foam and the turbulence, pointed to the 
eddies, and swirling mud, the colours intermingling. And he showed me 
where it was always good to put a line into the water and wait for a feed. 
 
The river is the river and the sea is the sea. Salt water and fresh, two 
separate domains. Each has its own complex patterns, origins, stories. 
Even though they come together they will exist in their own right. 
My hopes for reconciliation are like that. 
 
His view was that Aboriginal cultures should be able to continue and not 
be discontinued by colonisation. Those from different cultures and backgrounds 
could achieve reconciliation. Those coming from far away across the sea over 
the past two hundred or so years could reconcile with the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples who were the ‘original inhabitants of this vast continent’ 
with traditions built up over tens of thousands of years.
81 Later on in the same 
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  387Dodson embraced concepts from the language of common law and like 
Tully considered constitutionalism needed to be conceived in a way to 
accommodate the claims of Indigenous people: ‘We need to think through ways 
to accommodate the rights of indigenous people in Australian law and to make 
the conceptual link required to change the way decisions are made and business 
is done.’
83 He said Mabo would ‘fundamentally change Australia’. ‘Mabo put 




Dodson outlined what an accommodation would entail:
85   
 
Above all it must mean some form of agreement that deals with the 
legacies of our history, provides justice for all, and takes us forward as a 
nation. In the words of our council’s [Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation] vision we should walk together towards a united Australia 
which respects this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for all.  
 
Dodson emphasised that dialogue was needed to move things forward. 
While he noted that ‘our media, our constitution, our courts, our parliaments, 
our laws, serve most Australians fairly well’ he said they did not serve 
Indigenous people well: ‘All these national institutions would better serve 
indigenous people and the process of reconciliation, and the shaping of our 
nation, if we created more effective channels for their voices to be heard.’ He 
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  388said there needed to be ‘more talking with, and less talking about, Aboriginal 
people in all these forums. More sitting down together and less shutting out.’
86 
Dodson emphasised the methods the need for ‘communication, mediation and 
negotiation’, so ‘common ground’ could be found to build agreements and 





Michael Dodson was appointed as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner by the Keating government in 1993. He too used 
concepts from the common law language. In his first report he posed a question 
‘never been put to our people: Do you consent?’ He commented: ‘Ironically the 
likelihood of an affirmative answer is directly proportional to the faith held by 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that the Australian State will 
respect our right to self-determination: and this faith is inversely proportional to 
the fact that the question has never been asked.’
88  
 
Dodson said there was no equal sign between the legal decisions on 
native title and the views and practices of Indigenous peoples, and pointed out 
that ‘native title exists whether it is recognised by the common law or not’. 
Common law recognition ‘does not alter the form of that title, it only alters its 
enforceability in Australian courts’. He warned that to ‘pigeon-hole native title’ 
and ‘analogise it to western concepts of land tenure is paradoxical to the 
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  389recognition of a title based on our laws and customs’. That is, ‘Indigenous 
ownership’ must be recognised on ‘Indigenous terms’.
89  
 
Dodson placed the distinctions between Indigenous concepts and the 
legal decisions within the broader context of human rights. A separate chapter 
on this subject was contained in the first report on the operation of the Native 
Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the NTA).
90 It was within this context that he assessed the 
native title legislation. He argued it was ‘essential’ that the primary objectives 
of the NTA were ‘only approached from a perspective of ensuring full respect 
for the human rights of Indigenous peoples’ and that the ‘broad definition’ used 
in Section 223(1) to define ‘native title’ and ‘native title rights and interests’ 
was ‘both appropriate and necessary’.
91  
 
Dodson observed that for ‘indigenous peoples’ self-determination ‘has 
been held up … as the pre-eminent right of peoples’, but argued this ‘becomes 
an empty concept … unless we are free and supported to live according to the 





In her compact and powerful outline of the need for institutional change, 
Larissa Behrendt argued the ‘tensions between Indigenous Australians and the 
                                                 
89 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, above n 7, 54-55. 
90 ‘Chapter 2’ in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, above n 7, 
51-74. 
91 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, above n 7, 53-4; Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 223(1). 
92 Michael Dodson, Cultural Rights, above n 25, 7.  
  390dominant culture are wrapped up in identity: how Australians see themselves, 
how they see others and how they want society to respect who they are’.
93 
Behrendt emphasised the interconnection between personal identity and 
community, and advocated the principles of ‘substantive equality’ and ‘effective 
participation’,
94 which lent themselves to a ‘different kind of liberalism, an 
outcome-based liberalism’.
95     
 
Behrendt argued that contemporary Australia had been locked in a 
debate between ‘two forms of liberalism: a difference-blind liberalism and 
multicultural liberalism’. She said the former was based on the image of 
Australian identity as ‘monocultural, white Australia’ while the latter believed 




Behrendt wrote of two ‘ubiquitous’ goals: the claims for the recognition 
of ‘Aboriginal sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’. She said the meaning 
Aboriginal people place on sovereignty was ‘different’ from how it was used in 
an international legal context. Behrendt explained that the ‘key to understanding 
… is to unlock what it is that Aboriginal people are describing when employing’ 
the terms ‘Aboriginal sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’.
97 She said what 
was ‘most striking’ about the ‘use of the word sovereignty by Indigenous 
people’ was it included ‘an aspiration to greater community autonomy’ but that 
this fell ‘short of advocating a separation from the Australian state’. That is it 
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  391captured the ‘essence of both a separate cultural entity and historical 
dispossession and the exclusion and lack of consent involved in the creation of 
the modern Australian state’.
98 She noted there was a ‘spectrum of rights that 




Behrendt described the agenda she outlined as expressions of ‘political 
aspirations’ that challenged the ‘institutions of Australian society’ and sought to 
‘expose and erode the dominant, seemingly neutral, ideological base of 
institutional frameworks’. Her use of the word ‘politics’ to explicitly advocate 
an alternative set of norms to organise its governance relations comes very close 
to an alternative constitutional language. The breadth of her constitutional 
agenda is evidenced in the title of her first chapter: ‘Why question the rules?’
 100 
 
Extinguishment and recognition 
 
In his role as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice 
Commissioner Michael Dodson provided a distinct perspective on 
extinguishment, distinguishing between legal and moral dimensions of Mabo. 
He made the point that extinguishment of ‘native title was a breach of 
Indigenous human rights’. He said the Keating government he said that the 
‘clearly believed that this breach was a necessary compromise in balancing the 
competing interests’ whereas Dodson maintained ‘that extinguishment … 
should be kept to a minimum’. However, the ‘most important consideration in 
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  392working out the issues around extinguishment is the people who may be 
dispossessed as a result of the way the legal principles develop’. Their views, 
‘the legitimacy of the extinguishment of native title can only be determined by 
native title holders themselves’.
101 He drew a distinction between the language 
of common law and respect for the distinct cultural traditions of Indigenous 
people and the language of modern constitutionalism, which typically seeks the 
resolution of differences by parliament imposing a solution that ‘balances 
competing interests’.  
 
In his comments about co-existence he embraced concepts of common 
constitutionalism. He wrote that co-existence ‘between native title and other 
interests should be given effect where possible and native title should be 
understood to revive after the expiry of a granted interest’.
102   
 
Dodson also made the case that the extinguishment of native title was 
not ‘simply the removal of a right to land’ but could have the ‘effect of 
destroying traditional, social, economic, cultural, political and religious 
systems’. This would be ‘in contravention of the protection of human rights’ in 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social  and Cultural Rights and Article 30 
of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. He also pointed out 
that this was contrary to Article 14 of the International Labor Organisation 
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  393Convention No 169
103 and Articles 25 and 26 of the Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
104  
 
Dodson’s view has particular significance for the recognition of native 
title. First, he drew a distinction between traditional practices and its possible 
recognition by the Australian governing and legal system, which Tully calls a 
constitutional association. Secondly, extinguishment is wrong because it 
represents a denial of recognition and protection of the customs and laws of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This idea resonates with those 
expressed by Tully’s in Strange multiplicity, where he describes the 
circumstances of a governing and legal system, a ‘constitutional association’ 
that “discontinues or ‘extinguishes’ the pre-existing customs and ways of the 
people” as a ‘doctrine of discontinuity’.
105 Dodson’s approach also has practical 
implications for how we think about extinguishment and recognition. His advice 
suggests the way forward is to base a solution on the coexistence of Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous peoples. The claimant can sit down and mediate a solution 
with the current owners of the land so that as much of the traditions of the 
claimants can be accessed and given legal protection. Where traditional 
practices cannot presently be accessed or protected because of the existence of a 
‘granted interest’ these can be revived when that interest expired. Tully 
describes such a process as mutual recognition, where the parties engage in a 
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The view that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people support a 
practical dialogue based on the conventions of mutual recognition, consent and 
continuity is also supported by the specific comments included in the Aboriginal 
Peace Plan in April 1993 and the Eva Valley Statement in August that year. The 
Aboriginal Peace Plan calls for ‘[o]ver-riding Commonwealth legislation’ that 
ensures ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Title’ is ‘not to be extinguished 
by grants’ and this title shall ‘not ... be extinguished or impaired unilaterally 
without consent’.
107 That is, it is based on the ‘co-existence’ of native title with 
those derived from the Crown’s grants with the ‘revival’ of further native title 
rights when these grants expire. In a similar way, the Eva Valley Statement 
asserts: ‘No grant of any interest on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Titles 
can be made without the informed consent of all relevant title holders nor can 





In this chapter the evidence pointing to the existence of a distinct 
Indigenous perspective on the Mabo events and voiced in a human rights and 
common constitutionalism language has been outlined. The consistency of this 
expression is there in the statements from ATSIC, the two meetings in 1993 
leading up to the adoption of the native title legislation and the comments of 
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  395several prominent Indigenous leaders. There are concepts and ideas around the 
recognition of their distinct cultures independent of the modern constitutional 
language.  
 
The significance of the call for a treaty comes from the perspective of 
the common constitutional language. Its basis is a form of mutual recognition 
where both parties accept the distinct cultural background of the other and agree 
on how to move forward.   
 
Furthermore, the discussion about extinguishment and recognition brings 
to the fore that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have a distinct 
perspective about these issues that cannot be resolved by the ‘normal’ rules of 
governance. It identifies a basis to move forward concerning native title – where 
the parties engage in a dialogue to mediate the claims for recognition and 
accommodate their differences. That is, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples sought to co-determine along with non-Indigenous representatives who 
could board and what cargo would go on the ship and its direction. 
 
 Having determined that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
have a distinct constitutional perspective, the next chapter will centre on the 
work undertaken by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and will consider 
the treatment of three of the other claims raised around Mabo. 
  396Chapter 11: 
The significance of the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation  
 
 
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologies and 
expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so that 
other part accepts the apologies and forgives.  
Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation
1 
 
Following Mabo Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples called for 
a treaty or agreement, a rewriting of the Constitution’s preamble and the 
removal of s 25 of the Constitution and this chapter will consider these claims. 
Each of the claims was addressed by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
(the Council) in its final report on its work, Reconciliation: Australia’s 
challenge, and formally presented to the Howard government. It was produced 
on the eve of the centenary of Federation and presented to federal parliament in 
December 2000.
2 While established several months prior to the High Court’s 
June 1992 decision,
3 much of the Council’s work was in the post-Mabo 
environment. In September 2002, the Howard government formally responded 
                                                 
1 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation, 
(Canberra: 2000) (“Declaration”). 
2 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Reconciliation: Australia’s challenge, Final report to 
the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Parliament, (Canberra: 2000), inside front cover. 
(Accessed 19/01/2004 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/2000/16) 
(“Reconciliation: Australia’s challenge” or “final report”). 
3 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth). 
  397to the Council’s report and recommendations.
4 In examining these documents, 
and other material, this chapter will consider how the different constitutional 
languages were reflected in the debate over reconciliation. 
  
This chapter will examine: 
 
•  the impact on the Council of Mabo; 
•  the discussion in federal parliament about reconciliation;  
•  the Council’s final report; and, 
•   the Howard government response. 
 
Additional to the final report other material issued by the Council 
referred to in this chapter includes its statement issued on Mabo,
5 excerpts from 
its submission to the Mabo Ministerial Committee
6 and two documents that 
were ‘ceremonially’ handed to the Prime Minister at Corroboree 2000 in 
Sydney in May that year: the Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation
7 
and the Roadmap for Reconciliation. The latter comprises four national 
strategies respectively addressing the reconciliation process, the promotion of 
                                                 
4 Commonwealth Government, Response to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Final 
Report - Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, (Canberra: Office of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
September 2002). 
5 ‘Council looks at High Court decision’, Walking Together No 1, October 1992. [Accessed 
22/01/2006 @ http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1992/2/3.html]. 
6 Commonwealth Government, Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, Discussion 
Paper, June 1993, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 93-95 (“Mabo: 
The High Court Decision on Native Title”). 
7 Declaration, above n 1.  
  398recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights, overcoming 
disadvantage and the achievement of economic independence.
8  
 
Robert Tickner’s Taking a stand is also helpful. Since Tickner was the 
minister responsible for Indigenous affairs in both the Hawke and Keating 
Labor Governments from shortly after the establishment of the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 1990 until the defeat of the 
Keating government in March 1996 his work is invaluable in providing detailed 
information about reconciliation.
9 The discussion of attitudes of the parties in 
Parliament is drawn from the Hansard Weekly transcripts.  
 
The Council and mutual recognition 
 
When established in 1991 the Council comprised 25 members (14 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander members and 11 non-Aboriginal 
members).
10 It was established by an act of parliament
11 and was unanimously 
supported in the House of Representatives by Labor and the Liberal-National 
Party Coalition.
12 The legislation specified the Council’s chairperson ‘must be 
an Aborigine’ and ‘at least 12 members … must be Aborigines and at least 2 
must be Torres Strait Islanders’, it would include the chairperson and deputy 
chairperson of ATSIC and it would include a person ‘nominated by the Leader 
of the Opposition in the House of Representatives’.
13 The first chair was Patrick 
                                                 
8 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Roadmap for Reconciliation, (Canberra: 2000). 
9 Robert Tickner, Taking a stand, (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001). 
10 Ibid. 38.  
11 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth). 
12 Tickner, above n 9, 38. 
13 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth), s 14.  
  399Dodson, a Yawuru man with lengthy experience on land councils and a former 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Deaths in Custody Commissioner, and his 
deputy was prominent former High Court judge Sir Ronald Wilson.
14  
  
The Council was a unique body stepping outside the language of modern 
constitutionalism and establishing a basis for mutual recognition where a 
cultural dialogue between representatives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander People and other Australians could discuss how best to achieve 
reconciliation. Similar to the examples cited by Tully, here was a body where by 
‘listening to the different stories others tell, and giving their own in exchange, 
the participants come to see their common and interwoven histories together 
from a multiplicity of paths’.
15 Its main object was ‘to promote a process of 
reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the wider 
Australian community … based on an appreciation by the Australian 
community as a whole of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and 
achievements and of the unique position of Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders as the indigenous peoples of Australia’.
16 Both cultural traditions came 
together to undertake ‘initiatives for the purpose of promoting reconciliation’, to 
‘promote, by leadership, education and discussion, a deeper understanding by 
all Australians of the history, cultures, past dispossession and continuing 
disadvantage of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and of the need to 
                                                 
14Tickner, above n 9, 39; Patrick Dodson, Beyond the Mourning Gate – Dealing with 
Unfinished Business, The Wentworth Lecture 12 May 2000, (Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 2000). 3.  
15 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge, UK: 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 25-26. 
16 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991 (Cth), s 5.  
  400redress that disadvantage’ and ‘provide a forum for discussion by all Australians 
of issues relating to reconciliation …’
17  
 
In the context of the establishment of the Council, the term 
reconciliation conveyed a meaning of peoples that is in the spirit of the common 
constitutional language. Reconciliation became associated with the work of the 
Council and its 10-year process of mutual recognition. The term acknowledged 
that the people were from two distinct cultural traditions and came together to 
‘harmonise’ and ‘make compatible’
18 so the injustice and disadvantage faced by 
Australia’s first peoples could be overcome. That is, reconciliation was ‘about 
addressing past grievances and about forging a new foundation for future 
relations between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians’.
19  
 
The Council’s post-Mabo submission 
 
At the beginning of October 1992 the Council issued a statement on the 
significance of the High Court’s Mabo decision. Several aspects in the statement 
suggest the impact of the decision modified its work. One was the view that ‘the 
decision has dramatically changed the legal principles of Australian traditional 
land ownership’. Another was the announcement that it had decided to ‘begin an 
active process of communication and consultation about the issues it has raised, 
especially the recognition of the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people’. The Council would ‘listen to a range of views and come to a national 
                                                 
17 Ibid. s 6(1)(a), (b) & (d).  
18 H.W. Fowler, & F.G. Fowler, (Eds), The concise Oxford dictionary of current English, Fifth 
Edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1034.  
19 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Sharing History: A Sense for All Australians of a 
Shared Ownership of Their History, Key Issue Paper No. 4 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1994), 41.  
  401consensus on the best way of recognising the rights of Australia's indigenous 
people’. Further modification was the establishment of a Consultative 
Committee to ‘assess whether reconciliation would be advanced by a formal 
document or documents of reconciliation and to examine legal and 
constitutional options for any document or documents’.
20 
 
The Council also made a submission to the Keating government’s post-
Mabo consultation along similar lines. Its association with the language of 
common constitutionalism is suggested by its call to reconsider the ‘relationship 
between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and government at all 
levels of law, policy and practice’, the ‘recognition of customary law’, support 
for ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages and cultures’, ‘a vision of 
self-determination’ and the ‘possible recognition of a formal relationship in a 
document of reconciliation’. The submission embraced the convention of 
consent when it stated that ‘in many areas the past actions of the Crown have 
dispossessed’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples ‘without negotiation 
or compensation, leading to social, cultural and economic hardship …’
21 
 
Parliament and reconciliation 
 
Looking at how the various parties in federal parliament considered 
reconciliation in the light of Mabo, the Liberal and National parties moved away 
from the views they held when the Council was first established. Now they 
disconnected reconciliation from native title, in keeping with the modern 
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  402constitutional language. Then Coalition leader Dr Hewson charged that the bill 
‘confuses settlement of land management issues arising from the High Court’s 
judgement ... with the wider issue of reconciliation with the Aboriginal and 
Islander communities’.
22 That is, he suggested Mabo was about land 
management and not a process of mutual recognition.  
 
Making a similar criticism, the Member for Adelaide, Trish Worth 
described it as ‘reckless to intermingle issues relating to reconciliation which 
are sociological with issues relating to the Mabo judgement which are legal and 
administrative. We cannot legislate for good race relations, and to try to 
incorporate reconciliation and legal reform into the one process could jeopardise 
both.’
23 Senator Boswell, the leader of the National Party in the Senate, said the 
High Court decision was ‘limited to unalienated crown land’. Contrasting this 
with the government’s approach he stated that the ‘Prime Minister has taken that 
decision and extended it to include land management, reconciliation, mining 
leases, pastoral leases, stock routes and tourist leases’. Therefore, the ‘Pandora’s 
box has been well and truly opened’.
24  
 
By contrast, the ALP considered recognition of native title as bound up 
with reconciliation and in this respect stepped outside the modern constitutional 
language. Its approach was reflected in the Framework of Principles, issued by 
the government in June 1993. The last of its principles explained that the ‘Mabo 
decision is an opportunity. The commitment to reconciliation should be 
reaffirmed. The reconciliation process is especially important in the light of 
                                                 
22 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 12, 1993, 3407 (23 November 1993).  
23 Ibid. 3575 (24 November 1993).  
24 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 4605 (15 December 1993).  
  403Mabo. There would be serious consequences for reconciliation if there was an 
inadequate response to Mabo.’
25 In introducing the legislation to parliament, 
Prime Minister Keating linked it to the establishment of a land acquisition fund. 
He spoke of the situation facing ‘Aboriginal communities’ where ‘native title 
has been extinguished or lost without consultation, negotiation or 
compensation’: ‘Their dispossession has been total, their loss has been 
complete’. He said the government shared the ‘view of ATSIC, Aboriginal 
organisations and the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, that justice, 
equality and fairness demand that the social and economic needs of these 
communities must be addressed as an essential step towards reconciliation’.
26 
 
The Australian Democrats were represented on the Council because of 
their Senate membership and supported reconciliation. In 1993, Cheryl Kernot, 
the party’s representative on the Council,
27 told the Senate that ‘we cannot 
separate native title from reconciliation’, since it ‘is an ongoing process’ and 
how ‘we respond to an understanding of special attachment to land is a measure 
of how we are performing our partnership as we move towards reconciliation’.
28 
  
  The Greens (WA) too supported reconciliation, but were concerned that 
the Keating government’s legislation would fall short of this goal. Senator 
Christabel Chamarette said it was crucial ‘that we have to acknowledge the truth 
of the historical injustice’ and until ‘we acknowledge it, then no healing or 
reconciliation is possible’. She linked native title and reconciliation and said if 
                                                 
25 A Framework of Principles, Point 33, reprinted in Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native 
Title, Appendix, above n 6, 106; see also Tickner, above n 9, 125. 
26 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard No 11, 1993, 2882 (16 November 1993). 
27 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 4624 (15 December 1993).  
28 Ibid. 4626.  
  404‘this legislation fails to at least protect existing native title rights, based on the 
High Court’s decision, it is unacceptable to the Greens’.
29 
 
The final report 
 
The Council’s final report sought to remove the language of White 
Australia from the Constitution. It proposed to ‘remove section 25 of the 
Constitution’ and introduce a new section ‘making it unlawful to adversely 
discriminate against any people on the grounds of race’
30 Clause 25 provides for 
voting in federal elections where a ‘law of any State’ deems that ‘all persons of 
any race are disqualified from voting’.
31 The effect of the Council’s proposal 
was to block the impact of state laws on voting in federal elections and stated 
that it was inappropriate to continue to allow a state to disqualify a race from 
voting.  
 
The other recommendations though were framed in the common 
constitutional language. The Council proposed: ‘The Commonwealth 
Parliament prepare legislation for a referendum’ to ‘recognise Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples as first peoples of Australia in a new preamble for 
the Constitution’.
32 This reflected the guidance of the convention of continuity. 
The Constitution as currently worded does not acknowledge or take into account 
the tradition of the inhabitants present when the country was colonised. It 
follows the doctrine of discontinuity whereby ‘a new constitutional association 
                                                 
29 Senate Weekly Hansard No 15, 1993, 5006 (16 December 1993).  
30 Reconciliation: Australia’s challenge, Chapter 10.  
31 Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Constitution, (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1993), s 25 (“The Australian Constitution”). 
32 Ibid.  
  405… discontinues or ‘extinguishes’ the pre-existing customs and ways of the 
people’.
33 In response, the Council said the Constitution needed correcting to 
acknowledge both Indigenous and non-Indigenous traditions can be 
acknowledged.  
 
This proposal was also guided by the convention of consent. Non-
Indigenous people throughout Australia ensured the ‘new system of government 
… was not imposed … by the British Parliament’.
34 However, the ‘Founding 
Fathers’ failed to ensure that the new structure of governance was not imposed 
on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. Thus, in its referendum 
proposal the Council did not just indicate the mechanism necessary for 
constitutional change but was also guided by the convention of consent. This 
signalled that the Council wished to move forward with the consent of both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. That is why it also proposed that 
governments throughout Australia recognised that the land and its waters were 
‘settled as colonies without treaty or consent and that to advance reconciliation 
it would be most desirable if there were agreements or treaties’.
35 
 
It also recommended that draft legislation be introduced to federal 
parliament. While it was acknowledged that this did not represent ‘an expert 
drafting exercise’ the Council considered it ‘an impetus to pursue the legislation 
for those who support the Council’s vision’ and that it indicated ‘how the first 
                                                 
33 Tully, above n 15, 125.  
34 ‘An outline’ in The Australian Constitution, above n 31, v. 
35 Reconciliation: Australia’s challenge, above n 2, Chapter 10.  




The legislation provided the main form for the continuity of the mutual 
recognition process that began with the establishment of the Council in 1991. 
This was apparent from the preamble to the bill where the first of its six 
principles concerns ‘the status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
as Australia’s first peoples’. Two other principles referred to reconciliation as 
‘an on-going process’ that would address ‘unresolved’ issues.
37 A further reason 
to view this as a mutual recognition process was that Part 4 of the draft bill 
established a ‘process that allows Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
and government to reach agreement on a framework for negotiation of 




In addition, Part 2 of the legislation specifically sought to ‘recognise the 
unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’. This part of the 
legislation also incorporated the Declaration. Most poignant in conveying the 
imaginary of mutual recognition was the clause that called on Indigenous and 
other Australians to ‘walk the journey of healing’ and those who represented the 
European tradition of governance to apologise and express ‘sorrow and sincere 
regret for the injustices of the past’, and for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples to accept these apologies and offer forgiveness.
39  
                                                 
36 Ibid. Chapter 7, p 6.  
37 Ibid. Appendix 3, p 2.  
38 Ibid. Appendix 3, p 4.  
39 Declaration, above n 1.  
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ATSIC advanced a claim for a treaty in 2001 in the common 
constitutional language because it provided for another form of mutual 
recognition between Indigenous and other Australians. The final report 
recommended that ‘to advance reconciliation it would be most desirable if there 
were agreements or treaties’.
40  
 
Its inclusion flowed from the experiences already reached between 
‘parties’ at various levels. The final report noted that the Council had ‘promoted 
agreements between parties at the local, regional and sectoral levels as a key 
part of the reconciliation process’. Furthermore, these were seen as 
empowering. ‘Negotiated sectoral and regional agreements enable Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples to have greater control over their destinies.’
41  
     
Howard government response 
 
Now the language of the Howard government response to the Council’s 
final report will be examined. Before the Council presented its final report, but 
after Howard was ceremonially presented with ‘national reconciliation 
documents at Corroboree 2000,
42 the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for 
Reconciliation was asked by the Council to ‘provide information about the 
Commonwealth Government response’ to these documents. The final report said 
these responses indicated a ‘significant level of action by government 
departments that [would] …. address many of the issues that currently stand as 
                                                 
40 Reconciliation: Australia’s challenge, above n 2, Chapter 8 ‘Recommendations’ (1 of 1).   
41 Ibid. Chapter 7 ‘Documents – Putting it in Writing’ (4 of 7). 
42 Ibid. ‘Council’s Letter to Parliament’, 1.  
  408impediments to reconciliation’.
43 The Howard government formally responded 
to the recommendations in September 2002.
44  
 
Unlike the Council, the Howard government did not interpret s 25 as 
totally reflecting the language of White Australia. It noted that the clause was 
linked to another clause that outlined the formula for determining the 
membership of the House of Representatives. It argued that since s 25 was a 
‘limitation on the previous section’ its ‘clear intention’ was to ‘discourage 
discrimination by the states on the basis of race’. However, the government also 
said it recognised this section anticipated ‘State provisions to disenfranchise 
citizens on the basis of race’ and that had ‘no role to play in the governance of 
the modern nation’.
45 In terms of constitutional languages, the Howard 
government appeared to consider that while the clause partially reflected the 
language of White Australia its purpose was non-discriminatory.  
 
In response to the fifth recommendation that proposed that ‘Each 
Government and Parliament … Recognise that this land and waters were settled 
as colonies without treaty or consent’, the Howard government ‘affirmed that 
Indigenous people were the original custodians of this land and its waters and 
that they were settled as colonies without treaty or consent’.
46 Thus, in one 
respect the government acknowledged the convention of consent. However, it 
was silent on whether it considered it necessary for contemporary Australia to 
                                                 
43 Ibid. Chapter 8, 5.  
44 Response to Reconciliation, above n 4.  
45 Ibid. 20.  
46 Ibid. 22.  
  409have the consent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to its 
governance arrangements.  
 
The government’s stance toward a new preamble was indicative of its 
attitude toward the continuity of the culture and practices of the first peoples in 
this country. The government argued that it has already ‘put forward a proposed 
preamble to the Constitution at a referendum in November 1999’ with a similar 
intent to that of the Council and since it was ‘not approved by the Australian 
people’ it ‘respected ... this decision’. It said the proposed wording ‘honoured 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders’ as the ‘nation’s first people, for their 
deep kinship with their lands and for the ancient and continuing cultures which 
enrich the life of our country’.
47 However, it is not at all clear that the 
government respected Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples when it put 
the referendum forward. There is certainly evidence that the wording was 
hastily compiled with only limited consultation and no consent. A report in The 
West Australian the day after the vote on the wording for the referendum noted 
that former Council of Aboriginal Reconciliation chair Pat Dodson, then 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission chairperson Djerrkura
48 and 
Kimberley Land Council executive direction Peter Yu had slammed the wording 
as ‘drafted behind closed doors without any meaningful consultation with the 
Australian people, indigenous and non-indigenous’.
49 
 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 20.  
48 The former chair of ATSIC has recently died and during the mourning period a first name is 
not mentioned. 
49 Karen Middleton, ‘Senate vote on preamble riles elders’, The West Australian 13 August 
1999, 4. 
  410The government also rejected the need for any post-Council formal 
process where Indigenous and other Australians would mutually recognise the 
culture of each party and engage in a dialogue about how Australia’s 
governance arrangements could be corrected to recognise the contribution of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples. It specifically rejected the 
proposed draft legislation, arguing that this ‘would impose a potentially 
divisive, protracted (at least 12 years) and inconclusive process on the nation’.
50    
 
The government defined reconciliation through its own image. It did not 
countenance the possibility that Indigenous people might want their culture 
recognised in ways different to those achieved by non-Indigenous Australians. 
Instead of listening to the voices of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, 
reconciliation would be non-constitutional and restricted to matters of economic 
and social disadvantage. It judged progress as Indigenous Australians enjoying 
‘the same opportunities and standards of treatment as other Australians’ and 
pointing to ‘better health, better education, and a better standard of living’.
51 
   
Confirmation of the government’s approach was reinforced by the 
differences between its revised declaration presented on 11 May 2000 and the 
Declaration. The government’s revision accepted six of the 11 principles that 
guided the Declaration. Instead of declaring that ‘we respect and recognise 
continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions’ the revised version stated that 
‘we respect the cultures and beliefs of the nation’s firsts people and recognise 
the place of traditional laws within these cultures’. Behind the subtle word 
                                                 
50 Response to Reconciliation, above n 4, 18.  
51 Ibid. 2.  
  411changes was a significant difference. The Howard government revision did not 
recognise ‘continuing customary laws …’ Instead it effectively expressed an 
acknowledgement that traditional laws were important to Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people. Similarly, the ‘one part of the nation apologies ... as we 
walk the journey of healing’ was replaced by ‘Australians express their sorrow 
and profoundly regret the injustices of the past …’ The ‘respect … the right of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to self-determination’ was 
removed and replaced by ‘respect for the right of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples, along with all Australians to determine their own destiny’. The 
last principle of the Declaration expressed the ‘hope … for a united Australia 
that respects this land of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
heritage; and provides justice and equity for all’ was completely removed in the 
revised declaration. Each of the culturally distinct aspects Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people sought to have recognised were removed. Thus, the 
revised declaration was not a document of mutual recognition that reflected a 
common constitutional language, but a statement that transformed the 
Declaration into the modern constitutional language. 
 
The government’s rejection of a treaty was framed through the prism of 
the modern constitutional language. It said it had rejected a treaty because ‘such 
a legally enforceable instrument, as between sovereign states would be divisive’ 
and ‘would undermine the concept of a single Australian nation …’
52  Given 
that the proposal advanced by the Council reflected a meaning of ‘treaty’ 
entirely different to this view, the government either did not listen closely to 
what the Council said or would not countenance the possibility that any other 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 23.  
  412meaning could exist. For instance, the ‘unresolved issues for reconciliation’ 
were premised on a close working relationship developed within the Australian 
nation to achieve reconciliation: ‘effective political participation’, ‘protection of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture, heritage and intellectual property’ 
and ‘constitutional reform to enable the recognition of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples and the protection of their rights’. Furthermore, the 
Declaration expressed its ‘hope … for a united Australia’ and spoke of ‘Our 
nation’. Not the words of people who sought a separate state, but of those who 




  In concluding an examination of material concerning reconciliation, 
three things stand out. First, there were serious differences among the 
parliamentary parties, with the Coalition rejecting the idea that native title was 
connected to reconciliation. Instead, it characterised native title as a land 
management issue, an idea associated with the modern constitutional language.  
 
Secondly, the Council was a body of mutual recognition and so, despite 
Australia’s lack of experience of treaty constitutionalism, this was not an 
insurmountable barrier to embracing a new ethical frame. The principle reason 
for this is that this frame has a practical basis and is developed out of listening 
to, and working closely with, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
  413Thirdly, the Council spoke in the language of common constitutionalism 
whereas the Howard government responded in the language of modern 
constitutionalism.   
 
In concluding this chapter, the examination of the Mabo claims that was 
outlined in Chapter 1 has now been completed. The remaining task is to connect 
together the findings outlined over this and the previous five chapters and 
provide an overall prognosis of Mabo. This purpose will be addressed next.  
  414Chapter 12:  
Constitutional languages and Australia’s 
first peoples  
 
This thesis has concentrated on the Mabo events, focussing on how the 
claims of Australia’s Indigenous peoples were treated by Australia’s governing 
institutions. The claims are linked to a contemporary problem: the difficulties 
people have in gaining recognition for their distinct cultural practices under the 
modern constitution. As was discussed in Chapter 2, among the claims for 
cultural recognition are those by nationalists, immigrants, exiles, refugees, 
women, Indigenous peoples and same-sex relationships. While these culturally 
diverse claims share the common aspiration of self-determination, with the 
exception of those made in the name of nationalism, the claims are usually 
treated as falling outside the concerns of Western constitutionalism. 
 
However, if an analogy is drawn between constitutionalism and 
language it is possible to appreciate why contemporary societies tend to act 
toward the claims in this way. Desiring to be treated differently, claimants come 
up against the modern constitutional language and its premise that the people 
are homogenous. So a paradox arises between the aspirations of claimants and 
the language in which their claims are judged. 
 
A general resolution to this paradox exists in a much older, common 
constitutional, language that provides a basis to respect cultural diversity. The 
  415contrast with the older language helps to highlight the concomitants of modern 
constitutionalism. Unlike the common language, modern constitutionalism is 
not based on the long-held customs of the people. Instead, its adherents 
advocate a complete break with the past, proposing a new foundation based 
upon a set of ‘modern’ European institutions. While the struggles in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries eventually eclipsed common 
constitutionalism, its existence demonstrates the Western constitutional tradition 
is not indivisible. Rather, constitutionalism is better understood as comprising 
multiple languages where particular sites become the focus of interaction and 
struggle for influence. Indeed, when the presumption that constitutionalism is 
indivisible is discarded and contemporary sites of struggles are examined for 
signs of the influence of particular constitutional languages, as James Tully did 
in a North American context, it is possible to identify the existence of more than 
one language.  
 
A methodology that views constitutionalism as analogous to language is 
unusual because current theoretical preferences are skewed to seeking solutions 
elsewhere. When considering the theoretical approach to apply to examine the 
Mabo events it was tempting to select from the familiar cache of political and 
legal theories used to examine society. Usually such theories place emphasis on 
the individual, the community, or the nation.
1  
 
However, to adopt any one of these theories would have meant 
presuming the problem laid outside the constitutional language used to judge the 
                                                 
1 James Tully, Strange multiplicity: constitutionalism in an age of diversity, (Cambridge, UK: 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 36.  
  416claims. More than likely the result of such an enquiry would have suggested the 
modification of some aspect of current theory to better accommodate the claims 
of Indigenous peoples in Australia. When this method was put to one side, it 
was possible to concentrate on the processes involved in the debates and 
highlight the influence of conflicting constitutional languages. Identifying the 
influence of the languages was essential because the influence of a particular 
constitutional language was hidden by discussion about the myriad of legal and 
political issues in arriving at decisions. Once this difficulty was appreciated it 
was possible to identify patterns in the language used by the decision-makers.  
     
Indeed as was observed in Chapter 4, so all-pervasive is the influence of 
the modern constitutional language on current thinking that even those who seek 
to challenge the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from contemporary societies 
often do so from within the frame of modern constitutionalism. Its influence is 
apparent in the approaches used by Kent McNeil in Common law aboriginal 
title and Robert A. Williams (Jr) in The American Indian in western legal 
thought: the discourses of conquest.
2 Both these authors challenge the treatment 
of Indigenous land claims at common law and propose alternative solutions, but 
when taken against the backdrop of constitutional languages both authors miss 
crucial aspects. Events where other constitutional perspectives are articulated 
remain unexamined or are put to one side because they lack consistency with 
the dominant trend. In another case, suspicion of the motives of colonial 
dissidents leads to the dismissal of ideas echoing the common constitutional 
                                                 
2 Kent McNeil, Common law aboriginal title, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Williams, R. A. 
(Jr), The American Indian in western legal thought: the discourses of conquest, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
 
 
  417language. As to the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from contemporary society, 
there remains little examination of whether the central presumptions of the 
modern constitutional language are part of the problem.  
 
In Chapter 4, the related point is also made that it is important to 
differentiate between common law as an institution and the constitutional 
languages spoken by participants. There is no equal sign between judge-made 
law and the language of common constitutionalism. The degree to which they 
overlap is not determined a priori; it is only answered by an examination of the 
actual practice.  
 
Application to Australia 
 
Applying the analogy of constitutionalism to language to examine how 
Indigenous Australians are presented by constitutional scholars, Chapter 5 
demonstrates that while most scholars pose the need for an accommodation with 
Indigenous people, they do not explicitly acknowledge Indigenous customs and 
laws as constitutional. Their position results from the influence of modern 
constitutionalism and its presumption that all speak a universal constitutional 
language.  
 
A detailed examination of the Mabo events directly challenges this 
assumption. Despite the absence of treaty-making in Australia’s constitutional 
tradition, when these events are investigated it exposes a great deal about the 
influence of particular constitutional languages. While often an element of this 
or that convention rather than a rounded articulation of an alternative 
  418perspective, the evidence suggests unmistakeably the presence of another 
language. In addition to modern constitutionalism, another language, labelled in 
this thesis as human rights and common constitutionalism, guides the thinking 
of some key participants.  
 
Applying the common constitutional language to the Mabo events poses 
a strategic challenge on how to move forward with a new awareness that it was 
wrong to dispossess Indigenous people of their lands or to treat them as though 
they had no laws and customs. The most significant point arising from Tully’s 
study is to overcome oppression, recognition must be mutual. Recognition 
cannot be restricted to constitutional forms selected by the dominant culture. 
The Mabo events pose a key question: Through which constitutional language 
do Indigenous peoples in Australia express their claims?  
 
Neither the High Court nor federal parliament discussed this question. 
Instead, presuming the constitutional language universal, these bodies chose 
those aspects of the claims that could be heard and advanced. Unsurprisingly, 
then they provided monological ‘solutions’. These solutions were not 
exclusively expressed in the language of modern constitutionalism. Viewed 
from the common constitutional perspective, the debate was an eclectic mixture 
that incorporated elements of the conflicting ethical frames. Advances were 
made on some aspects, problems created on others. Only through a detailed 
examination is it possible to take apart the elements of each language to 
understand its impact and to help move forward.  
 
  419The key question still needs to be answered. Significantly, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples advanced their claims in the human rights and 
common constitutional language. This provides the raison d’ētre
3 for the study. 
Looking back to the time when the thesis topic was originally conceived, after 
reading Tully’s Strange multiplicity the initial response about the Mabo events 
was that the claims advanced by Australia’s first peoples were not heard on their 
own terms by the institutions of governance. This general presumption provided 
a motivation to focus the study on the constitutional languages expressed in the 
events. While the investigations undertaken in this thesis may also be viewed as 
independent contributions to knowledge, and therefore important in their own 
right, any finding that the claims were expressed in the dominant constitutional 
language would have directly challenged the initial hypothesis.  
 
Some may consider that the human rights and common constitutional 
language are two distinct languages because each component has differing 
origins: one in ancient custom, the other in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, 
the examination undertaken in Chapter 4 shows these components overlap. The 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is guided by the three 
common conventions. If human rights and common constitutionalism are two 
distinct languages it is difficult to say where one language begins and the other 
one ends. Moreover, and significantly, as discussed in Chapter 10 in the Mabo 
debates Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples use concepts that 
associated with both human rights and common constitutionalism. That they are 
conceptually intertwined is reflected in Noel Pearson’s declaration, for instance, 
                                                 
3 The ‘raison d’ētre of something is the ... justification for its existence’. See John Ayto (Ed), 
The Wordsworth dictionary of foreign words in English, (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd, 1995), 256. 
  420that Mabo is ‘essentially about the recognition of indigenous human rights’.
4 
Since the aim of this study is to identify how the languages were employed in 
situ,
5 the fact that key participants embrace the language in this way is the 
paramount reason to treat it as singular. Whether such treatment holds for other 
debates is open to discovery. 
 
The claims for recognised of their customs and practices by Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples involved four constitutional forms. One is to 
have Australia’s Constitution recognise their unique cultures and to remove its 
discriminatory provisions. Another is to have all their connections to land 
recognised and protected from extinguishment. The August 1993 meeting at 
Eva Valley proposed a form of mutual recognition whereby the 
‘Commonwealth Government’ was to reach agreement about the legislation 
with ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’. The initial federal 
legislation on native title adopted in 1993 did not provide this basis. Instead, the 
parliament selected the criteria by which to determine those claims for 
recognition that would proceed and those which would be extinguished. 
Another form was sought was a treaty or agreement between non-Indigenous 
and Indigenous people. The fourth claim arose from the Bringing Them Home 
Report released in May 1997.
6 A body of mutual recognition between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people is needed to consider the work already 
done by bodies like the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and to mediate 
the solutions to each of these forms.  
                                                 
4 Noel Pearson, ‘Law must dig deeper to find land rights’, The Australian 8 June 1993, 11. 
5 The Latin in situ means literally ‘in place’. See John Ayto, (Ed), The Wordsworth dictionary 
of foreign words in English, (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1995), 160. 
  421Constitutionalism and Indigenous peoples 
 
Reviewing the evidence unearthed from this examination, to recap it 
began by looking at those events preceding the High Court’s 1992 decision. As 
was discussed in Chapter 6, when established Australia’s Constitution included 
only negative references to its Indigenous peoples. Considered from the 
standpoint of recognising the distinct cultures of peoples, the Federation 
reflected the influence of three constitutional languages: White Australia, 
modern and common. Reflecting the language of White Australia it voiced two 
exclusionary references that barred the federal government from legislating on 
behalf of Indigenous peoples. Signalling the influence of the modern 
constitutional language, Australia’s Federation was viewed as the founding 
moment, establishing European-type institutions. The new framework provided 
no basis to respect the continuity of the customs and practices of Indigenous 
peoples. However, in its relations with Britain, the Federation contained an anti-
imperial feature: the assertion that the people of Australia should consent to the 
new constitutional arrangements.   
 
The influence of the language of White Australia on constitutionalism 
should not come as a complete surprise. After all, the power and influence of the 
White Australia policy has been well documented in recent years by scholars 
such as Henry Reynolds, Andrew Marcus and Bain Attwood.
7 However, White 
                                                                                                                                    
6 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: National Inquiry 
into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, 
(Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997). 
7 Henry Reynolds, The law of the land, 2nd Edition, (Ringwood, Vic: Penguin Books Australia 
Ltd, 1992); Andrew Markus, Australian race relations, 1788-1993, (St Leonards, NSW: Allen 
& Unwin, 1994); Bain Attwood, Andrew Markus et al, The 1967 referendum, or, When 
  422Australia is better understood as a distinct constitutional language. Chapter 6 
identified the most prominent of the arguments advanced through this language 
are the idea that non-Europeans were inferior to those from Europe and the view 
that Indigenous peoples were too backward to have a system of governance. 
This language was reflected in idea that the land was empty upon colonisation. 
It influenced a series of court cases based on this presumption as well as 
Federation itself.  
 
A cultural recognition perspective also helps reflection on the 1967 
referendum. To those who embraced the modern constitutional perspective, the 
removal of the influence of the language of White Australia made Australia’s 
Constitution more consistent with the modern project. Viewed from the 
common constitutional perspective though, the referendum did not provide 
cultural recognition for Indigenous peoples. The 1967 referendum left the 
business of cultural recognition unfinished. However, it did take a very 
significant step forward. The removal of the influence of the language of White 
Australia was always a necessary task in order to achieve recognition.  
 
It is also noticeable that the movement to remove the exclusionary 
provisions from the Constitution used the language of human rights. Indeed, 
many of the changes to relations with Indigenous peoples from the 1960s 
onwards used this language: the removal of the system of permits, the ending of 
racial exclusion from clubs, the right to vote, introduction of various state-based 
land rights legislation and the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act (the 
                                                                                                                                    
Aborigines didn’t get the vote, (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 1997).  
  423RDA) in 1975.
8 The 1967 referendum reflected the language of human rights in 
two senses. It motivated the participants in the movement for social change. It 
also reflected actual constitutional amendments that considered it wrong to 
exclude Indigenous people from decision-making. Moreover, it was likely that 
the substantial issues around recognition of the Mabo claim itself would not 
have occurred after 1988 if not for the enactment of the RDA and the influence 
of human rights on the High Court majority’s thinking.  
 
When the Meriam people sought recognition of their traditional 
connections to the lands they had occupied from time immemorial, a new stage 
in the struggle of Indigenous people for cultural recognition commenced. The 
High Court was obliged to confront the influence of the language of White 
Australia on common law. The majority explicitly rejected the proposition that 
the lands were empty before colonisation and affirmed that the Indigenous 
inhabitants were guided by an elaborate system of laws and customs. 
  
Theory is one thing though, its practical implications something else. 
When the common law rejected the language of White Australia after more than 
200 years significant practical implications inevitably arose. After all, this 
language guided a myriad of government and court decisions that systematically 
dispossessed Indigenous people of their lands. Justice Brennan explained this 
dispossession more eloquently in Mabo as the ‘recurrent exercise of a 
paramount power to exclude the Indigenous inhabitants from their traditional 
lands as colonial settlement expanded and land was granted to the colonists’.
9 
                                                 
8 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
9 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1, 41-42 (Brennan J).  
  424The rejection of the language of White Australia masks the existence of two 
constitutional perspectives available to guide the High Court. One path was 
modern constitutionalism; the other with the human rights and common 
constitutionalism. The High Court majority (and subsequently also federal 
parliament) baulked at the practical implications of rejecting the White Australia 
language and proceeded along another path that privileged modern 
constitutionalism.  
 
In his 1996 article on ‘Racial Discrimination and Unilateral 
Extinguishment of Native Title’, McNeil compared the High Court decision to 
common law precedent.
10 The challenge faced by the Court majority was that if 
it followed common law precedent it could open the door to widespread claims 
by Indigenous people who sought title to lands from which they had been 
wrongful dispossessed. As discussed in Chapter 8, advice provided to the 
Keating government argued the introduction of RDA strengthened the likely 
success of such claims. McNeil explained that normally the Crown could only 
grant interests where it had title and the Crown cannot ‘extinguish existing 
interests in land by grant’.
11 However, since the Crown had ignored this 
precedent when it embraced the language of White Australia, it was unlikely it 
could show it held valid interests when Indigenous people were dispossessed of 
their land. Instead of following this course, McNeil said that it ‘thus appears that 
the judges were influenced by unarticulated practical considerations’.
12 McNeil 
observed that there could be ‘no doubt that the High Court’s position on 
                                                 
10 See Kent McNeil, Emerging justice?, (Saskatchewan, Canada: Native Law Centre, University 
of Saskatchewan, 2001), 357-408. 
11 Ibid. 369.  
12 Ibid. 406-407.  
  425extinguishment … [had] been influenced by the fact that virtually all private, 
non-native title land titles in Australia would be vulnerable if grants did not 
extinguish or suspend native title to the extent that the two were inconsistent’.
13 
In response to their dilemma, the High Court majority introduced a new 
inconsistency. While it sought to reject the language of White Australia, in 
practice it preserved the consequences that arose from long adherence to the 
language. It did so by introducing a rule that native title was to have inferior 
protection from the Crown than other titles and so was liable to extinguishment 
‘by the Crown by inconsistent grant or appropriation’.
14 
 
Having decided upon this course, the High Court majority did not 
consider the alternative path of common constitutionalism. Through its 
introduction of rules that provided native title with inferior protection, the High 
Court majority was also obliged to reject common law precedent to fully respect 
‘the rights of property of the inhabitants of an area’.
15 Instead, it declared the 
extinguishment of native title could occur by issuing grants without the consent 
of the title-holders. Effectively, Mabo retrospectively validated dispossession 




Another analogy with a contemporary resonance may assist in drawing 
out the significance of this stance. If native title was analogous to a car, then the 
High Court majority acknowledged that many cars had been stolen from their 
rightful owners. The language of White Australia was equivalent to a stolen car 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 415.  
14 Ibid. 404. 
15 Richard H. Bartlett, Native title in Australia, Second Edition, (Chatswood, NSW: 
Butterworths, 2004), 25. 
  426racket. The cars were granted to settlers and registered. In 1992, the High Court 
considered it too late for the original owners of the vehicles to lodge claims for 
unlawful dispossession. Instead, the High Court ruled that only those original 
inhabitants still in possession of their cars had a possibility of getting 
registration. 
 
When parliament considered its response to Mabo, it too substantially 
followed the majority’s direction. It adopted legislation that validated grants of 
freehold estate issued before 1994 and extinguished the native title concerned. 
As Bartlett observed, the parliamentary process ‘did not contemplate any 
negotiations or agreement with respect to the validation of past grants’.
17 In 
such circumstances the possibility of Indigenous people succeeding in having a 
system established where all of their connections to land could be recognised 
was impossible. Furthermore, when parliament reconsidered the native title 
legislation it became increasingly clear that the Howard government’s concern 
lay almost exclusively with non-Indigenous interests and not with the 
recognition and protection of the native title of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.  
 
Nevertheless, while the High Court and parliament saw no need to 
overcome the injustice of assigning inferior protection to native title, the 
elements of an alternative approach were discernable from the stance of others. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, Justice Toohey rejected the majority’s view that the 
Crown should not have to prove its right to acquire title. In this respect he did 
                                                                                                                                    
16 Ibid. 28-9.  
17 Ibid. 40.  
  427no more than upholding common law precedent. The gulf between Justice 
Toohey’s position and that adopted by the High Court majority and federal 
parliament is stark. Justice Toohey correctly identified an injustice that arose 
from providing native title with inferior protection. The majority view, however, 
envisaged the practical problems that were likely to arise if existing title-holders 
were threatened with dispossession. Though not explicitly stated it appears the 
Court considered dispossession of existing title-holders was unjust. In order to 
address this matter, the Court imposed a modern constitutional ‘solution’ unjust 
to Indigenous peoples. 
 
A just resolution to this dilemma lies with the convention of consent. 
Native title can be given the protection accorded to other titles and the practical 
problems for existing titleholders can also be addressed. The solution becomes 
apparent when one examines the impact of extinguishment upon native title. It 
is for this reason that Chapter 10 included a specific discussion on this subject. 
Summed up, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 
Michael Dodson expressed it most clearly when he said that ‘as long as our laws 
and customs are being observed and practiced, the only manner in which our 
title can be validly extinguished is through consent’.
18 If the convention is to be 
successfully embraced it will need the creation of new institutions of mutual 
recognition where Indigenous and non-Indigenous people can discuss and 
decide how practical problems arising from 200 years of the dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples can be resolved. 
 
                                                 
18 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report – 
January – June 1994, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), 81. 
  428The National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) is not that institution. This 
body is obliged to implement the native title legislation, and as was discussed in 
Chapters 8 and 9, the legislation comprises elements of recognition and 
extinguishment. While it may still mean that particular claimants can 
successfully make a claim, others come up against the injustice of unilateral 
extinguishment. This is apparent from recent figures provided by the NNTT. As 
of 10 April 2006, 25 of the 81 determinations made thus far have found that 
‘native title does not exist’.
19  
 
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation was an institution of mutual 
recognition. Established several months prior to Mabo by federal parliament, as 
the discussion in Chapter 11 shows this body had many unique features. As a 
model of a way forward for relations between Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples and other Australians, it provided a powerful example of the 
philosophy and practice of common constitutionalism. It also showed that 
despite the absence of a strong tradition of this language in Australia, this 
philosophy was not so elusive that it remained undiscovered. Direct experience 
with Indigenous people in a dialogue was crucial to appreciating a distinct 
Indigenous perspective. Its constituents, recommendations, draft legislation and 
the Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation exhibited the features of a 
body that sought to bring peoples from two different traditions together so that 
they could move forward together. Nothing captured that spirit better than the 
statement: ‘As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologies 
and expresses it sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the 
                                                 
19 National Native Title Tribunal, ‘Some statistics about native title determinations’. See 
NNTT@http://www.nntt.gov.au/applications/determinations.html. [Accessed 16/04/2006]. 
  429other part accepts the apologies and forgives.’
20 Another example suggests that 
direct experience working with Indigenous people is a crucial ingredient to 
embracing the language of common constitutionalism and human rights. In 
Chapter 7 it was found that Justice Toohey, too, embraced a position more 
favourable to the recognition of native title; perhaps because of his experience 
as the first Aboriginal Land Commissioner.
21  
 
The analysis provided in this thesis has concentrated on bringing to the 
fore the strategic concerns about whether or not the claims of Indigenous people 
have been adjudicated in a language that is just to their claims. A detailed 
examination of the Mabo events demonstrates that the amendments adopted by 
federal parliament in 1998 did not provide a just basis to recognise all native 
title claims. The conventions of human rights and common constitutionalism 
were trimmed of their authority to limit any inconsistency with the modern 
constitutional language. In the words of Blackshield and Williams: both ‘Mabo 
(No 2) and the Wik Case took care to avoid any tendency to undermine the 
formal constituent structures of national independence’. They observed that the 
Court ‘recognised the customary laws and entitlements of indigenous peoples 
only to the extent that the norms of this constitutionally established nation allow 
or required such recognition’. They also comment that concerning ‘other aspects 
of the laws of the indigenous peoples, it may be that not even this degree of 
accommodation-on-sufferance can be achieved’.
22  
                                                 
20 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation, 
(Canberra: 2000).  
21 John Toohey, Seven years on, Report to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs on the Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and related matters, (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1984). 
22 Tony Blackshield & George Williams, Australian constitutional law and theory: commentary 
and materials, Third Edition, (Leichhardt, NSW: The Federation Press, 2002), 176. 
  430Questions 
 
Several questions were posed in Chapter 5 and having concluded the 
investigations, responses to these can now be provided. Concerning the 
significance of Mabo the examination undertaken in this thesis suggests that its 
significance is language-dependent. The High Court removed the language of 
White Australia so that contemporary common law was no longer associated 
with the dispossession of Indigenous people. But the High Court’s decision also 
opened the door to a range of other claims – many for the first time. Viewed 
from the common constitutional perspective it opened a new chapter in cultural 
recognition; a story not yet completed. 
 
Concerning the extent to which the constitutional languages expressed in 
Australia are more similar to those described by Tully about the North 
American circumstances, the findings of the thesis suggest that it is more 
complex. In addition to the tension between the two constitutional languages of 
modern and common constitutionalism, is the long standing influence of the 
language of White Australia. Nevertheless, the repudiation of the White 
Australia language by the Mabo decision if anything brings Australia closer to 
the classical tension between the two languages as described by Tully.  
 
The settlement process was the talk of 1993. As was noted earlier, the 
June 1993 Discussion Paper reported that the Keating government received a 
proposal from ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representatives concerning 
a ‘Settlement Process’ that would ‘determine all matters concerning Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people’s interests and rights will be resolved to 
  431enhance self determination and to ensure that indigenous people can take 
responsibility for their own future’.
23  
 
Reviewing the debates from 1992 through to 1998 suggests settlement 
was pushed off the agenda because the conversations about Mabo increasingly 
took place in the modern constitutional language. This language is premised on 
the idea that settlement has already happened: Federation. Through that process, 
the colonial settlers negotiated a just relationship for themselves with Great 
Britain. They participated in a popular vote on new relations of governance. A 
major shortcoming of this process though was its unjustness toward Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Rectifying this is a task that remains. 
  
Why is it that proposals for a treaty have not yet succeeded? The 
examination undertaken earlier suggests the reason the government has not yet 
acted on treaty proposals is because the term treaty is not part of a ‘normal 
negotiation among members of a culturally diverse society over how they are 
going to recognise and accommodate differences and similarities over time ...’
24 
Instead, it is presumed the concept can only be applied to sovereign states. The 
comments from the Howard government’s response to the Council for 
Aboriginal Reconciliation’s final report support this conclusion: ‘such a legally 
enforceable instrument, as between sovereign states would be divisive, would 
undermine the concept of a single Australian nation’.
25 This reflects a mind-set 
                                                 
23 Commonwealth Government, Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, Discussion 
Paper, June 1993, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 95 (“Mabo: 
The High Court Decision on Native Title”). 
24 Tully, above n 1, 58. 
25 Commonwealth Government, Response to the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Final 
Report - Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, (Canberra: Office of Aboriginal and Torres 
  432on the meaning of the term treaty that holds the government captive and unable 
to find a way forward. 
 
As to whether Australia inherited the English constitutional tradition and 
its conventions and precedents, judging by the examination that has been 
undertaken in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, there is 
little appreciation the conventions of mutual recognition, consent and continuity 
are part of the English common law tradition. Nor though is there appreciation 
of common law precedent for those dispossessed reclaiming title to land. 
Whether the lack of appreciation has arisen from the influence of particular 
conjunctural views that were embraced in Australia’s political and legal 
tradition requires further inquiry. 
 
Theory and practice 
 
The thesis will conclude with a few more words about the theory and 
practice of the philosophy of common constitutionalism. The Australian 
experience with the Mabo events reinforces the conclusion that the modern 
constitutionalism language is unable to accommodate claims for recognition 
with the partial exception of those claims presented in the normative nation-
state model.
26 This model presumes claims for cultural recognition are non-
constitutional and responds accordingly. Tully demonstrates that just as the 
claim of the settlers in the United States for independence from Britain can be 
                                                                                                                                    
Strait Islander Affairs, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
September 2002), 23. 
26 When I say partial I have in mind that the framing of a claim in terms of the nation-state 
model, while echoing the norm followed by many European peoples, is no guarantee of easy 
  433characterised a struggle for self-determination, so too are the claims of ethnic 
minorities, migrants, women and Indigenous peoples. He outlines the features of 
a constitutional philosophy and practice where through a dialogue the claims are 
conciliated over time to achieve an accommodation of their cultural differences. 
Moving beyond the current circumstances is likely to be difficult because of the 
ambitious nature of the project. Any philosophical approach that implies the 
institutions of governance need modification for reconciliation to succeed with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples is a major task.  
 
  In order to carry out this inquiry it was also necessary to put to one side 
any pre-conceived notions of what constitutionalism should or should not be. 
The dominant language uses constitutionalism in a way that does not take 
account of the customary law of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples; 
this explains the inclination to overlay the claims within the current 
constitutional frame. But such an approach resolves nothing – at least from the 
perspective of the claimants. As Wittgenstein says: ‘A picture held us captive. 
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed 
to repeat it to us inexorably.’
27  
 
At one level, the story that has been told over the past few chapters does 
not have a particularly complex message. In the end, it is necessary to listen to 
the voices of Indigenous peoples as a guide to achieving reconciliation.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
acceptance. A solemn reminder of this lesson is the struggle of the Timorese people for 
independence.   
27 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, Second Edition, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), s 115. 
  434Why were Australia’s decision-makers not guided by this ethic? One 
reason is that the influence of the modern constitutional language has stamped 
its legacy on the day-to-day decision-making of federal parliament. For 
instance, when a decision is taken to legislate, it is now institutionalised through 
a plethora of steps, with each step being carefully codified. Such embedded 
practice needs to be critically questioned and significantly modified to 
accommodate Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in decision-making. 
Implementing this will take awareness and sustained effort. Another reason is 
the pressure certain interests bring to bear on federal parliament. Concerning 
native title, business interests made it clear to the Keating government it wanted 
‘certainty’ for existing grants. The Keating government was clearly influenced 




Constitutional dialogue is a very old way of resolving problems ‘in 
which citizens reach agreements on appropriate forms of accommodation of 
their cultural differences’.
29 The way forward from this position does not lie 
with constitutional scholars ‘solving’ contemporary problems through 
identifying weaknesses in current theory. Rather, it is through engaging in a 
dialogue that hears Indigenous peoples express their claims on their own terms 
and with non-Indigenous resolved to achieve a constitutional accommodation. 
What has attempted to be demonstrated in this thesis is that elements of this 
philosophical approach are already being practiced, but the lessons of these 
experiences are not necessarily well appreciated and need wider discussion. 
                                                 
28 Mabo: The High Court Decision on Native Title, above n 8, 97. 
29 Tully, above n 1, cover. 
  435Since this is overwhelmingly a practical philosophy, awareness is a key 
ingredient. This study’s findings will be enriched by feedback from Indigenous 
peoples on whether they believe an understanding of the Mabo events is helped 
by looking through the prism of constitutional languages and whether the study 
has accurately captured the distinct features of their perspective.  
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